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Abstract 
 
Recent years have seen migration rise to the top of political agendas around the 
world. A series of ‘migration crises’ in 2015 demonstrated the limits of the existing 
international architecture leading states to reconsider the global response to 
migration. In October 2016, in addition to the International Organization for 
Migration (IOM) joining the United Nations (UN), 193 UN Member States 
unanimously agreed upon the New York Declaration (NYD) at the closing of the 
High-Level Summit to Address Large Movements of Refugees and Migrants, to 
commit themselves to negotiate two Global Compacts by 2018, one on migration 
and the other on refugees. This decision commenced two years of consultations and 
negotiations, which concluded with the adoption of a Global Compact on Refugees 
(GCR) and a Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (GCM) in 
December 2018. By bringing IOM into the UN system and endorsing a 
comprehensive set of, albeit non-binding, commitments, states acknowledged 
migration as a global governance issue and accepted the necessity of 
institutionalizing migration within the UN. Next to the migration crises of 2015, 
which provided the necessary ‘window of opportunity’ to pursue institutional 
change, however, this dissertation argues that reframing migration as a 
development issue by the UN was key to the process of institutionalizing migration 
into the UN. The inclusion of migration in the Sustainable Development Goals 
(SDGs) in 2015 was a key milestone securing consensus among UN Member States 
that migration, an issue previously held at arms-length from the UN, was indeed 
relevant to its mandate. Hence, the dissertation investigates how migration became 
a global governance issue, and the role played by the UN in this process. 
Building on theoretical insights from the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF), 
and the methodological principles of process-tracing, the dissertation tells the story 
of how migration has evolved as a global policy issue since 1919. Framing analysis 
is used to analyse the different ways that migration has been framed, by whom, and 
to what end. Drawing on interviews with 43 key protagonists, actors involved in 
global-level discussions on migration, and the UN archives, the dissertation explores 
four case studies that shed light on how IOs have influenced global migration 
governance:  
1)  the creation of the Global Forum on Migration and Development 
(GFMD) (Chapter 5);  
2) the inclusion of migration in the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) 
(Chapter 6);  
   
 
vi 
 
3) IOM’s journey to becoming a UN agency (Chapter 7); and  
4) the negotiation of the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular 
Migration (GCM) (Chapter 8). 
The dissertation argues that a range of factors including the migration crises of 2015 
which propelled migration into the political limelight; the reframing of migration as 
a development issue (Chapter 5) and the subsequent inclusion of migration in the 
Sustainable Development Goals (Chapter 6); coupled with the increasing likelihood 
that the UN would appoint or create a new body for migration within the UN, led 
IOM’s Member States to conclude that it was necessary for IOM to become part of 
the UN system in 2016 (Chapter 7). However, while the migration crises of 2015 
created the ‘window of opportunity’ to bring IOM into the UN, it also provided a 
fertile environment for advocates of the migrant rights frame to revive their struggle 
for universal norms to govern international migration (Chapter 8).  
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1. Introduction 
 
Propelled into the spotlight by governments, primarily in Europe, facing 
increased numbers of migrants, including refugees, migration has not 
witnessed such sustained global attention in recent history. A series of 
‘migration crises’ around the world in 2015 demonstrated the limits of the 
existing international architecture leading states to reconsider the 
international response to migration. In October 2016, in addition to the 
International Organization for Migration (IOM) joining the United Nations 
(UN), 193 UN Member States unanimously agreed upon the New York 
Declaration (NYD) at the closing of the High-Level Summit for Refugees and 
Migrants, to commit themselves to negotiate two Global Compacts by 2018, 
one on migration and the other on refugees. This decision commenced two 
years of consultations and negotiation, which concluded with the adoption of 
a Global Compact on Refugees (GCR) and a Global Compact for Safe, Orderly 
and Regular Migration (GCM) in December 2018. By bringing IOM into the 
UN system and endorsing a comprehensive set of, albeit non-binding, 
commitments, states acknowledged migration as a global governance issue 
and accepted the necessity of institutionalizing migration within the UN. Next 
to the migration crises of 2015, which provided the necessary ‘window of 
opportunity’ to pursue institutional change, however, this dissertation argues 
that reframing migration as a development issue by the UN was key to the 
process of institutionalizing migration into the UN. The inclusion of migration 
in the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in 2015 was a key milestone 
securing consensus among UN Member States that migration, an issue 
previously held at arms-length from the UN, was indeed relevant to its 
mandate. Hence, the dissertation investigates how migration became a global 
governance issue, and the role played by the UN in this process. 
Building on theoretical insights from the Advocacy Coalition Framework 
(ACF), and the methodological principles of process-tracing, the dissertation 
tells the story of how migration has evolved as a global policy issue since 1919. 
In operationalizing the concept of constitutive power, framing analysis is used 
to analyse the different ways that migration has been framed, by whom, and 
to what end. Drawing on interviews with 43 key protagonists, actors involved 
in global-level discussions on migration, and the UN archives, the dissertation 
explores four case studies that shed light on how international organizations 
have influenced global migration governance:  
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1) the creation of the Global Forum on Migration and 
Development (GFMD) (Chapter 5);  
2) the inclusion of migration in the Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs) (Chapter 6);  
3) IOM’s journey to becoming a UN agency (Chapter 7);  
4) the negotiation of the Global Compact for Safe, 
Orderly and Regular Migration (GCM) (Chapter 8). 
 
The dissertation argues that the migration crises of 2015 which propelled 
migration into the political limelight; the reframing of migration as a 
development issue (Chapter 5) and the subsequent inclusion of migration in 
the Sustainable Development Goals (Chapter 6); coupled with the increasing 
likelihood that the UN would appoint or create a new body for migration 
within the UN, led IOM’s Member States to conclude that IOM needed to 
become part of the UN system in 2016 (Chapter 7). However, while the 
migration crises of 2015 created the necessary ‘window of opportunity’ to 
bring IOM into the UN, it also provided a fertile environment for advocates 
of the migrant rights frame to revive their struggle for universal norms to 
govern international migration (Chapter 8). The remainder of this 
introductory chapter is structured as follows. First, the background and 
relevance of the dissertation are established (Section 1.1). Section 1.2 then 
outlines the research aims and questions (Section 1.2). The final section 
summarizes the overall structure of the dissertation (Section 1.3).  
 
1.1 Background and Relevance 
 
As recently as the 1990s, migration was mostly absent from international 
policy discussions. In the lead up to the adoption of the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs) in 2000, there were discussions among 
international actors regarding whether to include migration; however, it was 
not feasible to get states to agree on targets on migration (Skeldon, 2013). In 
the early 2000s, potentially as a result of (unfounded) optimism regarding the 
role of remittances in take-off development (de Haas, 2010), or due to the 
exclusion of migration from the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), 
efforts to institutionalize migration as a UN issue witnessed new energy 
(Brønden, 2012). In 2002, then Secretary-General Kofi Annan identified a need 
to ‘take a more comprehensive look at the various dimensions of the 
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migration issue’1 (para. 39). He thus requested his advisor, Professor Michael 
Doyle, to prepare a report on the possibilities for furthering international 
cooperation on migration. In his report, the so-named ‘Doyle Report’, several 
options were considered, including the creation of a new global organization 
for migration. However, the report largely concluded that consensus on 
migration issues at the international level was too weak and fragmented to 
support the idea of creating a new global organization, be it through the 
designation of an existing organization as ‘lead agency’, merging existing 
organizations, or creating a new one. The report concluded that the best 
interim solution would be to enhance inter-agency coordination and pay more 
attention to the management of international migration.  
Although dismissed at the time, one of the main arguments for creating a 
global body on migration, or for either merging or appointing an existing 
body, related to the fragmented nature of global migration governance. 
According to Papademetriou (2011), global governance of migration can be 
‘loosely defined as the creation of a more or less formal set of norms and rules 
to regulate the behaviour of states with respect to the movement of people 
across international borders’ (p.1; own emphasis). While definitions of global 
governance often focus on the ‘norms, rules, principles and decision-making 
procedures that regulate the behaviour of states (and other transnational 
actors)’ (Betts, 2011, p.4), Papademetriou’s definition of global migration 
governance draws attention to the temporal, processual nature of governance 
and is adopted as the working definition of global migration governance in 
the dissertation. 
The absence of an overarching global framework for the governance of 
international migration has been subject to ongoing discussions over the past 
decade (Newland, 2010; Koser, 2010; Marchi, 2010; Betts, 2011; Martin, 2015). 
In other fields, such as trade, finance, and health, frameworks for multilateral 
cooperation exist, generally within the context of the UN system. For a long 
time, this was not the case for migration; however, as Betts (2011) argued, ‘this 
is not to say that there is no global migration governance. Despite the absence 
of a ‘top-down’ multilateral framework, there is a rapidly emerging ’bottom-
up‘ global migration governance’ (p.2). Betts (2011) described bottom-up 
global migration governance as ‘a complex and fragmented tapestry of 
overlapping, parallel, and nested institutions’ (p.2). Fragmentation describes 
the different institutional arrangements that have emerged for different 
 
1 Report of the Secretary-General: Strengthening of the United Nations: an agenda for further change, 
UNGAOR, 57th Session, UN Doc A/57/387 (9 December 2002) 
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categories of migrants. For example, refugees fall under the mandate of the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and the 1951 
Refugee Convention and its 1967 protocol provide UNHCR with the 
normative authority to protect refugees. Similarly, migrant workers have 
fallen under the normative mandate of the International Labour Organization 
(ILO) since its creation in 1919. The ILO oversees several normative 
instruments designed to protect the rights of migrant workers, albeit with 
significantly lower rates of ratification than the Refugee Convention. The 
reality that policy categories such as ‘refugee’, ‘migrant worker’ or ‘irregular 
migrant’ do not always neatly match the reality of human mobility, added to 
the fact that policies in other areas, such as the labour market or human rights, 
have implications for the patterns and governability of population 
movements, has led to overlap and often competition between international 
organizations. The result of this overlap is the existence of many 
organizations, most of which are nested within the UN system, for whom 
migration is relevant to their mandate. Membership in the now-defunct 
Global Migration Group (GMG) provides substance to this statement. Before 
being superseded by the UN Migration Network in 2019, 22 organizations 
were members of the GMG.  
Much of the literature on global migration governance has focused on 
understanding how it has emerged (Geddes, 2018; Korneev & Kluczewska, 
2018). The literature on multilevel governance has informed much of the 
research in this area (cf. Lavenex, 2016; Bisong, 2018; Caponio and Jones-
Correa, 2018; Marti, 2018; Scholten et al., 2018; Panizzon, 2011; Panizzon and 
van Riemsdijk, 2018; Kunz, Lavenex, and Panizzon, 2011). A typical starting 
point in the literature on global migration governance is its fragmented nature 
(Martin, 2015; Betts, 2011; Miller, 2000). This relates in part to the distinctively 
separate refugee and migration regimes (Betts, 2011; Long, 2013; Karatani, 
2005), as well as to how, in the absence of an overarching global framework, 
questions relating to migration have been addressed across countries and 
regions. In this context, regional governance has been conceptualized as a 
stepping stone for more global cooperation (Thouez & Channac, 2005; 
Lavenex, 2018). 
In recent years, however, an emerging body of literature has started to shift 
the focus away from the study of events to a more ideational and processual 
focus (Piper, 2015). Korneev and Kluckzewska (2018) conceptualize 
international organizations as global governors which, they argue, ‘shifts the 
focus from global migration governance as an emerging structure to global 
migration governors as sources of agency and, consequently, to the outcomes 
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that flow from interactions between various agents’ (p.57). This view is 
reflected in a growing body of literature that examines the role of international 
organizations in migration governance2 and is also mirrored by a similar shift 
in the study of international organizations (Barnett and Finnemore, 2004). 
Generally speaking, these studies have focused on individual organizations, 
primarily UNHCR and IOM, with a few notable exceptions focusing on the 
interaction between two or more organizations (Elie, 2010; Hall, 2013, 2015; 
Koch, 2014; Korneev, 2013; Lavenex, 2016; Poutignat & Streiff-Fénart, 2010; 
Wunderlich, 2012). Among the recurring arguments in this body of literature 
is the idea that the delegation of authority by states to IOs is a way of diffusing 
accountability and furthering the interests of developed countries (cf. Brachet, 
2016; Valarezo, 2015; Ashutosh and Mountz, 2011; Andrew and Eden, 2011; 
Geiger and Pécoud, 2014). IOM, in particular, has faced criticism in the 
literature for their role in depoliticizing migration through its advocacy of the 
migration management approach (Brachet, 2016; Caillault, 2012; Collyer, 
2012; Geiger & Pécoud, 2014; Georgi, 2010; Georgi & Schatral, 2012; Koch, 
2014; Korneev, 2014). However, a theoretical contradiction is embedded here. 
On the one hand, international organizations are conceptualized as 
independent actors able to exert influence, reflecting the ideational shift in the 
study of international organizations (Barnett and Finnemore, 2004; Broome 
and Seabrooke, 2012); but on the other, they are still primarily viewed as 
instruments of powerful states (Keohane & Nye, 1974; Mearsheimer, 1995). 
Less attention has been given to the role of IOs in framing migration as a 
global policy issue.  
Although the framing literature has been used in the context of migration 
research, scholars primarily use its tools to study media representations of 
migrants (c.f. Van Gorp, 2005; Vliegenthart and Roggeband, 2007; Balabanova 
and Balch, 2010; Cheng et al., 2011; Pajnik, 2010; Sommer and Ruhrmann, 
2010; Helbling, 2014; Brouwer, van der Woude, and van der Leun, 2017; 
Greussing and Boomgaarden, 2017; Lawlor, 2017; and Georgiou and 
Zaborowski, 2017) or to study the evolution of migration policy in different 
contexts (c.f. Boswell, 2007; Roggeband and Verloo, 2007; Helbling, 2014; 
 
2 See for example: Amaya-Castro, 2012; Andrew and Eden, 2011; Andrijasevic and Walters, 2010; 
Ashutosh and Mountz, 2011; Barnett and Finnemore, 2004; Betts and Durieux, 2007; Brachet, 2016; 
Caillault, 2012; Elie, 2010; Feldblum, 1999; Frowd, 2014; Geiger, 2010; Georgi and Schatral, 2012; 
Hall, 2013; 2015; Hartigan, 1992; Hess, 2010; Hoffmann, 2016; Koch, 2014; Korneev, 2013; 2014; 
Lavenex, 2016; Loescher, 2001; Nieuwenhuys and Pécoud, 2007; Pécoud, 2010; Poutignat and 
Streiff-Fénart, 2010; Roper and Barria, 2010; Scalettaris, 2010; Schatral, 2011; Scheel and Ratfisch, 
2014; Valarezo, 2015; Vollmer, 2016; and Wunderlich, 2012 
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Menz, 2015; Ransan-Cooper et al., 2015; and Delgado Wise, 2018a). Another 
more diverse body of literature focuses on specific frames, albeit with less 
consistent application of framing analysis, often only using the term ‘frame’ 
descriptively (c.f. Bardsley and Hugo, 2010; Dyer, 2010; Balch and Geddes, 
2011; Bleich, 2011; Boswell, Geddes, and Scholten, 2011; Scholten, 2011; 
Carrera and Hernanz, 2015; and Dehm, 2015). Three commonly studied 
frames are: 
1. migration management (c.f. Carrera and Hernanz, 2015; Ashutosh 
and Mountz, 2011; Scheel and Ratfisch, 2014; Valarezo, 2015; 
Caillault, 2012; Dini, 2018; Georgi and Schatral, 2012; Oelgemöller, 
2011;  
2. migration and development (c.f. Bakewell, 2008; Skeldon, 2008; 
Raghuram, 2009; Schiller, 2009; de Haas, 2010; 2012; Gamlen, 2010; 
Brønden, 2012); and  
3. human rights (c.f. Cook, 2010; Jordan, 2002; Pécoud and de 
Guchteneire, 2007; Rother, 2018; Cholewinski and Taran, 2009; 
Basok and Piper, 2012; Dyer, 2010).  
While these frames are often studied in isolation, Boswell (2007) argues that 
limiting one’s focus to a particular frame ‘may constrain observation of 
alternative trajectories in the framing of migration issues’ (p.592). What is 
missing from the existing literature is a systematic analysis of how migration 
has evolved as a global policy issue.  
 
1.2 Research aim and questions 
 
Beyond contributing empirical data to support a more comprehensive 
understanding of the evolution of global migration governance, and the role 
played by the UN herein, the dissertation also aims to make several theoretical 
and methodological contributions to the literature.  
Explicitly, the dissertation assesses the appropriateness of the Advocacy 
Coalition Framework (ACF) to the global policy process and establishes 
connections between different disciplinary approaches to the study of 
governance. Furthermore, in addition to suggesting some theoretical 
augmentations to the ACF to increase its appropriateness as a theoretical 
framework through which to study the global policy process, it also tests a 
potential research design that could be replicated for other global policy areas.  
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This dissertation also seeks to push forward thinking on international 
organizations by paying attention to the interaction of factors that have 
influenced the evolution of global migration governance with a specific focus 
on how international organizations have affected and been affected by these 
developments. In so doing, it takes migration as a global policy issue, 
conceptualized as the migration policy subsystem, as its central unit of 
analysis. By applying a governance lens (specifically resource exchange 
between actors in policy networks) to the question of the autonomy of 
international organization, the dissertation contributes to two distinct bodies 
of literature:  
1) the literature on discursive institutionalism. Schmidt (2010) calls 
on researchers to focus on showing, by empirical means, ‘how, 
when, where and why ideas and discourse matter for institutional 
change, and when they do not’ (Schmidt, 2010, p.21). The 
literature on governance often focuses on the first two pillars of 
institutionalization, norms, and institutions, and less on the role 
of discourse in the process of institutionalization;  
2) the literature on the behavioural logic of international 
organizations, which addresses a previous scarcity in research 
that treats IOs as actors in their own right (Barnett & Finnemore, 
2004; Broome & Seabrooke, 2012).  
By conceptualizing global governance as the site in which networks of actors, 
including international organizations, struggle to define and solve global 
problems, the dissertation offers a bridge between different disciplinary 
perspectives and brings power into the picture. Accordingly, the main 
research question addressed in this dissertation is as follows: 
How have international organizations influenced global 
migration governance?  
To address the main research question, the dissertation examines several 
theoretical and empirical sub-questions. In establishing the theoretical and 
conceptual framework for the dissertation: 
a) What is global (migration) governance? (Chapter 2) 
b) What are international organizations, and, specifically, what 
influences the autonomy of international organizations? 
(Chapter 2)  
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c) How do international organizations exert influence? (Chapter 
2) 
In empirically addressing the research question:  
d) How has global migration governance evolved over the past 
century? (Chapter 4) 
e) How did international organizations mobilize the ‘migration 
and development’ frame in order to further international 
cooperation on migration in:  
f) the creation of the Global Forum on Migration and 
Development? (Chapter 5) 
g) the inclusion of migration in the Sustainable Development 
Goals (SDGs) (Chapter 6)  
h) Why did IOM become a related agency of the UN in 2016? 
(Chapter 7)  
i) How did the migration crises of 2015 affect how different actors 
framed migration as a global policy issue? (Chapter 8) 
 
1.3 Structure of the study  
 
The remainder of the dissertation is structured as follows. Chapter 2 provides 
the conceptual underpinnings of the thesis. The chapter first discusses our 
two main variables of interest: governance and international organizations. 
To ground the discussion of global migration governance within the broader 
governance literature, Chapter 2 develops the concept of governance drawing 
on and synthesizing research from different disciplinary perspectives, most 
notably, those of international relations and public policy. Having established 
that governance is both the process and product of the interaction of resource-
dependent actors operating in networks around different policy issues of 
international relevance, international organizations are established as key 
actors in this process. However, the extent to which IOs can exert influence is 
determined by their level of autonomy, which is, in turn, shaped by states. 
States delegate authority to IOs to address challenges where 
intergovernmental cooperation is deemed more efficient than unilateral 
efforts and, increasingly, to achieve broader collaborative goals, such as global 
economic development or world peace. However, underpinning this 
relationship is the impulse of states to preserve their sovereignty. The 
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relationship between states and IOs is therefore theorized as one in which a 
careful balancing act exists between states delegating enough authority for 
them to be effective, but not too much that it would challenge state 
sovereignty. However, it is neither sufficient to remove this relationship from 
its context nor to homogenize states or international organizations. The 
advocacy coalition framework assists us with situating the relationship 
between states and IOs into a framework that recognizes the factors that may 
influence the relationship, and thus governance as an outcome, at three levels: 
1) factors internal to states and IOs; 2) factors specific to the policy subsystem; 
and 3) external factors. 
Building on the theoretical framework, Chapter 3 outlines the methodological 
approach. The overall research design is inspired by process tracing, which is 
a family of methods often applied by historians and International Relations 
(IR) scholars in their efforts to understand why certain events occur. However, 
unlike traditional process tracing, which is often neo-positivistic, this 
dissertation follows an interpretive approach to adequately address the 
question of how IOs can exercise constitutive power. The concept of 
constitutive power is operationalized using framing analysis. With these 
broad design questions addressed, the chapter then outlines a five-stage 
research process: 1) soaking and poking; 2) constructing a timeline; 3) 
identifying key factors; 4) case selection; and 5) case study implementation. 
After constructing the initial timeline, four cases were selected for closer 
examination:  
1) the creation of the Global Forum on Migration and Development 
(GFMD) at the first High-Level Dialogue on International Migration 
and Development (HLD) in 2006 (Chapter 5);  
2) the inclusion of migration in the SDGs (Chapter 6);  
3) IOM’s journey to the UN (Chapter 7) and  
4) the genesis of the Global Compacts (Chapter 8).  
 
In Chapter 3, the rationale for selecting each case is explained. Two key data 
sources were used throughout the dissertation. Firstly, semi-structured 
qualitative interviews were conducted with 43 key actors involved in the 
journey. The interview material was complemented by the analysis of a 
corpus of documents (n=510) extracted from the UN Archives. Supplementary 
data were also used to improve the analysis where appropriate.  
Chapter 4 sets the context for the dissertation by critically analysing the 
evolution of the global migration governance landscape from 1919 to 2018, 
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establishing a timeline for the several critical events that took place. In doing 
so, the chapter demonstrates that, while historical accounts of its evolution 
are often presented linearly, a degree of cyclicity exists through which certain 
‘trigger events’, such as the 1973 Oil Crisis or the end of the Cold War, 
influenced the perceived need for international cooperation on migration. In 
addition to cyclicity, the chapter also provides evidence of different 
trajectories in the evolution of global migration governance, depending on 
whether one views migration as a matter of human rights or as a management 
issue.  
Chapter 5 investigates the genesis of the GFMD. The GFMD is an annual 
informal, state-led, non-binding gathering during which states discuss 
migration-related topics. The GFMD was launched at the first HLD in 2006. 
The first meeting of the GFMD was held in Brussels, Belgium, in 2007, and it 
continues to happen on an almost annual basis. The late Sir Peter Sutherland, 
appointed by Kofi Annan to be his Special Representative to guide the HLD 
in 2006, essentially spearheaded the GFMD. The core argument of the chapter 
is that the ‘migration and development’ frame was deliberately used by the 
UN to overcome conflicts that had hindered previous efforts at international 
cooperation on migration. The argument that the GFMD presented an 
opportunity to reframe migration in a way that would allow progress in 
international dialogue on migration is neither new nor hidden (Sutherland, 
2013a; Roldan and Gasper, 2010; Rother, 2018). However, researchers have 
rarely examined the emergence of the GFMD empirically. Hence, this chapter 
provides an empirical example of how IOs can exercise constitutive power. 
The inclusion of migration in the SDGs is said to have brought migration more 
generally, and IOM specifically, into the UN. While the way migration has 
been included in the SDGs has been subject to empirical examination, the 
process leading up to their adoption, particularly from a framing perspective, 
is less well documented. Having argued in Chapter 5 that the reframing of 
migration as a development issue was instrumental in furthering 
international cooperation on migration, Chapter 6 examines how actors from 
different advocacy coalitions engaged rhetorically with the ‘migration and 
development’ frame. To achieve this, the chapter analyses the arguments put 
forward by various actors in the years preceding the adoption of the SDGs to 
justify why migration should be included in these goals. Chapter 6 
demonstrates how the migration and development frame successfully 
galvanized the positions of different actors as they sought a place for 
migration in the Sustainable Development Goals. 
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On 19 September 2016, then Secretary-General of the UN, Ban Ki-moon and 
Director-General of the IOM, William Lacy Swing, signed an agreement 
which, for the first time in its history, brought IOM into the UN system. 
Chapter 7 traces IOM’s journey from the small, temporary intergovernmental 
organization created in 1951 as the Provisional Intergovernmental Committee 
for the Movement of Migrants from Europe (PICMME) to its entry into the 
UN as a ‘related agency’ in 2016. The chapter focuses on three key periods 
during which IOM’s relationship with the UN was subject to intense 
discussion. In the early 1990s, IOM’s relationship with the UN became more 
formal. IOM became a charter member of what would become the UN Office 
for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in 1991. In 1992, IOM 
signed an agreement which gave the organization observer status at the UN, 
and, in 1996, signed a Cooperation Agreement to specify the parameters of 
the IOM-UN relationship further. In the early 2000s, the UN had started to 
take a more serious look at its portfolio on migration. Although the subject of 
IOM joining the UN was put on the agenda at IOM Council Meetings in 2002, 
IOM’s Member States ultimately decided against formally entering the UN, 
and instead agreed to look at how to strengthen existing arrangements. 
However, in 2016, IOM became a UN ‘related agency’. The core purpose of 
this chapter is to understand the factors that tipped the scales in favour of UN 
membership by focusing on each of these three moments. In line with the 
theoretical framework, IOM is conceptualized as a resource-dependent actor 
whose actions and decisions are a function of internal and external factors. 
Accordingly, specific attention is placed on how IOM reacted to external 
events that had implications for its survival as an organization. 
In December 2018, 181 Member States voted in favour of the adoption of the 
Global Compact on Refugees (GCR), and 153 Member States voted in favour 
of the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (GCM) at the 
UN General Assembly. The Global Compacts represent the first time that 
states have explicitly negotiated an overarching framework for the 
governance of migration. Chapter 8 examines how the migration crises of 
2015, primarily in Europe but also in the Andaman Sea and Central America, 
presented a window of opportunity for those seeking to strengthen the role of 
the UN in the area of migration. Paradoxically, while migration crises may be 
viewed as a failure of multilateralism, crises can also present the opportunity 
to deepen multilateral responses. However, in responding to the ‘migration 
crises’ of 2015, the fault lines between different coalitions of actors appear to 
have resurfaced. The chapter examines the emergence of the Global Compacts 
focusing on two areas where polarization seems to have become more 
pronounced because of the crisis: 1) between the refugee and migration 
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regime; 2) between the human rights frame and the migration management 
frame.  
The final chapter concludes the dissertation by summarizing the main 
academic findings of the research and its policy implications. The concluding 
chapter also highlights the limitations of the study and suggests avenues for 
future research.  
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2. International Organizations and Global 
Migration Governance 
 
2.1 Introduction  
 
This chapter provides the conceptual and theoretical departure point for the 
research. As a reminder, the key question guiding this dissertation is as 
follows: how have international organizations influenced global migration 
governance? The question already establishes two variables of interest, 
international organizations and (global migration) governance, and assumes 
a relationship of dependency between them. The question also suggests that 
international organizations (IOs) influence governance. However, 
international organizations are also a constituent part of governance 
established by states to address particular challenges. Section 2.2 thus builds 
the conceptual underpinning of the dissertation by first exploring the concept 
of (global) governance (Section 2.2.1) and then the concept of international 
organization(s) (Section 2.2.2). With governance established as the dispersion 
of authority, often, but not exclusively to international organizations, Section 
2.2.3 turns to consider two interrelated concepts that mediate the relationship 
between international organizations and governance: power and authority. 
Building on this, Section 2.3 conceptualizes the relationship between 
international organizations and states as being a two-way relationship in 
which states can exercise influence over international organizations, but the 
reverse can also be true. How these relationships play out in practice is the 
product of the interaction between factors that, in line with the advocacy 
coalition framework (ACF), can be categorized into three levels: internal 
factors, factors specific to the ‘policy subsystem’, and external factors. 
Equipped with this framework, Section 2.4 discusses the implication of the 
framework to the case of global migration governance.  
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2.2 Key Concepts 
 
2.2.1 Governance 
 
A common starting place for defining a concept is its etymological roots. 
Governance finds its roots in the Greek verb kubernân meaning to pilot or to 
steer and in the Latin gubernare, which has similar connotations (Kjær, 2004). 
However, governance, as with many concepts in the social sciences, is an 
ambiguous term, used by both academics with different disciplinary 
alignments as well as practitioners in numerous ways. Conceptual ambiguity 
in the theoretical and practical applications of the term governance is well 
recognized (for just a few examples see Cruz, 2015; Finkelstein, 1995; Hewitt 
de Alcántara, 1998; Jessop, 1998). Whitman’s (2009b) edited collection on 
global governance showcases this with chapters on governance as: 
‘international organization’ (Weiss & Kamran, 2009); ‘configurations of 
state/non-state activity’ (Porter, 2009); ‘liberal hegemony’ (Friedrichs, 2009); 
‘public policy networks and partnerships’ (Steets, 2009); ‘sector-specific 
management’ (Whitman, 2009a); and as a ‘summative phenomenon’ (Knight, 
2009). Given the complexities and expansive nature of the literature on 
governance, this section identifies core features of governance and 
approaches to its study, in order to inform the research design and subsequent 
analysis. 
Although the application of the term has earlier roots1, the revival of 
governance as a concept within the social and political sciences in the 1990s 
coincided with changes that challenged existing conceptualizations of the 
relationship between state and society in the post-Cold War context. 
Globalization, defined here as the increased interconnectedness of localities 
driven by, among other factors, advancements in technology (such as 
communication and transport), the proliferation of large international 
corporations and the transition towards market economies in most countries 
of the world (Friedman, 2000), has increased the complexity of policy 
problems and as such arguably reduced the ability of states to govern 
effectively. Another significant change in state-society relations accompanied 
concerns regarding the sustainability of the welfare state in many countries in 
 
1 See for example Pagden (1998) on Kant’s ius cosmopoliticum as the genealogy of global 
governance. 
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the Global North. Many states began to follow in the footsteps of neoliberal 
figureheads such as Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher, and a wave of 
privatization of previously public services ensued (George & Wilding, 1994). 
With the addition of non-state actors in the policy process, governments faced 
increased challenges, particularly regarding policy implementation. With 
lessened control over policy outcomes, governing became more complex.  
While an oversimplification, different strands of the governance literature 
speak broadly to these trends. The first relates to how states maintain control 
over policy outcomes in the presence of increasingly complex policy networks 
of public and private actors at the national, sub-national, and supra-national 
level. This complexity has arguably been the genesis of concepts such as ‘new 
public management’ (Hood, 1995), ‘public-private partnerships’ (Linder, 
1999), and ‘joined-up government’ (Pollitt, 2003). Among public policy 
scholars, the work of Rod Rhodes has been particularly influential. In his 
‘hollowing out of the state’ thesis, Rhodes argues that the delegation of state 
functions to private actors has fragmented service delivery posing 
coordination challenges that affect the ability of states to exert direct control 
over policy outcomes (Rhodes, 1994, 1997; Skelcher, 2000). Accordingly, 
Rhodes (1997) defined governance as ‘self-organizing interorganizational 
networks characterized by interdependence, resource-exchange, rules of the 
game, and significant autonomy from the state’ (p.15). From a government 
perspective, governance is what governments do to co-ordinate and exert 
influence over these networks of actors, often service providers, to achieve 
their policy goals.  
One of the most cited analytical tools applied to the study policy networks is 
the advocacy coalition framework (ACF), which was first developed by 
Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1988) as an alternative to the policy cycle 
approach. The ACF has since developed, and it has been applied to a 
multitude of different polices areas (Sabatier & Weible, 2007; Weible, 2008; 
Weible et al., 2009, 2011; Pierce et al., 2017). A core feature of the original ACF 
was that it ‘purposely avoids a linear depiction of the policy process’ (Weible 
et al., 2009, p.133). By taking the policy subsystem, defined by Sabatier (1988) 
as the ‘set of actors who are involved in dealing with a policy problem’ (p.138) 
as its unit of analysis, the ACF encourages scholars to focus on the interactions 
of actors belonging to different coalitions in order to understand policy 
change. In further operationalizing the concept of governance and the role of 
international organizations herein, the ACF will be discussed further in 
Section 2.3 and Chapter 3. 
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On the other hand, governance, or perhaps more appropriately, global 
governance, has been used to describe the process of creating rules and 
structures that help to solve problems arising as a consequence of increasing 
interdependency. Rosenau’s seminal definition of global governance, 
presented in the first issue of its eponymous journal, reads as follows:  
‘Global governance is conceived to include systems of 
rules at all levels of human activity – from the family to 
the international organization – in which the pursuit of 
goals through the exercise of control has transnational 
repercussions’ (Rosenau, 1995, p.13). 
This definition draws attention to the fact that it is not just governments or 
international organizations that can exercise authority, or steer, policy 
outcomes. However, it is also a broad definition, and, as Finkelstein (1995) 
noted, it is ‘hard…to know what is excluded by that definition – or where to 
dig into the spaghetti bowl he puts on the table’ (p.368). The broadness of 
Rosenau’s (1995) definition is reflected in its diverse applications in the 
academic literature and in practice. Just a few examples include ‘family 
governance’ (cf. Miller and Le Breton-Miller, 2006; Berent-Braun and Uhlaner, 
2012; Suess, 2014); ‘higher-education governance’ (cf. Dobbins, Knill, and 
Vögtle, 2011; Kerry, 2003) or ‘corporate governance’ (cf. Hart, 1995). 
Therefore, Finkelstein (1995) further specifies that ‘global governance is 
governing, without sovereign authority, relationships that transcend national 
frontiers’ (p.369; emphasis added). By this definition, global governance refers 
to the system of rules created outside of the national state context but with 
implications for policies relating to transnational problems  
Thus, on the one hand, governance refers to the actions of governments 
navigating increasingly complex configurations of actors, and on the other to 
the solving of global problems through the creation of systems of rules for, 
and often by, these very same networks. Although these discussions have 
broadly taken place in disciplinary isolation, with the former being the focus 
of public policy scholars primarily working in national contexts, and the latter 
in international relations with a more global focus, interdisciplinarity in 
governance studies are increasingly commonplace. Nested ‘between 
international relations and public policy’ (Kjær, 2004, p.99) the multilevel 
governance model analyses the relationships between actors at different 
levels (sub-national, national, supranational) to understand how, and why, 
policy issues are governed in specific ways (Bache & Flinders, 2004). This 
approach has been taken by many scholars who investigate global migration 
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governance (Bisong, 2018; Caponio & Jones-Correa, 2018; Kunz et al., 2011; 
Lavenex, 2016; Marti, 2018; Panizzon, 2011; Panizzon & van Riemsdijk, 2018; 
Scholten et al., 2018). Where I depart from this literature is the testing of the 
suitability of the advocacy coalition framework, developed for the study of 
national policy development, to the global policy process. 
While it is essential to consider the theoretical understandings of governance 
from the perspective of different disciplines, it is of equal importance to 
consider the application of the concept by practitioners. For some critics, 
‘global governance represents the aspirations of liberalism for hegemonic 
status, but given the shortage of social and political regulations at the global 
level, this aspiration is not borne out by reality’ (Friedrichs, 2009 p.114). 
Hence, governance implies the shift of power from states to the market. This 
perspective is reflected in the ideologically driven perspectives of governance 
proposed by international financial institutions such as the World Bank and 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which, beginning in the 1980s, 
conditioned loans on governmental reform (Collier and Gunning, 1999), or so-
called ‘good governance’ (Weiss 2000). In comparative politics, ‘governance 
was brought into the equation with reference to the way in which institutions 
spanning the state-society divide were set up’ (Kjær, 2004 p.124). Hence, 
governance is used to describe the roles that states play in society, the three 
main models being the economic liberal, the Keynesian, and the neoliberal. In 
these accounts, governance becomes more of a descriptive and technocratic 
term (de Senarclens, 1998). However, it also highlights the importance of 
acknowledging that actors with different ideological perspectives may seek to 
steer global governance as an outcome, in different directions (Weiss, 2000).  
Despite different orientations, several characteristic features of governance 
can be derived from a comparison of approaches to governance research. The 
first is the role of networks of actors, both state and non-state, in the 
policymaking process (Rhodes, 1997; Rhodes, 2007; Dingwerth and Pattberg, 
2009). Although international organizations are not the only actors involved 
in policy networks, they are a ‘major centre of global governance’ (Rosenau 
1995 p.34), and thus, often the focus of research on global governance. The 
second is the centrality of ‘authority’ to governance definitions (Hewitt de 
Alcántara, 1998; Krahmann, 2003). Krahmann (2003) describes governance as 
‘the dispersion of authority’ (p.13). This description is particularly apt since it 
fits both the idea of government outsourcing to private actors in the face of 
budgetary challenges, but also to the movement towards bilateral and 
multilateral responses to challenges that, owing to globalization, are firstly 
more pronounced, and secondly, more visible.  
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The third characteristic feature of governance definitions, which is closely 
related to the notion of authority, is resources, or more precisely, the exchange 
of resources. This notion is often applied to draw attention to the power 
relations inherent in governance systems (Rhodes, 1997; Dingwerth and 
Pattberg, 2009). Dingwerth and Pattberg (2009) position resource exchange at 
the centre of their definition, operationalizing governance as ‘the outcome of 
multiple resource exchanges among various actors’ (p.42). By analysing 
patterns of resource exchanges in different policy networks, one can analyse 
the underlying factors that contribute to variations in governance as an ‘end 
product’. The study of resources offers researchers an analytical path that goes 
beyond description and seeks to understand the power relations that 
underpin and sustain governance arrangements. Given that the notion of 
steering is so fundamental to the etymological roots of governance, it is 
surprising that power has not received more attention in contemporary 
governance research (Dingwerth & Pattberg, 2009; Finnemore, 2014; Hurrell, 
2017).  
In framing the theoretical and methodological approach to this dissertation, 
global governance is conceptualized as the interactions of resource-dependent 
actors acting in networks to develop systems of rules to address policy 
problems that transcend national borders, as well as to the normative goals of 
these actors with respect to their vision of global problem-solving. With 
international organizations established as a ‘major centre of global 
governance’ (Rosenau, 1995 p.34), Section 2.1.2 turns to introduce the second 
variable of interest in the thesis: international organizations.  
 
2.2.2 International Organization(s) 
 
Claude (1964) makes the following distinction between international 
organization and international organizations: 
‘International organization is a process; international 
organizations are representative aspects of the phase of 
that process which has been reached at a given time’ (p.4; 
original emphasis). 
Keeping in mind that global governance is broadly about solving problems 
that cannot be addressed by states alone, the notion of international 
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organization as a process helps to conceptualize the role of international 
organizations, as actors. If international organizations are ‘representative 
aspects’ of progress in international organization as a process, then the study 
of international organizations is the study of global governance. However, 
international organization as a process and international organization as an 
entity require conceptual elaboration. 
 
International Organization as a Process  
 
International organization as a process can be understood differently 
depending on one’s view of the state. On the one hand, international 
organization is the process of improving state efficiency through enhanced 
cooperation. On the other hand, international organization is a process of 
moving beyond the traditional system of nation-states towards a new political 
system (Claude, 1964). States likely favour international organization as a 
means of enhancing state efficiency rather than a predecessor to new forms of 
government that transcend the national level. Particularly before 1945, states 
established international organizations to tackle inefficiencies caused by a 
lack of cooperation. Examples include the postal service (Armstrong, 1982) or 
telegraphs (Ruggie, 1992). With the establishment of the League of Nations 
and later the UN, a new type of international organization emerged: 
‘…here were organizations based on little more than 
shared aspirations, with broad agendas in which large 
and small had a constitutionally mandated voice’ 
(Ruggie, 1992, p.583). 
The League of Nations, and later the UN, were organizations established to 
prevent further interstate wars and had broad collaborative mandates, which, 
in their essence, fell closer to the notion of international organization as a new 
political system.  
Perhaps the most useful concept developed to understand the shifting nature 
of international cooperation in the twentieth century has been the concept of 
multilateralism. In the 1950s, Claude (1958) defined a number of different 
activities as multilateral:  
‘…mobilizing the collective condemnation of a state 
whose behaviour is alleged to fall below acceptable 
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international standards, organizing a general colloquium 
on the problems of the global situation and on national 
policies for dealing with those problems, drafting 
conventions of the sort which have come to be known as 
"international legislation," and formulating 
arrangements for the establishment of international 
organizations and the initiation of international 
programs’ (p.44). 
While multilateralism is not a new phenomenon, the twentieth century has 
witnessed an increase in the ‘breadth and diversity of multilateral 
arrangements across a broad array of issue-areas’ particularly since the end of 
World War II (Ruggie, 1992, p.584). In the early 1990s, several seminal articles 
were written on the subject of multilateralism (Kahler, 1992; Keohane, 1990; 
Ruggie, 1992). Keohane (1990) defines multilateralism as ‘the practice of co-
ordinating national policies in groups of three or more states, through ad hoc 
arrangements or by means of institutions’ (p.731). Ruggie (1992) adds that 
‘what is distinctive about multilateralism is not merely that it co-ordinates 
national policies in groups of three or more states…but that it does so on the 
basis of certain principles of ordering relations among those states’ (p.567). 
Hence, it is not just about the number of states cooperating but also about the 
reason for their cooperation. 
One of the fundamental principles guiding multilateralism from 1945, at least 
on paper, was the ‘sovereign equality of states’ (Kahler, 1992, p.681). 
Multilateralism was viewed as a way of moving beyond unilateral or bilateral 
decision making, which was believed to allow more powerful states to 
dominate weaker states. Although undermined somewhat by the rules 
governing membership of the UN Security Council, the notion of sovereign 
equality was reflected in the institutional set up of the UN whereby each 
Member State has the right to vote and, through formal governing bodies, 
collective decisions are made thus, at least theoretically, subsuming the 
interests of more powerful Member States (Browne, 2017; Keohane, 1990; 
Ruggie, 1992). The funding structure of the UN was initially based solely on 
mandatory, also referred to as ‘assessed’, contributions from its Member 
States to prevent wealthier states from exerting too much influence over the 
UN. Mandatory contributions were determined based on the ‘capacity-to-
pay’ model, with contributions capped at minimum and maximum levels to 
prevent freeriding and over influence, respectively (Graham, 2017b).  
21 
 
 
 
However, the vision of multilateralism, which was championed by the United 
States of America (US), was also politically motivated. The US was interested 
in forging alliances in Europe to protect itself against the threat of the spread 
of communism and an invasion from the former Soviet Union. Part of the 
vision was a ‘United States of Europe’ of sorts, that would act as another 
‘pole’, or centre of power, and decrease the likelihood of a war between East 
and West (Weber, 1992). Hence, one cannot discuss multilateralism ‘without 
referring to the world order and to the way international relations are 
organized in terms of power’ (Van Langenhove, 2010, p.234). As Kahler (1992) 
argues: ‘the levelling impulse of multilateralism simply does not fit the 
hierarchical power configuration of the international system’ (p.682).  
Even in the early days of the UN’s existence, there were numerous examples 
of states seeking to exert more influence. For instance, Article 51 of the UN 
Charter accords its Member States the right to self-defence. Latin American 
countries drove the adoption of Article 51 because they wished to establish 
the Latin American Security Organization without US interference. The article 
was later used by the US to establish the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) in 1949 without being vetoed by the Soviet Union (Ruggie, 1992). 
Furthermore, early changes to the funding structure of the UN, which allowed 
voluntary contributions for specific interventions, were introduced because of 
the desire of some countries to move beyond the impasse that existed between 
the US and the then Soviet Union (Graham, 2017a). Post-1945 multilateralism 
was, therefore, heavily influenced by bipolarity in the international system.  
Realists explain part of the deviation from pure ‘multilateralism’ as a response 
to the growing difficulty of cooperation in a world where the number of 
countries had increased through the process of decolonization in the 1950s 
and 60s (Kahler, 1992), and later through the dissolution of the Soviet Union 
in the 1990s. Realists argue that states, as rational actors, sought alternative 
forms of cooperation (Kahler, 1992; Olson, 1965). To describe these variations 
of multilateralism in practice, researchers have developed a range of different 
concepts. For example, Keohane (1990) used the concept of ‘supralateralism’ 
to describe cooperation among states that occurs above the level of bilateral 
cooperation but below the level of multilateral cooperation. The concept has 
not been widely applied empirically, although some scholars have used 
supralateralism to describe cooperation between the European Union (EU) 
and other countries and regional groupings (cf. Scott, 2013; Paoletti and 
Pastore, 2010; Henökl and Stemberger, 2016; Henökl and Webersik, 2016). 
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The concept of ‘minilateralism’ has been more broadly applied to describe 
cases where ‘coalitions of the willing’ have cooperated to further international 
cooperation on a specific issue. In the early 1990s, Kahler (1992) offers several 
examples of ‘minilateral “great power” collaboration within multilateral 
institutions’ (p.862) such as the US use of the Organization for European 
Economic Integration in its bid to create a new centre of power in Europe and 
the weighted voting systems in the Bretton Woods Organizations. The notion 
of ‘minilateralism’ as a means to overcome the problems of achieving 
collective action is a recurring argument that has found its place in discussions 
of global governance in policy fields such as climate (cf. McGee, 2011; 
Eckersley, 2012; Engelbrekt, 2015; von Lucke, 2019); peace (cf. Dian and 
Meijer, 2019; Ba, 2019); and migration (cf. Newland, 2012; Thouez, 2018; 
Ferreira, 2019). 
The range of descriptors used to explain minilateralism points to more 
profound ideological views on whether minilateralism should be viewed 
positively or negatively. For example, from a neoliberal perspective, 
minilateralism offers a solution to the collective action problem (Kahler, 1992). 
Moisés Naím (2009) described minilateralism as ‘the magic number to get real 
international action’ (p.136). Naím (2009) essentially argued that trying to 
achieve agreement among all world states is a ‘fool’s errand’ (p.135) and that 
only a certain number of states are needed to solve many global policy 
problems. As an illustration, the top 20 polluters emit approximately three-
quarters of all greenhouse gas emissions. Even with the best intentions, 
agreement between states on emissions that do not involve the world’s main 
polluters will have limited impact. For example, without the implementation 
of the Paris Climate Accord by countries such as the US or China, the 
agreement is unlikely to achieve its goals. Thus, in the area of climate change, 
von Lucke (2019) describes minilateralism as ‘principled pragmatism’ (p.1). 
However, from a more critical perspective, minilateral cooperation can also 
be a means to sustain existing power structures. Sridar and Woods (2013), for 
example, coined the term ‘Trojan multilateralism’ to describe how funders use 
specific funding instruments to create ‘the illusion of multilateral 
intent….[while] covertly introducing bilateral goals and interests in 
multilateral institutions’ (p.326).  
As the world has evolved, so too have the concepts used to describe it. Cohen 
(2018) argues that multilateralism has a life cycle and that the success of early 
multilateral efforts to shift the balance of power in the international system 
towards a multipolar model based on the principle of universality, has in fact 
made it increasingly difficult to reach agreement in a multilateral setting, an 
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argument evident in the realist writings of the early 1990s (Kahler, 1992). 
Hence, multilateralism, as a ‘problem solving strategy or organizing 
principle’ (Cohen, 2018, p.4), has evolved and matured over time (Kahler, 
1992; Weber, 1992; Van Langenhove, 2010). This has led to the emergence of 
concepts such as Multilateralism 2.0 (Van Langenhove, 2010), and ‘new 
multilateralism’ (Villanueva Ulfgard & Alejo Jaime, 2014). The critical 
takeaway from this discussion is that any attempt to understand the roles that 
international organizations play in global governance must recognize that the 
process of international organization has evolved over time and is deeply 
embedded in the power-relations inherent to the world order. How 
international organizations have evolved is a product of how multilateralism 
has evolved.  
 
 International Organization as an Entity 
 
With the proliferation of multilateral projects since the Second World War, it 
is unsurprising that significant growth in the number of international 
organizations has occurred. Over the past century, the number of 
international organizations has skyrocketed from 213 in 1907 to 66,298 in 2013 
(Figure 2.1). Despite Ruggie’s (1992) argument that international 
organizations ‘require no conceptual elaboration’ (p.573) other than in 
relation to the other concepts, such as multilateralism, it is argued here that a 
solid conceptualization of international organization as an entity is required 
to understand why organizations exhibit different behavioural logics (Barnett 
and Finnemore, 1999). Thus, this section first defines what is meant by 
international organizations before unpacking some of the factors that may be 
reasonably assumed to affect the degree to which international organizations 
can exercise influence over states, and consequently, global governance.  
While scholars often apply the terms international organization and 
intergovernmental organizations interchangeably, the latter is a sub-category 
of the former. International organizations can be classified in two ways: as 
intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) and as non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs). The contemporary distinction between an IGO and an 
NGO, established by the 1950 UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), 
Resolution 288(X), is based on the origin of an organization. An organization 
established by an intergovernmental agreement is an IGO. Any other 
international organizations are, by default, NGOs. At face value, therefore, 
IGOs are non-independent state actors, and NGOs are independent, non-state 
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actors. However, as will be further discussed, the question of independence is 
not straightforward. The extreme growth in the number of international 
organizations can be attributed to the proliferation of INGOs: in any given 
year, the average ratio of IGOs to NGOs was approximately 9:1 (Figure 2.1).  
Figure 2.1 Number of International Organizations, 1919-2013 
 
Source: Union of International Associations (2013) 
 
The absolute growth in the number of organizations was accompanied by a 
diversification in the types of organizations. The Yearbook of International 
Organizations classifies organizations as one of 15 main types2, each of which 
can be either intergovernmental or non-governmental. Categories A through 
D are considered as ‘conventional international bodies’, while Categories E to 
G are considered as ‘other international bodies.’ The remaining categories are 
‘special types’. According to data from the Union of International 
Associations (UIA), there were 37 conventional intergovernmental 
organizations in 1909, a number which had increased to 123 by 1951, and 
peaked at 378 in 1985 before falling to 297 by the end of the Cold War in 1991 
 
2 These are: A) federations of international organizations; B) universal membership organizations; 
C) intercontinental membership organizations; D) regionally defined membership organizations; 
E) organizations that have emerged from other organizations; F) organizations having a special 
form; G) internationally focused national organizations; H) dissolved or inactive organizations; 
J) new bodies – still to be classified; K) subsidiary and internal bodies; N) national organizations; 
R) religious orders and secular institutes; S) autonomous conference series; T) multilateral treaties 
and intergovernmental agreements; and U) currently inactive non-conventional bodies. 
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(Figure 2.2). In 2013, there were 265 conventional intergovernmental 
organizations recorded by the UIA. Part of the decline is  due to a change in 
how organizations were classified. From 1983, the UIA expanded the 
categories it used to describe international organizations. However, it also 
points to diversification in the forms of international organizations, which in 
turn highlights the relevance of understanding how different characteristics 
may influence the ability of an organization to exert influence. Accordingly, 
aside from noting the increase in the number of INGOs, it is also important to 
point out that, between 1981 and 2013, regionally defined membership 
organizations represented an average of 73 per cent of all conventionally 
defined intergovernmental organizations. 
The focus of this dissertation is primarily on the UN, which is the only 
federation of international organizations (Category A) reported by UIA, along 
with its members, which are generally universal membership organizations 
(Category B), organizations that have emerged from other organizations 
(Category E) and organizations with a special form (Category F). While the 
dissertation focuses on a subsample of IGOs, hereafter referred to as 
international organizations (IOs), it also recognizes the fact that the 
environment in which these IOs operate is increasingly populated by other 
internationally oriented actors (Van Langenhove, 2010).  
Figure 2.2 Number of Conventional Intergovernmental Organizations, 1919-2013 
 
Source: Union of International Associations (2013) 
 
The preoccupation with explaining existence and form has dominated much 
of the scholarship on IOs (Andreev, 2007). Claude (1964) offers two metaphors 
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to explain different perspectives of the nature of international organizations. 
The first is called the ‘seed approach’ and makes the argument that just like a 
seed, the development of an international organization is mostly 
predetermined, albeit that its survival is dependent on external factors. The 
second, ‘the building theory’, argues that just as a building can be made and 
remade, IOs can also be remodelled to address changing interests and 
objectives (p.9-11). The extent to which IOs themselves can exert influence 
over their own evolution depends upon one crucial factor: autonomy.  
Particularly in early studies of IOs, limited attention was paid to their role as 
independent actors (cf. (Huntington, 1973; Keohane & Nye, 1974; 
Mearsheimer, 1995). From a realist perspective, ‘intergovernmental 
organizations are merely instruments of governments, and therefore 
unimportant in their own right’ (Keohane & Nye, 1974, p.39). As Huntington 
(1973) argued, ‘the United Nations and other international organizations have 
remained relatively weak because they are inherently the arenas for national 
actors; the extent to which they can become independent actors themselves is 
dependent on agreement among national actors’ (p.338). However, Michael 
Barnett and Martha Finnemore, in their 2004 book, Rules for the World: 
International Organizations in Global Politics, have been particularly influential 
in challenging the ‘preoccupation with creation at the expense of behaviour’ 
(p.11). Their core thesis is that IOs can act independently and influence the 
behaviour of states through exercising authority using regulatory and 
constitutive power (Barnett and Finnemore, 2004). Having conceptualized IOs 
as resource-dependent governance actors, the remainder of this section will 
focus on unpacking how various resource-related factors might be expected 
to affect an organization’s autonomy and, accordingly, its ability to exert 
influence over states (Section 2.2.3). 
Resources themselves can be conceptualized in several different ways. 
Dingwerth and Pattberg (2008) distinguish between four different types of 
resources: political, financial, cognitive, and moral. Different actors will have 
varying levels of access to each of these types of resources. One might expect 
a state to have access to all kinds of resources since it is able to establish 
binding rules (political); distribute financial resources (financial); organize 
knowledge creation and gathering (cognitive) and, in democratic states, have 
a legitimacy associated with representing the electorate (moral) (Dingwerth 
and Pattberg, 2008). For IOs, the level of their resources will often depend on 
their organizational characteristics, such as their mandate or financial 
regulations. For an IO, political resources will depend upon its mandate. For 
example, a normative body possesses political resources embedded in its role 
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as the custodian of internationally agreed-upon norms. However, if the same 
organization is primarily financed by states, and reliant on states to permit its 
operations, the organization may face a dilemma whereby it has to make a 
trade-off between securing financial resources and exercising political 
influence.  
The first factor that could, therefore, be expected to influence autonomy 
relates to the design of the organization. The mandate of an organization 
dictates its role vis-à-vis states. For example, if an organization is established 
to ensure state compliance with a specific convention, then that organization 
has been accorded a degree of autonomy in monitoring and reporting on the 
activities of states. In her work, Nina Hall (2013) developed a typology of 
international organizations running along a continuum from normative 
organizations to functional organizations. On one end of the spectrum, 
normative organizations ‘have a legal authority to ensure norm compliance’ 
(p.92) while functional organizations ‘are not mandated to promote, or ensure 
compliance with, international norms’ and instead exist ‘to perform specific, 
discrete tasks and are often project-based organizations as a result’ (p.92-93). 
Hall theorizes that normative and functional organizations will exhibit 
different behavioural logics. Functional organizations will be more likely to 
make cost-benefit assessments and opt for the option which brings the most 
significant material gain (‘logic of consequence’), making them more 
susceptible to the interests of rich states. On the other hand, normative 
organizations act in accordance with the ‘logic of appropriateness’, meaning 
whether the specific action is in line with the norm they are tasked to uphold, 
theoretically granting them a degree of independence from states. Therefore, 
a normative organization might reasonably be expected to have more 
considerable influence because of its legally derived authority to ensure norm 
compliance. 
A second key factor relates to the way in which an organization is financed. 
Researchers frequently use funding patterns as a proxy for ‘institutional 
multilateralism’ (Keohane, 1990); ‘bureaucratic autonomy’ (Ege & Bauer, 
2017) or the ‘exercise of power’ (Browne, 2017). One reason is that funding is 
empirically observable and, with advancements in the standardisation of 
accounting regulations, increasingly comparable. For example, in 2006, the 
UN adopted the International Public Sector Accounting Standards (IPSAS) to 
make the financial data of different organizations increasingly comparable. 
However, the study of funding also serves to fill a research gap where ‘the 
link between the formal delegation of power and IOs’ actual power to shape 
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global governance outcomes has remained unclear due to a limited focus on 
IO capabilities’ (Heldt & Schmidtke, 2017, p.52).  
In the early days of the UN, the principle of mandatory contributions was 
central to the funding of the new organization. Mandatory, or ‘assessed’ 
contributions, are a legal obligation associated with membership, and non-
payment usually results in a penalty such as the removal of voting rights. The 
very notion of voluntary contributions was not present in the UN Charter, 
and early funding rules prohibited the earmarking of funds for fear that 
funding could be used by wealthier states to exercise influence over the UN 
(Graham, 2017a). Already in the first decade of the UN’s existence, however, 
programmes were created outside of the mandatory scheme, and, by 1960, 
voluntary contributions exceeded mandatory contributions for the first time 
(Graham, 2015). While voluntary contributions were quick to overtake 
mandatory contributions in terms of volume, until the 1990s, these 
contributions were still primarily unrestricted, hereafter unearmarked, 
meaning that decisions regarding how the money was spent rested with the 
governing body of the recipient organization. In what Graham (2017a) 
describes as a ‘sea-change’ (p.366), however, the 1990s witnessed a shift from 
unearmarked voluntary contributions towards the increasing use of 
earmarking stipulating how the contribution could be used. Between 1994 and 
2009, unearmarked voluntary contributions were relatively stable, decreasing 
by just two per cent. On the contrary, earmarked funds increased by more 
than 200 per cent (Graham, 2015). Of the 49.3 billion USD contributed to the 
UN system in 2016, mandatory contributions represented less than a third 
(28.3%) of total revenue for organizations within the UN system, while 
voluntary contributions represented some two-thirds (64.3%) of total revenue. 
The remaining amount is derived from other sources, such as interest. 
Voluntary contributions were predominantly earmarked, representing 84.1 
per cent of all voluntary contributions and more than half (54.1%) of all 
contributions to the UN system (United Nations, 2018a).  
Authors such as Graham (2015, 2017a, 2017b), Browne (2017), and Seitz and 
Martens (2017) have argued that shifts in the funding patterns of the UN 
towards earmarked funding, particularly since the 1990s, have disrupted the 
way it functions as a multilateral system by creating new governing 
relationships between funders and international organizations (IO) that 
circumvent formal governing bodies. The main argument here is best 
understood from the perspective of the principal-agent problem. In a pure 
multilateral model, the governing body of an organization would have the 
ability to allocate and distribute its revenue as it sees fit. By contributing 
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funding earmarked for a specific purpose, funders reduce the ability of the 
governing body of an organization to make this decision. Thus, voluntary 
funding rules are more likely to create scenarios where the agent (the IO) is 
‘governed’ by multiple principals (member states and other actors) thus 
undermining its multilateral character. Therefore, the proportion of 
earmarked funding influences the autonomy of an organization through 
either stipulating its activities or giving the organization the freedom to 
allocate funds as its governing body sees fit. An organization receiving 
primarily earmarked funds may therefore be expected to have less 
independence (or to rely on different strategies to obtain authority) than one 
with more fiscal autonomy. However, organizations that receive higher levels 
of earmarked funding might also be expected to experience more volatility in 
their revenue and as such be more entrepreneurial in how they make use of 
their cognitive resources to define problems in a way that legitimizes their 
organization’s interventions (Barnett and Finnemore, 2004). 
The important takeaway from this brief discussion of the international 
organization as an entity is the importance of recognizing that not all 
international organizations are the same. The ability of organizations to exert 
influence depends, in part, on internal characteristics that affect their ability 
to acquire resources and, as such, to act as autonomous actors.  
 
2.2.3 Conceptualizing Influence: Authority and Power  
 
Having established that governance is both the process and the product of the 
interaction of resource-dependent actors operating in networks around 
different policy issues of international relevance and that international 
organizations are key actors in this process, this section critically considers 
what is meant by our mediating concept: influence. At its core, the research 
question is about power, and more specifically, the power of international 
organizations to establish norms and rules to govern the behaviour of states 
regarding specific global policy problems. To understand how IOs might 
influence states, and by extension global governance, two related concepts 
merit further elaboration: authority and power.  
In the act of creating an IO, states accord them the authority to act in the areas 
stipulated by its mandate. The power to influence is derived, in part, from this 
delegated authority. However, the authority to act does not guarantee 
influence: ‘IO authority is intensified to the extent that others perceive the IO 
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as being both an authority and in authority’ (Barnett and Finnemore, 2004, 
p.35). This definition largely accords with a Weberian conceptualization of 
authority as legitimate power, which in turn makes it a social phenomenon 
(Natorski, 2018). Authority cannot exist without the social relations that 
legitimize it: 
‘The essence of authority is a relationship between two 
or more actors in which the commands of certain actors 
are treated as binding by the others’ (Weber 1954, p.328 
in Spencer 1970, p.124).  
However, authority can take different forms, some of which are more visible 
in terms of their translation into influence than others. Barnett and Finnemore 
(2004) outline four types of authority: rational-legal, delegated, moral, and 
expert. Rational legal authority refers to the basic form and vocabulary of the 
organization, usually predefined by its creators. This type refers to the 
authority to act. Delegated authority occurs when a specific task is assigned to 
an organization. States may delegate specific tasks, such as the regulation of 
the international postal service, to IOs. Moral authority and expert authority 
each allow IOs to play a depoliticizing role in their handling of specific issues 
and generally refer to how IOs exercise authority. Moral authority is derived 
from the notion of placing specific collective interests above national interests 
and can be enacted particularly by IOs with a normative mandate. Expert, or 
cognitive authority, on the other hand, is derived from knowledge, which is 
often acquired experientially. Broome and Seabrooke (2012) argue that the 
way the international organizations ‘see’ the world through developing and 
applying different measurement and benchmark standards requires them to 
have ‘cognitive authority’ that allows them to ‘measure, analyse and prescribe 
institutional changes for states’ (Broome & Seabrooke, 2012, p.2). Hence, while 
an IO may be created to address a specific challenge, the way in which that 
challenge is interpreted, defined, and operationalized may lead IOs to act in 
ways contrary to the initial expectations of their creators.  
These different types of authority also largely rhyme with different 
conceptualizations of power. Parsons (1967) defined power as ‘a generalized 
capacity to secure the performance of binding obligations by units in a system 
of collective organization when the obligations are legitimized with reference 
to their bearing on collective goals…’ (p.308, in Lukes, 1974, 31). This 
approach is distinct from approaches to power that focus on the relationships 
through which power is exercised. Instead, it draws attention to the 
interlinkages between power and authority, considering power as an inherent 
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part of social systems. Following this reasoning, an IO established by states to 
respond to a specific challenge, read ‘collective goal’, would represent one 
source of authority for an IO to exercise power. However, power is a complex 
concept. Lukes (1974) argues that power can be both overt and covert. At a 
basic level, power, was conceived by Dahl in 1957 as follows: ‘A has power 
over B to the extent that he can get B to do something B would not otherwise 
do’ (Lukes, 1974, p.16). Luke described this as overt power. However, power 
can also be exercised covertly: ‘A may exercise power over B by getting him 
to do what he does not want to do, but he also exercises power over him by 
influencing, shaping or determining his very wants’ (p.27).   
In a similar vein, Barnett and Finnemore (2004) argue that IOs can exercise 
both regulative and constitutive power. Regulative power relates to the power 
of IOs to monitor and report on the activities of states and represent, in the 
words of Merlingen (2003), the ‘international conduct of the conduct of 
countries’ (p.367). The most obvious example of this in the context of 
international organizations would be the creation of legally binding 
international conventions. By ratifying international conventions, states 
accord their custodian organizations the authority to monitor their conduct, 
report on non-compliance, and provide policy prescriptive advice. However, 
given that states may initiate the development of such conventions, are 
involved in their formulation and initial adoption, have the sovereign right to 
choose whether to ratify a convention, and can withdraw themselves from all 
or some of their provisions, the adequacy of such agreements, particularly for 
intractable policy problems, has come under increasing scrutiny. Hence, the 
changing nature of multilateralism has resulted in IOs adopting new tactics 
with respect to influencing the conduct of states. 
Constitutive power relates to the way that IOs create, define, and map social 
reality. IOs, through the creation of narratives, frame problems in specific 
ways (Broome & Seabrooke, 2012). The way a problem is defined has 
implications for the way solutions are designed. This point resonates with the 
definition of symbolic power proffered by Pierre Bourdieu, as the ‘power of 
constructing reality’ (Bourdieu, 1991, p.166); and to Lukes (1974) definition of 
covert power as the ability to exercise control through shaping preferences. 
IOs can, through the collection of data and the crafting of narratives, exert 
influence on how problems are defined, thus influencing the policies designed 
to address them (Broome & Seabrooke, 2012).  
The main takeaway from this section is that influence can be broadly defined 
in two ways. First, IOs can influence states using overt, regulative power, 
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where they use their legal and delegated authority to influence the decisions 
of states with regards to policies of international relevance using instruments 
such as international conventions. Second, IOs can influence states using 
covert, constitutive or symbolic power by framing problems in a specific way, 
which in turn compels states to act in specific ways. It can be reasonably 
assumed that the different IOs, along with states and other governance actors, 
will have different levels and configurations of authority, and thus, that the 
extent to which IOs can exercise influence will vary. While harder to measure, 
I would expect that IOs increasingly seek to wield covert power since the 
collective action challenge of a growing, multipolar world has made reaching 
agreements of a legally binding nature more complex. 
 
2.3 The Relationship between International Organizations 
and States 
 
Based on the conceptual discussion in Section 2.2, several core principles 
underpin the development of the theoretical framework presented here. First, 
states delegate authority to IOs to address challenges where 
intergovernmental cooperation is deemed more efficient than unilateral 
efforts and increasingly with the purpose to achieve broader collaborative 
goals, such as global economic development or world peace. Second, IOs can 
exercise influence over states through the creation and enforcement of legal 
norms, but also at the level of reality construction. The relationship between 
states and ‘their’ international organizations is therefore theorised as one in 
which a careful balancing act exists between states delegating enough 
authority to international organizations for them to be effective, but not too 
much that it would challenge state sovereignty or disrupt the existing power 
hierarchies. 
To develop this argument further, it is necessary to look first at the 
relationship between states and international organizations. The framework 
(Figure 2.3) assumes that the relationship between states and international 
organizations is bidirectional, meaning that while states influence and exert 
power over international organizations, the reverse can also be true. 
Authority is considered both as something that can be bestowed as well as 
something that can be exercised. States delegate authority to an IO through 
the delegation of tasks, usually defined in the organization’s mandate.. 
However, given that mandates are often broad and general, the role of 
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operationalizing a mandate requires interpretation (Evans & Finnemore, 
2001). This provides space for IOs to exercise regulative and constitutive 
power through the collection of data on a specific topic and through the 
development of narratives that define policy problems (Barnett and 
Finnemore, 2004) but also to build up expertise in specific operational areas 
that allows them to exercise expert authority further enhancing their 
authority.  
 
Figure 2.3 The Relationship between States and IOs 
 
Source: Author’s own 
 
However, it is not sufficient to remove this relationship from its context nor 
to homogenise states or international organizations. The discussion on 
multilateralism established that international organization as a process is a 
product of the evolving distribution of power in the global system, and the 
discussion on international organizations highlighted considerable 
differences in their nature and form. Next to acknowledging the likelihood 
that more powerful states may use IOs to exert influence over less powerful 
states, therefore, the discussion on the relationship between states and 
international organizations needs to be embedded within a broader 
theoretical framework that accounts for these factors.  
Nay (2011) argues that, to understand reforms in the international system, it 
is necessary to look at the external environment which presents both 
opportunities and threats to an organization; as well as to analyse the 
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‘interests, intentions and strategies of actors who contribute to channel 
external pressure into appropriate functional responses within the 
organization (p.694). However, factors specific to a policy area may also affect 
the relationship between states and international organizations. It can be 
assumed that many of the same external factors would place pressure on 
international organizations operating in that policy area. However, as 
demonstrated by Hall (2016), the way in which organizations respond to 
changes in the external environment may vary depending upon institutional 
specific characteristics, thus supporting Nay’s (2011) assertion that the 
behaviour of IOs is a function of external pressure and internal dynamics.  
The advocacy coalition framework (Sabatier, 1988) helps to incorporate these 
complexities into our conceptual framework. While Sabatier (1988) developed 
the advocacy coalition framework to study policy change over time and in a 
national context, it holds promise for understanding how international 
organizations and states interact in their responses to global policy problems 
His framework departs from three core principles. First, that one must look at 
policy change temporally, taking a research period of at least ten years. 
Second, he identifies the existence of policy subsystems, which he defines as 
‘a set of actors who are involved in dealing with a policy problem’ (Sabatier 
1988, p.138). Within each policy subsystem, different ‘advocacy coalitions’ 
exist, typically between two and four, which are ‘composed of people from 
various organizations who share a set of normative and causal beliefs and 
who often act in concert’ (p.133). Sabatier’s (1988) third principle is that public 
policy can be viewed in terms of belief systems. Members of different 
advocacy coalitions can hold different views on how to define and address 
not only a specific policy problem, but also potentially their normative 
assumptions regarding how the process of international organization should 
be pursued. In his framework, policy change is the product of negotiations 
between resource-dependent actors in different coalitions within a policy 
subsystem, sometimes facilitated by a ‘neutral’ policy broker.  
One aspect of the ACF that has been relatively understudied in its empirical 
applications is the role of policy brokers in the policy process. Policy brokers 
are ‘policy actors operating between coalitions’ (Pierce et al., 2017, p.4). 
Individuals have long been considered as a key factor contributing to 
organizational behaviour and thus change (Evans & Finnemore, 2001). 
Schmidt (2008) argues that individuals can act as ‘entrepreneurs’ (Finnemore 
& Sikkink, 2001) or ‘mediators’ (Jobert, 1989) ‘who serve as catalysts for 
change as they draw on and articulate the ideas of discursive communities 
and coalitions’ (Schmidt, 2008, p.310).  
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Accordingly, how negotiations play out between actors will be a product of 
the resources available to, and constraints encountered by each actor in the 
policy subsystem, the presence of policy brokers, as well as to how different 
organizations react to one another. As DiMaggio & Powell (1983) argued: 
 ‘Organizations…respond to an environment that 
consists of other organizations responding to their 
environment, which consists of organizations 
responding to an environment of organizations' 
responses’ (p.149). 
Beyond the policy subsystem, external factors will also influence these 
negotiations. Sabatier (1988) makes a distinction between ‘relatively stable’ 
(p.134) and ‘dynamic’ factors (p.136). Stable factors might include 
characteristics of the specific policy problem, cultural values and social 
systems, global resource distribution, and legal structures. Dynamic factors, 
or ‘system events’, could include changing socio-economic conditions (such 
as the oil crisis of 1973); the advancement of technology (such as jet aircraft); 
change in the governing coalition; and policy decision in other policy 
subsystems. In a later revision of the advocacy coalition framework, Sabatier 
and Weible (2007) added an additional element external to the policy 
subsystem: ‘coalition opportunity structures’. The addition, inspired by the 
literature on political opportunity structures, highlighted the role of factors 
mediating the relationship between external and internal factors. An external 
event can create the necessary consensus needed to push forward a policy 
change that, regardless of whether consensus existed within the policy 
subsystem, may not have otherwise occurred (Sabatier & Weible, 2007). This 
notion is similar to that of Kingdon’s (1995) ‘windows of opportunity’, which 
occur when problems, policy proposals, and politics converge at a specific 
point in time.  
The advocacy coalition framework, therefore, assists us in situating the 
relationship between states and IOs into a framework that recognizes the 
factors that may influence the relationship, and thus governance as an 
outcome, at three levels: 1) factors internal to states and IOs; 2) factors specific 
to the policy subsystem; and 3) external factors (Figure 2.4).  
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Figure 2.4 Contextualising the Relationship between States and IOs 
 
Source: Author’s own 
 
2.4 Conclusion: What is Global Migration Governance?  
 
Having disaggregated the main research question by defining (global) 
governance, international organization as a process and as an entity, and 
considering how the concepts of authority and power can be applied to 
understand the extent to which IOs can influence global governance, this 
chapter closes with a discussion of what the conceptual and theoretical 
approach implies for the dissertation. 
Section 2.2.1 defined global governance as the interactions of resource-
dependent actors in networks to develop systems of rules to address policy 
problems that transcend national borders, as well as to the normative goals of 
these actors concerning their vision of global problem-solving. Section 2.2.2 
highlighted that the process of international organization has evolved and is 
deeply embedded in the power-relations inherent to the world order. These 
developments have also resulted in diversification in the nature and form of 
IOs. Hence, the ability of organizations to exert influence depends, in part, on 
internal characteristics, which affect their ability to act as autonomous actors, 
which in turn is a product of their external environment. With these 
observations in mind, Section 2.3 theorised the relationship between states 
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and IOs as one in which a careful balancing act exists between states 
delegating enough authority for an IO to be effective, but not so much that it 
would challenge state sovereignty. 
Defining global governance in this way implies a need to analyse how 
migration has evolved as a global policy issue over time through the 
interaction and exchange between different actors. Although developed to 
deal with ‘wicked policy problems’ in a national context, the advocacy 
coalition framework (Sabatier, 1988, 1998; Sabatier & Weible, 2007) offers a 
theory of the policy process that assists in this task. By applying the advocacy 
coalition framework, migration is defined as a ‘policy subsystem’. The 
framework suggests policy changes will be the product of the interactions 
between states, IOs, and other actors operating in ‘advocacy coalitions’ and 
facilitated by policy brokers. In line with Sabatier, I would expect to identify 
at least two or three ‘advocacy coalitions’ with distinctly different approaches 
to migration as a global policy issue. From the literature on global migration 
governance, three competing ‘coalitions’ can already be identified: 1) 
migration management; 2) migrant rights; and 3) migration and development 
(Piper, 2017; Delgado Wise, 2018a). Accordingly, the extent to which specific 
arguments gain acceptance, and lead to a policy change, is determined by the 
access of IOs to different kinds of resources, notably authority, as well as to 
the external environment. Accordingly, in examining the history of global 
migration governance, I pay close attention to how different factors have 
influenced how different actors have defined migration as a global policy 
issue and the role that IOs have played in the framing of migration as a policy 
problem.  
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3. Methodology 
 
This chapter situates the overall methodological approach of the dissertation 
within broader research paradigms, discusses the overall research design, 
introduces the primary sources of data used throughout, and how they were 
gathered and analysed. The chapter first discusses the overall research design 
strategy (Section 3.1) and provides an overview of the research process 
(Section 3.2). Section 3.3 then describes how the data were collected and the 
broad analytical strategy. Section 3.4 concludes with some reflections on the 
methodological challenges encountered.  
 
3.1 Research Design  
 
At a broad level, the methodological approach taken in this dissertation is a 
case study. By taking the case of migration, I hope to offer some broader 
observations about the evolving nature of multilateral problem-solving over 
the past century. The selection of migration as a case study is appropriate for 
several reasons. Migration policy has always stood out as an area where the 
politics of policymaking are at their most present. Migration can be an 
emotive policy issue, and, as the past few years have shown, can topple 
governments1, divide electorates2, and challenge the very notion of 
multilateralism. Often the discussions around migration at the political level 
are not even about migration, but rather reactions to broader socio-economic 
change in which migrants are scapegoated and treated as the cause, rather 
than the consequence, of broader societal change. However, even seemingly 
innocuous policy problems, such as those that the Global Postal Union seeks 
to address, face similar issues3. Lessons learned from an examination of 
global policymaking in the area of migration can have broader applicability 
to the understanding of how other intractable policy problems, such as 
 
1 Belgium (Guild et al., 2019) 
2 Brexit (Betts and Collier, 2017) Belgium (Guild et al., 2019) 
2 Brexit (Betts and Collier, 2017) 
3 Trump’s negotiations with the Global Postal Union (Abrams, 2019) 
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climate change, can be best addressed. Furthermore, the discussion 
concerning the UN’s role in the area of migration has been subject to intense 
debate, particularly since the early 2000s. 
Before discussing the overall research design, a few words regarding my 
background are appropriate. My anthropology training proved useful during 
my years working as a contract researcher from 2012 until 2017, during which 
I was both a participant and an observer in global discussions, albeit at a 
relatively junior level. More specifically, I participated in three Global 
Forums on Migration and Development meetings (Civil Society Days and 
Common Space) in Turkey (2015), Bangladesh (2016), and Germany (2017) 
alongside several preparatory meetings. Although it would have been of 
value to participate in the Government Days of the GFMD, access to these 
days was more restricted. Nevertheless, participating in the Civil Society 
Days, and, in 2017 being part of the International Steering Committee for this 
event, allowed me to follow the dialogue, and, while not the focus of this 
dissertation, to gain insight into the role of global civil society actors in the 
process. I was also the assistant coordinator of the United Nations University 
(UNU) Migration Network from January 2016 until June 2017 as the UNU 
was preparing to take over as chair of the Global Migration Group (GMG). In 
addition to these specific processes, I was involved in numerous research and 
evaluation projects for a range of different international actors.  
In the relatively short period that I was actively engaged with global-level 
discussions on migration, I witnessed several reorientations in how different 
actors were framing migration. Perhaps the most illustrative example of this 
is work that I was commissioned to do for the World Bank’s Global 
Knowledge Partnership on Migration and Development (KNOMAD) in 2014. 
The task was to construct a dashboard of indicators that would measure 
policy coherence in the area of migration and development. After submitting 
an initial draft of the dashboard in the summer of 2014, we entered a period 
of consultations, testing, refinement, and reframing. The creation of an 
indicator is arguably one of the most obvious ways in which IOs can exercise 
constitutive power. If you can shape data collection on a specific topic, then 
you can shape how governments and other actors view a particular issue. 
Next to yearlong discussions on how to define specific indicators, we 
repackaged the dashboard on multiple occasions. On the first occasion, we 
repackaged the dashboard as a tool for measuring the implementation of the 
migration-related Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) commitments. On 
the second, it was the implementation of commitments in the New York 
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Declaration, and recently it has become about the Global Compact for Safe, 
Orderly and Regular Migration. A similar toolkit, which was born at around 
the same time, is now used by IOM to offer countries ‘insights on policy levers 
that countries can use to develop their migration governance’ (IOM, 2020a). 
Aside from the material benefits to IOs of having specific issues included in 
frameworks such as the SDGs, connecting indicators to frameworks that 
states have endorsed through intergovernmental processes is also arguably 
integral to the functioning of non-binding agreements as norm-setting 
instruments.   
I joined the field of migration at a time when there was a concerted effort at 
the international level to deepen the UN’s role in migration. The experience 
of working on the dashboard and other projects highlighted the competitive 
and reactive nature of global discussions surrounding migration and awoke 
a curiosity to investigate how, and why, the international landscape on 
migration had evolved in the way that it had. Furthermore, these experiences 
introduced me to the various actors operating at the global level, the 
protagonists in my story, as well as to the dominant narratives that I saw 
reproduced repeatedly. They also introduced me to some of the tensions and 
politics at play at the level of global policymaking. Scores of notebooks of 
reflections – field notes – from this time, have provided input to the 
dissertation. Without this experience, it is unlikely that I would have been 
able to access and interview as many relevant individuals as I ultimately 
managed to do.  
 
3.1.1 Process Tracing 
 
Process tracing provides the methodological point of departure for the 
research design. Process tracing refers to the analysis of a process to establish 
how and why a particular outcome occurred (Bennett and Checkel, 2015). I 
am interested in understanding the process of institutionalising migration 
into the UN. I will argue that the UN and other international organizations 
exercised constitutive power to shape the dialogues surrounding migration 
to achieve a consensus that migration should be a global governance issue. 
The justification for choosing process tracing as a guiding framework for the 
research design is threefold. First, it is an appropriate methodology for case 
study research, described by Bennett and Checkel (2015) as a ‘central within-
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case method’ (p.4). Second, process tracing has been used by scholars to 
examine the role of specific ideas in influencing policy outcomes (Jacobs, 
2015). Given the specific focus on how IOs can exercise constitutive power to 
exert influence over states through their ability to frame policy problems in 
specific ways, this proves to be an appropriate method. Third, as Checkel 
(2014) notes: ‘the potential for process tracing to help scholars produce 
integrative frameworks about international institutions, combining insights 
from different social-theoretic toolkits remains unfulfilled’ (p.74-75). As 
discussed in Chapter 2, the implementation of process tracing will be guided 
by theoretical insights about the policy process from the advocacy coalition 
framework. Furthermore, the concept of constitutive power will be 
operationalized using framing analysis (Section 3.1.2).  
Process tracing is often implemented by scholars in an unsystematic way, 
who rely more on intuition than on a clearly defined analytical strategy, 
which increases the risk of inferential errors (Collier, 2011). A common error 
made in the application of process tracing is the lack of consideration of 
equifinality, which is that there could be an alternative explanation for the 
observed outcome. Thus, a key component of good process tracing is the 
collation and critical consideration of alternative explanations (Bennett and 
Checkel, 2015). Researchers can identify alternative explanations by 
analysing data from a range of sources, including archival records, academic 
and grey literature, and observations from practitioners. In the design of my 
research, I tried to ensure that I had representation from different advocacy 
coalitions in order to identify potential differences in the way practitioners 
recounted the history of global migration governance. However, as discussed 
in Sections 3.3.1 and 3.4, the attempt to generate alternative explanations was 
somewhat limited by bias in the interview sample. Future research could 
extend the present study and test its findings through the inclusion of other 
voices, particularly those from the Global South, who, while present in the 
sample, are underrepresented. 
Process tracing is often implemented in a neo-positivistic manner, within 
which researchers collate evidence from a range of sources, and test pre-
determined hypotheses. However, a challenge with these neo-positivistic 
approaches is that the processes that lead to outcomes can be multi-causal. 
For example, an individual or organization may be instrumental in bringing 
about a policy change, but had other conditions been different, the policy 
change may not have occurred. The risk with considering various causes, but 
not how they interact with one another, is that process tracing results in a list 
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of potential causal factors without discriminating among the relationships 
that exist between them (Bennett & Checkel, 2015). Here the advocacy 
coalition framework (discussed in detail in Section 2.3) helps us to critically 
theorise how various internal, external, and mediating factors interacted to 
produce different outcomes, notably the inclusion of migration in the SDGs, 
IOM entry into the UN, and the adoption of the Global Compacts. 
Additionally, my interest in understanding how IOs exercise constitutive 
power to preserve and extend their role in global governance poses 
challenges to neo-positivistic process tracing. Particularly when one seeks to 
identify the influence of ideas on behaviour, this task becomes more 
challenging because the influence of ideas on actions is generally 
unobservable. However, scholars such as Robinson (2017) have also 
demonstrated the compatibility of process tracing with interpretive research 
design. A central feature of an interpretive approach involves ‘making (the) 
interpretation of events endogenous to the analysis itself’ (Robinson, 2017, 
p.509). Accordingly, researchers investigate how meanings and narratives are 
constructed (Collier, 2011). A vital element of the research design thus 
becomes the collection of accounts of the evolution of global migration 
governance from the perspective of actors closely engaged in discussions at 
the global level. A common way of collecting such data is through interviews. 
However, this approach also has challenges. For example, because of the 
political nature of the field, a pressure ‘for actors to employ verbal 
communication to strategically misrepresent the reasoning underlying their 
choices’ emerges (Jacobs, 2015, p.45). Although one cannot eliminate this 
challenge, offering anonymity to respondents can be conducive to eliciting 
more open responses. Furthermore, one can triangulate interview data using 
other sources of data, such as archival records. 
The principles of process tracing are employed throughout the dissertation. 
They provided structure to the research process and aided in the selection of 
case studies (outlined in Section 3.2). In Chapters 5 and 6, I use framing 
analysis to operationalize the concept of constitutive power. In addition to 
this, the advocacy coalition framework (Chapter 2) provides analytical 
guidance in Chapters 7 and 8 where I examine why IOM became a UN 
agency, and why states decided to negotiate a Global Compact on migration, 
despite historic resistance to handle matters related to migration within the 
context of the UN. Owing to the prominence of framing analysis, I turn now 
to briefly consider the main aspects of the framing approach that have guided 
the research before outlining the broad research process (section 3.2), the data 
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collection and analytical strategies (section 3.3) and the limitations of the 
approach taken (section 3.4). 
 
3.1.2 Framing Analysis  
 
Complementing the process tracing approach with framing analysis offers 
researchers an analytically fruitful method to explore how IOs exercise 
constitutive power. Scholars from several disciplines have applied the 
concept of frames and framing, notably communication studies (Entman, 
1993), social movement studies (Snow et al., 1986; Snow et al., 1988; Snow and 
Benford, 1992), sociology (Goffman, 1974) and public policy (Rein & Schön, 
1996). The attention given to frames by scholars from various disciplines has 
produced a rich body of literature exploring frames in different contexts, 
including in the area of migration. However, even within disciplines, 
disparate approaches have, in the words of Vliegenthart and van Zoonen 
(2011), produced ‘a cacophony of new definitions, divergent 
operationalizations and a wide, often incompatible range of empirically 
established content features’ (p.105). Hence, it is necessary to establish how 
framing analysis will be defined and operationalized in this dissertation. 
In his seminal writings on frame analysis, Goffman defines frames (and 
frameworks) as ‘schemata of interpretation’ (1974, p.21). Hence, frames are a 
way of viewing and making sense of the world. Building on the work of 
Goffman (1974), Snow and his colleagues argued that that ‘by rendering 
events or occurrences meaningful… (frames) function to organize experience 
and guide action, whether individual or collective’ (Snow et al. 1986, p.464). 
Thus, frames relate to how information is presented, interpreted, and acted 
upon at all levels of social interaction. In the policy context, Khaneman and 
Tversky (1984) famously demonstrated the power of framing when 
presenting policy options for a fictitious disease outbreak. They received 
vastly different results depending on whether the proposed solutions were 
framed in terms of how many people would live, compared to how many 
people would die.  
In recent years, a call for researchers to shift their focus from the study of 
‘frames’ to the analysis of the process of ‘framing’ has emerged to draw 
attention the power dynamics inherent to the process of defining policy 
problems (Carragee & Roefs, 2004; Snow et al., 2014; van Hulst & Yanow, 
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2016). Snow and Benford (1992) define framing as ‘an active, process-derived 
phenomenon that implies agency and contention at the level of reality 
construction’ (p.136). Given growing acceptance that international 
organizations can exercise constitutive power through their ability to shape 
reality (Barnett and Finnemore, 2004; Broome and Seabrooke, 2012), it is 
surprising that scholars have not paid more attention to understanding the 
mechanisms through which international actors frame specific policy 
problems and the implications that this has for governance. Hence, framing 
analysis allows the operationalization of the concept of constitutive power. 
Specifically, the dissertation draws a connection between the ‘policy broker’ 
in advocacy coalition framework theory and the ‘reframer’ in the framing 
literature to assess not only how the way migration has been framed as a 
global policy issue has evolved, but also by whom, and to what end.  
The framing literature provides a particularly suitable framework for 
studying global migration governance, given that ‘intractable social problems 
are characterized by a multiplicity of problem frames’ (Scholten, 2011, p.78). 
In line with advocacy coalition theory, one would assume that different 
coalitions of actors organize themselves around different ‘frames’ or ways of 
defining a particular policy problem competing with one another in order to 
influence the direction taken by policymakers operating in their specific area 
of concern. Accordingly, one would expect to find evidence of the framing 
act in the recollections of the process by key protagonists as well as in archival 
records. In turn, acting between advocacy coalitions, one would expect to 
identify individuals or organizations acting as policy brokers.  
Thus in Chapter 5, the process of reframing migration as a development issue 
is analysed through the application of Abolafia’s (2004) temporal model of 
framing to the analysis of interview data and archival records relating to the 
creation of the Global Forum on Migration and Development (GFMD) which 
was launched in 2006 and held its first meeting in 2007. Abolafia’s (2004) 
model involves three stages: 1) breaking the frame; 2) constructing the new 
frame; and 3) adjusting the frame. In short, Abolafia (2004) argues that to 
change the way an issue is framed, reframers must first cast doubt on pre-
existing frames. In constructing the new frame, the reframer must then be 
careful to ensure that the new frame resonates in some way with adherents 
of the frames they are attempting to move beyond because frames are 
ultimately about the underlying values through which actors view and 
interpret the world. When seeking to resolve frame conflicts, ambiguity in the 
frame design is crucial. As Rein and Schön (1996) argue: ‘behind most 
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political agreements, there lurks a misunderstanding: ambiguity may 
facilitate consensus’ (p.90). For this reason, once a new frame has been 
established, a process of adjustment, or ‘frame alignment’ (Snow et al., 1986), 
ensues in which adherents of different frames can identify their place within 
the new frame. Frame alignment is a necessary condition for the frame to 
invoke action (Snow et al., 1986). 
In Chapter 6, I look for evidence of ‘frame alignment’ by examining how 
different IOs incorporated the ‘migration and development’ frame into their 
rhetoric when advocating for the inclusion of migration in the SDGs. I do this 
by examining the arguments put forward in the writings of various IOs in the 
run-up to the adoption of the SDGs informed analytically by Habermas (1993) 
and Sjursen (2002), which I further explain in Section 3.3.3.  
 
3.2 Research Process 
 
While the research process itself was mostly iterative, some linearity to its 
implementation emerged. This section describes five key sequential stages of 
the research: 1) soaking and poking; 2) creating a timeline; 3) identifying key 
factors; 4) selecting within-case case studies; 5) implementing the case 
studies.  
 
Step 1: ‘Soaking and Poking’ 
Bennett and Checkel (2015) describe the first step of process tracing as 
‘soaking and poking’ (p.18). One immerses oneself in the case while 
identifying different explanations from a range of sources such as academic 
and grey literature and the first-hand accounts of individuals directly 
involved. Part of this step involved the active participation in global-level 
discussions on migration. Herein, I was aware of my position as a relatively 
junior participant. I was able to observe specific groups of actors interacting 
with one another in between sessions but I was not privy to their 
conversations.  
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Step 2: Creating a Timeline 
Collier (2011) suggests that a good starting point for process tracing is the 
creation of a narrative or timeline within which one can ‘explore the causal 
ideas embedded in the narratives, consider the kinds of evidence that may 
confirm or disconfirm these ideas, and identify the tests appropriate for 
evaluating this evidence’ (p.828-9). Thus, early in the research process, I 
constructed a timeline of events in the history of global migration governance 
based on an initial review of relevant academic literature (c.f. Ashutosh and 
Mountz 2011; Bakewell 2008; Georgi 2010; Hess 2010; Skeldon 2008; Bhagwati 
2003; Marchi 2010; Newland 2010; and Berne Initiative 2005). The initial 
timeline included events ranging from the establishment of the ILO in 1919 
to IOM’s entry into the UN system in 2016. I further refined and extended the 
timeline based on an extensive literature review, key informant interviews, 
and archival research (Chapter 4; Annex 4.1). 
 
Step 3: Identifying Key Factors   
Guided by the theoretical framework developed in Chapter 2 (Section 2.3) 
and key informant interviews, I then identified factors driving how different 
actors discussed migration at the global level. Nay (2011) argued that reforms 
in the international system are a function of internal and external factors that 
influence how IOs behave and categorized these into material, legal-political 
and cultural factors. The conceptual addition of the advocacy coalition 
framework (Sabatier, 1988, 1998; Sabatier & Weible, 2007) shifted the unit of 
analysis from IOs to the policy subsystem in which they operate. In the 
advocacy coalition framework, policy change is the product of definitional 
struggles between groups (advocacy coalitions) of resource-dependent actors 
holding different beliefs about how best to tackle a specific policy problem.  
In the migration governance literature, three main frames have dominated 
international discussions on migration: migration management, the rights-
based approach, and migration and development. Behind each frame, groups 
of actors, advocacy coalitions, seek to influence global discussions in a way 
that furthers their interpretation of the problem. How these interactions play 
out in practice is a function of how successfully framers can mobilize resource 
and how much their frame resonates and inspires others to act. System events 
change the playing field upon which these discussions occur and hence 
provide an opportunity to push for a frame shift. In presenting the overall 
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timeline of key developments relevant to global migration governance, 
Chapter 4 analyses external factors that have influenced how global 
migration has evolved. Table 3.1 summarizes the main factors that have 
theoretically influenced how global migration governance has evolved. 
Table 3.1 Factors Influencing Global Migration Governance 
 Material Legal-Political Cultural  
Internal  
(to IOs) 
Financial Capacity 
Staff 
Mandate 
Organizational 
Characteristics 
Individuals 
Mediating 
Factors 
Advocacy Coalitions and Policy Brokers 
System Events (Coalition Opportunity Structures) 
 
External 
(to IOs) 
Funding Source 
Other IOs 
(Competition and 
Cooperation) 
Politics (State 
Interests) 
Ideology 
Subsystem specific factors which directly or indirectly influence 
migration patterns  
(e.g., demography, economy, technology, conflict) 
Source: Author’s own  
 
Step 4: Case Selection 
Collier (2011) suggests that the data collection strategy should focus on 
‘taking good snapshots at a series of specific moments’ (p.824). In identifying 
these moments, Bennett and Checkel (2015) suggest a ‘bracketing strategy’ 
(p.15) whereby the researcher identifies shorter periods within a longer 
timeline for closer examination. Based on the initial literature review and my 
observations, I identified several moments as particularly relevant to the 
evolution of global migration governance: 1) the creation of the GFMD (2005-
2007); 2) the inclusion of migration in the SDGs (2012-2015); 3) IOM’s journey 
to the UN (1951-2016); and 4) the genesis of the Global Compact for Safe, 
Orderly and Regular Migration (2015-2018). Table 3.2 summarizes the 
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justification for selecting each of these cases and outlines the key factors (Step 
3) and the primary unit of analysis explored in each chapter.  
Table 3.2 Overview of Case Studies  
Case  Time  Reason for Selection Key Factors 
GFMD 2005-
2006 
Multiple authors have pointed to the 
significance of the GFMD as a pivot point in 
international cooperation on migration, 
where migration was reframed in order to 
advance international cooperation (cf. Betts 
and Kainz, 2018; Roldan and Gasper, 2010; 
Rother, 2018). This case study focuses on the 
process of how migration was reframed as a 
development issue, and by whom. The case 
focuses on the role played by the late Sir 
Peter Sutherland as a policy broker.  
Mediating Factors: 
the role of different 
actors in reframing 
migration (policy 
brokers). 
 
  
SDGs  2012-
2015 
While in 2000, migration, along with human 
rights more broadly, did not make it into the 
Millennium Development Goals, the 
inclusion of migration in the SDGs is 
celebrated by many observers as being the 
moment when states recognized migration 
as a matter meriting UN intervention. The 
way migration has been included in the 
SDGs has been subject to empirical 
examination; however, the process leading 
up to their adoption is less well documented. 
Examining the arguments made for why 
migration should be included in the SDGs 
sheds light into how the migration and 
development frame has functioned as a 
unifying frame. 
Mediating Factors: 
the role of the frame.  
Internal Factors: IO 
characteristics. 
 
 
IOM 1951-
2016 
IOM’s entry to the UN as a ‘related agency’ 
in 2016 represented a sea-change in terms of 
the UN’s role in migration. After decades of 
discussion, an organization with a sole 
migration mandate was part of the UN. Next 
to calls for more rigorous investigations of 
IOM (Elie, 2010; Andrijasevic & Walters, 
2010; Pécoud, 2018), this case study employs 
a bracketing strategy to examine three 
moments in time when the IOM Member 
States considered IOM’s relationship with 
the UN more intensely. It then discusses the 
factors most relevant to the decision taken by 
the IOM Member States in 2016 to bring IOM 
into the UN system.  
Mediating Factors: 
the role of system 
events (coalition 
opportunity 
structures).  
External Factors:  
Resources.  
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Case  Time  Reason for Selection Key Factors 
Global 
Compact  
2015-
2018 
The Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and 
Regular Migration represents the first time 
that states have explicitly negotiated an 
overarching framework for the governance 
of migration. Given historical resistance, this 
case study analyses the genesis of the Global 
Compact discussion. While the archival data 
available to investigate this topic entirely is 
limited because the archives of António 
Guterres are not yet available, the case looks 
at the potential role that the migration crises 
played in the negotiation of new, albeit non-
binding, norms for the governance of 
migration.  
Mediating Factors: 
the role of system 
events (coalition 
opportunity 
structures).  
 
 
 
Step 5: Implementing the Case Studies  
In implementing each case study, I repeated Step 1 and 2. Thus, for each case, 
I consulted relevant academic and grey literature and constructed timelines. 
I reviewed the interview transcripts and relevant documents from the 
archives for each case study. In Chapters 5 and 6, I used framing analysis to 
analyse the act of framing (Chapter 5) and then the functioning of the frame 
(Chapter 6). For Chapter 7, after constructing the initial timeline, the same 
bracketing strategy employed to identify the case studies (Step 4) was used 
to select different moments in time when IOM’s Member States discussed 
IOM’s relationship with the UN. In Chapter 8, I drew on the advocacy 
coalition framework in order to understand how an external system event –
migration crises – changed the playing field. 
 
3.3 Data Collection and Analysis 
 
A key aspect of process tracing is the collation of data from different sources 
such as key informant interviews, archival records, participant-observation, 
and grey literature. This section turns to look at how the data were gathered 
and analysed. There were two primary sources of data: key informant 
interviews (Section 3.3.1) and the UN Archives (Section 3.3.2). In addition to 
this, I gathered supplementary data for Chapter 6 (Section 3.3.3). 
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3.3.1 Key Informant Interviews  
 
The thesis draws heavily on 43 interviews conducted with representatives of 
different IOs, governments, and civil society actors between October 2016 
and January 2019. Interviews commenced shortly after the New York 
Declaration was signed in September 2016. 
Table 3.3 presents the summary statistics of the sample. When interview data 
are referenced in the dissertation, they are identified by the category of the 
actor (IO, GOV, OTHER), which is further explained in Table 3.5 below, and 
a reference number. For example, interview number eight which was 
conducted with a representative of an international organization is 
referenced as INT-IO-008. 
The majority of the interviews took place during two rounds of data 
collection: 1) from January to March 2017 and 2) from September 2018 to 
January 2019. The disadvantage of carrying out interviews at different times 
is that the responses may have been shaped by what was then a rapidly 
evolving landscape as the negotiations of the two Global Compacts were in 
full swing. It is crucial to remain aware that interviews capture the views of 
an individual at a specific point in time. For example, during my early 
interviews, few respondents discussed the Global Compacts process in any 
detail. Had I interviewed these individuals at a later date, their account of the 
evolution of migration as a global policy issue may have evolved.  
I prepared an initial list of 30 potential informants based on my network and 
observations from attending relevant events. I contacted another 34 potential 
informants based on the recommendations of other informants. The sampling 
method, purposive with snowballing, was appropriate because I wished to 
interview individuals who had specific experience working on migration-
related policy issues at the global level. All individuals contacted received an 
information letter (Annex 3.1) outlining the purpose of the study, the time 
commitment required, and crucially, how data would be recorded, stored, 
and used. At the start of each interview, this information was summarized, 
and informed consent obtained. Respondents were promised anonymity to 
promote an open environment during the interview. Thus, in the thesis, the 
selected quotations used are only identified by sector (international 
organization; government; or other actors (academia, civil society, think 
tanks, and foundations).  
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Table 3.3 Interview Respondents 
No Sex Age 
Cohort 
Category Informal* Interview 
Format 
Interviewed  
01 M 35-49 Other No In-Person Oct-16 
02 M 35-49 IO Yes In-Person Dec-16 
03 M 35-49 IO No In-Person Mar-17 
04 F 35-49 IO Yes Skype/Phone Mar-17 
05 M 50-64 GOV No In-Person Mar-17 
06 F 35-49 IO Yes Skype/Phone Mar-17 
07 F 65+ IO No In-Person Mar-17 
08 M 65+ IO No In-Person Mar-17 
09 M 65+ Other No In-Person Mar-17 
10 M 65+ IO No In-Person Mar-17 
11 M 65+ IO No In-Person Apr-17 
12 M 65+ IO No In-Person Mar/May-17  
13 M 50-64 Other No Skype/Phone Nov-17 
14 M 65+ IO No Skype/Phone Aug-18 
15 M 50-64 IO No Skype/Phone Sep-18 
16 M 35-49 IO Yes Skype/Phone Sep-18 
17 M 65+ Other Yes Skype/Phone Sep-18 
18 F 50-64 IO No Skype/Phone Sep-18 
19 M 65+ IO No Skype/Phone Sep-18 
20 F 65+ Other Yes Skype/Phone Sep-18 
21 M 50-64 IO Yes Skype/Phone Sep-18 
22 M 65+ IO No Skype/Phone Sep-18 
23 M 50-64 Other Yes Skype/Phone Sep-18 
24 M 50-64 IO Yes Skype/Phone Sep-18 
25 M 65+ IO No Skype/Phone Sep-18 
26 M 50-64 IO No Skype/Phone Sep-18 
27 M 65+ GOV No Skype/Phone Oct-18 
28 M 35-49 IO Yes Skype/Phone Oct-18 
29 M 50-64 IO Yes Skype/Phone Oct-18 
30 M 65+ Other No Skype/Phone Oct-18 
31 F 50-64 GOV Yes Skype/Phone Oct-18 
32 M 35-49 GOV Yes Skype/Phone Oct-18 
33 F 50-64 GOV No Skype/Phone Oct-18 
34 F 65+ Other Yes Skype/Phone Oct-18 
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35 M 65+ GOV No Skype/Phone Oct-18 
36 M 50-64 GOV No Skype/Phone Oct-18 
37 M 35-49 IO Yes Skype/Phone Oct-18 
38 M 65+ IO No Skype/Phone Nov-18 
39 M 65+ Other No In-Person Nov-18 
40 F 35-49 IO Yes Skype/Phone Jan-19 
41 F 50-64 IO No Skype/Phone Jan-19 
42 F 50-64 IO Yes Skype/Phone Jan-19 
43 M 65+ IO No Skype/Phone Jan-19 
Note: The ‘informals’, further discussed below, was a group of actors convened by Peter 
Sutherland in the lead up to the adoption of the SDGs. Members were identified from an email 
addressed to the ‘informals’ shared with the researcher. The email was sent on 30 October 2014 
to 59 recipients. 
 
In total, I contacted 64 individuals for interviews. Of this group, 13 did not 
respond, seven initially agreed to participate, but it was not possible to 
schedule an interview, and one individual declined. Contact with a potential 
participant was stopped after three reminders did not elicit any response. The 
remaining 43 were interviewed. The response rate was thus relatively high, 
at 67.2 per cent. I stopped the interviews based on diminishing returns, and 
the recognition that I had achieved saturation. Saturation was defined in two 
ways. First, when respondents were asked to provide suggestions for other 
individuals to contact as part of the snowballing sampling strategy, and no 
new names were emerging. Second, saturation was defined in terms of the 
types of answers received. However, several notable omissions from the 
interview sample exist. It would have been ideal to interview the late Sir Peter 
Sutherland and the late Kofi Annan, particularly given the significance 
accorded to these individuals by the majority of my respondents. In addition 
to this, the sample overrepresents male voices from the Global North. Despite 
efforts to engage with policymakers in the Global South, I received a higher 
rate of non-response from this group.  
Of the 43 interviews conducted, the vast majority (n=31) took place virtually 
(skype or telephone) or in writing (n=1). The biggest challenge with virtual 
interviews, particularly over the telephone, is the inability to read the body 
language of one’s respondent, which can make it more challenging to 
interpret what is being said. Although virtual interviews have limitations, 
however, it can be assumed that the target group was generally well versed 
in digital communication owing to the nature of their work. The advantage 
of virtual interviews for my target group was the ability to offer greater 
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flexibility and to reach a higher number of respondents. While 11 interviews 
were conducted face to face at the margins of various events – in Dhaka, 
Geneva, London, and Maastricht – this environment also gave less room to 
ensure that the setting for the interview was conducive to a deep 
conversation. Of the 43 interviews, 37 interviews were recorded and fully 
transcribed. Five interviews were not recorded, all of which took place face 
to face, and one interview was conducted in writing. During all interviews, I 
took extensive notes and, particularly for those interviews which were not 
recorded, I wrote up summary notes as soon as possible after the interview 
to retain as much information as possible.  
Approximately three-quarters of those interviewed were male (n=32), and the 
remaining quarter was female (n=11). Just less than one-quarter of the sample 
was aged 35 to 49 at the time of interview (n=10), just short of a third between 
50 and 64 (n=14), with the largest group (n=19) being aged 65 or above. While 
I made an effort to increase the number of female informants, the purposive 
nature of the sampling strategy made this challenging to achieve, which may 
be reflective of the, particularly historically, male-dominated nature of high-
level policymaking. In support of this, male respondents were particularly 
overrepresented in the 65+ age cohort (Table 3.4).  
Table 3.4 Respondents, by Age Cohort and Sex 
 
Male (%) Female (%) Total (%) 
35-49 7 (70.0%) 3 (30.0%) 10 (100.0%) 
50-64 9 (64.3%) 5 (35.7%) 14 (100.0%) 
65+ 16 (84.2%) 3 (15.8%) 19 (100.0%)  
32 (74.4%) 11 (25.6%) 43 (100%) 
 
Although many individuals have switched categories over the course of their 
careers, moving, for example from a government or academic posting to an 
IO, the categorization of key informants is based upon the position held by 
the individual for the majority of the period covered by the interview (Table 
3.5). Given the specific interest of the thesis in exploring the role of IOs in 
migration governance, the vast majority of participants (n=28) were 
representatives of various IOs including IOM (7), ILO (6), UNDESA (3), 
ICMPD (1), UNHCR (1), UNITAR (1), OHCHR (1), UN Women (1) and the 
World Bank (1); as well as five individuals who were part of Sir Peter 
Sutherland’s team. Because of the smaller number of respondents from 
academia (6), think tanks (1), foundations (1) and civil society organizations 
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(2), I grouped these into one category in the interest of protecting the 
anonymity guaranteed to participants in the information letter (Annex 3.1). 
Academic respondents were purposively selected based on their engagement 
at the multilateral level, and several had careers involving frequent shifts 
between academic and IO or GOV positions. Government representatives 
came from Denmark, the Republic of Ireland, Mexico, Sweden, Switzerland, 
and the US. Seventeen key informants were part of the informal group 
convened by Peter Sutherland in the years preceding the adoption of the 
SDGs in 2015. The ‘informals’ was a group of actors drawn from IO, 
governments, and civil society that developed a common messaging relating 
to the place of migration in the SDGs. Having proper representation from 
individuals in this group, as well as those who were not engaged, was 
essential to ensure that the views elicited were representative of a broader 
group of actors. 
 
Table 3.5 Respondents, by Category 
Category Code Number 
International Organizations IO 28 
Academia, Think Tanks, Foundations, Civil Society Other 9 
Government GOV 7 
 
The interviews were semi-structured, in that an interview guide was 
prepared (see Annex 3.2), but space was left to ask follow-up questions. As 
the research progressed, the interviews became less structured. Initially, I 
asked respondents to identify key events, individuals, and organizations that 
had influenced how different actors discussed migration at the global level. 
However, it became evident that these factors came forth organically in 
broader questions regarding how international discussions on migration had 
evolved throughout their careers situated earlier in the interview guide. The 
interviews broadly covered three areas:  
• The respondent’s view of how international cooperation on 
migration had evolved over the course of the individual’s career  
• The respondent’s view on the main factors influencing the way 
migration had been discussed at the international level (including 
prompts relating to key individuals, organizations, events, 
governments, funders, publications, and other possible factors) 
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• Targeted questions on: 
o IOM’s journey into the UN system; 
o The inclusion of migration in the Sustainable Development 
Goals (SDGs); 
o The Global Compacts   
I transcribed all of my recorded interviews4 were fully transcribed and 
imported into NVivo 12, along with detailed notes of the interviews that had 
not been recorded. I subsequently thematically coded the interview 
transcripts in NVivo 12. This process involved several rounds of coding, 
during which I read through the transcripts multiple times.  
The initial coding strategy involved the identification of several thematic 
categories that would be useful for different parts of the thesis. While I 
developed a set of ‘parent nodes’ (Table 3.6) to guide my coding of the 
transcripts, I identified additional nodes, along with child nodes (Annex 3.3) 
while coding. As Richards notes: ‘coding is not merely to label all the parts of 
documents about a topic but rather to bring them together so they can be 
reviewed, and your thinking about the topic developed’ (Richards, 2010, 
p.94). For example, by coding all references to different ‘initiatives’ such as 
the GFMD (Chapter 5), the Sustainable Development Goals (Chapter 6), or 
the Global Compacts (Chapter 8), it was possible to revisit these excerpts 
when analysing the data for each of these chapters. It was also helpful in 
constructing the timeline (Chapter 4) in the sense that it was possible to see 
how different respondents discursively connected various initiatives. Beyond 
the explicit example of frame conflicts cited by respondents, this also helped 
to uncover implicit frame conflicts identified through different ways of 
explaining how global migration governance had evolved. A full codebook, 
including coding guidelines, can be found in Annex 3.3.  
 
 
 
 
 
4 With the exception of three transcripts where I gratefully acknowledge research support 
provided by Catherine Hutchison.  
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Table 3.6 Summary of Thematic Coding  
Parent 
Node  
Description Files References 
Frames This node captures examples of how 
migration has been framed in different ways, 
including examples of the migration 
management, the migration and 
development, and the human rights frames.  
42 419 
Global 
Initiatives 
This node captures all references to various 
milestones in the evolution of migration as a 
policy issue.  
41 464 
Governance 
Drivers 
This node captures the factors that are 
considered to be drivers of changes in the way 
migration has been discussed at the 
international level. 
42 642 
Individuals This node captures ALL mentions of 
individuals by interviewees. and was used to 
identify potential interviewees (snowball 
sampling) 
40 643 
IOM This node captures all mentions of IOM 39 428 
Specific 
Individuals 
Based on the ‘individuals node’, the most 
commonly mentioned individuals were then 
coded to capture accounts of how these 
individuals were viewed in terms of the role 
in migration governance. 
36 201 
 
3.3.2 Archival Records 
 
Archival records supplemented the interview data. On several occasions, this 
allowed ‘off-the-record’ information to be taken into consideration where 
evidence was found within the publicly available United Nations Archives. 
Documents were primarily sourced from the personal archives of Secretary-
Generals Kofi Annan (1997-2006) and Ban Ki-moon (2007-2016). Since the 
Global Compacts were negotiated in 2017 and 2018, limited archival 
documents discussed the Global Compacts. Future research can make use of 
the personal archives of António Guterres after he concludes his term as 
Secretary-General. Documents which, like for Guterres’ predecessors, will 
likely include personal communications, memos, and briefs shared with the 
Secretary-General capturing significant developments in the ongoing debates 
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on migration-related matters. An initial search for the term ‘migration’ in the 
archives of Kofi Annan and Ban Ki-moon returned 1772 and 1630 documents, 
respectively. An initial review of these documents revealed much irrelevant 
material where the term migration was used in a different context, such as 
the migration of data or birds and animals, and duplicate documents. Thus, 
in order to narrow down these documents further, specific search terms were 
employed to gather documents relevant to each case study, namely, 1) IOM’s 
journey to the UN; 2) the GFMD; 3) the SDGs; 4) the Global Compacts. Having 
noted the significance of Peter Sutherland’s role during the interviews, I 
added a further search to locate files related to his role as the Special 
Representative of the Secretary-General for International Migration and 
Development (SRSG) (Table 3.7). Except for the inclusion of full folders 
(searches 7-9), no checks were done for duplications across categories. After 
checking for overlap between categories, the resulting corpus contained 510 
unique files. Of these documents, 425 appeared in one search; 58 in two 
searches, 21 in three searches, and the remaining six in four searches. Table 
3.7 summarizes the nine searches, including details on how many documents 
were ultimately included from each search and the reasons why documents 
were excluded.  
Table 3.7 The UN Archives, Building the Corpus 
# Date Search Terms  Files Exclusion Inclu
ded # Exclusion Reasons 
1 22.01.19 IOM  1126 882 Passing reference to IOM5 (361) 
Operational6 (321) 
Does not mention IOM7 (150) 
Duplicates (50) 
244 
2 12.02.19 Peter Sutherland 194 69 Not relevant8 (54)  
Duplicates (14) 
Not within correct date range (1) 
125 
3 22.03.19 GFMD 71 8 Not relevant (1) 
Duplicates (7) 
63 
4 07.08.19 SDGs/Post-2015 
Development 
Agenda  
273 154 Duplicates (17) 
No explicit references9 (137) 
119 
 
5 IOM mentioned in a list of organizations with no other significant mention of migration. 
6 Documents that included no more than 1-2 paragraphs describing IOM activities. 
7 IOM is not mentioned and there are no other significant references to migration. 
8 Does not relate to migration. Mentions Sutherland only in passing (e.g. as a past speaker in a 
series) or refers to a different Sutherland. 
9 No discursive connection is made between migration and the post-2015 development agenda 
and there are no other significant references to migration. 
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# Date Search Terms  Files Exclusion Inclu
ded # Exclusion Reasons 
5 11.07.19 Global Compact 
Migration 
34 20 No mention of compact (15) 
Not within the correct date range 
(1) 
Duplicates (4) 
 
14 
6 11.07.19 Global Compact 
Refugees 
39 37 Duplicates of GCM search (23) 
No Mention of Compacts (10) 
Not within the correct date range 
(2) 
Duplicate File (1) 
Folder Cover (1) 
2 
7 12.02.19 Folder: 
Development 
initiatives 
migration 
12 6 Already in Other Searches (4) 
Folder Cover (1) 
Duplicate (1) 
6 
8 12.02.19 Folder Human 
Rights refugees, 
migrants, 
displaced persons 
48 5 Folder Cover (3) 
Duplicate (1) 
Already in Another Search (1) 
43 
9 12.02.19 Folders: IGOs - 
IOM  
47 35 Already in Other Searches (34) 
Not relevant (1) 
12 
TOTALS 1844 121
6 
n/a 628 
 
Despite my effort to ensure that the corpus was comprehensive, some 
documentation may have been omitted due to the limitations of the search 
engine to capture keywords in documents where the quality of the scan was 
suboptimal. In addition to this, where some documents may be archived in 
folders of relevance to migration, occasionally human error results in 
inaccurately stored files. For example, several documents found in a folder, 
entitled ‘IGOS-IOM’ contained no references to IOM but were nevertheless 
relevant to the thesis. Other searches could have included, for example, the 
International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD), the Global 
Commission on International Migration (GCIM), the GMG, or the Berne 
Initiative. In terms of organizations, searches could have been done to gather 
documents from other actors such as UNHCR, UNDESA, ILO, or other 
relevant actors. The sample is, therefore, not a census of all documentation 
on migration housed in the UN archives. Despite this, given the selection of 
four case studies, it made sense to restrict the searches to those particular 
subjects. The UN Archives provide a wealthy source of data for future 
research. 
60   
 
 
 
After creating the archival corpus, I imported the relevant documents (n=510) 
into NVivo 12. I manually reviewed the documents, and recorded descriptive 
information in an Excel Sheet. This file included the date, language, author, 
and a brief description of the document (Annex 3.4). Using the query function 
in NVivo12, I identified subsamples that were of specific relevance to 
different chapters (Table 3.8). I analysed these subsets in their respective 
chapters. 
Table 3.8 UN Archives: Case Study Subsamples 
Chapter  Specific Search Term Number of 
Documents 
5. IOM: 
Journey to 
the UN 
International Organization for Migration, IOM  261 
6. GFMD GFMD, Global Forum on Migration and Development, 
Global Forum 
122 
7. SDGs Post-2015, Agenda 2030, SDGs, sustainable 
development goals 
99 
8. Global 
Compacts 
GCM, GCR, Global Compact, Global Compact 
Migration. Global Compact Refugee 
35 
 
3.3.3 Supplementary Data Sources  
 
While the interview and archival data pointed towards procedural aspects of 
the negotiation of the SDGs, they were not suited to understanding how 
different IOs framed the relationship between migration and development in 
advocating for the inclusion of migration in the SDGs. Thus, in addition to 
the interviews and archival records, I constructed two further sets of 
documents to support the analysis in Chapter 6. The first set of documents 
consists of the key outcome documents from the various bodies involved in 
the negotiations of the SDGs (Table 3.9). I coded these documents using 
NVivo 12 to identify passages relating to migration in order to analyse how 
migration was reflected throughout the SDG negotiations.  
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Table 3.9 List of Key Outcome Documents  
Author Description Published 
UNTT Realizing the Future We Want for All 
(UNTT, 2012) 
Jun-12 
UN General Assembly Rio Outcome Document: The Future 
We Want10 
Jul-12 
UNTT A Renewed Global Partnership for 
Development (UNTT, 2013) 
Mar-13 
Member States Dhaka Declaration11  Mar-13 
HLP A New Global Partnership (High-Level 
Panel of Eminent Persons, 2013) 
May-13 
SDSN Action Agenda for Sustainable 
Development (SDSN, 2013) 
Jun-13 
UN General Assembly HLD Declaration12  Oct-13 
UN Secretary-General Secretary-General Report for ICPD 
review13  
Jul-14 
OWG  Report of the Open Working Group 
(OWG) of the General Assembly on 
Sustainable Development Goals14  
Jul-14 
UN Secretary-General  Synthesis report of the Secretary-
General on the post-2015 sustainable 
development agenda15 
Dec-14 
SDSN Indicators and a Monitoring 
Framework (SDSN, 2015) 
Jun-15 
UN Addis Ababa Action Agenda16  Jul-15 
 
The second source of supplementary data was a sample of documents (n=121) 
written by the member organizations of the GMG in which they presented 
 
10 The Future We Want, GA Res 66/288, UNGAOR, UN Doc A/RES/66/288 (11 September 2012). 
11 Dhaka Declaration of the Global Leadership Meeting on Population Dynamics in the context of 
the Post-2015 Development Agenda (13 March 2013) 
12Declaration of the High-Level Dialogue on International Migration and Development, 
UNGAOR, 68th Session, UN Doc. A/68/L.5 (1 October 2013) 
13 Report of the Secretary-General: Recurrent Themes and Key Elements identified during the 
Sessions of the Commission on Population and Development, UNGAOR, 69th Session, UN Doc. 
A/69/122 (15 July 2014) 
14 UNGA, Report of the Open Working Group of the General Assembly on Sustainable 
Development Goals, UNGAOR, 68th Session, UN Doc. A/68/970 (12 August 2014) 
15 Report of the Secretary-General: The Road to Dignity by 2030: Ending Poverty, Transforming 
all Lives and Protecting the Planet, UNGAOR, UN Doc. A/69/700 (4 December 2014) 
16 Addis Ababa Action Agenda, UNGAOR, 69th Session, UN Doc. A/RES/69/313 (17 August 2015) 
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arguments for why the drafters of the post-2015 development agenda should 
include migration. International Organizations write prolifically. Google site 
searches for PDF documents on the websites of 17 GMG members17 identified 
just shy of three million documents, of which approximately 200,000 
referenced migration and just over 10,000 referred to both ‘migration’ and the 
‘post-2015’ development agenda. There are limitations to this approach. Next 
to the fact that PDF documents are only one medium through which IOs 
engage in discussions, the results that one receives may also be contingent on 
both location and past search history. Accordingly, I ran searches after 
clearing the cache of the computer to limit potential bias. Additionally, 
articles may be posted multiple times (duplicates) on different parts of a 
website.  A Google algorithm that automatically detects and removes possible 
duplicate texts from the results it displays (although the user can override 
this function if desired) partially resolves this issue. After implementing these 
exclusions, approximately 2500 documents remained. Based on the 
assumption that the first search results on Google will show the most 
relevant18 results, I downloaded the top 20 articles for each organization for 
further analysis, which resulted in an initial set of 340 documents. All 
documents were downloaded within one week (9 to 16 February 2017). 
Documents were excluded from the in-depth review if they did not meet all 
of the following requirements: (1) the document was produced before the 
adoption of the SDGs; (2) the document was produced by the organization; 
(3) the document discursively connects ‘migration’ and the ‘post-2015’ 
development agenda. Documents containing no narrative text (for example, 
conference programmes with no text other than the time and location of 
specific sessions) or those relating to alternative post-2015 processes were 
also excluded. In total, 219 documents were excluded (Table 3.10). 
Documents, where the specific IO was not the (sole) author of a document, 
were also excluded (n=92).  
 
 
17 The 17 members of the GMG included in the analysis were FAO, ILO, IOM, OHCHR, UN 
Women, UNCTAD, UN-DESA, UNDP, UNESCO, UNFPA, UNHCR, UNICEF, UNITAR, 
UNODC, UNU, World Bank, and WHO. The regional commissions were excluded. Additionally, 
members who joined the GMG after the adoption of the SDGs were also excluded (UNIDO, 
WFP). 
18 Relevance is defined as those documents where the keywords appeared most frequently or 
were well described in the search engine optimisation (SEO) description) of the document. 
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Table 3.10 SDG Documents, Inclusion and Exclusion Criteria  
Exclusion Reason Documents 
Published after October 2015 57 
Agency is not the (sole) author of the document  92 
Does not discursively link migration and post-2015 
development agenda 
59 
No narrative text (e.g., event schedule) 2 
Refers to a different post-2015 process (e.g., TB Strategy) 3 
Duplicate 6 
Total 219 
 
The resulting set of documents (n=121) were all published between 2012 and 
2015 and consisted of 3,892 pages of text. Sixty-one (50.4%) of these 
documents were published before the release of the Open Working Group 
(OWG) report on 18 July 2014, and 57 (47.1%) were published after. For three 
undated documents, I was not able to deduce whether it was prepared before 
or after 18 July 2014 from its contents. The significance of this date is that, 
while further negotiations had been anticipated, the 17 goals and 169 targets 
that comprise the SDGs were released and the window for bringing issues 
into the agenda were limited after this date. For three documents, the precise 
publication date is not available and cannot be deduced from the content of 
the document. A list of these documents is located in Annex 3.5.  
The documents were subsequently subdivided into three categories: 1) 
documents which made a passing reference to migration and the post-2015 
development agenda; 2) documents that solely focused on the post-2015 
development agenda (e.g., education and the post-2015 development 
agenda); and 3) documents that focused solely on migration and the post-
2015 development agenda. Just over half (55.4%) of the documents belonged 
to the first category. Just short of a third (31.4%) were documents focused on 
the post-2015 development agenda but without a specific migration focus. 
The remaining articles (13.2%) focused on migration and the post-2015 
development agenda. The 16 documents that solely focused on migration and 
the post-2015 development agenda were produced by four organizations: 
IOM (7 documents), ILO (6 documents), UNU (2 documents), and UNITAR 
(1 document) (Figure 3.1). 
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Figure 3.1 Documents Linking Migration to the Post-2015 Development Agenda  
 
Source: Author’s Own   
Note: n=121 
 
In each document (n=121), relevant passages where discursive linkages were 
made between migration and the sustainable development goals or the post-
2015 development agenda were identified and coded in NVivo12. For 
documents making a passing reference to migration and the post-2015 
development agenda (n=67), relevant passages were identified by doing 
keyword searches19. Only passages where migration and the post-2015 
development agenda were discursively connected were coded. Documents 
that were coded as ‘solely focusing on the Post-2015 development agenda’ 
(n=38) were searched for migration-related keywords on the assumption that 
any reference to migration in the context of these reports was, by nature of 
the document, discursively connected to the post-2015 development agenda. 
For documents where migration and the post-2015 development agenda were 
the sole focus (n=16), only passages explicitly offering arguments for why 
migration should be included were coded. After identifying the key 
arguments why migration should be included in the post-2015 development 
agenda, a secondary round of coding looked at the argumentation style 
 
19 Migration-related keywords included migr*, remittances, diaspora; and SDG related keywords 
included post-2015, post 2015, Agenda 2030, SDG, and sustainable development goal. 
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employed by different organizations in order to identify the frames 
underlying specific formulations.  
The analytical strategy for the second round of coding was informed by the 
work of Habermas (1993) and employed the operational definitions 
developed by Sjursen (2002). Habermas (1993) distinguished between three 
different approaches to argumentation: the pragmatic, the ethical-political, 
and the moral. The pragmatic approach is ‘based on a means-ends type of 
rationality where actors are considered to take decisions made on calculations 
of utility based on a given set of interests’ (Sjursen 2002, p.494). Pragmatic 
argumentation focuses on ‘technical and strategic direction for action’ 
(Habermas, 1993, p.10). The interests of the agent making the argument are 
central to the pragmatic approach. In the ethical-political approach, 
‘justification would rely on a particular conception of the collective ‘us’ and 
a particular idea of the values represented by a specific community’ (Sjursen 
2002, p.494). Ethical-political argumentation focuses on offering ‘clinical 
advice’ (Habermas 1993, p.9) based on an established set of mutually 
recognized rules. The moral approach, while similar to an ethical approach, 
differs in that ‘justifications rely on universal standards of justice, regardless 
of the utility of the policy to the particular actors involved in the decision or 
the specific values or perceptions of the “good life” embedded in the 
community outlining the policy’ (Sjursen 2002, p.494). Moral arguments offer 
some form of judgement about what one ‘ought’ to do. 
 
3.4 Methodological Challenges and Ethical 
Considerations 
 
In addition to the challenges already outlined in this chapter, this final section 
reflects on some of the broader challenges, one of which is related to the fact 
that the migration governance landscape was in a period of intense activity 
during the implementation of the study. This context made it challenging to 
organize interviews with individuals working in the field. Many of those I 
spoke to were actively engaged in fast-moving discussions as governments 
around the world negotiated the Global Compacts. On the one hand, this 
meant that many framed the evolution of global migration governance to 
explain the current developments without being asked to do so. However, on 
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the other hand, it meant that, had the interview been conducted at a different 
point in time, the same respondent may have given different answers. 
The politicised nature of the migration policy landscape also presented a 
challenge. To encourage an open environment for discussion, I guaranteed 
anonymity to all participants. Political sensitivities led several participants to 
request that the information shared during the interview or documents 
shared afterwards remained off the record. Ethically speaking, as a 
researcher, one must respect the wishes of one’s respondents. The use of the 
UN archives, however, allowed information that respondents had shared ‘off 
the record’ to be included with attribution only made to archives. The 
additional advantage of using multiple data sources was that this allowed 
information to be crosschecked, triangulated, increasing the robustness of the 
findings.  
A final notable consideration that merits reflection relates to the sample of 
respondents included in the thesis. I have already indicated that the sample 
reflects a significantly higher proportion of individuals from Western Europe 
and North America, as well as more males than females. The question arises 
as to whether this reflects a bias in the sample or bias in the composition of 
the particular group of actors engaging in global policy discussions relating 
to migration. Given that the same names were generally being suggested for 
interviews towards the end of the process, it is fair to assume that a degree of 
bias does exist in the group’s composition. It is likely that people from the 
Global South would have suggested different names altering the composition 
of the overall sample and reducing the Eurocentricity of the research findings. 
Given that I am also from Western Europe, it is important to state this 
upfront. While there was a higher proportion of non-responses from actors 
in the Global South, if given the opportunity to repeat the research, I would 
pay far more attention to ensuring better representation of actors from the 
Global South.  
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4. A History of Global Migration Governance 
 
4.1 Introduction  
 
In December 2018, almost a century after the end of the First World War and 
the signing of the Treaty of Versailles, states adopted two Global Compacts, 
one on migration and one on refugees, establishing roadmaps for the future 
of international cooperation relevant to population movements. While 
commentators often attribute these developments to the ‘migration crises’ of 
2015 (Newland, 2019; Betts, 2018; Guild, 2018; Klein Solomon and Sheldon, 
2019), they are also the product of more than one hundred years of 
institution-building during which the world has evolved tremendously. The 
world in 2018 looked very different from that of 1919. Rapid population 
growth, the advancement of technologies, war and conflicts, decolonization, 
economic crises, and other significant events have had implications for the 
patterns and governability of population movements. The environment 
within which IOs, states, and other actors operate has also dramatically 
changed. 
While there is a body of literature that investigates the history of various 
aspects of the global migration governance landscape (c.f. Bauloz 2017; Betts 
and Kainz, 2017; Martin, 2014; 2015; Koser, 2010; Chamie and Mirkin, 2013; 
Newland 2010; Pécoud and de Guchteneire 2007; Thouez 2018; de Wenden 
2012; Karatani, 2005; Long, 2013; Crush, 2013; Ghosh, 2005; Thouez and 
Channac, 2005; Böhning, 1991; Doyle, 2004; Miller, 2000; Martin, Martin, and 
Cross, 2007; and Widgren, 1990), few studies focus on providing a picture of 
its overall development. Notable exceptions include Martin (2014) who, in 
‘International Migration: Evolving Trends from the Early Twentieth Century 
to the Present’, traced the evolution of an ‘international migration “regime”’ 
(p.1) and Betts and Kainz (2017) who traced the evolution of global migration 
governance from 1919. While Martin (2014) drew attention to the cyclical 
aspects of the evolving regime, such as the role of conflict in catalysing action 
at the international level, her analysis is still often framed in terms of a linear 
journey towards a coherent regime. For example, she described the 
emergence of coordinative mechanisms such as the Global Forum on 
Migration and Development (GFMD) and the Global Migration Group 
(GMG) as ‘incipient regime-forming steps’ (p.2). Betts and Kainz (2017) were 
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perhaps even more linear in their approach. They divided the history of 
migration governance into four time periods: 1) early migration governance 
(1919-1989); 2) taking stock (1994-2006); 3) the era of migration and 
development (2007-2015); and 4) the New York Declaration and Global 
Compact Process (2016-2018). 
The challenge with adopting an overly linear view of the evolution of the 
global migration governance landscape is that one may ‘fall into progressive 
narratives in which global solutions build upon themselves, in which 
bilateral arrangements beget regional ones, regionals ones beget global 
multilateral ones, and multilateral solutions should and will deepen over 
time’ (Cohen, 2018, p.48). Cohen (2018) argued that that the success of early 
multilateral efforts, which shifted the balance of power in the international 
system towards a multipolar model, have made it increasingly difficult to 
reach agreement in a multilateral setting. Hence, multilateralism, as a 
‘problem-solving strategy or organizing principle’ (Cohen, 2018, p.50), has 
evolved and matured over time (c.f. Kahler 1992; Weber 1992; Van 
Langenhove, 2010). Accordingly, the governance of international migration 
may have become less multilateral over time. However, these broader 
theoretical considerations are rarely explicitly examined in the context of 
studies seeking to explain why global migration governance has evolved in 
the way it has. A need exists to consider the evolution of global migration 
governance in a way that accounts for these broader changes and which does 
not disconnect global migration governance from the context within which it 
evolved.  
Departing from the traditional linear accounts of the evolution of global 
migration governance, therefore, this chapter addresses the following sub-
questions:  
How has global migration governance evolved over the past 
century?  
What factors have broadly affected the way that global 
migration governance has evolved? 
 
After constructing a basic timeline of key events in the evolution of global 
migration governance, (Annex 4.1), I identified seven distinct, yet 
overlapping, phases, which provide structure to the remainder of the chapter 
(Table 4.1). Section 4.2 reviews the period between 1919 and 1951, which was 
an era of institution building. The majority of the institutions with a mandated 
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role in migration governance today were established by 1951. With the 
institutional landscape largely in place, Section 4.3 reviews the period 
between 1939 and 1990, during which various attempts were made to develop 
binding norms to govern population movements. Attempts to develop 
international conventions on migration have generally failed to gain traction, 
with the finalization of one convention shortly followed by the negotiation of 
a new instrument, with none receiving significant ratification, particularly 
among key countries of destination. Thus, from the mid-1980s, one begins to 
see attempts to govern migration proliferating in regional and informal as 
opposed to in global and formal settings (Section 4.4).  
After the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1991, renewed optimism for international 
cooperation saw the UN host a flurry of conferences on a range of different 
issues, which culminated in the adoption of an ambitious plan to tackle 
poverty, the Millennium Development Goals. Attempts to organize a 
conference on migration did not garner the necessary support, which, along 
with human rights more broadly, was omitted from the new agenda (Section 
4.5). While efforts to organise a conference on migration in the 1990s did not 
succeed, by the turn of the century, interest in migration had increased, 
perhaps as a result of 9/11 or the realization that remittances represented a 
more significant source of income to developing countries than development 
aid. Accordingly, former Secretary-General Kofi Annan placed migration 
high on the UN agenda (Section 4.6). However, next to the continuation of 
regional cooperation on migration outside of the UN, two distinct trajectories 
in migration’s journey as a global policy issue are apparent from the early 
2000s:  a slow-moving trajectory focused on migrant rights within the UN 
system (Section 4.6), and, particularly from 2006, a rapidly evolving trajectory 
focused on migration and development which took place chiefly externally to 
the UN but with a degree of UN involvement.  The developments from 2006 
arguably resulted in the acceptance of migration as a global policy issue 
through the inclusion of several migration relevant targets in the 
unanimously adopted Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in 2015 
(Section 4.7). However, a series of migration crises around the world in 2015 
demonstrated the limits of the existing international architecture, which led 
states to discuss new global arrangements. These discussions ultimately led to 
IOM entering the UN as a ‘related agency’ and states to decide to negotiate 
two Global Compacts (Section 4.8).  
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4.2 Early Global Migration Governance: Building 
Institutions (1919-1951) 
 
Although a desire to control population movements can be traced far back in 
history, for example, to the birth of the concept of state sovereignty in the 17th 
century, many of the international institutions that exist today were created 
by states in the early 20th century. A general trend towards international 
cooperation on a range of issues characterized the 20th century, and the 
number of international organizations increased exponentially (Section 2.2.2). 
Two particularly noteworthy attempts at intergovernmental cooperation 
were the League of Nations, founded in 1920 as a concrete outcome of the 
Paris Peace Conference, which marked the end of the First World War, and 
the UN, established shortly before the end of the Second World War. Both the 
League of Nations and the UN were efforts to encourage states to cooperate 
with the stated aim of achieving world peace. Hence, one should view the 
evolution of global migration governance in the context of ongoing efforts to 
shape and define the contours of what should fall under the remit of these 
respective organizations, a discussion influenced profoundly by the 
experiences of two World Wars. 
The creation of the ILO by the Treaty of Versailles in 1919 marked a key 
starting point for the journey of migration as a global policy issue (cf. 
Karatani, 2005; Long, 2013; Martin, 2014; Betts and Kainz, 2017). The 
preamble of ILO’s Constitution identified the ‘protection of the interest of 
workers when employed in countries other than their own’ as one of the 
‘conditions of labour’ that needed to be improved to address the injustice that 
can ‘imperil’ peace (ILO, 1919). The constitutional role of the ILO in labour 
migration was quickly operationalized. At the first meeting of the General 
Conference in 1919, two bodies were created within ILO tasked with 
migration matters: a special section in the International Labour Office dealing 
with questions relating to worker migration and their conditions in 
destination countries; and an international commission focusing on measures 
to regulate and protect migrant workers (Martin, 2014).  
Although mandated to work on labour migration, the ILO was soon called 
upon to assist Fridjolt Nansen in his role as High Commissioner for Refugees 
for the League of Nations. Nansen’s position was initially created to support 
Russians affected by the Denationalisation Decree of the then Soviet Union in 
1921, although in subsequent years, his mandate expanded to include 
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Armenian (1924), Assyrian and Assyro-Chaldean (1928) refugees (Long, 
2013; Martin, 2014). One of Nansen’s most notable contributions was the 
introduction of the Nansen Passport in 1922, which facilitated the 
international travel of refugees and is the antecedent of the modern-day 
passport. The Nansen Stamp Fund was established to facilitate the cost of 
obtaining this document but, between 1927 and 1930, also offered small 
business loans to refugees to help their integration in their new destinations. 
These measures reflected the nature of refugee protection of the time, which 
was focused on the economic inclusion of displaced populations driven 
primarily by development concerns (Long, 2013). Reflecting this focus, and 
on Nansen’s initiative, the ILO assumed operational responsibility for 
refugees, supporting Nansen’s office between 1925 and 1929. After Nansen 
died in 1930, his position as High Commissioner ceased to exist. However, 
the Nansen International Office for Refugees was created, working under the 
authority of the League of Nations for the best part of the next decade (Long, 
2013; Martin, 2014).  
From 1938, states created a series of temporary organizations to carry on 
Nansen’s work with refugees. In July 1938, a conference convened by US 
President Franklin D. Roosevelt in Evian brought together 32 states and other 
actors to discuss solutions for Jewish refugees (Martin, 2014). Many 
commentators look back at the Evian conference with scepticism arguing that 
‘some delegates spent far more time enjoying the Alps than they did 
discussing the plight of refugees’ (Martin, 2014, p.55). A concrete outcome of 
the Evian conference was the establishment of the Intergovernmental 
Committee on Refugees (IGCR). However, the IGCR ‘became inactive as soon 
as it was founded’ (Karatani, 2005, p.523). Karatani (2005) argues that its 
creation was more about establishing an institutional framework for 
addressing refugee matters to demonstrate US compassion for refugees and 
willingness to cooperate internationally while drawing attention away from 
US domestic policies. Amid the war, the US organized a conference in 
Bermuda to ‘revitalise the dormant IGCR’ (Karatani, 2005, p.527), which 
resulted in the creation of the United Nations1 Relief and Rehabilitation 
Administration (UNRRA) which would become part of the UN upon its 
establishment in 1945. In 1947, in the wake of displacement caused during the 
 
1 Although founded before the United Nations as we know it today, the use of United Nations 
in this context was a reference to a term coined by US President Franklin D. Roosevelt to describe 
the 26 nations that formed the ‘Allied Powers’ who were united against the Axis Powers 
(Germany, Italy and Japan) during the Second World War.  
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Second World War, the International Refugee Organization (IRO) was 
established to replace the UNRRA. After a series of other temporary 
organizations, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR) was established in December 1950, followed shortly by the 
adoption of the UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees in July 
1951.  
While historically ILO had provided operational support to the High 
Commissioner under the League of Nations, the politics of the Cold War 
came into play as states and other actors discussed how the international 
system should respond to displacement caused by the Second World War. 
The separation of the migration and refugee regimes, a separation that 
continues to influence the migration governance landscape today, occurred 
in the post-Second World War period (Karatani, 2005). To understand the 
separation further, one must take a step back and follow ILO’s journey at that 
time. In 1944, the Declaration of Philadelphia reinforced ILO’s mandate to 
work on programmes relating to migrant workers. In the years following 
World War II, the ILO continued to assert its place as the key institutional 
actor with a constitutional mandate to coordinate the international 
community’s response to migration. An ILO-UN plan on international 
coordination in the area of migration makes a distinction between different 
institutional actors operating in the area of migration based on their longevity 
and mandates. In the first category, the ILO and the UN are defined as being 
‘of permanent character and are charged by their constitutional characters 
with the responsibility for considering and solving international problems of 
an economic and social nature, and whose activities and programmes of work 
demonstrate their direct and major interest in migration problems’ (ILO, 1947 
in Karatani 2005, p.523). The second category included organizations that 
were ‘not of a permanent character or whose consideration of migration 
problems is only incidental to their other responsibilities and programmes’ 
(ILO, 1947 in Karatani 2005, p.523). The second category included the newly 
established IRO, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization (UNESCO), the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), the 
World Health Organization (WHO), and the International Bank for 
Development and Reconstruction (IBDR). 
In the years to come, ILO continued to assert its role, and, in 1951, organized 
a conference to lay out a proposal for the relocation of those displaced during 
the Second World War: 
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‘In 1951, ILO had proposed a flagship programme, 
which would have been huge in dollars of the day. The 
reaction from certain states was to boycott the big 
conference and instead to organize a meeting in Brussels 
to set up the Intergovernmental Committee on European 
Migration, which, as you know, was the genesis of IOM’ 
(INT-IO-012). 
However, as the quotation highlights, ILO’s proposal to be the central 
coordinator of international responses to migration was not to bear fruits. At 
a conference in Naples in October 1951, the ILO proposal to organize 
migration was rejected, mainly due to opposition from the US (Perruchoud, 
1989). Shortly after the conference, a Congressional Decision made their 
objections to ILO’s involvement clear:  
‘The US Congress was not prepared to release $10 
million in funding to an organization whose members 
included the Soviet bloc states Czechoslovakia and 
Poland, and instead favoured the establishment of a 
much more tightly controlled inter-governmental—
rather than international—organization which would 
focus solely on the transportation of migrants and 
refugees’ (Long, 2013, p.18). 
Shortly after the rejection of ILO’s plan, an intergovernmental organization, 
the Provisional Intergovernmental Committee for the Movement of Migrants 
from Europe (PICMME), was established to provide support to the newly 
established UNHCR. In an arrangement not dissimilar to that established 
between Nansen’s office and the ILO in the 1920s, PICMME was designed to 
provide operational support to UNHCR (Elie, 2010). Although initially also 
created as a temporary body, PICMME would eventually become a 
permanent institution, known as the International Organization for 
Migration (IOM) since 1989.  
By 1951, therefore, the institutional blueprints for global migration 
governance were mostly in place. Although new actors have since joined the 
ranks, ILO, UNHCR, and IOM continue to be the three IOs specifically 
mandated to deal with matters related to population movements. In the case 
of ILO, the focus is on labour migrants, for UNHCR it is refugees, and IOM 
has a broad mandate to work on migration-related matters. The US played a 
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significant role in establishing this institutional framework driven by the 
politics of the Cold War. The US viewed the League of Nations and the ILO 
as unsuitable venues within which to discuss refugee matters. Hence, as the 
dominant political power in the post-World War II era, the US used its 
financial power to establish new institutions, at first temporary in nature, to 
handle these matters. The US therefore influenced the separation between the 
refugee regime within the UN, and the migration regime largely external to 
the UN.  
 
4.3 Early Global Migration Governance: Developing 
Binding Norms (1939-1990)  
  
From an initial attempt in 1939 that failed because of the outbreak of war to 
the adoption of the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights 
of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families in 1990, various 
attempts to create binding norms in the area of migration have generally 
failed to gain traction. It is critical to view these developments in the context 
of a rapidly changing world. Next to the implications of Cold War politics in 
the establishment of the central institutions that remain relevant in the 
contemporary landscape of global migration governance, the end of the 
Second World War also marked the start of a process of decolonization which 
was to change the nature of labour migration: 
‘There was this issue of labour moving within the 
colonies, which was never seen as international 
migration because it was moving within the territory of, 
by and large, European countries’ (INT-IO-021). 
Previously the movement of an individual between the different territories 
was not considered to be international migration and therefore was excluded 
from the original migrant workers convention adopted by the ILO in 1939. 
As countries became independent, and Europe required workers for their 
post-war reconstruction, the question of governing international labour 
migration became increasingly pertinent. Externally to the UN, many 
industrialized countries started to institutionalize migration-related matters 
into their policy frameworks. While in the United Kingdom of Great Britain 
and Northern Ireland (UK) workers were still able to move within the 
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boundaries of the disintegrating Empire until the Commonwealth 
Immigrants Act 1962, many other countries in Europe established guest 
worker programmes to facilitate the migration of labourers to, and within, 
Europe. However, the 1973 oil crisis, which essentially put a stop to the post-
war guest worker programmes, changed the playing field, with countries in 
Europe increasingly concerned about irregular migration, joined by the US in 
the 1980s (Castles, 1986; Freeman, 1992). 
Next to increasing the number of individuals qualifying as international 
migrants, decolonization was also to change the balance of power in the 
global system. As Van Langenhoven (2010) notes, ‘when the UN was 
founded, two-thirds of its current members did not even exist as sovereign 
states as their people were still living under colonial rule’ (p.264). As more 
states joined the multilateral system, reaching an agreement that aligned with 
the interests of a greater diversity of states became increasingly tricky 
(Kahler, 1992). As countries gained independence, many became new 
members of the UN (Figure 4.1). Given that the UN was founded based on 
multilateral principles, that of the sovereign equality of states, the increased 
membership due to decolonization altered the playing field upon which 
international relations occurred. The end of the Cold War and the dissolution 
of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia in 1991 saw the UN membership grow 
even further. Furthermore, many Pacific Island states joined the UN in the 
1990s. It is within this evolving context that one should view the evolving 
normative framework that sought to govern population movements.  
Figure 4.1 UN Membership, 1945-2019 
 
Source: United Nations (2019c)  
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The negotiation of ILO’s first international convention for labour migration 
began before the Second World War (Miller, 2000). The convention 
responded to concern among countries of origin, most notably Italy, that 
‘migrants were primarily viewed as an exploitable labour force’ (INT-IO-
012). The Migration for Employment Convention, 1939 (No. 66), was adopted 
at the 25th Session of the International Labour Conference in June 1939. 
However, because of the outbreak of the Second World War, the convention 
did not receive one single ratification. A decade later, with new concerns 
primarily relating to the need for workers to rebuild Europe, the ILO adopted 
the Migration for Employment Convention (Revised), 1949 (No. 97) to revive 
interest in its pre-war attempt at creating binding norms in the area of labour 
migration. While the new convention reflected the essence of its antecedent 
convention, it gave more prominence to the notion of equal treatment and 
discrimination, as well as provisions relating to social security, remittances, 
and the health of migrant workers at all stages of the migration process 
(Annex 4.2). Convention No. 97 has arguably been the most successful 
attempt at creating binding standards in the area of labour migration: 
‘The 1949 instrument has quite a few ratifications 
amongst Western European countries, as well as 
countries like Israel and New Zealand reflecting that 
achieving agreement on binding standards relating to 
labour migration was once then less problematic than it 
became’ (INT-IO-021). 
However, viewed against other international conventions, it remains poorly 
ratified. 
After Convention No. 97, the focus of ILO’s next convention was on irregular 
migration. Between 1945 and 1974, many European countries, such as 
Belgium, France, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and, Germany from 1948, 
organised the recruitment of migrant workers to fuel post-war reconstruction 
efforts. Following the 1973 oil crisis, recruitment stopped, and migration from 
countries outside of the European Community was banned (Castles, 1986). 
However, migration continued, mainly through family reunification and 
formation at first, but then asylum increasingly became a de facto immigration 
channel for migrant workers (Freeman, 1992), which provided the rationale 
to develop a complementary convention that would address irregular 
migration (INT-IO-042). The Migrant Workers (Supplementary Provisions) 
Convention 1975 (No. 143) placed even more emphasis on ensuring the rights 
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of migrant workers. In addition to requiring states to repeal discriminatory 
legislation and practice, the new Convention also requires states to adopt 
‘positive actions in order to promote equality of treatment and opportunity’ 
(Chetail, 2019, p.209), which perhaps reflected the changing composition of 
UN membership. When the Migration for Employment Convention 
(Revised), 1949 (No. 97) was adopted, the UN had 57 Member States, a 
number which had more than doubled to 134 by the time the Migrant 
Workers (Supplementary Provisions) Convention 1975 (No. 143) was 
adopted in July 1975.  
However, Convention No. 143 was not well received. Just as the US’  decision 
to fund PICMME had thwarted ILO’s efforts in the 1950s, the ILO was side-
lined, this time by developing countries concerned that the Convention No. 
143 would restrict overseas employment opportunities and remittances 
(Böhning, 1991). Furthermore, the US and the UK, still the main centres of 
power in the international system, had little interest in the Convention. As 
noted, they still had policies in place to facilitate migration. For the US, it was 
not until the late 1980s that the US started to face increased irregular 
migration from Mexico and introduced employer sanctions coupled with an 
amnesty campaign in 1986 in an unsuccessful bid to tackle irregular flows 
(Freeman, 1992). For the US and the UK, this led to the exploration of 
alternative forms of intergovernmental cooperation, which will be explored 
further in Section 4.4. However, for many developing countries, what 
Böhning (1991) describes as ‘the battle for the UN Convention’ (p.699) arose 
from dissatisfaction with Convention No. 143. As Böhning (1991) described, 
‘the ink on ILO Convention No. 143 had hardly dried when the Mexican and 
Moroccan governments began to join hands in UN circles but outside the ILO 
to launch the elaboration of a new Convention on illegal migrants and their 
employment’ (Böhning, 1991, p.699). In 1977, Mexico sponsored a General 
Assembly Resolution2 on ‘Measures to Improve the Situation and Ensure the 
Human Rights and Dignity of All Migrant Workers’. Two years later, the UN 
formed an Open-ended Working Group of the General Assembly to develop 
a new UN convention on migration3.  
 
2 Measures to Improve the Situation and Ensure the Human Rights and Dignity of All Migrant 
Workers, UNGAOR, 32nd Session, UN Doc. A/RES/32/120 (16 December 1977) 
3 Measures to Improve the Situation and Ensure the Human Rights and Dignity of All Migrant 
Workers, UNGAOR, 34th Session, UN Doc. A/RES/34/172 (17 December 1979) 
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Böhning (1991) posits that the reasons Mexico and Morocco wished to pursue 
a convention within the UN as opposed to through the ILO was because they 
did not enjoy an ‘automatic majority’ within the ILO, making the UN an 
easier venue within which to achieve their goals. By the time the International 
Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and 
Members of Their Families (ICRMW) was adopted, the UN had 157 Member 
States. It took nine years from the presentation of the first draft of the ICRMW 
in 1981 before the text was finalized - a testament to the difficulty of achieving 
consensus within the expanded UN. It took a further 13 years for the 
Convention to receive the 20 ratifications required for the Convention to 
come into force (Ghosh, 2005). The ICRMW further solidified the distinction 
between refugees and migrants, by explicitly excluding refugees from its 
definitions where Convention No. 97 and Convention No. 143 had included 
them (Chetail, 2019). This exclusion likely was to appease actors such as the 
US and UNHCR who wished to keep the refugee and migration regimes 
separate (Pécoud, 2017). 
The controversy surrounding the ICRMW and ILO conventions resulted in a 
relatively low rate of ratification, particularly among key destination 
countries. As of 20 August 2019, less than half (n=91) of UN Member States 
had ratified at least one of the three migration-related conventions (C97, 
C143, and the ICRMW) (Table 4.2).  
Table 4.2 Ratifications of Key Migration Relevant Conventions  
Convention Description  Ratification 
C66 Migration for Employment 
Convention, 1939 (No. 66) 
Primarily relates to ensuring the 
rights of migrants in destination 
countries and regulating the 
recruitment process. 
0 
C97 Migration for Employment 
Convention (Revised), 1949 
(No. 97) 
Primarily relates to ensuring the 
rights of migrants in destination 
countries and facilitating 
migration. Annexes 1 and 2 relate 
to the regulation of recruitment 
and Annex 3 to the transfer of 
personal effects.  
50 
C143 the Migrant Workers 
(Supplementary Provisions) 
Convention 1975 (No. 143) 
Primarily relates to ensuring the 
rights of migrants in destination 
countries and on ‘illegal’ 
migration. 
24 
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Convention Description  Ratification 
ICRMW 1990 International 
Convention on the 
Protection of the Rights of 
All Migrant Workers and 
Members of Their Families 
(ICRMW) 
Focuses on the rights of migrant 
workers, primarily in destination 
countries. 
554 
Source: C66, C97, and C143 (ILO, 2019); ICRMW (United Nations, 2019a) 
 
Of these states, 61 Member States had ratified one convention, and 24 had 
ratified two conventions. Six states had ratified all three conventions 
(Albania, Burkina Faso, Madagascar, the Philippines, Tajikistan, and the 
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela). No EU5 Member State had ratified the 
1990 ICRMW. Among EU Member States, four countries had ratified the 
other two conventions (Cyprus, Italy, Portugal, and Slovenia), and six had 
ratified C97 (Belgium, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain, and the UK 
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland). Sweden had ratified C143. It is of note 
that ratifications in Europe mainly came from countries that were historically 
countries of emigration such as Italy and Portugal. Some evidence suggests 
that these countries warned others not to ratify the ICRMW and that the EU 
also put pressure on countries not to ratify the ICRMW (Pécoud, 2017). The 
remaining 17 EU Member States had not ratified any of the conventions. Of 
the traditional destination countries outside of Europe – the US, Canada, 
Australia, and New Zealand – only New Zealand had ratified Convention 
No. 97.  
Since the adoption of the ICRMW, efforts to establish universally binding 
norms in the area of migration have waned. Instead, states have pursued 
minilateral solutions to the challenges of migration at the regional level 
(Section 4.4); and, at the global level, through informal multilateralism in the 
form of non-binding norms and guidelines (Section 4.5 to 4.7). 
 
 
4 In addition, 13 countries are signatories to the convention but have not ratified it: ‘the signature 
qualifies the signatory State to proceed to ratification, acceptance or approval. It also creates an 
obligation to refrain, in good faith, from acts that would defeat the object and the purpose of the 
treaty’ (OHCHR, 2014). 
5 At time of writing this included the UK. 
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4.4 Regional Cooperation on Migration (1985-present) 
 
With many states reluctant to subscribe to binding norms in the area of 
migration, from the mid-1980s, a trend towards interstate cooperation on 
migration at the regional level through Regional Consultative Processes 
(RCP) emerged, first in Europe but then in other parts of the world. This 
change ushered in a period of informal collaboration on international 
migration in regional settings, and with limited formal engagement with the 
UN. Two key factors have likely driven this development. The first factor is 
the increasing complexity of migration patterns (Miller, 2000; Thouez & 
Channac, 2005; Von Koppenfels, 2001). The process of decolonization 
significantly increased the number of individuals qualifying as international 
migrants and created the need for migration policies to govern movements 
within the former territories. Additionally, the fall of the Berlin Wall in 
November 1991 and the resulting collapse of the Soviet Union and the 
removal of exit restrictions from many former Soviet States ushered in liberal 
economic policies (Bhagwati 1998; Von Koppenfels 2001; de Haas, Natter, 
and Vezzoli 2018).  
The second factor is the deepening of regional integration projects, starting in 
Europe. Von Koppenfels (2001) argues that RCPs are both a product and a 
facilitator of regional integration. The process of European integration started 
in the immediate post Second World War period. European integration was 
partly sponsored by the US, who was interested in establishing a unified 
Europe as a centre of power able to resist the potential threat of war between 
East and West (Dedman, 2006; Weber, 1992). The idea of a common market 
originated in the European Coal and Steel Community (1951) and gradually 
expanded as European integration deepened, first with the European 
Economic Community (1958-1986), then the European Community (1986-
1991), and finally, the European Union (Dedman, 2006). As the Cold War 
drew to a close, European integration accelerated. The Single European Act 
of 1986 established the goal of a common market by 1992. Combined with the 
dismantling of the internal borders in Europe, a process starting with the 
Schengen Agreement in 1985 led to the Maastricht Treaty and the creation of 
the EU in 1992. In other parts of the world, similar processes emerged. For 
example, in 1991, the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR) was created. 
In 1992, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was signed, 
and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) created a Free 
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Trade Area (AFTA). In 1994, the Common Market for Eastern and Southern 
Africa (COMESA) was founded.  
Given these contextual factors, it is unsurprising that the first RCP originated 
in Europe. As discussed, the 1980s in Europe had seen an increased number 
of asylum applications. The closure of the guest worker programmes in 
Europe in the mid-1970s had led to increasing migration through other 
channels, first family reunification, and later through asylum channels. The 
economic recession, coupled with growing unemployment, led to a 
‘xenophobic backlash’ against immigrants that heightened the political 
salience of migration (Thouez & Channac, 2005). Given that many European 
countries were facing similar challenges, intergovernmental cooperation 
became an increasingly logical choice. To discuss these challenges, Poul 
Hartling, then High Commissioner for Refugees, convened ‘Consultations on 
the Arrivals of Asylum-Seekers and Refugees in Europe’, a meeting attended 
by 35 Member States of the UNHCR Executive Committee in May 1985. In 
response to a call for ad hoc consultations between states, the then Under 
Secretary of State to the Swedish Minister for Migration Affairs, Jonas 
Widgren, called a meeting in Stockholm in November 1985 which was 
attended by seven European governments: Sweden, Denmark, France, 
Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland and the UK (Wall, 2018). This 
meeting was retrospectively considered the first meeting of the 
Intergovernmental Consultations on Migration, Asylum and Refugees (IGC), 
the world’s first RCP on migration (Wall, 2018). A key feature of the IGC was 
its independence from the UN even though UNHCR, and from 1993, IOM, 
hosted its Secretariat. 
By 1990, the IGC had more than doubled in size as Australia, Austria, 
Belgium, Canada, Finland, Italy, Norway, and the US joined its ranks. With 
the addition of Australia and the US, the IGC became a group of likeminded 
states, defined not by geography but by shared experiences and an interest in 
finding solutions. Although membership has fluctuated, it has remained 
relatively constant, with between 14 and 17 participating countries at any 
given point (Wall, 2018, p.34–35). Significantly, the IGC expanded beyond its 
European focus, with the participation of three traditional countries of 
immigration (Australia, Canada, and the US), arguably creating a new, more 
international, if not global, dynamic for discussion.  
Coupled with its independence, several core features of the IGC, such as its 
informal, non-binding and confidential nature, provided the blueprint for 
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other RCPs, which proliferated in the years to come (Von Koppenfels, 2001). 
Early examples include the Central American Commission of Migration 
Directors (OCAM) (1990); the Budapest Process (1993); the Puebla Process 
(1996); the Inter-Governmental Asia-Pacific Consultations on Refugees, 
Displaced Persons and Migrants (APC) (1996); The Pacific Immigration 
Directors’ Conference (1996); and the now-defunct Manila Process (1996) and 
CIS Conference (1996). The trend continued, and today there are at least 28 
active RCPs (Annex 4.3).  
The place of RCPs in the evolution of global migration governance is the 
subject of some debate within the literature. Some observers view RCPs as a 
step towards the creation of an international regime for migration: 
‘My interpretation is that states concluded that 
migration was too complex and politically sensitive a 
topic for them to address at the global level, and so they 
instead chose to meet in much smaller regional circles. 
Since these circles were informal and non-binding, it was 
possible to have a conversation. At the global level, it 
was apparent that the cleavage between North and 
South, between developed and developing, countries 
was too big a matter to bridge at that time’ (INT-IO-015). 
The argument was that, by establishing networks (Koser, 2010) and 
promoting policy convergence (Thouez & Channac, 2005; Von Koppenfels, 
2001), RCPs ‘could be valuable building blocks towards the establishment of 
a new international regime for better management of migration’ (Ghosh 2000, 
p.239), primarily because they could overcome the collective action challenge 
that characterized cooperation within the evolving multilateral system 
(Section 2.2.2).  
However, Klein Solomon (2005) argues that, while RCPs have ‘helped to 
create a climate conducive to the formation of other non-binding and 
informal platforms on migration management…(they) should not necessarily 
be seen as direct building blocks for the creation of formal institutions or a 
binding migration regime at the regional or global level’ (p.19). The argument 
is that RCPs occupy a logical place in a multilevelled system of governance. 
Not all aspects of migration governance merit a global response. Following 
the principle of subsidiarity, issues should be managed at the lowest logical 
level (Lavenex, 2018). Much migration occurs within regions, making RCPS 
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logical venues within which to discuss regional migration dynamics, 
explaining why RCPs have different thematic foci across the world (Klein 
Solomon, 2005; Von Koppenfels, 2001) and why, despite the further 
development of international fora on migration, RCPs and increasingly 
Interregional Forums (IRFs) continue to exist.  
Critics of RCPs and other informal, non-binding intergovernmental fora 
argue that they represent a shift towards ‘soft modes of network governance’ 
(Lavenex et al., 2016, p.459). They encourage members to emulate the policies 
and practices of regional or global hegemons regardless of whether their 
practices are in line with international standards. The tension between 
informality with action, and formality with inaction, has characterized many 
of the discussions on global migration governance in the post-Cold War era.  
 
4.5 Post-Cold War Euphoria: The Quest for New Global 
Arrangements (1991-2000) 
 
The 1990s was a decade of transformation for multilateralism. Particularly 
after the international response to the Gulf War in the late 1980s, there was 
optimism regarding what could be achieved through international 
cooperation (Kamau et al., 2018). This optimism led to a flurry of UN 
conferences on a range of different issues. Perhaps the most concrete outcome 
of these conferences was the adoption of the Millennium Declaration6 on 8 
September 2000, which led to the formulation of eight Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs) in 2001. However, the post-Cold War euphoria 
also led to the diffusion of liberal economic policies around the world. The 
1980s had witnessed the rise of neoliberalism, particularly in Western Europe, 
where the Post-Second World War welfare state projects were under strain 
(George & Wilding, 1994). The rise of neoliberalism led to a wave of 
privatization of previously public services as well as the injection of market-
based principles into state-run services. This trend was transferred around 
the world through the structural adjustment programmes of organizations 
such as the IMF and the World Bank (Collier & Gunning 1999). As Miller 
 
6 United Nations Millennium Declaration, UNGAOR, 55th Session, UN Doc. A/RES/55/2 (18 
September 2000) 
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(2000) argued, ‘the collapse of communism and the crisis of socialism 
accentuated the power of market forces’ (p.34).  
The liberal expansion is possibly most observable in the further evolution of 
the global trade regime. In 1994, the Uruguay Round of General Agreement 
on Trade and Tariff (GATT) Trade Talks concluded, which led to the General 
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) and the establishment of the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995. Although the ‘movement of natural 
persons’ was included as the fourth mode of service provision across borders 
in the GATS, commitments were initially limited to intra-company 
transferees with management or technical appointments that were 
considered essential to the functioning of the business; and to short-term 
business visitors. In 1996, the Negotiating Group on Movement of Natural 
Persons concluded their work, which modestly increased the coverage of 
Mode 4 through the addition of new categories of service providers and, in 
some cases, increased the permitted duration of stay (WTO, 2020). However, 
while no data exist to measure the extent of mobility facilitated through Mode 
4, it is not believed to represent a significant proportion of international 
migration flows (Nielson & Taglioni, 2003). Hence, it was amidst these 
changes that a discussion began about whether migration should be subject 
to similar agreements (Ghosh, 2000a).  
Following an initial presentation in an ILO working paper in 1991 (Böhning, 
2004), Thomas Straubhaar (1993, 2000) elaborated on the idea of a Global 
Agreement on Migration Policy (GAMP) similar to the GATT and GATS. 
Straubhaar’s premise was that the free movement of people is generally 
beneficial to the migrants but also to countries of origin and countries of 
destination. Thus, his vision for a GAMP was an agreement that would 
facilitate the entry and exit of individuals while also addressing externalities 
caused by international migration. However, as Böhning (2004) noted, the 
idea of an international organization that would actively promote more or 
free movement was never likely to receive political support. In a piece 
originally published in 1992 in the Christian Science Monitor, Jagdish 
Bhagwati, like Straubhaar, described the GATT as being ‘a worthy model’ for 
a World Migration Organization. He suggested that, akin to the trade policy 
reviews published by GATT officials, periodic migration policy reviews 
could ‘embarrass countries into more human and liberal ways of dealing with 
influxes of aliens’ (Bhagwati, 1998, p.316). Although not explicitly stated in 
his 1998 essay, the notion of state sovereignty is present in his reflection on 
the piece six years later: ‘the organization could not tell nations what to do, 
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since control of the border is regarded as an essential part of a nation-state’ 
(Bhagwati, 1998, p.1). In 1993, Bimal Ghosh brought similar ideas to the 
Commission on Global Governance with a paper entitled ‘Movements of 
People: The Search for a New International Regime’ (Ghosh, 2000a). These 
debates were further fuelled by the New International Regime for Orderly 
Movement of People (NIROMP) project when it launched in 1997, with 
financial support from the Swedish government (Ghosh, 2000a).  
Despite attempts to further institutionalise migration, however, even efforts 
to organise a conference on migration failed to gain the necessary support. In 
1993, a General Assembly Resolution discussed convening a UN Conference 
for the ‘Comprehensive Consideration and Review of Refugees, Returnees, 
Displaced Persons and Migrants’ (RES/48/113). States also discussed the idea 
for an international conference on migration at the 1994 International 
Conference on Population and Development (ICPD) in Cairo, where, again, 
no consensus was reached. The Programme of Action endorsed by 179 states 
at the conference did, however, devote an entire chapter to international 
migration and development, and internal migration (including forced 
displacement) was covered in the context of urbanization. For this reason, the 
ICPD conference is often considered to be the genesis of contemporary 
discussions on global migration governance (c.f. Newland, 2010; Betts, 2011). 
After the conference, the UN Population Division surveyed Member States 
on four occasions, in 1995, 1997, 1999, and 2003, finally reaching agreement 
on the organisation of a High-Level Dialogue on Migration and Development 
(HLD) which was held in New York in 2006 (Chamie and Mirkin 2013) 
(Section 4.7). 
As these discussions were ongoing, and in a further reflection of the 
expansion of liberal policies, aid agencies experienced a reduction in their 
budgets as donors from both ends of the political spectrum responded to 
concerns about the effectiveness of aid by reducing Overseas Development 
Assistance (ODA) (Carbone, 2013). Facing organisational downsizing, the 
high-level meeting of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development's (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC) in 1995 
focused on reframing development cooperation as an investment. An 
outcome of this meeting was the formation of the Groupe de Réflexion, which, 
although it had no clear end goal at inception, was tasked with the 
reinvigoration of the aid discussion. One of the concrete outputs of the group 
was a set of goals – the International Development Goals (IDGs), which were 
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a culmination of a review and synthesis of the declarations agreed upon at 
the many UN summits of the early 1990s.  
Concerned that the DAC was ‘taking control of a UN agenda’ (Hulme 2009, 
p.19), the idea of development goals was taken up by the UN towards the end 
of the 1990s. In preparation for the Millennium Assembly of the UN, Kofi 
Annan appointed John Ruggie to help him prepare a report based on 
previous UN conferences and summit declarations that would be acceptable 
to UN members. This report became ‘We the Peoples: the Role of the United 
Nations in the 21st Century’. The UN also collaborated in the publication of 
another report, entitled ‘2000: A Better World for All: Progress towards the 
International Development Goals’ alongside, in alphabetical order, IMF, 
OECD, and the World Bank. The UN’s involvement in the report accorded 
legitimacy to the IDGs, although there was still some concern that donor 
countries were over-influencing the agenda (Hulme, 2009). After 
negotiations, which primarily took place behind closed doors, the 
Millennium Declaration7 was unanimously accepted by the UN Member 
States on 8 September 2000, closely followed, in 2001, by the announcement 
of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), which strongly resembled 
the IDGs (Bernstein, 2005). Migration, along with human rights, was 
excluded. 
 
4.6 A New Century: A New Chance? (2001-2006) 
 
On the one hand, the new century opened with renewed optimism regarding 
the ability of the international community to solve the world’s biggest 
challenges. Described as ‘the world’s biggest promise’, the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs) were a set of eight goals, 18 targets and 48 
indicators with the broad aim of reducing poverty around the world (Hulme, 
2009). On the other hand, however, Zürn (2018) argues that two events in 
2001 ‘wrecked the liberal hopes that dominated the 1990s’ (p.1). The first was 
the attack on the World Trade Centre on 11 September, and the second was 
the coining of the term ‘BRIC’ by Goldman Sachs to describe the growth of 
 
7 United Nations Millennium Declaration, UNGAOR, 55th Session, UN Doc. A/RES/55/2 (18 
September 2000) 
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new economic powers (Brazil, Russia, India, and China8). The latter arguably 
symbolizes the completion of a global shift to a multipolar world. Whereas 
the world in which the UN was created was largely bipolar, by the turn of the 
century, it was multipolar. There had also been a shift from an open system, 
in which states were still being defined, towards a relatively closed system 
(Cohen, 2018). With Switzerland joining the UN in 2002, having previously 
opted to remain outside owing to its professed neutrality, hopes for genuine 
multilateral problem-solving based on the principle of the sovereign equality 
of states (Kahler, 1992) were renewed.  
Against this backdrop, and despite the challenges encountered concerning 
the organisation of a conference on migration in the 1990s, by the turn of the 
century ‘migration was everywhere one looked in the UN system and 
beyond’ (Newland 2010, p.333) and calls for a Global Migration Organization 
witnessed new energy (Bhagwati, 2003; Ghosh, 2000a; Helton, 2003). Several 
possible explanations that relate to external system events can be offered for 
the increased attention on migration at the global level.  
The first possible explanation is that migration’s exclusion from the MDGs 
had drawn attention to a lacuna in the development agenda. Despite not 
being included in the Millennium Development Goals, migration was 
explicitly mentioned in the Millennium Declaration alongside other goals in 
areas deemed ‘too difficult to measure unambiguously or too sensitive to 
handle politically’ (Browne & Weiss, 2014, p.6). This mention took the form 
of a commitment: 
‘to take measures to ensure respect for and protection of 
the human rights of migrants, migrant workers, and 
their families, to eliminate the increasing acts of racism 
and xenophobia in many societies and to promote 
greater harmony and tolerance in all societies9’ (para. 25, 
p.7). 
Given that the MDGs provided structure to development financing, it is 
plausible that the exclusion of migration provided the necessary impetus for 
the migration community to renew its efforts in the new millennium (INT-
 
8 Later becoming the BRICS with the addition of South Africa. 
9 United Nations Millennium Declaration, UNGAOR, 55th Session, UN Doc. A/RES/55/2 (18 
September 2000) 
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IO-002) (Section 4.6). As Steven Sinding stated of reproductive health, ‘if you 
are not an MDG, you’re not on the agenda’ (cited in Hulme 2009, p.25).  
Related to this, was the ‘rediscovery’ (INT-IO-024) of remittances by the 
World Bank in the early 2000s: 
‘If you look at the 1990s you hardly find any work by the 
World Bank. There were one or two papers on 
migration. What triggered this new development was 
the role of remittances. Suddenly people started noticing 
remittances’ (INT-IO-011). 
‘It really only took off when the World Bank jumped on 
it with the remittances issue’ (INT-IO-019). 
Remittances represented a tangible way of discussing migration-related 
phenomena without descending into discussions that had previously 
polarized countries: 
‘The developing countries did not want to say that 
people were leaving because they could not provide 
them with jobs, and the people in the North did not want 
to say that their border controls were broken. There was 
a polarized view in those days. Remittances brought 
fresh air to the whole thing by saying that remittances 
are more of a lifeline for developing countries, for poor 
people, than official aid’ (INT-IO-024). 
In light of the spread of liberalism, and the reduction of aid budgets, the 
recognition of the volume of remittances by the World Bank also drew 
attention to an alternative source of development financing. While 
remittances are  private money, the shifting focus of neoliberalism towards 
reduced state involvement arguably carved the path for the revival of 
discussions regarding the relationship between migration and development 
(de Haas, 2012). 
Another possible explanation for heightened international interest in 
migration is that the attack on the World Trade Centre on 11 September 2001 
(9/11) provided the necessary ‘coalition opportunity structure’ to reassert the 
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importance of the international community addressing matters of relevance 
to migration, from a security perspective. 
‘The 9/11 events raised national security risks 
significantly, or, to describe it more accurately, national 
security risk perception went up significantly in many 
developed countries. That put a shine on migrants. 
There were more border controls, more checks, and 
more worries about terrorists’ (INT-IO-024). 
While a significant body of literature exists, that asserts that the 9/11 attack 
contributed to the securitization of migration policy, Boswell (2007) 
challenged this assertion. She argued that 9/11 increased awareness of 
migration as a political issue, which was in line with a pre-existing process of 
securitization that had already started in Europe in the 1970s (Boswell, 2007). 
By 2001, migration had already been included in the UN’s security pillar 
through the addition of two protocols to the United Nations Convention 
against Transnational Organized Crime in 2000: 1) the Protocol to Prevent, 
Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Person, Especially Women and Children; 
and 2) the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Air and Sea 
(Ghosh, 2005). Significantly, these protocols have received much higher levels 
of support than the various migration-related conventions discussed in 
Section 4.3. 
Regardless of the precise reasons, from the early 2000s, migration started to 
receive more attention at the global level. However, two distinct trajectories 
in migration’s journey as a global policy issue are apparent: one focused on 
migrant rights within the UN system, and the other on migration 
management primarily outside of the UN. 
Within the UN, the legitimacy of a rights-based approach to migration was 
affirmed by the appointment in 1999 of Ms Gabriela Rodríguez Pizarro from 
Costa Rica as the first Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants. 
The rights-based approach to migration was further reinforced by the 
commitment made in the Millennium Declaration in 2000, and again in 2003 
when the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All 
Migrant Workers (ICRMW) received the necessary ratifications to come into 
effect (Section 4.3). However, efforts to further the normative architecture for 
a rights-based approach to migration were hindered by low ratification rates. 
In this context, the ILO sought to develop a non-binding multilateral 
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framework for labour migration. At the 92nd Session of the International 
Labour Conference in 2004, a Governing Body Resolution called for an ILO 
Plan of Action on Labour Migration (ILO, 2004). As part of the Plan of Action, 
the Governing Body agreed that the ILO should develop a Multilateral 
Framework for Labour Migration (MLF), which, after expert meetings in 
November 2005, was adopted at the 295th session of the ILO Governing Body 
in 2006 (ILO, 2006). While at the time, some states feared that the MLF would 
become a ‘backdoor convention’ (INT-IO-021), it ultimately became little 
more than a programmatic tool (Siegel et al., 2013). Some evidence suggests 
that this was because the ILO was instructed not to push the framework for 
fear that it would undermine efforts to galvanize support for international 
cooperation on migration that were being pursued by the Secretary-General 
(INT-IO-021).  
With heightened global attention to migration, the formula developed by the 
IGC in the 1980s was applied at the global level through the creation of 
informal state-led dialogues that promoted intergovernmental cooperation 
regarding migration. In 2001, the Swiss government launched the Berne 
Initiative which was a ‘states-owned consultative process with the goal of 
obtaining better management of migration at the global level through 
cooperation between states’ (Martin 2015, p.71) which led to the adoption of 
the non-binding International Agenda for Migration Management in 2004. 
Although a less often discussed process, the Berne Initiative is viewed by 
many observers as the first attempt to pursue global level cooperation on 
migration: 
‘the Berne Initiative Process was, put as simply as 
possible, a test of whether the global international 
community could identify some principles of 
governance that may apply to all’ (INT-IO-015). 
At the same time, and also outside of the UN, the IOM launched the 
International Dialogue on Migration (IDM) in 2001 (Martin 2015; Newland 
2010).  
With increased attention on migration, and potentially concerned that states 
may bypass the UN, then Secretary-General Kofi Annan expressed a desire 
to develop a comprehensive response to migration at the international level. 
In his 2002 report, ‘Strengthening of the United Nations: An Agenda for 
Further Change’, Kofi Annan noted: ‘I also believe that it is time to take a 
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more comprehensive look at the various dimensions of the migration issue’ 
(para. 39, p.10). In 2001, Kofi Annan tasked Prof. Michael Doyle to lead a 
working group on migration. Doyle’s report reviewed the opportunities for 
international cooperation on international migration, assessing, in particular, 
the feasibility of a global organization for migration, be it through the 
designation of an existing organization as ‘lead agency’, merging existing 
organizations, or creating a new one. The report concluded that not enough 
consensus on migration existed at the international level. Thus, the best 
interim solution was to enhance inter-agency coordination and to pay more 
attention to the ‘management’ of international migration.  
On 9 December 2003, Kofi Annan, at the behest of Member States, and in 
response to Doyle’s report, launched the first-ever global panel addressing 
international migration. The Global Commission on International Migration 
(GCIM) was comprised of 19 members from across the world and it was co-
chaired by Hon. Jan O. Karlsson (former Swedish Minister for Migration and 
Development) and Dr. Mamphela Ramphele (South Africa and former World 
Bank Managing Director). The Commission’s report, ‘Migration in an 
interconnected world: New directions for action’, was published in 2005 
(GCIM, 2005). Next to a comprehensive overview of migration-related issues, 
the report led to the formalisation and enlargement of the Geneva Migration 
Group, which became the Global Migration Group (GMG) in 2006 when its 
founding members were joined by the World Bank, the United Nations 
Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA), the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP), and the United Nations Population Fund 
(UNFPA) (Pécoud & de Guchteneire, 2007).  
After the GCIM report, and in response to the 2003 agreement to hold an 
international conference on international migration10, Kofi Annan in 2006 
appointed the late Sir Peter Sutherland to be his Special Representative on 
Migration and Development. As a former and the youngest Attorney General 
of Ireland, Director of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 
and the WTO and Chairman of BP plc and Goldman Sachs International, 
Peter Sutherland came with international authority and a strong message: 
‘Migration can be an enormous force for good: one of the 
great drivers of economic growth, individual liberty and 
 
10 International migration and development, UNGAOR, 58th Session, UN Doc. A/RES/58/208 (23 
December 2003) 
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personal prosperity. As such, I am delighted to 
undertake this assignment for Kofi Annan. The goal is to 
maximise the benefits of migration and minimise 
potentially negative impacts’ (United Nations, 2006). 
One of Sutherland’s first tasks was the organisation of the first HLD on 
International Migration and Development in New York in 2006 (United 
Nations, 2006). One of the most significant outcomes of the HLD was the 
agreement by Member States to organize a Global Forum on Migration and 
Development (GFMD). The first GFMD took place in Brussels in 2007 which 
arguably ushered in ‘the era of migration and development’ (Betts and Kainz 
2017, p.1). 
 
4.7 The Era of Migration and Development (2006-2015) 
 
From 2007, interest in migration among UN agencies increased. The GMG 
witnessed several rounds of enlargement, the largest of which took place in 
2007 when UNESCO, the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), the 
United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR) and the UN’s 
five Regional Commissions joined the group. The World Health Organization 
(WHO) and UN Women joined in 2010 and UNU and FAO in 2014. Many 
attribute this growth in interest to the framing of migration as a development 
issue. Although the theoretical link between migration and development 
predated 2007 (Section 4.2), its significance as an international policy field 
became particularly prominent with the establishment of the GFMD in 2007, 
arguably at the expense of some of the rights-based initiatives, discussed in 
Section 4.6, that had gained momentum since the turn of the millennium 
(INT-IO-011; INT-IO-021; INT-IO-040, INT-IO-042).  
The first meeting of the GFMD took place in Brussels, Belgium, on 9-11 July 
2007, and it has continued on an almost annual basis ever since rotating 
between developed and developing countries. Since its inception in 2007, the 
GFMD has become the most important meeting of states with regards to 
migration at the international level (INT-IO-013). The conversations at the 
GFMD have evolved, often influenced by external events such as the 2008 
financial crisis, the elaboration of the post-2015 development agenda, and the 
Syrian crisis (Table 4.3). 
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Table 4.3 GFMD Meetings 2007-2019 
Year Location Theme 
2007 Brussels, Belgium Migration and socio-economic development 
2008 Manila, Philippines Protecting and Empowering Migrants for Development 
2009 Athens, Greece Integrating Migration Policies into Development 
Strategies for the Benefit of All 
2010 Puerta Vallarta, 
Mexico 
Partnerships for Migration and Human Development: 
Shared Prosperity, Shared Responsibility 
2011 Geneva, 
Switzerland 
Taking Action on Migration and Development – 
Coherence, Capacity and Cooperation 
2012 Port Louis, Mauritius Enhancing the Human Development of Migrants and 
their Contribution to the Development of Communities 
and States 
2013-
2014 
Stockholm, Sweden Unlocking the Potential of Migration for Inclusive 
Development 
2014-
2015 
Istanbul, Turkey Strengthening Partnerships: Human Mobility for 
Sustainable Development 
2016 Dhaka, 
Bangladesh 
Migration that works for Sustainable Development of 
all: Towards a Transformative Migration Agenda 
2017  
2018 
Berlin, Germany and 
Marrakesh, Morocco 
Towards a Global Social Contract on Migration and 
Development 
2019 Ecuador Sustainable approaches to human mobility: Upholding 
rights, strengthening state agency, and advancing 
development through partnerships and collective 
action. 
 
Over time, traditional ‘migration and development’ topics such as 
remittances and diaspora engagement have played a less central role in the 
discussions at the GFMD. One explanation for this is that the ‘migration and 
development’ framing was used instrumentally to bring states together. Once 
less controversial topics had been discussed, states could turn their attention 
to more controversial matters, such as the rights of migrants. This view is 
perhaps why Skeldon (2008) argued that ‘migration and development’ was 
‘a passing phase’ and Gamlen (2010) suggested that UNDP’s Human 
Development Report on migration would represent a ‘high-water mark’ in 
international discussions on ‘migration and development’ (p.421). 
Many observers note that, over time, the topic of human rights became more 
prevalent at the GFMD. However, while there was a deliberate decision to 
exclude human rights from the discussions at the GFMD as it was being 
conceptualised (Chapter 5), human rights was treated as a cross-cutting 
theme at the first GFMD in 2007 ‘seen throughout the meeting as an essential 
prerequisite to migrants contributing to development’ (GFMD 2008, p.22). 
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The topic of human rights was more concretely addressed during the second 
meeting of the GFMD in the Philippines, probably due to the host’s interest 
in protecting its significant number of emigrants abroad. At the Mexican 
GFMD, human rights were brought even more into the foreground, because 
of Mexico’s interest in protecting its migrants in the US:  
‘Mexico put the human rights of migrants on the table 
because Mexicans were mistreated in the US and they 
wanted, as representative of the South, to bring the issue 
of the human rights of migrants onto the table’ (INT-IO-
013). 
From a review of the Chair reports of the GFMD from Belgium in 2007 to 
Bangladesh in 2016, rights are, with the exception of Belgium, most 
frequently mentioned in the reports of countries in the South (Figure 4.2). 
Figure 4.2 Word Frequency in GFMD Chair Reports, 2007-2016 
 
Source: Author’s own, based on GFMD Chair Reports, 2007-2016  
 
However, despite the suggestion that the era of migration and development 
might be coming to an end, and as the deadline for the Millennium 
Development Goals approached, the discussion turned to ensure that 
migration was reflected in the Post-2015 development agenda: 
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‘Different constituencies saw an opportunity. 
Sutherland and the GFMD crowd saw this as a way to 
elevate the issue of migration from their personal 
perspective, which was this treasured ‘migration and 
development’ framing’ (INT-IO-040). 
Discussions regarding the place of migration in the post-2015 development 
agenda began at the GFMD in Mauritius in 2012 and were finalized during 
the Swedish chairmanship of the GFMD in 2013/14, which coincided with the 
second High-Level Dialogue on International Migration and Development in 
2013. The inclusion of migration in the Post-2015 development agenda was 
one of the most concrete policy commitments made at the second HLD. In the 
country statements made at the HLD ‘the most commonly mentioned policy 
priority was integrating migration into the post-2015 development agenda’ 
(UNDESA, 2014, p.9). Unlike the first HLD, a final declaration11 emerged 
from the second HLD on the initiative of Mexico (INT-IO-016; INT-IO-029):  
‘The declaration of the second High-Level Dialogue in 
2013 was critical because it signified that we had arrived 
at a consensus in the United Nations on the links 
between migration and development. This no doubt 
facilitated the General Assembly to agree with migration 
being mainstreamed into the Sustainable Development 
Goals’ (INT-IO-029). 
In the HLD Declaration12, Member States acknowledged ‘the important 
contribution of migration in realizing the Millennium Development Goals’ 
and recognised ‘that human mobility is a key factor for sustainable 
development which should be adequately considered in the elaboration of 
the post-2015 development agenda’ (para. 8, p.2). Accordingly, on 25 
September 2015, the Member States of the UN unanimously adopted 
Sustainable Development Goals13. In addition to a paragraph devoted to 
migration in the preamble, migration was explicitly mentioned in four of the 
 
11 Declaration of the High-Level Dialogue on International Migration and Development, 
UNGAOR, 68th Session, UN Doc. A/68/L.5 (Oct. 1, 2013) 
12 Declaration of the High-Level Dialogue on International Migration and Development, 
UNGAOR, 68th Session, UN Doc. A/68/L.5 (Oct. 1, 2013) 
13 Transforming our World: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, UNGAOR, 70th 
Session, UN Doc. A/RES/70/1 (25 September 2015) 
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SDGs targets (8.8, 10.7, 10.c. and 17.18). Furthermore, some argue that 
migration is implicit across the entire development agenda, a point that will 
be returned to in Chapter 6.  
However, already at the second HLD, the conversation started to shift from 
a focus on development. On the first day of the second HLD, 3 October 2013, 
a boat capsized off the coast of Lampedusa, which resulted in the deaths of 
at least 368 people. In his opening remarks, Ban Ki-moon stated the following: 
‘Before I begin, let me just note that we need to look no 
further than this morning’s headlines to see the great 
importance of this dialogue. Dozens of African migrants 
are reported to have perished in the Mediterranean after 
the ship on which they were travelling sank’ (Ki-moon, 
2013). 
One of the concrete actions taken after the second HLD was the Migrants in 
Countries in Crisis (MICIC) initiative, which was established by the 
Philippines and the US in 2014 and was born out of the challenges faced 
during the 2011 Libyan crisis.  
‘Libya was a bold example. There were lots of 
international workers trapped during the outbreak of 
the civil war. We wanted to move the discussion from a 
talking shop and to focus on implementation and that is 
why we designed the Migrant in Countries in Crisis 
Initiative’ (INT-IO-037). 
In 2015, the number of deaths due to unsafe sea crossings increased as the 
Syrian Crisis escalated (IOM, 2020). The focus shifted, as it had in the late 
1980s towards the mass displacement of people. In this context, states began 
to look for new international solutions to migration-related challenges.  
4.8 Towards New Global Arrangements: the Global 
Compacts (2016-2018) 
 
In October 2016, in addition to IOM joining the UN as a ‘related agency’, 
Member States unanimously agreed upon the New York Declaration (NYD) 
at the closing of the High-Level Summit for Refugees and Migrants, where 
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states committed themselves to negotiate two Global Compacts, one on 
migration and the other on refugees, by 2018. This commenced two years of 
consultations and negotiation, which concluded in December 2018. However, 
these negotiations took place in a considerably complex context. On 23 June 
2016, the British public voted in a referendum on their membership in the 
European Union. The resulting vote, marginally in favour of leaving the EU, 
triggered several years of negotiations, which ultimately resulted in the UK 
leaving the EU on 31 January 2020. In January 2017, Donald Trump became 
the 45th president of the US, which marked the start of a period of American 
isolationism. Trump’s withdrawal from the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly 
and Regular Migration (GCM), citing concerns that it was a ‘back-door 
convention’ incompatible with the sovereign right of states to control their 
borders, is emblematic of a crisis in multilateralism (Ferris and Martin, 2019; 
Ferris and Donato, 2019). However, unlike in the 1950s, when the US used its 
power to steer migration outside of the UN, in a markedly different world, 
the negotiations went ahead without the US.  
The withdrawal of the US is one explanation for the distinctly separate nature 
of the negotiations. The NYD had initially envisaged more overlap between 
the two Compacts in recognition of the fact that refugees are also migrants, 
and that a group of individuals exists who do not qualify as refugees under 
the 1951 Convention and its 1967 protocol and yet face similar vulnerabilities. 
However, while UNHCR led the GCR negotiations, states retained more 
control over the GCM negotiations. The Global Compact on Refugees was 
adopted by consensus, receiving 181 votes in favour, two against (Hungary 
and the US) and three abstentions (Eritrea, Liberia, and Libya) at the General 
Assembly of the UN on 17 December 2018. After being adopted by 164 
Member States at an Intergovernmental Conference in Marrakesh, Morocco, 
on 10 December 2018, the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular 
Migration was endorsed by the General Assembly on 19 December 2018. At 
the General Assembly, the GCM received slightly less support, with 152 
Member States voting in favour of endorsing the GCM, five voting against it 
(Czech Republic, Hungary, Israel, Poland, and the US). Twelve Member 
States abstained14. 
Since the adoption of the GCM, several initiatives have been launched to 
support its implementation. The UN Migration Network, which replaced the 
GMG and is chaired by IOM, was launched by António Guterres at the 
 
14 For a full list of the votes see United Nations (2018c). 
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Marrakesh meeting. In May 2019, the Migration Multi-Partner Trust Fund 
(MPTF) was launched to provide financial support to Member States in 
implementing the commitments outlined in the GCM (United Nations, 
2019b). The non-binding nature of the Compacts does, however, point to the 
fact that, while states have accepted the institutionalization of migration into 
the UN, they remain hesitant to create legally binding norms. While much 
remains to be seen in terms implementation, the GCM marked a defining 
moment in the journey of migration as a global policy issue.  
 
4.9 Conclusion 
 
From this review of the evolution of global migration governance, it is 
evident that the process of institutionalising migration into the UN has not 
been linear: 
‘It looks in hindsight as quite linear, but if you have been 
involved and living the day-to-day, it was not really 
very linear. It reacted to external factors: what was 
happening in the real world, and to the way that 
international organizations operate’ (INT-IO-040). 
The way migration has been framed as an international policy issue has 
changed over time, driven by external (dynamic and stable) factors such as 
decolonization which definitionally changed the meaning of international 
migration; economic crises which, among other impacts, altered the demand 
for migrant labour; and conflict. Furthermore, as the multilateral system has 
evolved, the environment within which migration is discussed at the global 
level has also evolved as the power hierarchy has shifted from a bipolar to a 
multipolar system. Accordingly, since the end of the Cold War, and 
particularly since the turn of the millennium, migration has gained 
prominence as an issue that should be more clearly institutionalized within 
the UN. In the remainder of the dissertation, I will examine four case studies  
that seek to uncover the extent to which framing migration as a development 
issue has been at the centre of IO’s efforts to convince states to deal with 
migration within the context of the UN. However, without the existence of 
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external system events, notably the migration crises of 2015, the results of IO 
framing efforts may not have led to the same outcome. 
Multiple authors have pointed to the significance of the GFMD as a pivot 
point in international cooperation on migration, where the problem of 
migration was reframed as a development issue in order to advance 
international cooperation (cf. Betts and Kainz 2017; Roldan and Gasper 2010; 
Rother 2018). Accordingly, Chapter 5 examines the genesis of the GFMD. The 
inclusion of migration in the SDGs is said to have brought migration more 
generally, and IOM specifically, into the UN. Hence, Chapter 6 examines how 
actors from different advocacy coalitions engaged with the migration frame 
to convince the architects of the SDGs that migration should be reflected in 
the new development agenda. The dissertation then turns to look at the next 
aspect of the institutionalization of migration into the UN: the designation of 
IOM as the UN’s lead agency for migration. Chapter 7 examines IOM’s 
journey to the UN from its creation as a temporary intergovernmental 
committee in 1951 to its entry as a ‘related agency’ of the UN in 2016 and 
critically analyses the factors contributing towards the decision that IOM 
should be part of the UN system. Finally, Chapter 8 looks at the most recent 
attempt of the UN to develop norms to guide states in the governance of 
migration. The GCM represents the first time states have explicitly negotiated 
an overarching framework for the governance of migration. Given historic 
resistance to developing norms in the area of migration, this case study 
analyses the genesis of the Global Compact discussion. 
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5. Reframing Migration: the Global Forum on 
Migration and Development 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
The Global Forum on Migration and Development (GFMD) was established 
at the UN High-Level Dialogue (HLD) on International Migration and 
Development in September 2006. While the agreement to hold the HLD 
represented a degree of progress in the willingness of states to discuss 
migration within a UN setting, the provision that it would have no binding 
outcome highlighted a continued resistance to the idea of full UN 
engagement on the topic. There was thus some concern about what would 
happen after the HLD in 2006. Within this context, the idea of a global 
consultative forum on international migration began to take shape. The first 
meeting of the GFMD was hosted by the Government of Belgium in Brussels 
in July 2007, and most recently, the 12th GFMD meeting took place in Quito, 
Ecuador in early 2020. 
Scholars often describe the GFMD as a pivot point, or ‘stepping stone’ (Rother 
2018, p.854), in the evolution of international cooperation on migration when 
the problem of migration was reframed in order to advance international 
cooperation (cf. Betts and Kainz, 2017; Roldan and Gasper, 2010; Rother, 
2018). As Kofi Annan’s opening remarks at the first HLD make clear, the 
argument that the GFMD presented an opportunity to reframe migration to 
foster progress is neither new nor hidden: 
‘I am especially delighted that so many of you have 
embraced my proposal for a Global Forum on Migration 
and Development, and asked me to help set it up. And I 
am particularly grateful to the Government of Belgium 
for offering to host the first meeting next year. I believe 
such a Forum can foster practical, evidence-based 
cooperation among governments. It can give you a 
chance to frame the issues in a way that allows you to 
move forward together, to discover areas where you 
agree, and to find ways of improving cooperation’ 
(Annan 2006). 
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The GFMD provides a concrete example of how the UN exercised constitutive 
power to influence intergovernmental cooperation on migration. However, 
the GFMD has rarely been the subject of empirical analysis. An exception is 
the work of Roldan and Gasper (2010). They use both frame-reflective policy 
analysis and discourse analysis to analyse Kofi Annan’s opening address at 
the HLD in 2006 and the Chairman’s report of the second meeting of the 
GFMD in Manila in 2008. Roldan and Gasper (2010) focus primarily on the 
rhetorical devices through which Kofi Annan frames the GFMD as a solution 
to ‘entrenched disagreements and mistrust’ (p.24) that had characterized 
international cooperation on migration.  
 
This chapter investigates the role played by the UN and specifically Peter 
Sutherland, as a policy broker in the conceptualization of the GFMD. Sabatier 
(1998) defined policy brokers as actors ‘whose principal concern is to find 
some reasonable compromise which will reduce intense conflict’ (p.133). 
Accordingly, this chapter employs Abolafia’s (2004) temporal model of 
framing to investigate the role of policy brokers in the global policymaking 
process.  In doing so, the chapter also responds to a common criticism of 
framing research, which is that researchers often anthropomorphize frames 
to the neglect of the role played by different actors in (re)framing efforts 
(Benford, 1997). 
 
Having identified the GFMD as a relevant case study that will help us to 
understand how international organizations have influenced the evolution of 
global migration governance, this chapter will address the following sub-
questions:  
How was migration framed as a global policy issue before the 
establishment of the GFMD? 
What was the role of different actors in promoting or opposing 
a frame shift after the establishment of GFMD? 
What factors influenced the adoption of the ‘migration and 
development’ frame? 
 
To address these questions, the chapter draws on two primary sources of 
data1. The first is a subsample of documents collated from the UN Archives 
 
1 Section 3.3 provides details on how the data were collected. 
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(n=110), which refer to the GFMD. Particular attention was given to 
documents published before the first GFMD in July 2007. During this time, 
various actors interacted with then-Secretary-General Kofi Annan regarding 
the conceptualization and realization of the forum. Additionally, the chapter 
draws on key informant interviews. The majority (n=35) of respondents 
discussed the GFMD. The documents and interview transcripts were coded 
in NVivo 12. The codebook is located in Annex 3.3.  
The remainder of the chapter is divided in three parts. Building on the 
discussion in Chapter 4, the first part of the chapter outlines the way different 
actors framed migration before the first GFMD (Section 5.2). The second part 
of the chapter (Section 5.3) focuses on early discussions centred on the 
creation of a Global Forum, which began in the months preceding the first 
High-Level Dialogue on International Migration and Development. Having 
established in Section 5.3 that Sir Peter Sutherland’s vision of the global 
forum came into fruition, the third part of the chapter (Section 5.4) examines 
Sutherland’s role in more detail. Specifically, it applies Abolafia’s (2004) 
temporal model of framing to analyse the framing/rhetorical devices 
employed by Sutherland to galvanize support for his vision and to mobilize 
action.  
 
5.2 Framing Migration before the GFMD  
 
In the early part of the 21st century, there were two distinct trajectories in 
migration’s journey as a global policy issue: one focused on migrant rights 
and the other on migration management (Section 4.5 and 4.6). A third frame, 
‘migration and development’, also started to gain traction as a policy field in 
the early 2000s (Section 4.7). Although overlap exists, distinct groups of 
actors, or advocacy coalitions, promote these policy frames:  
‘There is a huge constituency in the UN that is all about 
migration and human rights. There is large support for 
that agenda. There is also support for an agenda that is 
about migration management and strengthening the 
capacity of states to manage migration. But there is 
actually a small group of countries that has any interest 
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in the migration and development agenda’ (INT-GOV-
031). 
With limited interest by states in the migration and development agenda, one 
might wonder why it gained such prominence in global policy discussions. 
This section introduces each frame, the actors supporting each frame, and the 
central premises of each frame (Table 5.1).  
Table 5.1 Migration Frames 
 Rights Management Development 
Problem 
Definition 
Migrant rights are 
human rights. 
Migrants are 
vulnerable to 
exclusion.  
Migration is a 
phenomenon that 
needs to be 
managed. 
Migration and 
development are 
inextricably linked.  
Solutions International law – 
conventions and 
guidelines with a 
preference for 
binding norms 
Knowledge 
sharing, informal 
guidelines, sharing 
good practices, 
partnerships,  
Knowledge sharing, 
informal guidelines, 
sharing good 
practices, 
partnerships, 
Frame 
Characteristics 
Normative, 
formal, binding 
norms 
Pragmatic, 
informal, good 
practice 
Pragmatic, informal, 
good practice 
Key Frame 
Supporters 
(Advocacy 
Coalitions) 
ILO, OHCHR, civil 
society (mainly 
rights-based 
organizations), 
Countries in the 
Global South (e.g., 
Philippines, 
Mexico, Morocco) 
IOM, ICMPD, 
Countries in the 
Global North (e.g., 
the US, Australia, 
EU Member States) 
World Bank, UNDP, 
Sutherland, civil 
society (mainly 
development and  
diaspora), countries 
in both the Global 
North and South 
(e.g., Sweden, 
Switzerland, 
Philippines, 
Bangladesh) 
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5.2.1 The ‘Rights’ Frame 
 
Framing migration as an issue of rights has a long tradition, particularly 
within the UN. The driving force behind the development of norms in the 
area of migration was an interest, particularly among countries of origin, to 
protect the rights of migrant workers in countries of destination (Section 4.3). 
Proponents of the migrant rights frame argue that, if migrants rights are 
protected, then many of the problems associated with migration will be 
solved. By focusing on migrants as individuals, the human rights frame often 
deals with issues such as working and living conditions, labour standards, 
access to justice, and detention. A by-product of the focus on ensuring rights 
is the question of vulnerability of those whose rights are not respected. 
However, particularly since welfare state retrenchment and the diffusion of 
structural adjustment policies around the world in the 1980s, the accordance 
of rights to non-citizens has become an increasingly sensitive electoral issue: 
‘Migrants have rights like anyone else. States accept that, 
except they do not want to do the speech act of ratifying 
a convention that says so’ (INT-IO-013). 
The framing of migration as a matter of human rights has been most strongly 
advocated by countries in the South. Mexico and Morocco were the countries 
that put their weight behind the ICRMW. Thinking back to our discussion of 
the international organization as an entity (Section 2.2.2), one would expect 
normative organizations such as ILO, the Office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), and UNHCR to be more likely 
to support a rights frame. Additionally, organizations focusing on specific 
population groups such as UNICEF (children) and UN Women, which each 
are custodians of widely accepted international human rights instrument,2 
might be expected to frame their work with migrants in terms of human 
rights. A rights-based frame is also a natural position for many civil society 
actors advocating for migrants around the world (Piper, 2017).  
Historically the elaboration of legally binding international instruments has 
been the cornerstone of the human rights approach. Particularly in the early 
 
2 Except for the United States, all UN Member States are party to the Convention on the Rights 
of the Child (CRC). One hundred and eighty-nine Member States are party to the Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW). 
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2000s, this is evident in the way proponents of the human rights frame 
describe the evolution of migration as a global policy issue. Of the Berne 
Initiative, one observer noted:  
‘They had regional consultations, then came up the 
International Agenda for Migration Management, which 
is a terrible document that talks about migrant rights but 
does not refer to any of the international migration 
instruments’ (INT-IO-011). 
However, developing such norms has been a challenge in the area of 
migration (Section 4.3), and thus proponents of the human rights frame have 
often found themselves side-lined (Piper, 2017).  
 
5.2.2 The ‘Migration Management’ Frame 
 
Just as the human rights framers criticize the migration management frame, 
the same is true of the management framers, with the caveat that they 
acknowledge the necessity of respecting human rights without placing norm 
adherence at the centre of their proposed solutions: 
‘As important as rights are, and they are important, 
unless we have the technical wisdom, and expertise, to 
deal with the phenomenon of migration, we will not go 
anywhere’ (INT-IO-015). 
The ‘frame’ pursued through many of the regional consultative processes 
(Section 4.4) and amplified through IOM’s International Migration Dialogues 
(IMD) and the state-led Berne Initiative (Section 4.6) was ‘migration 
management.’ Discussions focused on logistical aspects of human mobility 
that states could theoretically address more efficiently in cooperation with 
one another, often focused on topics such as irregular migration, border 
management, smuggling, and trafficking. In simpler words, migration 
management is about ‘migration’ as a phenomenon more than it is about 
‘migrants’ as individuals.  
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Hess (2010) describes migration management as ‘a catch-all term used by 
scientists in an analytical sense as well as policy practitioners in a positivistic 
or descriptive way’ (p.97). The concept is often considered to have emerged 
in the 1990s; however, as Dutch historian Marijke van Faassen (2014) argued, 
migration management finds its roots in international discourse in the late 
1940s describing efforts made by the international community to organize 
migration from Post-war Europe. IOM defines migration management as:  
‘A term used to encompass numerous governmental 
functions within a national system for the orderly and 
humane management for cross-border migration, 
particularly managing the entry and presence of 
foreigners within the borders of the state and the 
protection of refugees and others in need of protection. 
It refers to a planned approach to the development of 
policy, legislative and administrative responses to key 
migration issues’ (IOM 2016).  
Migration management thus consists of an eclectic collection of policies and 
practices implemented by governments across time and space, but with the 
specific objective of exerting influence over cross-border movements. 
Migration management is a technocratic rather than a normative term. The 
specific goals of migration management can change over time, and vary by 
context shifting, for example, from policies intended to halt immigration to 
those focused on the selection of immigrants (Hess, 2010).  
Countries in the North have most strongly advocated the framing of 
migration as a management issue. Thinking back to the discussion of 
international organizations as entities (Section 2.2.2), one would expect 
functional organizations to be more likely to support the migration 
management frame. By rejecting ILO’s plan and planting the seed of the 
future IOM as the PICMME outside the UN system in 1951 to provide 
operational support to UNHCR, the US arguably initiated a parallel trajectory 
for the governance of migration that was based on politically motivated 
concerns more than normative goals.  
The concept of migration management is not without criticism, described by 
critics as a way to depoliticize migration (Geiger & Pécoud, 2012) and part of 
a broader neoliberal project ushering in the principles of New Public 
Management to the area of migration policy (Georgi & Schatral, 2012). Civil 
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society actors often organize themselves in opposition to the migration 
management frame (Piper, 2017). Opposition to the migration management 
frame was particularly prominent in the early 2000s when civil society actors 
mobilized against IOM organizing protests and marches in 2002 in Berlin, 
Vienna, and Helsinki, and in 2003 in Geneva and Bonn (Georgi & Schatral, 
2012). 
 
5.2.3 The ‘Migration and Development’ Frame 
 
The early 2000s also witnessed a revival of discussions on migration and 
development. While the conceptual linkage of migration and development is 
not new (Ravenstein, 1885), the migration and development discourse has 
been subject to much academic reflection in the past decade (cf. Bakewell, 
2008; Skeldon, 2008; Delgado Wise, Márquez Covarrubias, and Puentes, 2013; 
Brønden, 2012; Schiller, 2009; de Haas, 2010; 2012; Vammen and Brønden, 
2012; Gamlen, 2014). Hein de Haas (2010) argues that views on migration and 
development, both in academic narratives and policy discussions, have 
swung back and forth like a pendulum (p.67). Before 1973, de Haas (2010) 
identifies optimism in the academic discourse, which led to the view that 
migration could lead to ‘take-off development’ in developing countries 
through capital and knowledge transfers. However, when a more pessimistic 
narrative emerged after the 1973 oil crisis, with discussions on brain drain 
and dependency, the view that migration could lead to take-off development 
disappeared. From the 1990s to the early 2000s, slightly more positive 
accounts arose, coinciding with the new economics of labour migration 
school of thought. At this time, migration was primarily considered as a 
livelihood strategy for households but could not overcome broader structural 
constraints. Post-2000, de Haas (2010) describes ‘a resurgence of migration 
and development optimism under the influence of (a) remittance boom’ 
(p.230).  
The central premise of the ‘migration and development’ frame is that 
migration can be both positive and negative for development, although with 
a general emphasis on the potentially positive developmental impacts of 
migration. Through policies targeting remittances, such as the famed tres por 
uno programme in Mexico, migrants can contribute towards development in 
their countries of origin. The interest in potential development contributions 
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that migrants can bring has created interest in diaspora engagement policies, 
which, as Gamlen (2014) observed, have mushroomed around the world. 
Migration and development as a policy field is thus most often associated 
with topics relating to remittances, diaspora engagement, and the mobility of 
the highly skilled (Skeldon, 2008). The ‘migration and development’ frame 
has been most concretely advocated by the World Bank and the IMF, from an 
economic development perspective, and UNDP, from a human development 
perspective. However, as Chapter 6 demonstrates, a wide range of different 
actors have engaged with the ‘migration and development’ frame.  
Next to being a frame in its own right, the ‘migration and development’ frame 
can also be viewed as a paradigm within which advocates of different policy 
frames can find common ground. Some critical commentaries suggest that 
states have used migration and development as a ‘smokescreen’ for 
immigration control (Bakewell, 2008; Gamlen, 2014; Korneev, 2013; Pian, 
2010). Hence, the ‘migration and development’ frame has been used to 
further the interests of those who view and frame migration as an issue of 
management at the expense of a more rights-based discussion. For advocates 
of a management frame, it offers a way of justifying their goals in a more 
palatable way. For example, well-managed migration can lead to positive 
development outcomes. Similarly, however, from a human rights 
perspective, a migrant whose rights are protected is more able to contribute 
to, and experience, development. Thus, in a quote attributed to one of the 
GCIM Commissioners, Mary Robinson, former President of the Republic of 
Ireland and former UN High Commissioner for Human Rights: 
‘If you do not want to do it for the right reasons, do it for 
the reasons that benefit you. As long as people are on the 
side-lines, they are not benefiting the societies in which 
they live’ (INT-IO-004). 
Therefore, the ‘migration and development’ frame can be viewed as both a 
frame in its own right and as a unifying frame that has been cleverly 
employed by policy brokers because it resonates with advocates of the 
‘human rights’ and ‘management’ frames. Having defined our three main 
frames, Section 5.3 examines the discussions that ensued as preparations 
were underway for the first HLD. 
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5.3 The Genesis of the Global Forum on Migration and 
Development  
 
The earliest use of the term ‘global forum’ in the context of international 
migration can be traced back to the end of 2005 as then-Secretary-General 
Kofi Annan was looking for ways to follow up on the recommendations made 
by the Global Commission on International Migration (GCIM). Writing to the 
former chairs of the GCIM on 21 November 2005, he noted:  
‘The Dialogue provides a unique opportunity, indeed, a 
test of whether the United Nations can establish itself as 
the global forum where governments may discuss, 
negotiate and build consensus on international 
migration issues’ (United Nations Archives 2005, p.2).  
Kofi Annan appointed Peter Sutherland to be his Special Representative for 
International Migration and Development (SRSG) to ensure that, after the 
struggle to garner the necessary consensus to hold the first HLD, it would 
mark the start of increasing intergovernmental cooperation on migration, 
within the context of the UN.  
Different actors sought to influence the early conceptualization of the global 
forum in the months preceding the first HLD. Early discussions focused on 
whether the global forum should be established within the UN, if at all. At 
the centre of this discussion were the SRSG, Peter Sutherland, and the former 
Director of the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA), José 
António Ocampo. Each man submitted regular reports on the ongoing 
conceptualizations of the forum to Kofi Annan. Both men supported the idea 
of a global forum, although differed in their views on the role that the UN 
should play. Ocampo promoted a global forum implemented under the 
auspices of the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) (United Nations 
Archives, 2006a). Sutherland, on the other hand, promoted a ‘light-link 
model’ whereby states would take ownership of the forum with support from 
the UN (United Nations Archives 2006b, p.1).  
Other actors are also referred to in this documentation, notably where they 
advocated against the global forum as being either duplicative or premature. 
These actors included several states (the US, Australia, Bulgaria) and IOs 
(ILO, IOM, OHCHR, UNCTAD, UNFPA, UNHCR, the World Bank). Their 
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different views towards the forum are summarized in Table 5.2 and further 
discussed below. 
Table 5.2 Views towards the Global Forum 
Actor Position  Description  
DESA Supportive UN-led; DESA as Secretariat 
Peter Sutherland Supportive State-led; ‘Light link model.’  
Core Group of 
Countries* 
Supportive Southern States plus Spain = UN-led 
Northern States = state-led 
ILO Neutral to 
Negative  
Premature; States will not support; undermines 
GMG  
UNHCR Neutral to 
Negative  
Premature; States will not support; undermines 
GMG 
World Bank Neutral to 
Negative  
Premature; undermines GMG 
OHCHR Neutral to 
Negative  
Premature; undermines GMG 
UNFPA Neutral to 
Negative  
Premature; undermines GMG 
IOM Neutral to 
Negative  
Duplicative; undermines GMG; concern for own role 
UNCTAD Neutral to 
Negative  
Duplicative 
US  Against  Mistrust in the UN 
Australia  Against  No reason stated in the documentation 
Bulgaria  Against No reason stated in the documentation 
Sources: United Nations Archives 2006a; 2006e; 2006f; 2006g; 2006h; 2006i 
Notes: *The core group of countries is a group of Member States that Peter Sutherland has 
engaged in early thinking on the global forum. Its members were Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Mali, 
Mexico, Morocco, the Netherlands, Nigeria, Philippines, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland 
(United Nations Archives, 2006h). 
 
With ‘the mandate of carrying out all substantive work related to 
international migration and development as well as providing substantive 
support to any United Nations body dealing with the subject’ (United 
Nations Archives 2007, pp.1–2), Ocampo’s view of a forum established under 
ECOSOC is self-evident. DESA had a long history of supporting the 
Secretary-General in matters relating to international migration, such as 
organizing annual Coordination Meetings on International Migration since 
2002. Sutherland’s advocacy of a ‘light link model’ on the other hand, related 
to his mandate to further the dialogue on migration within the UN, while 
recognizing the difficulties of doing so given past experiences in the area. His 
arguments pointed to a more incremental process whereby states would first 
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discuss the least controversial area of migration and, in doing so, build the 
necessary trust to engage in its more challenging aspects.  
The main concerns related to the establishment of the global forum came from 
the many UN entities with competencies, and often mandates, to work on 
migration-related issues. Several UN entities were concerned that the GFMD 
would undermine the newly expanded Global Migration Group (GMG). 
Duplicative efforts were the Director-General of United Nations Conference 
on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) Supachai Panitchpakdi’s primary 
concern when he wrote to Deputy Secretary-General, Mark Malloch Brown, 
on 20 April 2006 (United Nations Archives, 2006e). The relationship between 
the GMG and the GFMD became a key topic of discussion between Peter 
Sutherland and Kofi Annan. Sutherland wished to see the GMG established 
as the secretariat for the forum; however, this idea failed to gain any currency 
among GMG members (United Nations Archives, 2008). The main reason 
given for this was that the GMG was ‘not in a position to provide secretariat 
support for the Forum since it is not ready to set up a secretariat for itself over 
the medium-term future’ (United Nations Archives 2006b, p.1).  
What is perhaps surprising is the ‘neutral to negative’ view of IOM on the 
GFMD, given that, from 2009, IOM hosted the GFMD Support Unit, which 
continues to provide secretariat support to the Chair-in-Office of the Forum. 
However, IOM’s resistance towards the GFMD can be viewed in the context 
of its relationship with the UN. As further elaborated in Chapter 7, by the 
time the GFMD was being conceptualized, IOM’s relationship with the UN 
had been discussed several times. In response to Kofi Annan’s desire to see 
the UN more comprehensively respond to migration issues in the early 2000s, 
then Director-General of IOM, Brunson McKinley, had explored UN 
membership with the UN Council. However, the Member States of IOM 
voted against UN membership. There was perhaps a fear on the part of IOM 
that, if the GFMD were pursued within the UN, it would lose relevance. 
While states generally supported the idea of having a global consultative 
forum with 82 UN Member States indicating their support at the HLD 
(United Nations Archives, 2006i), the main differences in opinion related to 
its relationship with the UN. Before the HLD, the core group of countries that 
Peter Sutherland had engaged in garnering support for the forum, was itself 
divided in terms of whether the forum should be a UN initiative:  
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‘A North/South divide (with only Spain aligning itself 
with the South) has emerged on the issue of the Forum’s 
linkage to the UN. Many Southern countries stressed the 
importance of setting up the Forum under UN auspices. 
Both Mali and Nigeria argued that the Forum needed the 
‘umbrella of legitimacy’ of the UN. Likewise, the 
Philippines and Mexico argued for a clear linkage 
between the Forum and the UN. Canada and the 
Netherlands stressed the need for the Forum to be ‘state-
run’ and avoid being tied too closely to the UN’ (United 
Nations Archives 2006h, p.1). 
Although not part of the core group of countries, the main Member State 
opponents to the global forum were the US, Australia, and Bulgaria. While 
the objections of Australia and Bulgaria are not explicitly stated in the 
documentation, they are likely similar to the US. In a submission to the Policy 
Committee on migration, the following comment is made: 
‘Considering the growing wariness with the UN in the 
US, advancing a multilateral approach to international 
migration through the UN could evoke some negative 
reactions. There is a need to allay the concerns of key 
players in order to further a balanced approach to the 
migration issue and the follow-up to the Dialogue’ 
(United Nations Archives 2006a, p.6). 
The objection was, therefore, less about multilateral cooperation on 
migration, which was already underway through the various Regional 
Consultative Processes (RCPs) that had emerged since the creation of the 
Intergovernmental Consultations on Migration and Asylum (IGC) in 1985 
(Section 4.4), and more about it being conducted under the auspices of the 
UN. The position of the US on the forum is perhaps the most compelling 
reason why Sutherland’s vision of a state-led forum ultimately came into 
fruition. In his address to the HLD, Kofi Annan outlines his vision for the 
forum:  
‘The Forum must be led and overseen by states. But the 
United Nations System, and I personally, stand ready to 
support it. I have decided to extend the mandate of my 
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Special Representative on Migration beyond this 
Dialogue. I trust that the Special Representative will 
form an essential link between the proposed Forum and 
the entire United Nations system’ (Annan, 2006). 
The GFMD provides a concrete example of how a policy decision with 
regards to intergovernmental cooperation on migration has been influenced 
by the UN balancing its desire to remain involved in the conversation 
without being perceived as a threat to states, particularly the US, who 
remained a significant funder of their work. 
 
5.4 The Role of Peter Sutherland as a Policy Broker  
 
Another notable aspect of the way the GFMD was framed was its focus on 
development. Although the ‘migration and development’ frame has earlier 
roots, its operationalization as a means of furthering international 
cooperation is generally associated with the GFMD and the work of Peter 
Sutherland. The notion that individuals can drive specific ideas is not new in 
the literature. What Weiss (1989) refers to as ‘policy entrepreneurs’ or 
Fligstein (2001) calls ‘institutional entrepreneurs’ is described by framing 
scholars as ‘frame sponsors’ (Rein and Schön 1996, p.90) or ’reframers’ 
(Abolafia 2004, p.354), and in the advocacy coalition framework as ‘policy 
brokers’ (Sabatier, 1988, p.133). The vast majority (n=30) of interviewees 
identified Peter Sutherland as being a, if not the key figure in global migration 
governance for ensuring the success of the first HLD, establishing the GFMD; 
advocating for the inclusion of migration in the Sustainable Development 
Goals (SDGs) (Chapter 6) and his role in IOM becoming a related agency of 
the UN (Chapter 7).  
Peter Sutherland came to his post as SRSG with a remarkable CV. His 
experience in both the policy and business realms, and especially the 
successful negotiation of the Uruguay Round establishing the World Trade 
Organization, gave him the credibility in the eyes of many states:  
‘He was the attorney general of Ireland, he was 
European Commissioner, he was the last Director-
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General of the GATT, the first Director-General of WTO, 
he was Chair of the Board of Goldman Sachs, and he was 
Chair of the Board of the London School of Economics. 
That was someone that states trusted’ (INT-IO-013). 
However, this also meant that he was viewed with suspicion, particularly by 
adherents to the ‘human rights’ frame: 
‘Peter Sutherland was mainly a private sector person, 
WTO chief, affiliated to Goldman Sachs. He was not the 
right person for that role in my personal view because 
he really did not promote a rights-based approach to 
migration’ (INT-IO-011). 
This position is understandable since, in early conversations about the 
GFMD, Peter Sutherland did advise that the global forum be steered away 
from controversial issues, primarily human rights. In a letter addressed to 
Kofi Annan on 3 April 2006, Sutherland writes: 
‘I have heard, indirectly, of a number of governments 
that have been told of a “parallel event”3 to take place 
during September's High-Level Dialogue. Apparently, a 
letter has been received from you regarding this and it 
would focus on 'migrant rights.' Whilst undoubtedly 
migrants rights have to be referred to in the Report the 
response I have heard to this suggestion, from a number 
of developed countries that would normally be 
sympathetic, is extremely negative that may lead to 
down-grading of ministerial participation at the HLD 
itself - out of concern that it would degenerate into a 
'shouting match' about rights. Everything that I have 
heard from delegations suggests that we would be much 
better advised focusing on the economic aspects of 
migration while making the obligatory references to the 
rights issue. Anything other than this will inevitably 
 
3 The parallel event that he is referring to is the annual treaty event held on the sidelines of the 
General Assembly. In 2006 this was called ‘Crossing Borders’ and focused on advocating 
ratifications of conventions relevant to migrants.    
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result in a failure of the HLD’ (United Nations Archives, 
2006b).  
Thus, it can be argued that the omission of human rights was tactical, a 
strategic manoeuvre in order to first build trust before reintroducing the 
concept of human rights. 
‘Peter Sutherland was very strategic in bringing states 
slowly to the issue and, and then progressively, the 
human rights issues of migrants became part of the 
conversation’ (INT-IO-013). 
Having established that Peter Sutherland acted as a policy broker, the chapter 
now examines how he reframed migration as a development issue using 
Abolafia’s (2004) temporal model of framing. Abolafia’s model  involved 
three stages: 1) breaking the frame; 2) constructing the new frame; and 3) 
adjusting the frame. (p.90).  
 
5.4.1 Breaking the Frame: Casting Doubt 
 
According to Abolafia (2004), in the first stage of a reframing effort, 
‘reframers attempt to establish that existing practices are no longer viable’ 
(p.354). As different actors were discussing the GFMD, Sutherland made 
frequent references to the limitations of past attempts to further migration 
governance within the UN system as the rationale for his ‘light-link’ model. 
For example, Sutherland communicated the following to Kofi Annan on 3 
April 2006:  
‘This informal Forum idea is vital because earlier 
debates in the Second and Third Committees, the 
Population and Development Commission, the Social 
Development Commission and the Cairo Conference 
have been seen to be unproductive, politicised, 
uninformed and ultimately quite marginal’ (United 
Nations Archives 2006c, p.2). 
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In breaking the frame, Sutherland reminded his audience of the failures of 
past endeavours to justify his proposal. He undermines Ocampo’s proposal 
by pre-emptively assuming that it will fail, as similar endeavours had in the 
past. Rather than migration being the problem, a lack of constructive 
international cooperation on migration is instead framed as the problem. This 
position was particularly prominent in Kofi Annan’s address to the HLD 
(Roldan & Gasper, 2010) as well as in Ban Ki-moon’s opening address to the 
first GFMD in 2007 in Brussels in which he noted: 
‘For many years, Member States of our United Nations 
found it hard to discuss the sensitive issue of migration 
in the international arena. So the topic was never high 
on the UN agenda -- until the High-Level Dialogue at 
UN Headquarters in New York last September. Even 
then, some sceptics predicted that positions would be 
too entrenched, that north and south would become 
hopelessly embattled, and that genuine dialogue would 
be impossible. The past nine months have proved those 
sceptics wrong. As we have grasped migration’s 
powerful potential for good, old stereotypes have 
crumbled, and new opportunities have captured our 
imaginations’ (Ban, 2007, p.1).  
His moral judgement on the correctness of the decision to hold the GFMD is 
an example of motivational framing (Snow et al. 1988). He praised the 
audience for doing something that was deemed impossible.  
 
5.4.2 Constructing the New Frame: Migration and Development  
 
Abolafia (2004) argues that in the next stage of reframing, ‘reframers must 
move interested actors’ attention beyond the past and into the future to 
construct an image of the new policy frame and its superior efficacy’ 
(Abolafia, 2004, p.258). After reframing the issue of migration as an issue of a 
lack of international cooperation, the matter of what would be covered within 
the forum came to the fore. As a member of Peter Sutherland’s team noted:  
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‘We gave a lot of thought to the name of the Global 
Forum. It was not a Global Forum on Migration. It was 
a Global Forum on Migration and Development because 
that was a way to dull the politics around migration’ 
(INT-IO-037). 
Although the ‘migration and development’ frame had earlier roots (Section 
5.2.3), its operationalization as a means of furthering international 
cooperation is often associated with the first HLD and the GFMD. Betts and 
Kainz, (2017), for example, argued that the ‘migration and development era’ 
began in 2006. The notion that the ‘migration and development’ frame acted 
as a ‘unifying narrative’ bridging different interests is generally accepted by 
the interviewees4. See, for example, the following illustrative quote: 
‘At the time, it was often said that the reason to link 
migration with development was a way to bring all of 
the international community to the table. The Southern 
countries were interested in development, and the 
Northern countries were interested in stopping 
migration. Speaking crudely’ (INT-IO-040). 
Sutherland specifically advocated a positive framing of migration that built 
on the already growing optimism which was fuelled, in part, by the 
‘rediscovery’ of remittances by the World Bank (de Haas 2010). A key feature 
of the reframing of migration was its portrayal as a ‘triple win’ phenomenon, 
which is often attributed to Kofi Annan:  
‘The focus on migration and development was very, 
very intentional in the sense that Kofi Annan and his 
people thought that migration and development would 
be the least contentious aspect of the migration issue. 
Kofi Annan came out with this phrase, which I never 
really liked, when he talked about migration as a win-
win-win situation: a win for countries of origin, a win for 
 
4 INT-IO-008, INT-IO-013, INT-IO-016, INT-IO-025, INT-IO-021, INT-IO-026, INT-GOV-031, 
INT-GOV-032, INT-OTHER-034, INT-GOV-036, INT-IO-037, INT-IO-038, INT-IO-040 
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countries of destination, and a win for migrants 
themselves’ (INT-IO-008). 
Knowing that the GFMD is still organized on an annual basis, that migration 
has been included in the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) (Chapter 6), 
and that IOM has now become a ‘related agency’ of the UN (Chapter 7), it is 
evident that, while still an ‘ill-defined’ link in 2006 (United Nations Archives, 
2008), the ‘migration and development’ frame was successful in sustaining 
international dialogue on migration.  
 
5.4.3 Aligning the New Frame 
 
Abolafia (2004) noted that ‘the rejection of old and valued frames is not likely 
to go unchallenged’ (p.357). As already discussed above, the main frame 
conflict evident in the commentaries of the GFMD occurred between 
advocates of a ‘human rights’ frame and the ‘migration and development’ 
frame. The reasons for this conflict is perhaps because the ‘migration and 
development’ frame resonated more with adherents to the migration 
management frame owing to its more practical nature. 
‘The creation of the Global Forum for Migration and 
Development, and this is very much a personal view, 
took us off track a little bit… it was very consistent with 
IOM’s particular world view at the time, which was that 
you do not engage in “politically sensitive issues” like 
the rights of people on the move, you look at it from a 
very broad migration and development framing’ (INT-
IO-040). 
The main fear was that the GFMD was an initiative of Northern States to 
pursue their interests in the area of migration:  
‘The relation between development and migration was 
political and conceptually a bit difficult to grasp in the 
UN historically, especially by countries of origin. The 
concept was not originally put forward as a way simply 
to recognize the fact that there is a link between 
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development and migration, but it was perceived as a 
North-South issue, it was perceived as Europeans 
mainly, and the US, pushing for that notion of creating a 
sense of responsibility in countries of origin. At least, 
this is how countries of origin, at that time, used to see 
it’ (INT-GOV-036). 
The fear that the GFMD would lead to the furtherance of Northern interests, 
is arguably what drove the organizations of the UN with human rights 
mandates as well as many civil society actors to push for the inclusion of 
human rights on the GFMD agenda: 
‘At the first GFMD, there was a strong suspicion that it 
was something that the wealthy governments of the 
North were putting to deflect attention away from 
injustices. From the beginning, there has been an outside 
civil society tactic…(to) bring human rights to the fore’ 
(INT-OTHER-023). 
Perhaps to offer reassurances to the supporters of a human rights frame, the 
topic of human rights was already introduced into the discussions at the 
GFMD in Manila. However, this was done in a way that kept the interests of 
those resistant to efforts to promote a human rights frame engaged. In a 
memo sharing updates on the GFMD with Ban Ki-moon on 9 January 2008, 
Peter Sutherland noted:  
‘The main theme to be discussed (at the second GFMD 
in Manila) will be Migration, Development and Human 
Rights. In spite of the potentially divisive nature of this 
subject, I am confident that the organizers will handle it 
in a non-confrontational manner.… Esteban Conejos 
emphasized that upholding the human rights of 
migrants - a potentially controversial issue - was to be 
considered as a shared responsibility by all governments 
involved. This approach, complemented by my 
encouragement to avoid any North-South divide, 
allayed the apprehension of those countries either 
wanting more, or, at the opposite, less engagement of the 
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GFMD on the human rights terrain’ (United Nations 
Archives 2008, pp.1–2). 
While the topic of human rights has been discussed at the GFMD, therefore, 
many observers, including former Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights 
of Migrants, François Crépeau remained concerned that its coverage, if at all, 
is either cursory or ‘dismissed as divisive5’ (para. 50. p.10). Assuming 
different interests within one frame does not guarantee that differences will 
be resolved. In this case, reframing migration as a development issue in order 
to move discussions on migration forward may have only served the interests 
of Northern States. One key informant went as far as to describe the GFMD 
as a ‘consolation prize’ for countries in the South who had long been calling 
on the UN to hold a global conference on migration (INT-IO-028). This is, in 
fact, one of the major critiques evident in the academic literature on the 
‘migration and development’ frame arguing that it has been used as a 
‘smokescreen’ for immigration control (Bakewell, 2008; Gamlen, 2014; 
Korneev, 2013; Pian, 2010).  
 
5.5 Conclusion 
 
It is without dispute that there are different ways of looking at migration as 
a global policy issue. The two dominant approaches are the ‘rights-based’ 
approach and the ‘migration management’ approach. The rights-based 
approach is more rigid in the sense that its cornerstone is the UN’s human 
rights architecture. Actors within the rights-based community are focused on 
international norms, preferably legally binding, that, if upheld, are believed 
to result in the achievement of a broader common goal: peace. This rigidity 
was often commented upon and frequently dismissed, by actors who 
approached migration from a management perspective. Advocates of the 
migration management frame argue that it is much more flexible because it 
is based on identifying operational solutions to problems. Technocratic as 
opposed to than dogmatic. However, this, in turn, has raised the concern that 
the migration management frame is set on depoliticizing migration to further 
 
5 UNGA, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants: Human Rights of 
Migrants, UNGAOR, 68th Session, UN Doc. A/68/283 (7 August 2013) 
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the interests of Northern states. These opposing frames reflect underlying 
belief systems concerning the role of IOs in global governance (Section 2.2.2). 
From the human rights perspective, international cooperation is about the 
achievement of broader common goals. From the migration management 
perspective, it is about increasing state efficiency in the handling of matters 
with a cross-border component. The clever framing of migration as a 
development issue offered the UN a way of exercising constitutive power to 
maintain the UN’s role in migration governance without alienating either 
group.  
By first reframing migration as an issue of international cooperation before 
using the ‘migration and development’ frame to calm the fears of certain 
Member States wary of the idea that the GFMD would lead to the creation of 
some kind of World Migration Organization, Peter Sutherland successfully 
acted as policy broker. By focusing on migration and development, rather 
than the human rights of migrants, or management-related issues, he 
facilitated the creation of a space for actors with different frames of reference 
to come together, to build trust, so as to further international cooperation on 
migration. The core argument of this chapter is therefore that, in line with 
ACF, Peter Sutherland acted as a ‘policy broker’ helping to achieve a level of 
cooperation and coordination between adherents of different advocacy 
coalitions through the cultivation of a pre-existent, if less dominant coalition 
under the umbrella of the migration and development frame.  
Given the instrumentalization of the ‘migration and development’ frame as a 
means of furthering international cooperation on migration, it is unsurprising 
that several commenters have proposed that the optimism of migration and 
development as a policy field may be a ‘passing phase’ (Skeldon 2008). 
However, as the next chapter will demonstrate, the migration and 
development frame has continued to be of importance to international 
discussions on migration. The inclusion of migration in the Sustainable 
Development Goals brought migration squarely into the UN (Chapter 6) and 
arguably led IOM to become a ‘related agency’ of the UN (Chapter 7).  
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6. Migration and Development: A Passing 
Phase or Here to Stay?1 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
On 25 September 2015, Member States of the UN unanimously adopted a 
Resolution called ‘Transforming our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable 
Development’2. In a follow up to the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs), the resolution set out 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and 
169 targets laying the blueprint for development efforts for the next 15 years. 
Where the MDGs had been far more streamlined, with its eight goals and 18 
targets focused primarily on developing countries, the SDGs reflected 
broader shifts in the global system and, as such, were designed for all 
countries, regardless of their level of development (Kamau et al., 2018). 
Although the Millennium Declaration contained a commitment ‘to take 
measures to ensure respect for and protection of the human rights of 
migrants, migrant workers and their families3’ (para. 25, p.7), migration, 
along with other issues deemed ‘too difficult to measure unambiguously or 
too sensitive to handle politically’ (Browne and Weiss 2014, p.6) did not 
appear in the MDGs. However, with the developments since the adoptions 
of the MDGs (Section 4.6 and 4.7), in particular the GFMD (Chapter 5), there 
was more optimism regarding the possibility of seeing migration included in 
the post-2015 development agenda:  
 
1 This chapter develops the ideas presented in two previous publications. First, it draws on a 
conference paper presented at the Migrating out of Poverty Conference ‘From Evidence to 
Policy’ which was held on 28-29 March 2017 at the School for Oriental and African Studies 
(SOAS) in London (McGregor, 2017). I am grateful for the helpful comments received from 
Manolo Abella (discussant) and other participants at the conference. These ideas were further 
developed in McGregor (2020). Here I am grateful to Ronald Skeldon, Tania Bastia and Michaella 
Vanore for their helpful comments on the draft. 
2 Transforming our World: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, UNGAOR, 70th 
Session, UN Doc. A/RES/70/1 (25 September 2015) 
3 United Nations Millennium Declaration, UNGAOR, 55th Session, UN Doc. A/RES/55/2 (18 
September 2000) 
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 ‘With discussions underway on the post-2015 
development agenda and a new set of goals for 
sustainable development, the time is ripe to present a 
compelling case about why migration matters for 
development’ (Ban, 2013). 
As efforts mounted to define the successor to the MDGs, the migration (and 
development) community moved swiftly into action. While their arguments 
were not always the same, the migration community united around one 
objective: to see migration reflected in the SDGs. While different actors were 
united in their desire to see migration included in the new development 
agenda, however, the complexity of how migration is included in the SDGs 
is a testament to the utility of the ‘migration and development’ frame in 
unifying disparate interests under one umbrella. This chapter examines the 
arguments put forward by various actors in the years preceding the adoption 
of the SDGs for why migration should be included. The chapter assesses the 
extent to which the ‘migration and development’ frame has acted as a 
unifying frame by resolving frame conflicts or merely served to mask the 
underlying conflicts in the interest of furthering international cooperation. 
The chapter draws on several data sources. First, it draws on interview data. 
Of the 44 interviews, 27 key informants, including several actors who were 
very close to the negotiation process, were able to comment on the process of 
negotiating the inclusion of migration in the SDGs. Next to the key informant 
interviews, a subsample of the UN archival records was examined (n=37). 
This review primarily revealed procedural aspects of the process of 
developing the SDGs as they related to migration. However, it was also the 
source of several interagency collaborative texts arguing for the inclusion of 
migration in the SDGs. To understand the different arguments being put 
forward by different actors, and the outcomes of these efforts, however, 
further data were required. Thus, in addition to the interviews and archival 
records, I constructed two further sets of documents. The first set of 
documents included the key outcome documents that emerged throughout 
the negotiation of the SDGs, as listed in Section 3.3.3. The second source of 
supplementary data was a sample of documents (n=121) written by members 
of the Global Migration Group (GMG) between 2012 and 2015 in which 
arguments are made for the inclusion of migration in the post-2015 
development agenda. 
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The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 6.2 sets the 
context by briefly summarizing the process leading up to the adoption of the 
SDGs. Section 6.3 then deconstructs the different arguments made for why 
migration should be included in the post-2015 development agenda by 
examining the documents produced by individual IOs in the lead up to the 
adoption of the SDGs. Section 6.4 then examines the specific efforts of 
different constellations of actors, namely an informal working group 
established by Peter Sutherland, the GMG, and the GFMD, to galvanize 
support for the inclusion of migration in the post-2015 development agenda. 
Section 6.5 discusses how migration was ultimately included in the SDGs. 
Section 6.6 concludes the chapter. 
 
6.2 Negotiating the Sustainable Development Goals  
 
To understand how different actors lobbied for migration to be reflected in 
the SDGs, it is useful to offer a brief overview of the process leading to their 
adoption, which was ultimately the product of two parallel processes (Table 
6.1). The first was a process initiated by the UN to define a successor agenda 
to the MDGs, dubbed the post-2015 development agenda. The second 
emerged from the UN Conference on Sustainable Development (Rio+20). 
Discussions about the successor to the MDGs began in earnest within the UN 
in 2012. In January 2012, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon formed the UN 
System Task Team on the Post-2015 Development Agenda (UNTT). The 
UNTT brought together more than 60 UN entities, agencies, and IOs to 
provide technical support to state-led multi-stakeholder consultations on the 
post-2015 development agenda. The UNTT prepared numerous background 
reports, including 28 thematic think pieces. Next to the UNTT, Ban Ki-moon 
also created the High-Level Panel of Eminent Persons on the Post-2015 
Development Agenda (HLP) in July 2012. The HLP had the goal of providing 
recommendations on the development agenda post-2015. The group, which 
was headed by Liberia, Indonesia, and the UK, finalized their work in May 
2013 with a report suggesting 12 indicative goals and targets. 
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Table 6.1 Timeline of SDG Negotiations 
Year SDG/Post-2015 Processes 
2012 Q1 UN Task Team on Post-2015 Development Agenda (UNTT) Created (January) 
Q2 UNTT release 18 Thematic Think Pieces (May)  
UNTT releases report ‘Realizing the Future We Want’ (June) 
Rio+20 Conference (20-22 June)  
Q3 High-Level Panel (HLP) of Eminent persons created (July) 
 
Open Working Group (OWG) created (September) 
Q4  
2013 Q1 UNTT release 10 Thematic Think Pieces (January) 
 
UNTT release report ‘A renewed global partnership for development’ (March) 
OWG Thematic meetings and 100 Country meetings (March 2013-January 2014) 
Q2  
High-Level Panel releases Report (May) 
OWG Thematic meetings and 100 Country meetings (continued) 
Q3 The High-Level Political Forum is founded and holds its first meeting (July) 
Q4 OWG Thematic meetings and 100 Country meetings (continued) 
2014 Q1 
 
OWG negotiate co-facilitators draft report. (March – July) Q2  
HLPF Meeting (30 June-9 July) 
Q3 
OWG negotiations continue including finalization of the report on 18 July  
 
Q4  
2015 Q1 SDG Negotiations (January – August) 
Q2  
HLPF Meeting (26 June-8 July) 
Q3 
Financing For Development Conference (July) 
SDGs text adopted by acclamation (2 August) 
SDG Adoption (September) 
Notes: The table is colour coded as follows: post-2015 process (yellow); Rio+20 process (blue) 
SDG process (green) 
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In a parallel process, the idea of Sustainable Development Goals started to 
take shape. The idea of Sustainable Development Goals was first put forward 
by Paula Caballero of Columbia in 2011. Her proposal, made ahead of the 
Rio+20 conference, was a vision for a set of goals that, unlike the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs), would apply to all countries. Her proposal 
initially faced fierce opposition, particularly from those fearing that it would 
undermine the MDG process. However, at an informal preparatory event for 
Rio+20, attended by a group of around 40 states gathered in Bogota, 
Colombia, her proposal slowly gained support. By January 2012, the concept 
of having sustainable development goals had made it into the zero draft of the 
Rio+20 outcome document (Dodds et al., 2017). 
Rio+20 led to the establishment of the High-Level Political Forum on 
Sustainable Development (HLPF), which held its first meeting on 24 
September 2013 and met again twice throughout the negotiations, from 30 
June to 9 July in 2014 and from 26 June to 8 July in 2015. The main tasks of the 
HLPF were to ‘provide political leadership, guidance and recommendations 
for sustainable development, follow up and review progress in the 
implementation of sustainable development commitments, enhance the 
integration of the three dimensions of sustainable development in a holistic 
and cross-sectoral manner at all levels and have a focused, dynamic and 
action-oriented agenda, ensuring the appropriate consideration of new and 
emerging sustainable development challenges’4 (para. 2., p.3). 
Rio+20 also led to the creation of the Open Working Group (OWG) in 
September 2012. The OWG form was a compromise between the US and the 
EU, who wanted to establish a small technical working group; and the G77, 
who wanted an open-ended working group. The compromise was an Open 
Working Group with 30 seats but, owing to the immense interest, resulted in 
a total of 70 countries sharing the 30 seats. The President of the General 
Assembly appointed Hungary and Kenya to co-host the meetings, and 
UNDESA and UNDP provided an interagency technical support team. From 
March 2013 to February 2014, the OWG held monthly meetings covering 
different thematic areas. From March to July 2014, the OWG discussed a draft 
set of goals prepared by the co-chairs. A critical difference between the 
negotiations of the MDGs and the SDGs was the space given to different 
actors to define what would become an SDG. Where the UN Secretariat had 
 
4 Format and Organizational Aspects of the High-Level Political Forum on Sustainable 
Development, UNGAOR, 77th Session, UN Doc. A/RES/67/290 (9 July 2013)  
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primarily driven the efforts to define the MDGs, states retained control over 
the drafting of the SDGs (McGregor, 2020). Throughout the OWG 
deliberations, ‘new proposals kept coming in from all sources. Governments, 
UN agencies, NGOs and many others all wanted their favourite issues to be 
part of the new framework’ (Dodds et al. 2017, p.36). Many of these proposals 
also emanated from the post-2015 development agenda process, including 
the work of the HLP.  
On 18 July 2014, the OWG agreed upon a final text that included 17 goals and 
169 indicators. While many had anticipated further rounds of negotiations, 
there was a fear that ‘any attempt to reopen individual goals or targets could 
lead to very protracted and difficult negotiations’ (Dodds et al. 2017, p.70). 
As a result, the WOG decided to ‘seal’ the goals and to make only minor 
refinements as required. The decision not to reopen the goals and targets 
during negotiations meant that the window for influencing the SDGs was 
relatively short. By 18 July 2014, the stage was set. The majority of the 
negotiations on the SDGs themselves took place between January and July 
2015. The process was co-facilitated by David Donoghue of Ireland who had 
co-facilitated the 2013 General Assembly Special Event reviewing progress 
made on the Millennium Development Goals, and Macharia Kamua of Kenya 
who had co-chaired the OWG. This pairing ensured that, while initially 
parallel processes, the post-2015 discussions and the SDG discussions were 
brought together to avoid unnecessarily duplicative efforts. The zero draft was 
distributed on 1 June 2015, and, after several rounds of negotiations, the sixth 
and final text of the SDGs was adopted by acclamation on the 2 August 2015 
and as a General Assembly resolution on 25 September 20155.  
 
6.3 Arguing for the Inclusion of Migration in the Post-
2015 Development Agenda 
 
Section 5.2 discussed how actors frame migration as a global policy issue in 
different ways, which in turn has implications for the solutions they offer. 
The mobilization of the ‘migration and development’ frame as a unifying 
frame, subsuming the interests of actors from conflicting frames, was also 
 
5 Transforming our World: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, UNGAOR, 70th 
Session, UN Doc. A/RES/70/1 (25 September 2015) 
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discussed. Where countries in the North had primarily viewed migration 
through the migration management frame, countries in the South had long 
advocated for a rights-based approach to migration at the international level. 
Normative agencies, such as ILO and UNHCR, tasked with upholding 
specific conventions, and with rights-based mandates, historically found 
themselves side-lined (Chapter 4) when Northern States, often the US, used 
their power to steer international collaboration on migration towards 
interventions that focused on the logistical aspects of population movement, 
such as the facilitation of transport, and largely rejected the pursuit of a 
normative approach to migration at the international level (Section 4.3). The 
function of the GFMD was to bridge these conflicts, and, by focusing on 
migration and development, Peter Sutherland and others were certain that 
states could build trust to the point that they would be able to discuss some 
of the more controversial migration-related challenges (Section 5.3). Hence, 
the ‘migration and development’ frame was instrumentalized in order to 
bring the topic of migration under the mandate of the UN. 
If the purpose of the ‘migration and development’ frame was to galvanize 
support for migration as an international policy issue, then an examination 
of the arguments put forward for why migration should be in the post-2015 
development agenda should provide a fruitful source of data on the 
evolution of the narrative. While different actors agreed that migration 
should be in the post-2015 development agenda, considerable diversity in 
argumentation points to the unifying power of the ‘migration and 
development’ frame. The thematic coding of relevant passages of the IO 
documents6 identified five distinct arguments why migration should be 
included in the post-2015 development agenda. The two most commonly 
cited arguments were: first, migration can be an enabler of development 
under the right conditions (33%); and second, that migrants are at risk of 
being excluded from development owing to vulnerabilities arising from their 
migration status (33%). The three other, less cited reasons included the 
conceptualization of migration as a development challenge (19%), migration 
as a response to (under)development (11%), and forced displacement as a 
development challenge (4%). 
  
 
6 For a description of how these excerpts were identified please refer to Section 3.3.3 
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6.3.1 Migration as a Development Enabler 
 
The prominence of the argument that migration enables development is not 
entirely surprising given that the concept of ‘development enablers’ was 
given a prominent place in the debate by the UNTT (2012). The majority of 
these arguments focused on the economic benefits that migration can have 
for countries of origin and destination, as well as for the migrants and their 
families. The basic premise of this argument is that migration, under the right 
conditions, can contribute towards the achievement of development goals 
through, for example, the transfer of remittances or knowledge. For example: 
 ‘Migration and remittances can be leveraged to raise 
development financing via reducing remittance costs, 
lowering recruitment costs for low-skilled migrant 
workers, and mobilizing diaspora savings and diaspora 
philanthropic contributions. Remittances can also be 
used as collateral, through future-flow securitization, to 
facilitate international borrowings with possibly lower 
costs and longer maturities. And they can facilitate 
access to international capital markets by improving 
sovereign ratings and debt sustainability of recipient 
countries’ (World Bank, 2015, p.1). 
The extent to which migration can be an enabler of development is often 
conditioned on migration being ‘well-managed’ (cf. IOM, n.d.a.; UNDP, 
2013); or the human rights of migrants being respected (cf. ILO, 2013; IOM, 
2013; UNFPA, n.d.; World Bank, 2014); or both: 
‘The positive impact of migration is neither 
predetermined nor guaranteed. On the contrary, 
comprehensive, and well-managed migration policies 
are crucial, and ideally these should be developed and 
implemented through close cooperation between the 
countries of origin and destination, to ensure orderly 
mobility with full respect for the human rights of all 
migrants. Only development initiatives such as these 
will be able to unleash the development potential of 
migration and allow migrant diaspora resources to be 
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fully utilized, beginning with the benefits accruing to the 
migrants themselves’ (IOM, n.d.b, p.4). 
6.3.2 Migration as a Characteristic of Vulnerability  
 
The central premise of the ‘vulnerability’ argument is that migrants, as a 
social group alongside other groups such as women, persons with 
disabilities, ethnic minorities, are at risk of being excluded from 
development.  
‘Disaggregated data will be essential for monitoring 
equity gaps, strengthening social accountability and 
ensuring that the gaps between the most and least 
advantaged groups are narrowing. Data should also be 
disaggregated by all grounds of discrimination 
prohibited by international human rights law, including 
inter alia by sex, age, race, ethnicity, income, location, 
disability, and other grounds most relevant to specific 
countries and contexts, for example: caste, minority 
groups, indigenous peoples, migrant or displacement 
status’ (UNICEF, 2014, p.6). 
The identification of migrant status as a characteristic of vulnerability lent 
weight to the argument that migration should be a cross-cutting issue across 
the new development agenda, which aligned with the notion of an inclusive 
development agenda in which no one would be left behind. ‘Leave no one 
behind’ was the slogan of the HLP and was ‘popularized by the OWG’ 
(Kamau et al., 2018, p.124). This narrative also addressed the concern that 
certain groups had been excluded from the MDGs by nature of its design: 
‘The MDGs allowed overall progress to be recorded as 
the main indicator, despite slower progress experienced 
by certain segments of society and the growing 
exclusion and marginalization of vulnerable groups. 
Without an incentive to record their situation, some 
groups with limited or no political capital, such as 
migrants, were rendered invisible to the development 
agenda. As a new post-2015 development agenda is 
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being debated, OHCHR has consistently stressed that 
another method of measuring progress is needed, one 
which will provide more information about how 
progress is distributed while also providing incentives 
to focus on those groups which are being left behind’ 
(OHCHR, 2013, p.64). 
However, the vulnerability of migrants was also framed in connection to 
migrants as ‘development enablers’, providing that they experience the right 
conditions. These vulnerabilities related primarily to conditions in countries 
of destinations linked, in particular, to access to services but were also used 
to refer to the vulnerabilities of migrants to unethical recruitment practices or 
human traffickers, in the absence of legal opportunities to migrate. For 
example:  
‘A proactive approach to the protection of migrant 
workers towards improving development outcomes 
requires the formulation and implementation of gender-
sensitive labour migration policies, establishing effective 
labour migration institutions, and adopting and 
enforcing legislation and policies guided by 
international labour standards, which apply to all 
migrant workers unless otherwise stated’ (ILO, 2013, 
p.4). 
‘Universal health coverage, including for marginalized 
populations, can help to leverage the positive 
development impacts of migration’ (IOM, n.d.a, p.3). 
6.3.3 Migration as a Development Challenge 
 
The third most commonly cited argument was population movements, both 
internal and international, can undermine development. This argument was 
often paired with the argument that migration can support development, 
when well managed. In the context of urban growth, migration is argued to 
undermine rural development through the departure of human capital and 
to threaten urban development by placing pressure on public services. In the 
context of international migration, migration (human trafficking and 
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smuggling) is often positioned next to other transnational organized crimes 
as a challenge to establishing enabling environments for development. See, 
for example: 
‘Climate change and other environmental threats, rapid 
population growth and migration are putting 
disproportionate pressure on livelihoods in rural areas 
where poverty is already entrenched and people have 
the least resilience’ (FAO, 2014a, p.6; 2014b, p.2). 
 ‘On the other hand, crime-related violence, 
transnational organized crime, including trafficking in 
persons and smuggling of migrants, as well as drug 
trafficking not only caused losses in terms of human 
resources and future productivity, but also negatively 
affected the enabling environment for the realization of 
development goals, the rule of law, business and finance 
and human security’ (UNODC, 2012, p.2).  
6.3.4 Development as a Reason for Migration 
 
The impact of development, or lack thereof, on migration, was a far less 
prominent argument for the inclusion of migration in the post-2015 
development agenda. The basic premise of this argument is that migration is 
the product of a lack of development in one’s place of origin. It is an argument 
with a long history and it fuelled the notion of ‘aid in place of migration’ 
(Böhning and Schloeter-Paredes 1994). Although never directly arguing that 
migration should have a place in the post-2015 development agenda, FAO is 
most clear in referring to migration as a product of underdevelopment. FAO 
argued that rural development, such as the creation of livelihood 
opportunities and investments in public services, will prevent what it refers 
to as ‘distress migration’, which deprives rural areas of skills and puts 
pressure on infrastructure and services in urban areas (FAO, 2014, 2015). 
Similar arguments appear in the writings of UN Women concerning the 
impacts of migration on rural poverty rates (UN Women, 2013a, 2013b).  
However, critics have highlighted the folly of this argument, since, 
development can also increase migration (Skeldon 1997; de Haas 2010). 
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Arguments implying that underdevelopment leads to migration were 
therefore primarily framed in terms of the notion of migration out of choice 
rather than a necessity, a mantra that Pécoud (2015) attributed to the work of 
GCIM in the early 2000s and that was popularized by the ILO:  
‘The UN post-2015 development agenda is an 
opportunity to give renewed impetus to the shared 
responsibility to promote decent jobs and social 
protection everywhere. There is no corresponding 
responsibility on any one country to compensate 
demographic shortfalls in any other. This is what gives 
meaning to the idea that migration should be an option 
available to individuals and not an obligation imposed 
upon them’ (ILO, 2014, p.6). 
In a working paper commissioned by IOM ahead of the 2013 World 
Migration Report, Philip Martin made a similar argument that development 
enabled migration is likely to have more significant developmental impacts: 
‘Faster development will enable some of those now too 
poor to migrate to move to better opportunities, so that 
international migration and the potential for faster 
development may increase together’ (Martin, 2012, p.1). 
 
6.3.5 Displacement as a Development Challenge 
 
Although a less prominent narrative, displacement has increasingly been 
viewed as a development challenge, both for those displaced, but also for the 
localities into which displaced persons arrive. The framing of displacement 
as a development challenge in the years preceding the adoption of the SDGs 
focused primarily on the promotion of partnerships between humanitarian 
actors and development actors to limit the potentially disruptive impacts that 
displacement could have on development:  
‘As was noted in a joint statement from OCHA, 
UNHCR, and IOM in July, protracted displacement is a 
driver of inequality and may hinder the sustainable 
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development of both individuals and host communities, 
in addition to triggering conflict relapses. With forced 
displacement at its highest level since World War II, this 
is not a concern to be overlooked’ (IOM, 2014a, p.4). 
The depiction of displacement as a development challenge is, unsurprisingly, 
particularly prominent in the documents of UNHCR. However, references to 
displacement as a challenge to development do also appear in the texts of 
other agencies, perhaps in response to the increasing attention given to 
displacement in light of the Syrian crisis.  
 
6.3.6 Migration and Development as a Unifying Frame 
 
Based on the operational definitions of Habermas (1993) developed by 
Sjursen (2002) and discussed in Section 3.1.2, the theoretical discussion of IOs 
as an entity (Section 2.2.2) and the comparison of the human rights and 
management frames (Section 5.2), one can derive some expectations about the 
types of argumentation that different organizations will employ. 
Organizations with a preference for multilateral solutions to migration based 
on the principle of increasing state efficiency may be reasonably expected to 
employ pragmatic reasoning. In contrast, organizations that operate under 
the principle of international organization to achieve some shared goal may 
be more likely to employ moral and legal-ethical argumentation. Given the 
general resistance of Northern States to binding norms in the area of 
migration, one would expect limited use of legal-ethical arguments except for 
the writings of organizations with a normative mandate. However, given the 
interest of many developing countries in promoting rights within the context 
of global discussions on migration, one would still expect moral arguments 
to be prevalent. Hence, normative organizations are more likely to employ 
moral rather than ethical-political argumentation given general resistance to 
binding norms  
Figure 6.1 shows the distribution of pragmatic, ethical-political, and moral 
argumentation employed by the members of the GMG in the run-up to the 
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adoption of the SDGs7. Pragmatic argumentation was the most commonly 
employed argumentation style by all organizations but was particularly 
dominant in the writings of FAO, UNCTAD, UNDESA, UNITAR, UNU, and 
the World Bank. Moral argumentation was identified in the publications of 
13 of the 17 organizations, and was most prominent in the writings of 
OHCHR, UNICEF, and WHO. Ethical-political arguments were the least 
common and identified in the writings of just three organizations: ILO, 
OHCHR, and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). ILO 
primarily made ethical-political argumentation. UNODC employed both 
ethical political and pragmatic arguments with equal frequency. OHCHR 
made the occasional ethical-political argument but primarily made moral 
arguments (Figure 6.1). A summary of the arguments put forward by each 
organization can be found in Table 6.3.  
Figure 6.1 Arguments for Including Migration in the SDGs by Habermas’ Categories 
 
Source: Author’s Own  
 
 
 
7 The percentages were calculated based on the total coding density represented by each coding 
categories per organization. Coding density is the percentage of the text covered that is coded to 
a particular node. Two key limitations of this approach are that it captures the length of the 
argument and is dependent upon the length of the document.  
Thus, one must be careful with the interpretation of the figure. While this is an imperfect method, 
it provides an indicative overview of the argumentative style of different IOs, that largely 
corresponds with the findings of the qualitative content analysis (Table 6.3) 
. 
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Table 6.2 Arguments for Including Migration in the SDGs using Habermas 
IO Summary of arguments Pragm- 
atic 
Ethical-
Political 
Moral 
ILO Arguments are predominantly ethical 
political and outline the costs of non-
adherence to labour standards from the 
perspective of migrant workers. Pragmatic 
argumentation is used to propose policies 
related to decent work which contribute to 
sustainable development. 
✓  ✓   
IOM Broad range of arguments including the 
positive relationship between ‘well-
managed’ migration and development; the 
risk of migrants being excluded from 
development; with a focus on 
‘mainstreaming’ migration across different 
areas (health, education, environment etc).  
✓   ✓  
OHCHR Arguments very much based on an appeal 
to universal standards: ‘A post-2015 
development agenda must therefore be a 
global agenda, based on universal norms 
and universal objectives’ (OHCHR, 2012, 
p.5).  
 ✓  
 
✓  
UNCTAD Focus is on remittances as a means of 
enhancing trade/development linkages 
primarily through regulating the 
remittance transfer market and financial 
inclusion. 
 
✓    
UNHCR References to the post-2015 development 
agenda primarily relate to the recasting of 
displacement as not only a moral, 
normative issue, but also a development 
challenge. 
✓   ✓  
UNODC Focus primarily on smuggling as a 
phenomenon undermining sustainable 
development with references made to the 
UN Protocol against the Smuggling of 
Migrants by Land, Sea and Air and related 
conventions. 
 
✓  ✓   
UN-DESA Arguments are largely focused on the 
importance of taking demographic 
dynamics into consideration within the 
agenda. A recurring argument is the need 
to avoid viewing migration as a 
development solution.  
✓    
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IO Summary of arguments Pragm- 
atic 
Ethical-
Political 
Moral 
UNDP Given UNDP’s role in facilitating the post-
2015 development agenda consultations, it 
is unsurprising to find a diversity of 
arguments. Many relate to the absence of 
clear governance structure on migration 
alongside the role of migration as a 
development enabler, a challenge to 
development, and a product of 
development.  
✓   ✓  
UNFPA Generally arguments focus on migration 
being part of development with both 
positive and negative aspects that require 
consideration  
✓    
World 
Bank 
Primarily focused on migrants as 
development enablers through 
remittances, with a particular focus on 
reducing the cost of remitting and diaspora 
bonds. 
✓    
UNESCO Focus on education – access, effect on 
attitudes towards migrants, effect on 
labour markets. 
✓   ✓  
UNICEF Migration as a risk to children fulfilling 
their development potential  
  ✓  
UNITAR Focus on the relevance of cities to the post-
2015 development agenda. Largely relates 
to the pragmatic policy directions taken by 
cities. 
✓    
UN 
Women 
Focus largely on the negative impacts of 
migration on women (either those who are 
‘left behind’ or women migrants) and the 
importance of a human rights framework. 
✓   ✓  
WHO Focus is primarily on universal health care 
access as well as the retention of health care 
professionals.  
✓   ✓  
FAO Migration as a consequence of rural 
underdevelopment as justification for rural 
development projects. No direct 
arguments for the inclusion of migration in 
SDGs.  
✓    
UNU Focus is on the evidence on the migration-
development relationship and what this 
says about the place for migration in the 
post-2015 development agenda.  
✓    
 
A characteristic feature of the majority of arguments is the centrality of the 
agent, the hallmark of the pragmatic argument. The relationship between 
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migration and development was framed in terms of the mandate of the 
organization. This provides support for the argument that IOs frame the 
world in a way that justifies their existence (Barnett and Finnemore, 2004). 
For example, the World Bank and UNCTAD both focus on remittances as an 
enabler of development. The World Bank view is from the perspective of 
development financing, whereas UNCTAD focuses on the trade links that can 
be established through migration.  
Although it was expected that organizations with a normative mandate 
would be more likely to employ ethical-political arguments, this was only 
true for the ILO and, to a lesser extent, for OHCHR and UNODC. For 
example, UNHCR’s arguments were more pragmatic, calling for the 
development community to recognize displacement as a development 
challenge and to put their efforts (and money) behind interventions 
supporting durable solutions for displaced populations. While UN Women 
could have drawn on the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), their arguments primarily 
focused on the need to protect the vulnerabilities of migrant women.  
Overall, there were limited appeals to international standards when 
advocating for a place for migration in the SDGs. While the subject of human 
rights for migrants was more often part of ethical-political and moral 
arguments, pragmatic arguments for the protection of the rights pointed to 
the utility of protecting rights. For example, immigration reform to allow 
more labour mobility through regular channels can increase migrant 
remittances (UNDP, 2013). Additionally, migrants with equitable access to 
health care can reduce the cost of emergency care and pose fewer challenges 
to public health (IOM, n.d.a).  
The key takeaway from this discussion is that the degree of consistency across 
the writings of different IOs, suggests that the ‘migration and development’ 
frame resonated with actors with fundamentally different views concerning 
the purpose of international organization, and in turn, the best way to 
approach to migration in an intergovernmental setting. Drawing attention to 
the efficacy of protecting the rights of migrants from a development 
perspective appealed to adherents of both the migration management and 
migrant rights frames demonstrating the unifying power of the ‘migration 
and development’ frame. The high degree of consistency in the writing of IOs 
before the adoption of the SDGs points to a degree of coordination. As in 
Chapter 5, we now turn to specifically examine the role of policy brokers in 
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the curation of a shared narrative to convince the architects of the SDGs that 
migration should be reflected in the new agenda.  
 
6.4 Negotiating a Place for Migration in the Sustainable 
Development Goals: The ‘Two-Pronged’ Approach  
 
Thus far, this chapter has focused on why migration should be in the post-
2015 development agenda, noting the role of migration as an enabler of 
development and the role of migrants as subjects of development. However, 
counter-arguments on why migration should not be in the post-2015 
development agenda also merit consideration since they fuelled the effort to 
convince the architects of the SDGs to include migration. I observed two main 
points of contention. The first point of contention related to migration being 
‘too toxic’ (INT-GOV-032) and very unlikely to be agreed upon by the UN 
Member States in the negotiations. Nothing fundamental had changed since 
the early 2000s in the sense that migration remained a topic touching on state 
sovereignty with only limited coverage within the UN system. However, 
among the actors participating in the GFMD and GMG, a shared narrative 
had emerged, as well as new and compelling evidence that migration could 
have a noticeable impact on development (INT-IO-003; INT-IO-015;.INT-
GOV-032). 
The second reason relates to the views of the development community, 
whose absence from the GFMD is often noted (INT-GOV-028). The 
development community, as reflected in the arguments of FAO and others, 
had long viewed migration as the product of failed development. Peter 
Sutherland voiced this concern at the Twelfth Coordination Meeting on 
International Migration in February 2014 (UNDESA 2014). The necessity of 
going beyond a one-dimensional view of the migration was what had led the 
GCIM to forward the idea of ‘migration out of choice’ (Pécoud 2015, p.73). 
This message was also prominent in a think piece submitted to the UNTT by 
UNDESA and IOM in 2012. The primary task of those wishing to see 
migration in the SDGs was convincing development actors, and reluctant 
states of the salience of migration as an enabler of development, while 
simultaneously balancing the differing interests of GMG constituents 
through the incorporation of both a management and human rights 
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perspective. Deputy Secretary-General Jan Eliasson and later Michael Doyle 
referred to this vision as a ‘two-pronged’ approach:  
‘Mr Eliasson advocated for a two-pronged approach on 
migration and development that would both unlock the 
development potential of migration as well as ensure the 
dignity and rights of all migrants and their families’. 
(UNDESA 2014, p.1). 
There was, therefore, a decided effort among international actors to develop 
consistent messaging on migration and the post-2015 development agenda to 
be fed into the ongoing process to ensure that migration would be included. 
The second HLD in 2013 lent further legitimacy to these efforts. In the country 
statements at the HLD, ‘the most commonly mentioned policy priority was 
integrating migration into the post-2015 development agenda’ (UNDESA 
2014). In the HLD Declaration8, Member States ‘acknowledge the important 
contribution of migration in realizing the Millennium Development Goals, 
and recognize that human mobility is a key factor for sustainable 
development which should be adequately considered in the elaboration of 
the post-2015 development agenda’ (para. 8, p.2). There was also a call for the 
UN system and other relevant IOs to cooperate ‘in order to adopt a 
comprehensive and coordinated approach, and to consider migration issues 
in their contributions to the preparatory process that will establish the post-
2015 development agenda’ (para. 31, p.4). Three specific efforts merit further 
elaboration. 
The first is the creation of an informal multi-stakeholder group – ‘the 
informals’ – by Peter Sutherland in December 2012 ‘to discuss and strategize 
how to lobby governments to have key references to migration included in 
the SDGs’ (INT-IO-004). The group included government representatives 
(Bangladesh, Belgium, France, Germany, Mexico, Sweden, and Switzerland), 
UN agencies (such as UNDP, the World Bank, DESA, UNICEF) and other IOs 
such as IOM (before it became a related agency of the UN) and OECD; 
funding bodies (such as the Open Society Foundation and the MacArthur 
Foundation); civil society actors and other experts. As one participant 
observed: 
 
8 Declaration of the High-Level Dialogue on International Migration and Development, 
UNGAOR, 68th Session, UN Doc. A/68/L.5 (Oct. 1, 2013) 
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‘We managed to carve out a separate discussion on 
migration. The SRSG’s office convened a regular 
informal group, which was comprised of international 
agencies, the SRSG’s office, those few governments who 
were interested, civil society actors, and so on, who were 
able to put together different messaging on migration. 
We were doing a lot of advocacy, writing a lot of papers. 
Peter Sutherland and the IOM Director General, William 
Lacy Swing, published a few things. Through that and 
especially with the help of the governments which were 
involved and were very much interested in putting 
migration on the agenda in the intergovernmental 
discussions as well, we were able to start chipping away 
and get it in there as a standalone issue. Not a standalone 
goal, of course, but just something to be considered as 
one of the cross-cutting issues to be considered across 
the whole agenda’ (INT-IO-016). 
While there are plenty of other examples, the best-documented example of 
the work of the informals is a submission sent by Peter Sutherland to Ban Ki-
moon’s Special Advisor on post-2015 Development Planning, Amina 
Mohammed on 18 June 2013. It is not insignificant that Amina Mohammed 
was a former Chair of the IOM Council and had played a significant role in 
the discussion of IOM-UN relations in the early 2000s (Chapter 7). In his 
letter, Sutherland thanked Amina Mohammed for her ‘extraordinary efforts 
to include migration in the recently released HLP report’ (United Nations 
Archives, 2013a) and asked for her support to ensure that migration would 
also be featured in the Synthesis report of the Secretary-General on the post-
2015 sustainable development agenda9. To this end, he shared inputs 
prepared by the informal working group, which included: a paragraph on 
the impact of migration on development; a proposal for the formulation of 
 
9 Report of the Secretary-General: The Road to Dignity by 2030: Ending Poverty, Transforming 
all Lives and Protecting the Planet, UNGAOR, UN Doc. A/69/700 (4 December 2014) 
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migration targets and indicators10; and a review of the evidence on how 
migration had contributed to the achievement of the MDGs. 
The paragraph, which has been replicated in its near entirety in several places 
including the UNFPA's Deputy Executive Director of Management statement 
at the OWG Meeting in June 2013 (cf. Albrectsen 2013; Sutherland 2013a; 
2013b), neatly captured a multitude of the arguments already identified from 
various other sources and encapsulated the ‘two-pronged’ approach:  
‘Today, more than a billion people rely on international 
and internal migration to escape poverty and conflict, 
adapt to environmental and economic shocks, and 
improve the income, health, and education of their 
families. Annual remittances to developing countries 
alone approach $500 billion, triple the amount of ODA, 
while potential savings from reducing migration costs 
could be of a similar scale. There is clear evidence that if 
states make more informed policy choices, they can 
generate large economic and social gains from 
migration, while ensuring decent living and working 
conditions for migrants. Partnerships among 
governments, the private sector, and civil society should 
be built on mobility policies that: i) reduce 
discrimination against migrants and protect their rights; 
ii) lower the human, social, and economic costs of 
migration, including those related to recruitment, 
remittances, and obtaining documentation such as visas 
and residency permits; iii) expand opportunities for 
migrants to more productively invest their earnings and 
share their knowledge; and iv) enlist migrants and 
diaspora organizations in enhancing development in 
their communities of origin and destination’ (United 
Nations Archives 2013a, p.3). 
 
10 A sample of these include reducing the transaction cost of remittances; reducing the cost of 
recruitment, eliminating discrimination, reducing human trafficking, ensuring migrants have 
access to financial services, enhancing skills recognition and reducing irregular migration 
(United Nations Archives, 2013a).  
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The efforts of this group thus helped to galvanize efforts to create consistent 
messaging around the relevance of migration to any discussions of 
development at the global policy level. 
The second example is the efforts to develop consistent messaging by the 
GMG. During the negotiations, the GMG was chaired by IOM in 2013, the 
ILO in 2014, and the World Bank in 2015. Together, the GMG prepared 
several position papers and made joint statements regarding the place of 
migration in the post-2015 development agenda. Their work also reflected the 
’two-pronged’ approach: if human rights were respected, then the positive 
development impacts of migration could be enhanced. In their first position 
paper on the topic, ahead of the second HLD in October 2013, this view was 
evident:  
‘The GMG has long taken the view that if the human and 
labour rights of migrants are effectively respected and 
migration is well governed throughout the entire 
migration process, including through enhanced access 
to affordable, safe and regular migration channels, 
substantially improved human development outcomes 
will result for migrants, their families, communities and 
countries’ (GMG 2013, p.3) 
Nevertheless, controversy remained within the GMG over how migration 
should be included: 
‘…we had some joint GMG positioning around the SDGs 
and migration, and there was always the kind of tension 
between the rights-based agencies, and the more 
pragmatic, if you will, development or migration 
actors…but I think we did manage to have joint GMG 
positioning on the issue’ (INT-IO-006). 
The third example is the work of the GFMD. Although discussions regarding 
the post-2015 development agenda started in Mauritius, it was the primary 
focus of the Swedish Chair. The seventh meeting of the GFMD in May 2014 
in Stockholm was also one of the last gatherings of different stakeholders 
before finalization of the OWG goals in July 2014. The theme of the Swedish 
GFMD was ‘Unlocking the Potential of Migration for Inclusive 
Development’, and its main focus was on how to ensure that migration would 
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be included in the post-2015 development agenda. As a member of the 
informals, and with a place on Amina Mohammed’s High-Level Panel, 
Sweden was well placed to galvanize and communicate clear and consistent 
messaging to the negotiators. In a letter addressed to Ban Ki-moon on 28 May 
2014, Ambassador Eva Åkerman Börje, Chair of the Swedish GFMD writes:  
‘I recall your suggestion in the opening remarks that our 
“voices can impress upon those drawing up the post-
2015 framework” and your encouragement, when we 
met with the GFMD Troika on 21 February 2014, to feed 
in the results from the GFMD Summit Meeting to the 
continued post-2015 process. In response, I hereby 
submit the recommendations that came out of the 
GFMD Summit Meeting on including migration in the 
post-2015 development agenda. These were endorsed at 
the meeting and the Swedish Chair was requested to 
submit them to your esteemed office’ (GFMD 2014, 
p.109). 
The Swedish Chair’s recommendations were underpinned by two principles:  
 ‘1. Migration is first and foremost about human beings 
and the protection of their human rights and 
fundamental freedoms, irrespective of their migration 
status, needs to be included in the post-2015 
development agenda. 
2. There is consensus that migrants and migration 
should be recognized as enablers of development and 
should be included as such’ (GFMD 2014, p.110). 
These recommendations carried significant weight because 140 states had 
endorsed them. The state recommendations were further strengthened by the 
‘Stockholm Agenda’ which was a document prepared and endorsed by 312 
civil society organizations. The  Stockholm Agenda communicated the 
necessity of including migration from both a human rights perspective and a 
development perspective (GFMD Civil Society, 2014).  
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An examination of references to migration in the key outcome documents 
throughout the process offers support to the success of the ‘two-pronged’ 
strategy. References to migration in the first report of the UNTT and the 
outcome document of the Rio+20 Conference11 anchored migration in both 
sets of discussions. Much of the thinking in the UNTT report was based upon 
18 think pieces that had been prepared by different constellations of actors in 
May 2012. Next to a think piece solely focused on migration and human 
mobility, co-authored by DESA and IOM, migration was referred to in ten 
other think pieces: on countries with special needs; health; human rights; 
inequalities; growth and employment; peace and security; population 
dynamics; social protection and urbanization (see Annex 6.2) The UNTT 
report contained 11 substantive references to migration primarily centred 
around the argument that well-managed migration, where the rights of 
migrants are upheld, can contribute to development:  
‘The dynamism of migrants and their economic and 
other contributions to both their countries of origin and 
host countries need to be more fully harnessed, above all 
by recognizing migrants as positive agents of innovation 
with human rights. Better managing migration, both in 
countries of origin and destination, will be essential’ 
(UNTT, 2012, p.30). 
The report also positioned migration as an ‘enabler’ of development in its 
‘integrated framework for realizing the “future we want for all” in the post-
2015 UN development agenda’ (UNTT, 2012, p.24).  
The Rio+20 outcome document made three references to migration namely 
the importance of ensuring the participation of migrants and their families in 
the process; the need to consider population trends (including migration) 
systematically; and the need to respect the rights of migrants regardless of 
their status through interregional, regional and bilateral cooperation. Several 
key informants acknowledge the role played by IOM along with the US 
Government, the EU delegation, and the Vatican in securing a place for 
migration in the outcome document (INT-IO-28; INT-OTHER-034). Of note 
was the reframing of migration from a ‘scare tactic to galvanize attention to 
 
11 The Future We Want, GA Res 66/288, UNGAOR, UN Doc A/RES/66/288 (11 September 2012). 
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the need for environmental change’ (INT-OTHER-034) towards the view of 
migration evident in the Rio Declaration. As one key informant noted: 
‘We were relatively happy with the Rio Declaration 
where there was both a strong push to look at migration 
as a contributor towards economic development, but 
also a strong call for the human rights of the people that 
were part of these migration movements’ (INT-IO-040). 
Between December 2012 and March 2013, migration was discussed within the 
context of the Global Consultations on Population Dynamics, which was co-
led by Bangladesh and Switzerland, and supported by UNFPA, UNDESA, 
UN-HABITAT and IOM (in collaboration with UNDP, UNAIDS, UN 
Women, OHCHR, ILO, FAO, and the WFP). The consultations involved both 
face-to-face and digital consultations with academics (November 2012), the 
private sector (January 2013), civil society (February 2013), and Member 
States (March 2013) and resulted in the Dhaka Declaration12. The Dhaka 
Declaration was the outcome document of the Member State consultations on 
13 March 2013 and contained several references to migration. Five of the 11 
overarching recommendations mentioned migration, particularly concerning 
international cooperation, alongside eight thematic recommendations on 
migration and human mobility. The specific recommendations on migration 
capture a diversity of the arguments for the inclusion of migration, with a 
focus on maximizing the role that migrants can play as ‘agents of 
development’ through the systematic consideration of migration across the 
new development agenda. 
The next reference to migration was in the report of the High-Level Panel of 
Eminent Persons (HLP) in May 2013. While migration was not one of the 
HLP’s suggested goals or targets, their report did contain several references 
to migration, including a paragraph devoted to international migration as a 
key factor for sustainable development: 
‘The universal human rights and fundamental freedoms 
of migrants must be respected. These migrants make a 
positive economic contribution to their host countries, 
 
12 Dhaka Declaration of the Global Leadership Meeting on Population Dynamics in the context of 
the Post-2015 Development Agenda (13 March 2013) 
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by building up their labour force. Sending countries 
benefit from getting foreign exchange in the form of 
remittances and from greater trade and financial flows 
with countries where they have a large diaspora. By 
2030, as global population rises, there could be 30 million 
more international migrants, remitting an additional $60 
billion to their home countries through low cost 
channels’ (HLP, 2013, p.18). 
This reference again reinforced the argument that the contributions of 
migrants to development could be enhanced if their human rights were 
respected and protected. After the release of the OWG report in July 2014, in 
which migration was referenced in several targets, there was a shift in the 
focus of advocacy efforts from promoting the inclusion of migration, to 
discussing how the migration-related goals could be measured.  
 
6.5 Migration in the Sustainable Development Goals 
 
The result of these efforts was a place for migration in the Sustainable 
Development Goals, including an entire paragraph in the preamble devoted 
solely to migration:  
 ‘We recognize the positive contribution of migrants for 
inclusive growth and sustainable development. We also 
recognize that international migration is a 
multidimensional reality of major relevance for the 
development of countries of origin, transit, and 
destination, which requires coherent and 
comprehensive responses. We will cooperate 
internationally to ensure safe, orderly, and regular 
migration involving full respect for human rights and 
the humane treatment of migrants regardless of 
migration status, of refugees and of displaced persons. 
Such cooperation should also strengthen the resilience of 
communities hosting refugees, particularly in 
developing countries. We underline the right of 
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migrants to return to their country of citizenship, and 
recall that States must ensure that their returning 
nationals are duly received13’ (para. 29, p.8). 
Next to an entire paragraph devoted to migration in the preamble, migration 
is explicitly mentioned under the goals on reducing inequality (Goal 10 
Targets 7 and c), promoting decent work and economic growth (Goal 8 Target 
8) and the context of data disaggregation (Goal 17 Target 18) (Table 6.2). 
 
Table 6.3 Explicit Migration References in the Sustainable Development Goals 
8.8 Protect labour rights and promote safe and secure working environments for 
all workers, including migrant workers, in particular women migrants, and those 
in precarious employment 
10.7 Facilitate orderly, safe, regular and responsible migration and mobility of 
people, including through the implementation of planned and well-managed 
migration policies 
10.c By 2030, reduce to less than 3 per cent the transaction costs of migrant 
remittances and eliminate remittance corridors with costs higher than 5 per cent 
17.18 By 2020, enhance capacity-building support to developing countries, 
including for least developed countries and small island developing states, to 
increase significantly the availability of high-quality, timely and reliable data 
disaggregated by income, gender, age, race, ethnicity, migratory status, disability, 
geographic location and other characteristics relevant in national contexts 
Source: Transforming our World: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, UNGAOR, 70th 
Session, UN Doc. A/RES/70/1 (25 September 2015) 
 
In addition to this, the Addis Ababa Action Agenda, which complements 
Goal 17, contained four substantive references to migration. The first 
reference is the positive contributions of migrants to development primarily 
through remittances with the caveat that any approach should not equate 
remittances with other international financial flows but instead focus on 
reducing transfer costs and promoting financial inclusion. The second 
focused on ensuring that migrant and refugee children have access to 
education. The third focused on the need for international cooperation ‘to 
ensure safe, orderly and regular migration, with full respect for human rights’ 
 
13 Transforming our World: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, UNGAOR, 70th 
Session, UN Doc. A/RES/70/1 (25 September 2015) 
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and enhance the development benefits of migration. The last reference 
focused on ensuring that statistics are disaggregated by migratory status. 
Further references to mobility-related phenomena included human 
trafficking, mentioned in the context of Goal 5 on achieving gender equality 
(Target 2), Goal 8 on decent work and economic growth (Target 7), and Goal 
16 on promoting peaceful and inclusive societies (Target 2). Mobility in the 
context of higher education was captured in Goal 4 (target 4b). Migrants were 
also indirectly represented by the pledge to ‘leave no one behind’, and with 
this in mind, migration relevant goals and targets could be increased to 
include all goals and targets where inclusive language is used. In total, seven 
Goals (3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 16) and 27 Targets stipulate that the specific goal or 
target is ‘for all’, thus inclusive of migrant populations.  
The way migration has been included in the SDGs reflects the ‘two-pronged’ 
approach advocated for by key actors such as Michael Doyle and Jan Eliasson 
(UNDESA, 2014; 2015). The dominant narrative is arguably that of migrants 
as a distinct social group at risk of being excluded from development, as 
opposed to migration being conceptualized as an enabler of development. 
However, this latter narrative is captured in SDG 10 (reducing inequalities). 
The proposed indicators for measuring Target 10.7 include a measure of 
recruitment cost, for which ILO is responsible, and an indicator on the 
number of countries that have implemented ‘orderly, safe, regular and 
responsible’ migration policies. Target 10.c focuses on reducing the cost of 
migrant remittances.  
The reactions to the inclusion of migration in the SDGs have been varied. 
Some commentators view the SDGs as a missed opportunity for the 
‘indicators to be linked much more explicitly to the human rights 
architecture’ (INT-IO-018). On the other hand, almost any conceivable issue 
has made it into the 17 goals and 169 targets of the agenda, and thus 
policymakers and practitioners can make of the SDGs what they like. The 
way migration is covered can be interpreted in different ways (McGregor, 
2020) and thus is actually ‘quite vague in terms of what states committed 
themselves to’ (INT-IO-006). As was also true of the MDGs (Skeldon, 2008), 
it is possible to connect almost all goals to migration in one way or another 
(McGregor, 2020). As one interviewee noted, ‘you can ask five people and get 
five different answers as to which things are relevant’ (INT-IO-016). 
However, the fact that migration was included is arguably far more 
significant than how it was included: 
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‘What is important is that it is there. That created a 
political umbrella if you like that helped us to keep 
moving forward’ (INT-GOV-036). 
Thus, the inclusion of migration in the SDGs marked a significant moment in 
the institutionalization of migration as a global policy issue. 
 
6.6 Conclusion  
 
The title of this chapter is a reference to a 2008 paper written by Prof. Ronald 
Skeldon in which he proposed that the ‘migration and development’ 
optimism that had characterized the international policy world since the turn 
of the millennium, further fuelled by the HLD and GFMD, may be coming to 
an end (Skeldon, 2008). Given the instrumentalization of the ‘migration and 
development’ frame to further the process of institutionalizing migration 
within the UN, it is plausible that the inclusion of migration in the SDGs 
marked the beginning of the end of the migration and development era.  
What can be deduced from the comparison of the arguments made for the 
GFMD, with the calculated omission of human rights, to the arguments made 
for the inclusion of migration in the SDGs which captured human rights 
within a broader migration and development perspective, is that frames are 
not static but evolve. Framing migration as a development issue has been a 
vehicle for bringing migration into the UN. By focusing on economic 
development and the positive societal contributions that migration can make 
through monetary and social transfers, a series of events unfolded that have 
culminated in the acceptance of migration as a global policy issue. The 
inclusion of migration in the SDGs reflects this acceptance. The way 
migration is included in the SDGs points to the ability of the ‘migration and 
development’ frame to assume, if not resolve, frame conflicts. 
The importance that IOs accorded to seeing migration included in the SDGs 
is a testament to the increasingly important role that non-binding 
frameworks play in global governance. Throughout the process, a select 
group of individuals sought to insert carefully crafted paragraphs into key 
documents. Not having migration in the MDGs made it harder for IOs to 
justify interventions in the area of migration. The inclusion of migration in 
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the SDGs provided a ‘hook’ (INT-IGO-002) for various actors operating in the 
area of migration to legitimize their ever-expanding portfolios. The active 
role played by IOs to shape the language used to describe migration in the 
context of a new development agenda lends credence to the argument that 
IOs seek to influence states through constitutive power. The GFMD (Chapter 
5) and the SDG negotiations have demonstrated that particular individuals 
within IOs have actively shaped global migration narratives to ensure that 
both the human rights of migrants and the multifaceted relationship between 
migration and development have been included in a political declaration, and 
hence accorded legitimacy. Crucially, the way that migration has been 
reflected has been crafted in a way that was ambiguous enough not to 
alienate any states, but which still allowed for further international dialogue 
on migration.  
However, it would be too straightforward to leave the argument there. 
Focusing on the act of framing, as Benford (1997) warns, risks reifying the 
individual, or in this case, the organization. We have only really examined 
the struggle between IOs to develop a common language that would be 
accepted by states. However, states were also involved in the process. Given 
that almost any conceivable issue found a place within the SDGs, the SDGs 
may be symbolic of a broader state-driven shift in multilateralism, away from 
legally binding norms and towards creatively worded non-binding 
agreements which can be interpreted and adapted in different ways, 
dependent upon the adopter’s particular interests and objectives. 
Furthermore, just because Member States have agreed upon a text does not 
automatically guarantee their effective implementation. After all, the SDGs 
are not legally binding, and a cleverly framed commitment assuming 
multiple interests through ‘constructive ambiguity’ (INT-IO-037) does not 
negate the power dynamics underpinning them.  
One cannot decontextualize the process of advocating a place for migration 
in the post-2015 development agenda from the broader story of migration at 
the multilateral level. Seeing migration included in the SDGs was about 
furthering international cooperation on migration. For some states, such as 
Ecuador, Mexico, and Switzerland, bringing migration into the post-2015 
development agenda was a way of furthering the institutionalization of 
migration within the UN (INT-IO-015; INT-GOV-032; INT-GOV-036; INT-IO-
037). However, the conflict between adherents to the human rights and 
management frames remains. For some, the inclusion of migration in the 
SDGs was the step required to bring IOM, mostly unaltered, into the UN, 
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lending weight to the migration management frame. For adherents of the 
human rights frame, it was an opportunity to establish migration as a human 
rights issue. Like the first HLD, 2015 marked another pivot year in the journey 
of migration as a global policy issue. The next two chapters explore this 
argument in more detail. Chapter 7 examines IOM’s journey to the UN and 
the role of the SDGs herein. Chapter 8 looks at the negotiations leading to the 
Global Compacts. 
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7. The “Perfect Storm”? From Provisional 
Committee to UN migration agency 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
On 19 September 2016, then Secretary-General of the UN, Ban Ki-moon and 
Director-General of IOM, William Lacy Swing, signed an agreement which, 
for the first time in its history, brought IOM into the UN system as a ’related 
agency’. IOM’s entry into the UN was a remarkable development in the 
evolution of global migration governance, and for many signified the 
acceptance of migration as a policy area of relevance to the UN’s mandate, 
which as has been demonstrated was, as recently as the early 2000s, still 
subject to much contention. As the UN had looked for ways to address 
migration-related issues better in the early 2000s, IOM had considered the 
option of becoming a ‘related agency’ of the UN. However, the option was 
taken off the table by the UN who instead offered IOM ‘specialized agency’ 
status. The main difference between a specialized agency and a related 
agency is that the latter is excluded from Articles 57 and 63 of the UN Charter 
(United Nations Archives, 2014a). The main difference, therefore, is that the 
UN ‘may co-ordinate the activities of the specialized agencies through 
consultation with and recommendations to such agencies and through 
recommendations to the General Assembly and to the Members of the United 
Nations’ (United Nations, 1945, p.13) while a related agency, although ill-
defined, retains more autonomy from the UN. 
Prior to 2010, little academic attention was given to IOM. The relative absence 
of IOM from previous studies of IOs is potentially due to IOM being viewed 
as an instrument of state (Mearsheimer, 1995). As Feldblum (1999) argues, as 
‘a creation of Cold War politics, (the organization) was largely dominated by 
US interests and has been dismissed by scholars as a significant international 
actor in its own right’ (p.5). IOM, because of its history, was generally thought 
of as little more than a ‘travel agency’ (Caillault, 2012; Elie, 2010; Feldblum, 
1999). However, there have been increasing calls for the more substantial 
investigation of IOM (Andrijasevic & Walters, 2010; Elie, 2010; Pécoud, 2018). 
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While a burgeoning body of literature on IOM has emerged since 20101, the 
majority of these studies have focused on a specific aspect of IOM’s work, for 
example: in implementing information campaigns (Nieuwenhuys & Pécoud, 
2007; Pécoud, 2010); human trafficking (Schatral, 2011) and irregular 
migration (Brachet, 2016; Caillault, 2012); return migration (Caillault, 2012; 
Collyer, 2012; Koch, 2014); temporary migration (Gabriel & Macdonald, 2018; 
Valarezo, 2015); or border control (Andrew & Eden, 2011; Frowd, 2014) using 
primarily qualitative methods (archival analysis, ethnography and key 
informant interviews). There has been less focus on understanding IOM from 
the perspective of its evolution as an IO. This chapter uses archival records 
and key informant interviews to trace the history of IOM from its origins as 
a small, temporary, intergovernmental organization in 1951 to its entry into 
the UN as a ‘related agency’ in September 2016 (Figure 7.1). In doing so the 
chapter addresses the following research question: 
Why did IOM become a related agency of the UN in 2016?  
In line with the theoretical framework, IOM is conceptualized as a resource-
dependent actor whose actions and decisions are a function of internal and 
external factors. Specific attention is, therefore, placed on how IOM reacted 
to external events that had implications for its survival as an organization. 
In order to address the main research question, the remainder of the chapter 
is structured as follows. Section 7.2 provides the reader with a brief synopsis 
of IOM’s history, from its origins as the Provisional Intergovernmental 
Committee for the Movement of Migrants from Europe (PICMME) in 1951 to 
becoming the IOM in 1989. In line with process tracing, I then use a bracketing 
strategy to focus on three distinct points in time during which IOM’s 
relationship with the UN was the subject of intense discussion. The first 
moment comes in the early 1990s when IOM moved closer to the UN and 
became a founding member of what would become the Office for the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in 1991. It became a UN 
 
1 cf. Andrew and Eden 2011; Ashutosh and Mountz 2011; Andrijasevic and Walters 2010; Brachet 
2016; Bradley 2017; Caillault 2012; Collyer 2012; Elie 2010; Feldblum 1999; Frowd 2014; Gabriel 
and Macdonald 2018; Geiger 2010; Georgi 2010; Georgi and Schatral 2012; Guild, Grant, and 
Groenendijk 2017; Hall 2016; Koch 2014; Korneev 2013; Lavenex 2016; McGregor 2019; Morris 
2005; Nieuwenhuys and Pécoud 2007; Pécoud 2010; Poutignat and Streiff-Fénart 2010; Schatral 
2011; Valarezo 2015; Wunderlich 2012. 
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observer in 1992 and signed a cooperation agreement with the UN in 1996 
(Section 7.3). Shortly after the turn of the millennium, IOM-UN relations were 
again under discussion. The idea of IOM joining the UN was put on the 
agenda at the IOM Council Meetings in 2002, and a Working Group was 
created. However, IOM’s Member States ultimately decided not to join the 
UN (Section 7.4). In 2016, after migration had been accorded legitimacy as a 
relevant global policy issue in the SDGs, states were faced with several 
migration crises across the globe. IOM-UN relations were again the subject of 
debate, and this time IOM joined the UN (Section 7.5). Section 7.6 concludes 
with a discussion of the factors that have influenced IOM-UN relations as the 
organization journeyed towards the UN.  
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7.2 From the Provisional Committee for the Movement of 
Migrants from Europe to the International 
Organization for Migration  
 
From humble beginnings, IOM has grown from a temporary committee with 
limited membership established to address a particular problem in post-War 
Europe, to an organization with a broad mandate and a membership 
approaching universal (Figure 7.2). IOM’s story begins as the curtains rose on 
the Cold War. The organization began its life at the Migration Conference of 
Brussels on 5 December 1951 as the Provisional Intergovernmental 
Committee for the Movement of Migrants from Europe (PICMME). The 
original purpose of the organization was to provide operational support to 
the newly established UNHCR in achieving its normative protection mandate 
by facilitating ‘the orderly migration of large numbers of displaced, 
unemployed or under-employed persons in Western Europe’ (Carlin 1989, 
p.35). As discussed in Chapter 4, the ILO was poised to take on this function, 
as it had in the 1920s for Nansen, but its proposal was rejected, mainly due to 
opposition from the US (Ducasse-Rogier, 2001; Perruchoud, 1989). Fuelled by 
the politics of the Cold War, the US made its position clear on how 
intergovernmental cooperation on migration should be organized, by 
funding PICMME, as opposed to ILO, or any other UN agency (Long, 2013).  
Figure 7.2 IOM Member States 1951-2019 
 
Source: 1951-2011 (Ducasse-Rogier, 2001); 2011: (IOM, 2012a); 2019: IOM (2019) 
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Initially intended to provide a temporary solution for governments in Europe 
who feared the ‘economic stagnation and the social unrest that could be 
generated by a pool of “surplus population”’ (Karatani 2005, p.520), PICMME 
had an initial lifespan of 12 months. However, the question of the ongoing 
need for PICMME services became quickly evident to its member 
governments. From 13 to 21 October 1952, 20 member governments met in 
Geneva for the fourth session of PICMME. On the agenda at the meeting was 
a discussion about the future of the committee, including an appraisal of 
‘whether the experimental plan of attack on Europe's chronic surplus 
population problem during the previous year should be broadened or 
abandoned’ (ICEM 1953, p.169). UNHCR had already asked PICMME to 
expand its transportation services beyond Europe to support in the 
transportation of European refugees (mainly White Russians who had fled to 
China during the First World War) from China. Discussions regarding the 
possible involvement of PICMME in land resettlement programmes in Latin 
America were also underway. Therefore, the Committee concluded that 
PICMME continued to be relevant and so PICMME became the 
Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration (ICEM 1953; Elie 
2010).  
In 1953 the ICEM Constitution was adopted, coming into force in November 
1954 (Ducasse-Rogier, 2001). The Constitution authorized ICEM to organize 
the transport of migrants from European countries and to promote migration 
from Europe. ICEM was also tasked with the provision of services relating to 
the processing, placement, and settlement of migrants upon the request of 
states (Ducasse-Rogier, 2001). At this stage, it was anticipated that the 
organization would have a lifespan of a further three to five years with 1953 
designated as a ‘trial period for ICEM…because member governments 
wished to have further evidence that such a body as ICEM could make an 
effective contribution to the problems of population in Europe and overseas 
before acceding to the establishment of ICEM as a permanent agency; and 
second, because the Committee had to demonstrate its worth in a climate of 
receding migration and increasing obstacles to the development of organized 
migration’ (ICEM 1955, p.317). 
Over the next decade, ICEM facilitated the movement of over one million 
people, the majority of whom were European (Table 7.1). By the end of 
January 1957, ICEM had transported more than half a million (545,000) 
migrants and refugees from Europe. The main countries of destination were 
Australia (29.7%), the US (22.9%), Canada (15.2%), Argentina (11.7%), Brazil 
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(9.9%), and Venezuela (3.9%)2. The main countries of origin were Italy 
(32.3%), the Federal Republic of Germany (31.6%), Austria (9.5%), Greece 
(7.9%), and the Netherlands (7.2%)3 (ICEM 1957, p.406). The ‘one millionth 
migrant’ was a 10-year-old Latvian boy called Andrejs Suritis, who arrived in 
the US on 11 May 1960 (United States Department of State 1960, p.395). While 
transportation continued to be its primary function, ICEM was also providing 
a range of different services to countries related to the sustainability of the 
movement. For example, ICEM was involved in establishing a vocational 
training centre for prospective migrants in Italy and a training course for 
government officials in countries of destination (ICEM, 1959). 
Table 7.1 Movements facilitated by ICEM, 1952-1961 
Date Transported 
since 1 Feb 
1952 
Data descriptor Source 
21 December 1952 77,626 ‘from Europe’ ICEM (1953) 
30 September 
1953 
138,628 ‘from Europe’ ICEM (1954) 
31 July 1954 237,956 ‘total movements’ ICEM (1955) 
31 December 1955 406,867 ‘number of Europeans’  ICEM (1956) 
31 January 1957 545,000 ‘total’ ICEM (1957) 
31 August 1957 717,918 ‘total number of 
individuals’ 
ICEM (1958a) 
31 December 1957 775,000 ‘migrants and refugees’ ICEM (1958b) 
11 May 1960 1,000,000 ‘one millionth migrant.’ ICEM (1960), 
United States 
Department of 
State (1960)  
11 May 1961 1,091,099 ‘European refugees and 
nationals’ 
ICEM (1961) 
Notes: The data was collated from summary texts prepared for International Organization 
between 1953 and 1961. The data descriptor is included to signify whom the number presented 
in the adjacent column includes.  
 
 
2 Since these calculations are based on numbers presented textually in ICEM (1957) it is assumed 
that the remaining 6.6% were either transported to other destinations or are the result of a 
rounding issue. 
3 As for countries of destination, it is assumed that the remaining 11.6% were either transported 
from other countries or are the result of a rounding issue. 
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In the early 1960s, the fledgling organization faced new challenges. 
Compounding already existent budgetary challenges (ICEM, 1956), the cost 
of transportation had increased, and the availability of vessels for 
transportation decreased (ICEM, 1958a). The demand for ICEM services 
within Europe declined. Between 1955 and 1963, the number of refugees in 
camps in Europe dropped from 85,000 to 3,450 (ICEM 1964: 669). Despite the 
declining need for ICEM’s services in Europe, however, the UNHCR still 
called upon ICEM for assistance with refugee populations in other parts of 
the world ‘particularly in North Africa, Togo, the Congo, and Tanganyika4’ 
(ICEM 1962: 665). The US also thought that ICEM should evolve in light of 
the changing international situation and, ‘since the European refugee 
problem was considerably less critical and there was no longer a need for 
ICEM to "siphon-off" western Europe's surplus population, the new task for 
the Committee should be to supply manpower to underdeveloped countries’ 
(ICEM 1961 p.532). Thus, even in its early days it is possible to see how 
external factors influenced the organization.  
The politics of the Cold War also impacted the organization. In the post-
Second World War period, the Soviet Union accused governments such as 
the US, the UK, Australia and France of treating individuals residing in 
camps in Europe as a source of cheap labour, with the International Refugee 
Organization (IRO) acting as a recruitment agent supporting the capitalist 
agendas of potential destination countries (Long, 2013). Having replaced the 
operational functions of IRO, and with a membership that explicitly excluded 
communist countries, ICEM was not immune to these criticisms. In the early 
1960s, then Director-General, Wouter Havemaan accused the Soviet Union of 
spreading the term ‘economic refugee’ in a ‘campaign aimed at weakening 
the Western sense of responsibility for refugees’ (ICEM 1963: 828). 
Accordingly, from the early 1960s, special attention was given to providing 
resettlement to migrants with disabilities (ICEM, 1961; Long, 2013). However, 
while the number of individuals with a disability able to migrate had 
increased from one per cent in 1953 to seven per cent by 1961 (ICEM, 1961), 
UNHCR reported that, of the 15,000 European refugees still wishing to 
relocate in 1962, half required special assistance because of disabilities (ICEM, 
1962). Perhaps as a result of these challenges, the survival of the organization 
seemed to be in question. Between 1962 and 1980 several countries left the 
organization including Canada (1962), France (1962), Sweden (1962) New 
 
4 Now mainland Tanzania  
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Zealand (1967), the UK (1968), Australia (1973), Spain (1977), and Brazil 
(1980) based mainly on the view that the organization was no longer required 
(Ducasse-Rogier, 2001; ICEM, 1961, 1963).  
The 1980s saw the consolidation and expansion of ICEM from an 
organization at the brink of extinction into what was to become IOM. In 1979, 
James L. Carlin was appointed as Director-General, tasked with turning the 
organization around. One of his early accomplishments, as director, was the 
removal of the geographical restriction from the name of the organization to 
reflect the expansion of ICEM’s work into other parts of the world (Carlin, 
1989). From 1980, the organization was renamed the Intergovernmental 
Committee for Migration (ICM). Beyond the elimination of the geographical 
limitation, this also led to changes in the type of work that the organization 
performed: ‘in the early years, transport was the priority, but increasingly, 
more complex and sophisticated migration services (for example, 
recruitment, selection, labour reinsertion, and integration) took precedence’ 
(Perruchoud 1989, p.507). In 1985, when Australia re-joined the organization 
(having left in 1973), the organization had representation from all continents 
(except Antarctica) within its membership for the first time (Ducasse-Rogier, 
1991). Accordingly, the ICM constitution was amended in 1987 and, two 
years later, the organization became the International Organization for 
Migration (IOM) (Ashutosh & Mountz, 2011; Carlin, 1989).  
The early history of the organization continued to affect IOM, first in its 
struggle to survive (Section 7.3), in establishing itself as a leading 
international migration agency (Section 7.4), and finally, as the ‘UN migration 
agency’ (Section 7.5). Even as the organization evolved, it continued to be 
dismissed as either ‘basically a reisburo, service de voyage for migrants’ (INT-
IO-005), or as an ‘American Front organization’ (INT-IO-019). The fact that, 
until the appointment of António Vitorino (Portugal) in 2018, the Director-
General of IOM was, except for Bastiaan Wouter Haveman of the 
Netherlands between 1961 and 1969, always a US appointee, has further 
reinforced IOM’s reputation as a US-driven organization.  
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7.3 The Nineties: IOM Moves Closer to the UN 
 
The end of the Cold War was significant for the evolution of the multilateral 
system. As discussed in Chapter 4, the early 1990s saw revived interest in 
multilateralism (Hulme, 2009). The Uruguay Round of Trade Talks in 1994 
led to the Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) and the establishment of 
the WTO in 1995. In this context, the notion of an equivalent global body for 
migration started to gain traction (Ghosh, 2000; Straubhaar, 1993) and, at the 
International Conference on Population and Development in Cairo in 1994, 
UN Member States started to consider the idea of holding a conference on 
international migration. However, tainted by its legacy in the politics of the 
Cold War, the newly renamed IOM was struggling to find its place. Despite 
having grown during the past decade, the organization was still far from 
being universal. Between 1981 and 1991 the number of IOM Member States 
grew from 29 to 43 (Ducasse-Rogier 2001; Figure 7.2). Equipped with a 
broader mandate but with reduced need for resettlement services after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union and facing the closure of the Vietnam 
programme, James N. Purcell Jr. who became the Director-General of IOM in 
1988, recognized that the organization needed to prove its relevance to 
Member States, as otherwise it would very quickly lose steam. An accident of 
history, in the form of the first Gulf War, arguably helped IOM to survive:  
‘You had a moment where the organization was 
wondering, “well, what are we doing now?” And then 
Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait and hundreds of 
thousands of migrant workers, not refugees, people who 
had a job one day and a country to go home to, fled into 
Jordan. And the organization started to operate out of 
Jordan… we managed to build this air bridge for more 
than 200,000 and fly them home to countries like 
Bangladesh, India, Sri Lanka, the Philippines. Countries 
that had not even heard of the organization… And these 
countries suddenly became beneficiaries because IOM 
raised something like 120 million dollars at the time for 
the operation. The organization got better known, and 
we suddenly had a large number of new members 
coming in, as all of these countries realized that this 
might be a useful organization. And IOM suddenly had 
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new things to do, emergencies, then the Yugoslav war 
started and so on. (INT-IO-019). 
Thus, the first Gulf War was arguably what IOM needed to prove that it was 
an organization capable of acting swiftly in an emergency. IOM’s 
engagement in the relocation of migrant workers from Kuwait showcased the 
capacity of the organization, not only to the UN but also to a new set of 
potential Member States. As one interview respondent observed: ‘those 
efforts helped us tie back into the multilateral fabric’ (INT-IO-022).  
From 1991, IOM’s growth accelerated with the number of Member States 
doubling between 1991 and 2001 from 43 to 86 (Figure 7.2). The organization 
also moved closer to the UN. Following IOM’s intervention in the Gulf War, 
three significant advances occurred in IOM-UN relations. The first was that 
on 19 December 1991, IOM received a standing invitation to the Inter-Agency 
Standing Committee in paragraph 38 of the annex to the General Assembly 
Resolution5, which led to the establishment of the UN Office for the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). The Resolution also 
stipulated that the Emergency Relief Coordinator should work closely with, 
among other organizations, the IOM (para. 36). The following year, on 16 
October 1992, IOM was officially invited to become an observer at the UN 
General Assembly6. Thus, while IOM had not joined the UN, its role as an 
important international actor in the area of migration was consolidated: 
‘We were as close to UN membership as you could get 
without actually being a member. We were an observer’ 
(INT-IO-022). 
Three years later, after Council Agreement at its 407th meeting on 29 
November 1995, IOM intensified cooperation with the UN. Director-General 
Purcell was invited ‘to strengthen and, as appropriate, formalize cooperation 
with the UN system and other relevant organizations, having regard to the 
need to improve complementarity and avoid duplication, while ensuring 
mutual respect of the individual competences of the organizations 
 
5 Strengthening of the Coordination of Humanitarian Emergency Assistance of the United 
Nations, UNGAOR, 46th Session, UN Doc. A/RES/46/182 (19 December 1991) 
6 Observer Status for the International Organization for Migration in the General Assembly, 
UNGAOR, 47th Session, UN Doc. A/RES/47/4 (16 October 1992) 
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concerned7’ (para 6). The result of his actions was a Cooperation Agreement 
between the UN and the IOM, which was signed by then UN Secretary-
General Boutros Boutros-Ghali and Mr Purcell on 25 June 1996. Building on 
this agreement, a further Resolution8 at the 84th Plenary Meeting of the 
General Assembly on 13 December 1996 established that the General 
Assembly should be informed about cooperation between IOM and the UN 
under its regular agenda item on ’International Migration and 
Development’9.  
While the Gulf War had provided a lifeline to the organization and allowed 
it to establish itself as a relevant player, there was also a recognition within 
the IOM administration that, without a clear strategy, IOM would continue 
to face challenges to its existence. Having brought the organization closer to 
the UN, the next significant change that was implemented by Mr Purcell was 
a process of decentralization. In his management review, which took place 
between 1996 and 1997, the ‘primary responsibility for initiating and 
executing IOM service delivery to its Member States’ (2003b, p.2) was 
delegated from Headquarters to the field. Accompanying the process of 
decentralization, was the initiation of a  process, known as ‘projectization’ or 
‘the practice of allocating staff and office costs to the operational 
activities/projects to which they relate’ (IOM, 2002a, p.vi). The change in 
funding structure marked a significant turning point for the organization and 
is arguably what allowed it to grow from a small organization into one that 
has seen exponential growth in both budget and membership. However, the 
projectized nature of IOM has also been the root of the criticism that IOM is 
an organization that will do ‘anything for money’ (INT-GOV-035) and is often 
described in the literature as a ‘quasi-European’ (Caillault, 2012, p.134) or 
‘quasi-governmental’ (Geiger, 2010, p.151) organization.  
This view is relevant to mention because the projectized nature of the 
organization allowed it to be cost-effective and responsive to Member States, 
which was one of the primary arguments levied by Member States against 
why IOM should become a UN entity in the discussions that took place 
 
7 Future Activities of IOM, IOM Council Res. No. 923 (LXXI), 71st Session. IOM Doc RES No. 923 
(LXXI (29 November 1995). 
8 Cooperation between the United Nations and the International Organization for Migration, 
UNGAOR, 51st Session, UN Doc. A/RES/51/148 (4 February 1997) 
9 International Migration and Development, UNGAOR, 50th Session, UN Doc. A/RES/50/123 (23 
February 1996) 
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between 2002 and 2007 (Section 5.4). However, it is also what allowed the 
organization to evolve in close relationship with its Member States: 
‘I think the states really feel like they do not own the UN 
enough, and they cannot control it enough, and so, it is 
a weird ambiguous relationship, and I guess they feel a 
little bit more like the IOM is just doing what they want 
without having its own agenda’ (INT-IO-006). 
The significance of IOM’s close relationship with its Member States would 
bear fruit several decades later when the Member States lobbied the UN for 
IOM’s entry as a related agency (Section 7.6).  
 
7.4 IOM-UN Relations as ‘Migration’ receives more 
attention  
 
In the early 2000s, IOM’s non-UN status was again subject to discussion. 
Director-General Brunson McKinley attributed this to heightened awareness 
within the UN that migration was a subject that merited international 
attention, evidenced by its inclusion in the Secretary-General’s Report to the 
General Assembly on 9 September 200210. In his address to the IOM Council 
on 2 December 2002, McKinley stated:  
‘The UN is conscious of a gap in coverage and is looking 
for ways to fill the gap. What are the options? Creating a 
new UN agency for migration is problematic and would 
doubtlessly be strongly resisted by existing agencies and 
many governments. UN coordination mechanisms have 
serious limitations as well. That leads back to IOM’ 
(IOM, 2002b, para. 27). 
In the remainder of his speech, he made it clear that the Administration of 
IOM did not have a specific position on whether the IOM should join the UN 
but did highlight some positive and negative implications of such a move. 
 
10 Report of the Secretary-General: Strengthening of the United Nations: an Agenda for Further 
Change, UNGAOR, 57th Session, UN Doc A/57/387 (9 December 2002) 
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On the negative side of the ledger, questions surrounding whether IOM 
would be able to retain many of the characteristics that its Member States 
valued, such as its flexibility, light bureaucracy, and ability to act when the 
UN was unable to do so. However, he also pointed to the disadvantages of 
outsider status, such as the inability to contribute to discussions within the 
UN and a harder time gaining acceptance and recognition for its work. 
Additionally, it was plausible that outsider status would eventually restrict 
the resources available to the organization. Already at this stage, the 
suggestion of becoming a ‘related’ as opposed to a ‘specialized’ agency was 
tabled, as an alternative, more loosely defined status. In the General Debate 
that followed, 22 Member States offered their views on UN-IOM relations, 
converging on the view that further discussion and analysis was needed 
before making any further decisions (IOM, 2003a). Accordingly, Mr 
McKinley announced in his closing remarks that a Working Group on 
Institutional Arrangements would be established under the chairmanship of 
Ambassador Amina Mohammed (IOM, 2002b). 
As was discussed in Chapter 4, it was shortly after the IOM Council General 
Debate of 2002 that Michael Doyle submitted his report to Kofi Annan on 
migration. In particular, Doyle’s consideration of the possibility of an agency 
within the UN for migration, although dismissed at that stage for feasibility 
reasons, was enough to exert pressure on the IOM Administration to take 
action to preserve its role in the international landscape: 
 ‘Of course, we were not too happy to read about it, but 
it gave some kind of stimulus to try and get closer to the 
UN because when you smell competition, you have sort 
of an incentive’ (INT-IO-019). 
With the knowledge that the UN was actively evaluating its role on migration 
and preparing to launch the Global Commission on International Migration 
(GCIM), the first report of the Working Group on Institutional Arrangements 
was issued on 7 April 2003. The report outlined the advantages and 
disadvantages of two options: 1) keeping IOM outside the UN system (the 
‘status quo’; or 2) bringing it into the UN as a ‘specialized’ or ‘related’ agency 
(Table 7.2). 
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Table 7.2 Pros and Cons of IOM Joining the UN Legal status for staff 
 Status Quo Specialized Agency 
Pros Under the present configuration, 
IOM has already been able to 
contribute to global debates. 
Current UN coordination costs are a 
fraction of the cost for existing 
specialized agencies. 
 
De jure status preferable to de facto 
status, i.e., while IOM participates 
in UN Country Teams, this is by 
indulgence and is not a right. 
Access to the Chief Executive Board 
of the UN and its subsidiary bodies 
Ability to call on Residence 
Coordinator in countries where 
IOM is not present. 
Higher profile. 
Possible additional funding 
sources.  
Clarity for interlocuters. 
Legal status for staff. 
 
Cons No authoritative UN voice on 
migration. 
Risk of UN creating its own UN 
Migration Organization creating 
duplication or competition. 
IOM has no access to decision-
making processes. 
UN status could make it easier to 
secure funding rather than having 
to justify its role constantly. 
Timing is not right – economic, 
social, and political circumstances. 
Membership not large enough.  
Staff apprehension to change 
Increase cost and time.  
The potential loss of independence, 
efficiency, flexibility, and 
responsiveness. 
Source: Summarized from United Nations Archives 2003a 
 
When the Working Group met with IOM Member States on 15 May 2003 to 
discuss the preliminary report, the main conclusion as communicated by 
letter to Kofi Annan on 28 May 2003, was that: 
‘The majority of the members who spoke said that they 
were not convinced that the advantages of a move to 
seek specialized agency status outweighed the 
disadvantages, and were thus in favour of retaining 
IOM’s current status outside the UN system’ (IOM, 
2003a, p.35). 
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Despite Member State resistance, the Working Group continued its work and 
an addendum to the 7 April report was prepared and circulated on 22 
September 2003 ahead of their next meeting on 17 October 2003. This report 
paid more attention to the cost implications of specialized agency status and 
ways in which the current arrangements could be further enhanced through 
amendments to the existing cooperation agreement, as a sort of ‘enhanced 
status quo’. Interestingly, given that IOM would later become a related 
agency, this option was dismissed out of hand given that ‘“related agency 
status” is not a realistic option insofar as it is granted only to agencies whose 
mandate does not fall within the terms of reference of  ECOSOC (the 
Economic and Social Council)’ (IOM, 2003b, para. 25). 
As these discussions were ongoing, Brunson McKinley and the High 
Commissioner for Refugees, Ruud Lubbers, exchanged a series of letters 
between 6 August 2003 and 8 October 2003. On 20 October 2003, these letters 
were shared with IOM Member and Observer states via a Note Verbale and 
with Kofi Annan by the UN office in Geneva (UNOG) on 23 October 2003 
(United Nations Archives, 2003b). These letters offer a window of insight into 
some of the underlying tensions between the organizations, particularly with 
regards to their division of labour concerning Internally Displaced Persons 
(IDPs) in Iraq. At a time when Brunson McKinley was trying to establish the 
IOM as a key player in the area of migration, these letters, copied to several 
high ranking officials, including Kofi Annan, downplayed IOM as a serious 
actor, primarily due to its non-normative and projectized nature. This 
challenge was further compounded because, at the same time, IOM was the 
subject of a critical campaign spearheaded by the No Border Network who 
accused IOM of being a ‘Janus-faced organization’ (Ashutosh and Mountz 
2011, p.28) supporting the agenda of its main donors at the expense of 
migrant rights (Georgi, 2010). The European No Border Network organized 
protests against IOM in 2002 in Berlin, Vienna, and Helsinki and in 2003 in 
Geneva and Bonn. During the G8 Summit in 2003, more than 2,000 people 
marched to IOM’s Headquarters in Geneva (Georgi & Schatral, 2012).  
When Member States met on 17 October 2003, views were mixed, with ‘a very 
small number’ in favour of specialized agency status, and ‘a very small 
number’ opposed and calling for the debate to be closed (IOM, 2003b, para. 
9). The remaining Member States did not dismiss the idea of specialized 
agency status; however, either reserved judgement or expressed feelings that 
the timing was not right. In a letter dated 28 January 2004, this position was 
communicated to Kofi Annan:  
171 
 
 
 
‘IOM Member States were largely not in favour of IOM 
moving towards specialized agency status at this time. 
Nevertheless, they recognized both that current practical 
arrangements could be improved and that the broader 
issue should remain under advisement’ (United Nations 
Archives 2004, p.1). 
As later recorded in a note on IOM-UN relations at IOM’s 92nd Council 
Session in November 2006, an informal decision was taken following these 
letters to table the discussion until after the GCIM had concluded its 
deliberations (IOM, 2006). 
The next communication between Brunson McKinley and Kofi Annan 
recorded in the archives relating to the IOM-UN relationship appeared some 
two years later and came in response to the Secretary-General’s report in the 
lead up to the first High-Level Dialogue11 on 18 May 2006. In his letter dated 
30 June 2006, Brunson McKinley expressed concerns to Kofi Annan regarding 
the ‘omission of any serious reference to IOM’ (United Nations Archives 
2006c, p.4). In his letter, Brunson McKinley called for a ‘new, objective look 
at UN-IOM relations’ (United Nations Archives 2006c, p.4) and advises that 
it will be the focus of further discussion at the IOM Council meeting in 
November 2006. The letter suggested that the news of the establishment of a 
Global Forum on Migration and Development (Chapter 5), was the driver of 
this renewed focus on IOM-UN relations. Accordingly, Mr McKinley called 
for the further strengthening of IOM-UN relations in one of two ways. First, 
through the development of a new agreement that would preserve IOM as a 
non-UN entity but better integrate it into the various interagency 
management systems including UN Country Teams. Or second, that a 
relationship agreement in line with what the UN had in place with the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) (related agency) would be adopted. The outcome 
of this exchange of letters was a round of technical discussions, coordinated 
by the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA) in September 
2006 (IOM, 2006, para. 6). The broad conclusions of these discussions were 
that without UN membership IOM could not regularly participate in the 
UN’s Chief Executive Board for Coordination (CEB) and that ‘related agency’ 
status was not an option. Thus, if the IOM wanted to join the UN, it would 
 
11 Report of the Secretary-General: International Migration and Development, UNGAOR, 60th 
Session, UN Doc. A/60/871 (18 May 2006) 
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have to do so as a ‘specialized agency’ which would cost the organization 
approximately USD 210,000 per year (IOM, 2006, para. 10).  
At IOM’s 92nd Council meeting in 2006, this report was opened to a discussion 
(IOM, 2007b). Despite the communications with the UN, Brunson McKinley 
noted in his introductory remarks that he was not convinced that specialized 
agency status or maintaining the status quo were the only options available. 
He argued that, with membership growth, IOM was approaching the 
numbers used by WTO to negotiate its related agency status. The ensuing 
discussion echoed that of three years before: the majority felt that the time 
was not right to enter the UN with one unnamed delegate vehemently 
opposing UN membership: 
‘One delegate did not support the Administration’s 
action in reopening the issue in 2006, and considered 
that a clear position had been established in 2003 which 
it was inappropriate to change without putting forward 
very good reasons’ (IOM, 2007b, para. 225).  
There was a call for further review, particularly to establish a cost-benefit 
analysis of joining the UN, but a general preference for the status quo was 
evident. As one close observer of the process noted: 
 ‘I went to some Member States and said, “look, this 
issue is just swirling around, and I do not think you are 
particularly wise to leave so much uncertainty around 
it.” The answer I got was very clear. They said, “look, 
that was a very deliberate stance. We said no because we 
did not think that it would be appropriate for IOM to get 
into the UN now, but we did not say no, because we do 
not know how things are going to evolve, and we would 
like to leave that option open”’ (INT-IO-015). 
Seemingly unphased by previous discussions, Brunson McKinley on 10 July 
2007 wrote to Ban Ki-moon requesting two things: that IOM would be 
formally invited to the UN Development Group (UNDG) and to the CEB of 
the UN. Both requests were declined in a letter dated 8 October 2007 unless 
IOM became a specialized agency. However, a concession was made 
allowing IOM to receive invitations to the High-Level Committee for 
Programme (HLCP), which was a subsidiary body of the CEB, when issues 
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of relevance were to be discussed. On 9 November 2007, an updated 
document on IOM-UN relations was released (IOM, 2007a) in preparation for 
a discussion at the 96th Session of the IOM Council. This document explored 
four possible ways forward, albeit dismissing one of these outright. These 
were: 1) the fuller implementation of the existing cooperation agreement; 2) 
related agency status; 3) IOM as a UN programme or fund (dismissed 
outright), and 4) specialized agency status. At the 96th Session of the Council, 
the Member States decided to deepen the IOM-UN relationship without any 
changes to the legal relationship (IOM, 2008). 
An examination of the debates regarding IOM-UN relations between 2002 
and 2007 indicates that a degree of action-reaction to the developments 
occurring within the UN at that time existed. Each new development within 
the UN brought new energy to the discussion of the IOM-UN relationship. 
While several interview participants noted that Brunson McKinley was not 
interested in seeing IOM join the UN, and ‘toed the line of the US 
administration’ (INT-OTHER-030), the evidence suggests that he actively 
sought to continue the conversation on IOM-UN relations. For example, in a 
letter from Brunson McKinley to Kofi Annan sent not long after submission 
of the Doyle report, and as preparations were underway to launch the GCIM, 
he made a comment about Amina Mohammed (then President of IOM 
Council) being ‘best positioned to follow up with counterparts in the UN 
system and to influence the evolution of IOM Member State views’ (United 
Nations Archives, 2003c). It is also arguably the case that McKinley’s efforts 
to expand the organization, an effort that was remarked upon by multiple 
interviewees, was part of a strategy to ensure that, in the long term, IOM 
would be able to secure its position as a, if not the key actor on migration at 
the global level. The picture painted of Brunson McKinley by several 
interviewees was that of an ‘entrepreneur’ (INT-IO-008; INT-IO-010; INT-IO-
011) who ‘aggressively expanded’ (INT-IO-011) the organization and was 
‘very jealous of anybody else’s engagement’ (INT-IO-008) on migration-
related matters. Indeed, while Brunson McKinley was Director-General of 
IOM, its membership numbers doubled, from 43 to 86 members (Figure 7.2). 
Thus, while the discussions that took place between 2002 and 2007 did not 
result in IOM becoming a UN agency, they did plant a seed in the minds of 
its Member States that becoming part of the UN might be something that 
would be necessary for the future. 
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7.5 The Road to 2016: The Fear of Being Left Behind 
 
The next time that IOM-UN relations were subject to formal discussion at the 
IOM Council was in 2012 as the UN was preparing to hold the second High-
Level Dialogue on International Migration and Development and as 
discussions regarding the post-2015 development agenda were underway. 
Director-General William Lacy Swing proposed in his report to the 101st 
Session of the IOM Council that ‘Member States may find it in their interest 
once again to consider conducting a formal review of IOMʼs relationship with 
the UN’ (IOM, 2012b, para. 99). While exhibiting sensitivity to the political 
nature of the topic and emphasizing his neutrality, Director-General Swing 
drew attention to the importance of ensuring that IOM retained its position 
as ‘the leading international migration’ agency/organization on multiple 
occasions (IOM, 2012b).  
While IOM had grown as an organization in the decade since the start of the 
last round of discussions on IOM-UN relations, the global landscape related 
to migration had also changed considerably, and the UN had made strides in 
its efforts to bring migration more clearly under its mandate. Although 
organized outside of the UN, the GFMD by 2012 had already met five times, 
with preparations underway for its sixth meeting in Mauritius. Sutherland 
continued to act as the link between the GFMD and the UN, and, within the 
UN, plans for the second UN High-Level Dialogue on Migration and 
Development in 2013 were in place. The GMG had also grown from six 
members in 2002 to 20 members in 2012. These developments signified a 
maturation in the way the international community discussed migration. 
However, as new actors joined the field, IOM’s place in the global governance 
landscape became less secure: 
‘As more actors appear on the migration stage – many of 
them with a somewhat limited interest in migration and 
often lacking a global footprint – IOM is increasingly 
challenged to ensure that its own universal mandate and 
global reach are recognized…’ (IOM, 2012b, para. 69). 
A review of the archival records during this time uncovers two specific 
occurrences that point to the possibility that IOM may have faced exclusion 
as the UN formalized its role in the area of migration. These occurrences may 
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have prompted IOM’s Member States to reopen the discussion regarding 
IOM-UN relations. The first was the omission of IOM from an initial draft of 
the Secretary-General’s report on International Migration. As noted by 
Director-General Swing in a letter addressed to Deputy Secretary-General Jan 
Eliasson on 24 July 2013:  
‘the draft report of the Secretary-General, prepared by 
DESA does not adequately reflect IOM’s leadership on 
migration globally or in HLD preparations’ (United 
Nations Archives 2013b, p.1). 
Director-General Swing called for a speaking role for the GMG, which IOM 
was chairing, at the second HLD and the addition of a sentence to the 
Secretary-General’s report which acknowledged ‘the expansion of IOM's 
membership, activities and reach since the first HLD in 2006 and its ever-
closer partnership with the UN across the board, as an indication of improved 
attention to global migration governance’ (United Nations Archives 2013b, 
p.2). There was a swift response to this letter, as, the very next day, the 
Executive Office of the Secretary-General sent a revised copy of the report to 
Jan Eliasson in which two additional references to IOM were made in the 
introductory12 and concluding13 paragraphs of the report which were in line 
with the suggestions made by Director-General Swing (United Nations 
Archives, 2013c).  
The second occurrence was in August 2013 and took the form of the report 
submitted to the 68th session of the General Assembly by the Special 
Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants, François Crépeau. In his 
report14, Professor Crépeau highlighted some concerns regarding the 
organization:  
‘The fact that the mandate of IOM is not supportive of 
human rights is of concern for the whole United Nations 
 
12 ‘Since the first High-Level Dialogue. (IOM) has seen an expansion of its membership, activities 
and reach and an ever closer partnership with the United Nations entities dealing with 
migration.’ (United Nations Archives 2013b, p.29). 
13 ‘Cooperation and dialogue on migration within the United Nations, IOM and regional 
economic communities should be strengthened’ (United Nations Archives 2013, p.52). 
14 UNGA, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants: Human Rights of 
Migrants, UNGAOR, 68th Session, UN Doc. A/68/283 (7 August 2013) 
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system, as IOM is part of the Global Migration Group 
and the United Nations Country Teams in many 
countries and is often mistakenly believed, including by 
migrants themselves, to be a United Nations agency’ 
(para. 61, p.12). 
Many civil society organizations and UN agencies believed that IOM should 
amend its constitution and receive a normative mandate if it were to join the 
UN. It is unsurprising to see this view amplified at a time when both the UN 
and the IOM were reflecting on their positions in the global migration 
governance landscape. It is also reflective of a schism in the global migration 
governance landscape between those promoting a rights-based approach to 
human mobility, and those focused on the management of migration. IOM 
may have viewed these critiques as an attempt to undermine the credibility 
of IOM at a time when the organization was trying to secure its position, at 
the behest of its Member States, as the lead international agency for 
migration.  
As in 2002, when Kofi Annan announced his concern that the UN should 
more comprehensively tackle the issue of migration, the possibility that the 
UN would seek to create its own migration agency emerged in 2013. Two key 
documents were prepared that reviewed IOM-UN relations in September of 
that year, which led to the establishment of a Working Group on IOM-UN 
relations and the IOM Strategy:  
‘The documents entitled IOM–UN relations (SCPF/106) 
and Review of the IOM Strategy (SCPF/105) highlighted 
that, although IOM had worked as closely as possible 
with the United Nations within the current framework 
and had succeeded in making significant progress, it 
continued to be excluded from important processes 
because of its status as a non-United Nations 
organization. The Standing Committee had therefore 
agreed to establish a working group to consider IOM–
UN relations and the IOM Strategy’ (IOM, 2014b, para. 
54). 
After the first meeting of this Working Group, which took place on 13 
February 2014, and upon the request of the group, William Lacy Swing wrote 
to Ban Ki-moon to request information ‘on the different modalities of 
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association that currently exist in the common system for agencies, 
specialized organizations and other intergovernmental organizations to have 
any form of association with the UN’ (United Nations Archives 2014a, p.7). 
The fear of IOM’s exclusion from the UN’s work on migration was 
compounded in 2014. With discussions already underway, ‘the issue was 
brought into sharper and more urgent focus because of the discussions of the 
draft Second Committee Resolution on Migration and Development, and the 
potential implications of that for both the relationship and for IOM's role and 
work on the global stage in general’ (United Nations Archives, 2014b, p.1). 
The Second Committee Resolution on Migration and Development15 gave 
credence to the idea that the UN was bracing itself to take on migration, and 
by implication that the matter of a UN body for migration may again be put 
on the table. In his response to the Chairperson’s Report on the Working 
Group on IOM-UN Relations and the IOM Strategy, Director-General Swing 
noted that ‘the resolution, as currently drafted, risks the marginalization of 
IOM and the creation of new, additional and duplicative arrangements 
within the UN’ (United Nations Archives 2014b, p.4). He noted that IOM may 
have to, ‘as a matter of self-defence…consider the possibility of a more formal 
association with the UN system’ (United Nations Archives, 2014b, pp.3–4). 
In late 2014, documents issued by the UN Development Operations 
Coordination Office (DOCO) solidified these fears. On 11 December 2014, 
DOCO issued a document outlining new ‘Functioning and Working 
Arrangements’ effective as per 1 January 2015. On 3 March 2015, a second 
document, ‘Briefing Note: New UNDG Functioning and Working 
Arrangements and IOM’, was released, offering further clarifications on the 
original document. In short, these documents meant that IOM, as a non-UN 
entity, would no longer be allowed to sign UN Development Assistance 
Frameworks (UNDAFs), take a role in UN Country Teams beyond that of an 
ad hoc participant, or be the beneficiary of specific funding opportunities. 
The DOCO documents arguably triggered the IOM Member States to 
conclude that, if IOM did not join the UN, then it was at risk of becoming 
irrelevant, and critically, cut off from resources. By this stage, IOM was well 
integrated into almost all UN Country Teams (UNCTs) around the world and 
was a signatory to UNDAFs in 66 countries (United Nations Archives, 2015). 
On 5 March 2015, Director-General Swing wrote to Deputy Secretary-General 
 
15 Second Committee Draft Resolution: International migration and development, 69th Session, 
UN Doc. A/C.2/69/L.32 (30 October 2014) 
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Jan Eliasson to express his concern about the implications of the document 
for IOM-UN relations.  
‘As you are aware, IOM has, on a practical basis, for 
some time enjoyed inclusion in and access to various UN 
processes and mechanisms such as UNCTs and 
UNDAFs. I believed that the UN, as much as IOM, had 
been benefitting from this. We have, however, been 
taken by surprise that suddenly, and without any prior 
discussion or consultation, this practical approach is no 
longer to be followed as of 1 January 2015. 
[…] 
I am now obliged to bring to the attention of IOM 
Member States the likely impact this will have on IOM’s 
work, as it significantly changes the facts about the IOM-
UN relationship that we have presently shared with 
them’ (United Nations Archives 2015a, pp.1–2). 
There appears to be a direct correlation between the UN Development 
Operations Coordination Office documents and the decision of Member 
States to move IOM into the UN. As one interviewee argued: 
‘That was what woke up the Member States to a 
realization that it was not just that we kept whinging and 
whining, but that not being formally in the UN system 
was a problem. They began to see that there really was 
an issue’ (INT-IO-040). 
By October 2015, the Working Group on IOM-UN Relations and the IOM 
Strategy had concluded that it was time for the organization to formalize its 
relationship with the UN and presented its report to the Standing Committee 
on Programmes and Finance on 28-29 October 2015 (IOM, 2015). The 
Standing Committee recommended that the Council adopt the draft 
resolution, which was done on 24 November 2015. Council Resolution No. 
179 
 
 
 
130916 requested the Director-General to pursue a better legal relationship 
with the UN. From this point onward, IOM’s transition into a related agency 
was a swift one:  
‘On 25 July 2016, following the endorsement of the draft 
Agreement concerning the Relationship between the 
United Nations and the International Organization for 
Migration by the IOM Council on 30 June 2016, the 
General Assembly passed a resolution approving the 
draft Agreement. This Agreement, which came into 
force on 19 September, not only brought IOM into the 
United Nations system, it also resulted in IOM becoming 
the ‘UN Migration Agency’ (IOM, 2017, para. 8). 
7.6 IOM joins the UN: The “Perfect Storm17”? 
 
Previous attempts to bring IOM into the UN system have shown that it is 
ultimately the Member States of the organization that determined its fate. 
Without the endorsement of its Members States, the IOM Administration 
could not have pursued a relationship agreement with the UN. The question 
then becomes, what had changed by 2016 that resulted in the Member States 
of IOM agreeing for the organization to join the UN, having resisted this 
option for more than 20 years? Coupled with this, what led the UN to agree 
to IOM’s entry as a ‘related agency’, an option that had been categorically 
taken off the table just 15 years earlier? Perhaps the single most compelling 
argument relates to the fear of exclusion and the negative implication that 
exclusion could have for the organization’s access to resources and for its long 
term survival. On each occasion, sensing a certain level of threat to the 
organization’s existence, the management of IOM responded by seeking 
counsel on the matter of IOM-UN relations with its Member States. In the 
early 1990s, this threat was an existential one, whereby the organization was 
facing the genuine possibility that its lifespan was coming to an end. In 2002, 
this threat was represented by the Secretary-General’s report in which he 
 
16 IOM-UN Relations, IOM Council Res. No. 1309, 106th Session, IOM Doc. C/106/RES/1309 (4 
December 2015) 
17 INT-IO-040 
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expressed his intention for the UN to engage more comprehensively with the 
topic of migration.  
However, while an external threat to IOM’s existence seems to have been the 
trigger to discuss the organization’s relationship with the UN on each 
occasion, it does not seem to be sufficient to explain IOM’s entry into the UN 
system. One of the reasons cited for why IOM’s Member States decided not 
to join the UN in the early 2000s was the fear that the organization would 
become more expensive and bureaucratic should it join the UN. However, at 
that stage, the likelihood of migration being institutionalized within the UN 
did not seem to be plausible. Hence, there was not sufficient pressure to 
convince the IOM Member States that UN membership was required. By 2012 
when the matter was reopened for discussion, the migration governance 
landscape had evolved significantly, and it looked increasingly likely that 
migration would be included in the post-2015 development agenda and 
accordingly, institutionalized into the UN system. Several developments, 
most notably the UNOG clarifying the position of IOM with regards to the 
UNCTs, meant that IOM Member States faced the genuine possibility that 
IOM may be replaced by a new UN entity with a migration mandate: 
‘Because migration had been becoming more important, 
all the UN agencies had been trying to polish their 
credentials on migration issues. The UN was going to be 
exclusionary because that is how it functions. Money is 
tighter and tighter because there is less and less core 
funding, and more and more project and earmarked 
funding, and as migration is a sexy issue, everyone is 
trying to get a part of that cake. They were trying to 
make sure that the UN got the whole of the cake and that 
IOM was not going to have any part of it. So, eventually, 
the members, well, there were some holdouts, including 
the UK and the US. However, eventually, they saw that 
there was no way of guaranteeing IOM’s continuing role 
if it was not within the UN system’ (INT-IO-040). 
While the fear of IOM’s exclusion may have tipped the scales in favour of UN 
membership from the perspective of its Member States, this was not the only 
relevant factor at play. Just as the first Gulf War had allowed IOM to establish 
itself as a relevant player, the migration crises of 2015 also created a window 
of opportunity: 
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‘Of course, the Syrian crisis was out of control. We had 
the host countries such as Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey 
at breaking point, and still have that, in terms of 
numbers of refugees. Then we had the Myanmar 
situation, which later exploded into a mass outflow of 
Rohingyas to Bangladesh. Again, the increasing number 
of refugees, the protracted nature of the refugee 
situation, with no solutions in sight, and a very high 
burden on least developed countries, hosting large 
numbers of refugees. There was a clear feeling that 
something needed to happen. I think that this 
combination of factors helped the IOM Council to 
request the Director-General to look into cooperation 
agreements with the UN with the proviso that the IOM 
constitution or the IOM mandate should change as little 
as possible, or not at all. We did not want to change IOM, 
but we did want to have a link of some kind with the UN 
system, which is what, in the end, materialized’ (INT-IO-
029). 
Thus ultimately, after the discussion had been simmering away for the best 
part of two decades, the decision to bring IOM into the UN happened 
relatively quickly, to the great surprise of many actors involved: 
 ‘I am very surprised that the IOM deal went through so 
quickly, I was amazed by it. I think many people were 
actually’ (INT-IO-001). 
The speed at which the decision for IOM to join the UN was taken points to 
the importance of context-related factors that caused the relevant actors to 
move so swiftly. Having described IOM’s entry to the UN as a ‘perfect storm’, 
one observer noted:  
‘I remember the sense of urgency that was coming from 
the 38th floor, this sense of if we do not do it now, 
however imperfectly, we will never get the chance again 
to bring IOM into the system. For all of these actors, 
Sutherland, Ban Ki-moon, Eliasson, Bill Swing, this 
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became an urgent priority, a personally urgent priority’ 
(INT-IO-040).  
Next to the notion of a ‘perfect storm’, several of the respondents interviewed 
employed similar metaphors to describe IOM’s entry into the UN system 
(INT-IO-028; INT-IO-015; INT-IO-016; INT-IO-040; INT-GOV-031). The most 
commonly used metaphor was that of ‘moons’, ‘planets’ or ‘stars’ aligning. 
Both metaphors imply that IOM joining the UN was something that only 
occurred because multiple factors converged and that the right people were 
in the right positions at the right time: 
‘All of these things: the SDGs containing migration, the 
Global Compact starting its momentum before IOM 
became a member, the growing number of migration 
crises, and the fact that IOM had been part of UN 
Country Teams across the board without being a 
member, all of that, the stars were aligned somehow’ 
(INT-IO-028). 
 
7.7 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has demonstrated that IOM, as theory would lead us to expect 
from an IO, is sensitive to changes in its environment and reacts to external 
events that present both opportunities and threats to its existence. Having 
traced IOM’s journey from 1951 to 2016 with a focus on IOM-UN relations, 
this chapter has also provided empirical evidence in support of the argument 
that resources, as argued in Chapter 2, are a central factor influencing the 
evolution of global migration governance.  
An examination of IOM’s development trajectory as an organization shows 
that access to resources has played a determining role in how the 
organization has evolved. IOM’s very existence was the result of a decision 
by the US to exercise its monetary power to ensure that its preference for 
keeping migration out of the UN was achieved. Beyond its creation story, 
however, resources have continued to play an important role in IOM’s 
evolution as an organization. The management reforms initiated by James N. 
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Purcell Jr. in the 1980s, which led to the decentralization and projectization of 
the organization, contributed to its transition from an organization with a 
small and declining membership, to one that has seen exponential growth in 
both budget and membership and has become the lead UN agency for 
migration.  
One of the main reasons cited for why many IOM Member States wished to 
keep IOM outside of the UN until 2016 was that its organizational structure 
allowed for the cost-efficient delegation of migration management tasks, such 
as return, to an organization less encumbered by bureaucracy than the UN 
and, perhaps more importantly, one without a normative mandate. While the 
internal funding structure of IOM has allowed it to cut costs and increase 
efficiency, IOM’s dependence on the finances of wealthier states for its 
survival has meant that the organization is often viewed with suspicion by 
other actors. Given the support of wealthier states for the migration 
management frame with its associated focus on pragmatic solutions as 
opposed to the focus on norms among adherents of the migrant rights frame, 
this suspicion is particularly prominent among adherents of the migrant 
rights frame.  
While the IOM Administration may have sought to steer Member States 
towards the UN in the interest of ensuring that the organization remained 
viable, its Member States, especially the US as its main sponsor, have retained 
control over the organization. It was not until states accepted migration as a 
UN issue through the inclusion of migration in the SDGs that the necessity of 
having a UN body to coordinate its work on migration became apparent. 
Faced with the choice between the creation of a new UN agency for migration 
(or appointment of an existing UN agency) or to accept the entry of IOM to 
the UN system, its Member States chose for the latter with the provision that 
IOM could become a ‘related agency’ and enter with minimal changes to how 
the organization functioned.  
Hence this dissertation argues that it is a range of factors that led its Member 
States to acknowledge the necessity of IOM becoming part of the UN system 
in 2016. These factors included the migration crises of 2015 which propelled 
migration into the political limelight; the reframing of migration as a 
development issue (Chapter 5) and subsequent inclusion of migration in the 
Sustainable Development Goals (Chapter 6); coupled with the threat of IOM’s 
exclusion and the threat of the creation or appointment of a new lead agency 
for migration within the UN. However, while the migration crises of 2015 
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created the necessary ‘window of opportunity’ to bring IOM into the UN, 
they also provided a fertile environment for advocates of the migrant rights 
frame to revive their struggle for universal norms to govern international 
migration (Chapter 8).  
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8. Responding to Crisis? The Global 
Compacts 
 
8.1 Introduction 
‘In Europe today, I believe we may be confronted with a 
crisis. On one hand, the structure for the protection of 
refugees, so painstakingly built up over decades and 
emulated all over the world, is in serious danger. On the 
other hand, we have the opportunity at these 
Consultations to show that this structure is as valid and 
precious as ever and that the international community 
has the will and capacity to defend it and to strengthen 
it’ (Hartling, 1985). 
The words of former UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Poul Hartling in 
his opening address to the Consultations on the Arrival of Asylum-seekers 
and Refugees in Europe on 28 May 1985, could easily have been written for 
the High-Level Summit to Address the Large Movements of Refugees and 
Migrants in September 2016. As discussed in Chapter 4, the circumstances 
leading to each of these meetings bear a resemblance to one another. The 
events leading up to the meeting in 1985 started in the mid-1970s when 
several European countries closed programmes for guest workers as the 
effects of the 1973 oil crisis slowed down the pace of development. A 
mismatch between labour demand and the opportunities to migrate led to an 
increase in irregular migration (Castles 1986; Freeman 1992). Following the 
conference, Europe sought intergovernmental solutions informally within 
the context of the Intergovernmental Consultations on Migration and 
Asylum (IGC) (Section 4.4). Thirty years later, Europe was again in ‘crisis’ 
(Section 4.8).  
In 2015 almost a million people arrived in Europe, many of them seeking 
asylum (Ferris & Martin, 2019). With growing media attention, the political 
saliency of migration increased, and states again looked to intergovernmental 
cooperation for the solution. Accordingly, in December 2015, states called 
upon the UN to organize the High-Level Summit to Address the Large 
Movements of Refugees and Migrants. The Summit led to the adoption of the 
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New York Declaration (NYD), which in turn laid out a roadmap for the 
negotiation of two Global Compacts, one on Refugees and one for Migration. 
On 17 December 2018, 181 states voted in favour of adopting the Global 
Compact on Refugees (GCR) at the UN General Assembly. Two days later, 
after being adopted by 164 Member States at an Intergovernmental 
Conference in Marrakesh, Morocco on Monday 10 December 2018, the Global 
Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (GCM) was endorsed by 
153 Member States at the General Assembly on 19 December 2018. 
The notion that crisis can lead to policy change is well established in the 
literature (cf. Alink et al., 2001; Balch & Geddes, 2011; Rinscheid, 2015). 
However, the fact that not all crises lead to policy change poses an interesting 
empirical puzzle, which has led researchers to consider what mediating 
factors play a role in determining the impact of crises on policy. Employing 
advocacy coalition theory, Rinscheid (2015) suggests that ‘the type of policy 
subsystem that is hit (by crises) is the decisive moderating factor’ (p.35) in 
determining whether policy change occurs as a result of a crisis. Weible (2008) 
describes three types of policy subsystems: unitary, collaborative, and 
adversarial. The evidence presented in Chapters 5 and 6 suggests that, as 
migration has evolved as a global policy issue, the migration policy 
subsystem has transitioned from being adversarial, characterized by 
fragmentation, low levels of coordination, and seemingly incompatible ways 
of framing migration as a global policy issue, towards a more collaborative 
subsystem. According to Weible (2008), a collaborative subsystem is still 
characterized by fragmentation but with an emphasis on ‘win-win’ policy 
design and more interaction between adherents of different advocacy 
coalitions (p.622).  
However, in responding to the ‘migration crises’ of 2015, the fault lines 
between different coalitions of actors appear to have resurfaced. There is 
evidence that the migration policy subsystem may be transitioning back to a 
more adversarial model, as members of different advocacy coalitions make 
use of the ‘migration crises’ to reorient the discussions regarding migration. 
Furthermore, another fault line that has long characterized migration 
governance came to the fore: the separation between migrants and refugees. 
As Chapter 4 discussed, the refugee regime is far more unitary than the 
migration regime. Rinschied (2015) argues that policy change is more likely 
to result from a crisis in adversarial subsystems as compared to unitary 
subsystems because different advocacy coalitions will be more likely to have 
arguments ready to employ when an opportunity for policy change presents 
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itself. Accordingly, one would expect to see more policy changes arising from 
the ‘migration crisis’ within the migration subsystem as opposed to the 
refugee subsystem. Furthermore, Rinschied (2015) also argued that ‘a policy-
proximate crisis is likely to trigger a temporary increase in subsystem 
polarization’ (p.39). I extend this argument by suggesting that the 2015 crisis 
also led to inter-subsystem polarization.  
While the Global Compacts have only relatively recently been adopted, a 
considerable body of literature has already emerged, providing commentary 
on the compacts1. Thus far, the literature on the Global Compacts, often 
written by close observers and participants in the process, can be grouped 
into three broad categories. The first to a body of literature focused on the 
process leading up to the adoption of the Global Compacts (c.f. Ferris and 
Donato, 2019; Newland, 2019; Klein Solomon and Sheldon, 2019; Ferris and 
Martin, 2019; Guild, 2018; Vitorino, 2019; McAdam, 2019; Rother and 
Steinhilper, 2019; Wouters and Wauters, 2019). The second to assessments of 
the content of the Compacts from different thematic perspectives such as 
human rights (Gest et al., 2019; Guild et al., 2019; Hujo, 2019; Delgado Wise, 
2018b); the facilitation of mobility (Costello, 2019; Crépeau, 2019); detention 
(Majcher, 2019); forced migration (Jubilut & Casagrande, 2019); labour 
markets (Martin and Ruhs 2019); travel security (Koslowski, 2019); climate 
(Warner, 2018) and gender (Hennebry & Petrozziello, 2019). The third 
category captures literature that reflects on the (potential) impact of the 
Compacts from a geographical perspective (c.f. Khadria et al., 2019; 
Maiyegun, 2019; Kale & Erdoğan, 2019; Goodwin-Gill, 2019; Martín Díaz & 
Aris Escarcena, 2019; Akram, 2019). This chapter contributes to this growing 
literature on the Global Compacts by examining the process that led to the 
adoption of the Global Compacts in 2018, with specific attention given to 
inter-subsystem (refugees versus migrants) and intra-subsystem (human 
rights versus management) polarization. The chapter addresses the following 
research question: 
How did the ‘migration crises’ of 2015 affect how migration 
was framed as a global policy issue?  
 
1 The majority of this literature can be found in two special issues on the Global Compacts, one 
in the International Journal of Refugee Law (2018) and one in International Migration (2019).  
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In keeping with the process-tracing approach, the chapter follows the 
emergence of the Compacts in a chronological way (Figure 8.1). As such, the 
remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 8.2 discusses the 
origin of the Global Compacts from the original conceptualization as a global 
compact on responsibility-sharing for refugees in 2015 to two separate 
compacts, one for refugees and one for migrants. It explores the first example 
of polarization accentuated by the crisis: the distinction between migrants 
and refugees. Section 8.3 focuses on the High-Level Summit with attention to 
the drafting and adoption of the New York Declaration, which provided the 
blueprints for the subsequent Global Compact negotiations. Here it is already 
possible to identify evidence that the migration crises exacerbated intra-
subsystem tensions and provided a platform upon which to discuss 
migration within a protection framework making a rights-based approach 
more palatable. Section 8.4 examines the evolving context within which the 
Global Compacts were negotiated before Section 8.5 compares the 
negotiations and reception of each Compact. Section 8.6 concludes the 
chapter. 
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8.2 The Genesis of an Idea: One Compact becomes Two 
 
From January to April 2015, nearly 2,000 people are known to have lost their 
lives in the Mediterranean Sea (IOM, 2020b). On one day, 19 April 2015, more 
than 600 people died when their boat capsized near the island of Lampedusa 
(Spindler, 2015). It is widely accepted that the Global Compact process was 
triggered by the increase in the number of people arriving in Europe (c.f. 
Betts, 2018; Guild, 2018; Klein Solomon and Sheldon, 2019; Newland, 2019; 
Arnold‐Fernández, 2019; Hujo, 2019; and Maiyegun, 2019): 
‘If you had asked me when the crunch point came, I 
could identify one fairly clearly, and that was the 2015 
mass inflow of people into Europe. To me, that was the 
tipping point’ (INT-IO-015). 
One of the earliest references to a Global Compact in the UN archives is in a 
letter sent by Ban Ki-moon to the leaders of the G20 on 4 November 2015:  
‘It is time that we agree on a new Global Compact on 
burden and responsibility sharing in this area. We need 
a new spirit of solidarity, and a renewed commitment to 
our obligations and responsibilities’ (United Nations 
Archives 2015b, p.4). 
Initial discussions focused on holding a conference likened to the conference 
that led to the Comprehensive Plan of Action (CPA), which was formulated 
for Indochinese refugees in 1989 (Klein Solomon & Sheldon, 2019). However, 
particularly given that arrivals in Europe represented but a fraction of the 
world’s displaced population, an international conference to solve a problem 
that many actors felt Europe should be able to address on its own, did not 
receive much support:  
‘We first tried to create a summit of European, African 
Union, and Middle Eastern leaders in June of 2015 to 
deal with the Mediterranean crisis. We pushed hard for 
the idea of a comprehensive approach, an action plan for 
the Mediterranean. Ban (Ki-moon) was simply not able 
to do that’ (INT-IO-037). 
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In the context of preparations for the eighth GFMD meeting in Istanbul in 
October 2015, however, the idea of a conference took on a more international 
flavour as countries beyond Europe highlighted their displacement-related 
challenges (Ferris and Martin, 2019). As Sutherland wrote to Ban Ki-moon on 
21 July 2015: 
‘Last week, I spoke at an excellent (preparatory) GFMD 
meeting in Brussels that focused on the international 
dimensions of the Mediterranean crisis; the session 
attracted dozens of states and agencies, as well as civil 
society, and was the first such conference to bring a truly 
international dimension to what has been framed 
principally as a European crisis’ (United Nations 
Archives, 2015a, p.4). 
After several informal meetings about a conference, at the UN General 
Assembly, in December 2015, Member States called on Ban Ki-moon to 
organize a High-Level Summit on Addressing Large Movements of Refugees 
and Migrants to be held on 19 September 20162. To this end, in January 2016, 
Ban Ki-moon appointed Karen AbuZayd to be his Special Adviser to assist in 
the preparation of the Summit and to prepare a report as input. The resulting 
report, released on 21 April 2016, ‘In Safety and Dignity: Addressing Large 
Movements of Refugees and Migrants3’, proposes two Global Compacts: one 
on responsibility-sharing for refugees; and one on safe and orderly migration. 
A striking aspect of the report is its reinforcement of the separation between 
migrants and refugees:  
‘It is important to bear in mind the significant distinction 
between migrants on the one hand and refugees on the 
other’ (para 12). 
The report refers to ‘refugees and migrants’ on 71 occasions. The reverse 
formulation, ‘migrants and refugees’, appears nine times. Alternative 
formulations, such as ‘migrants, including refugees’, which definitionally 
 
2 High-Level plenary meeting on addressing large movements of refugees and migrants, 
UNGAOR, UN Doc. A/70/L.34 (15 December 2015) 
3 Report of the Secretary-General: In Safety and Dignity: Addressing Large Movements of Refugees 
and Migrants, UNGAOR, 70th Session, UN Doc A/70/59 (21 April 2016) 
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recognize refugees as a subcategory of migrants, do not appear in the report. 
The report does, however, acknowledge that ‘certain vulnerable migrants 
who are not refugees’ (para 93) also need international protection and, as 
such, established the three-pillar structure that was also reflected in the New 
York Declaration. 
This points to our first schism. While the dissertation has predominantly 
focused on the frame conflict between a human rights and a management 
approach to migration, another longstanding area of friction relates to the 
separation of the migration regime and the refugee regime (cf. Karatani, 2005; 
Betts, 2011; Long, 2013). Refugees have long been institutionalized within the 
UN, represented by an institution (UNHCR) and norms (the 1951 Refugee 
Convention and its 1967 Protocol).  
However, the categories used to define mobile populations are highly 
political, and it has been long acknowledged that distinguishing between 
migrants and refugees is not straightforward (cf. Scalettaris, 2010; Crawley & 
Skleparis, 2018; Carling, n.d.). Carling (n.d.) distinguishes between residualist 
and inclusive definitions of a migrant. A residualist definition would be that 
a migrant is anyone who is not a refugee. In contrast, an inclusive definition 
would view refugees, like international students or labour migrants, as a 
category of migrant. As argued by Rasmussen (2011), ‘classifying issues into 
categories that link them to or separate them from other policy issues requires 
“framing” by political actors’ (p.934). One of the most prominent actors 
behind the framing of refugees as a distinct category of individuals separate 
from migrants is UNHCR. 
‘UNHCR has taken on this stance that refugees are not 
migrants. They are not a sub-class of migrants. They 
have nothing to do with migrants. It is a completely 
different thing, and they are scrupulously going through 
every document that comes their way to make sure that 
they say “refugees and migrants”’ (INT-OTHER-034).  
While this is by no means a new concern, it appears to have become more 
pertinent in the context of the 2015 crises: 
‘Before UNHCR’s creation, it was considered quite 
normal to talk about refugee movements and labour 
migration as two sides of the same coin. From the 50s, 
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60s and 70s onwards there became a complete separation 
where UNHCR insisted on a strict distinction between 
refugees and migrants culminating in an article written 
by Eleanor Feller, a senior UNHCR staff member, with 
the title “Refugees are not Migrants” (Feller, 2005). From 
that point onwards, UNHCR actually moved away from 
the “refugees are not migrants” position, however, over 
the last two years, UNHCR is reversing to a more 
traditional perspective where refugees and migrants are 
strictly distinguished, and I think that is mainly because 
of the so-called refugee crisis particularly in Europe’ 
(INT-IO-08). 
Feller (2005) argues that UNHCR has ‘good reasons’ (p.28) to uphold the clear 
distinction between refugees and migrants because, in the context of the 
internationally agreed-upon framework, the Refugee Convention and its 
Protocol, refugees are clearly defined. Referring to refugees as migrants, 
particularly in a climate where ‘migrants’ are viewed pejoratively, may 
undermine public sympathy towards refugees. In the context of the 2015 
‘crisis’ in Europe, Crawley and Skleparis (2018) argued along a similar line: 
‘the use of different categories to describe those on the move has become 
deeply politicised in the context of Europe’s “migration crisis” (p.49). By 
casting those arriving in Europe as ‘migrants’ rather than ‘refugees’, the 
legitimacy of their claims for international protection was no longer taken for 
granted. However, Feller (2005) also acknowledges that: 
‘Definitions can become quite artificial, even dangerous, 
if they lead to some being helped and others ignored, 
regardless of need’ (Feller, 2005, p.34). 
While there is an argument to be made for preserving the refugee definition, 
there is also a clear rationale to address the challenges faced by migrants who 
are not refugees: 
‘I think we probably do need to preserve the legal 
distinction, but I also think we need to be very aware 
that it is not an absolute distinction. An awful lot of 
people who want to move from one country to another 
have a mixture of motives and may or may not qualify 
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as refugees. At the same time, even if they do not qualify 
as refugees, this does not mean that their movement is 
entirely voluntary’ (INT-IO-038). 
Over the years, and particularly in times of ‘crisis’ there have been moves 
made by members of both the migration regime and the refugee regime to 
more clearly define the grey area that exists between the migration and 
refugee regimes, sometimes referred to as the ‘migration-asylum nexus’ 
(Castles, 2007, p.39). Different concepts have been used to describe 
individuals who ‘fall in between this ideal type of refugee on the one hand 
and migrant on the other’ (INT-IO-040) such as the concept of migrants in 
vulnerable situations, or mixed migration. 
According to Scalettaris (2010), since 2001, UNHCR has ‘strived to introduce 
the distinction between forced and voluntary migration’ (p.263). 
Distinguishing between forced and voluntary migration would give credence 
to the argument that individuals who do not qualify as refugees under the 
1951 Refugee Convention but are nevertheless in refugee-like situations such 
as Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) or individuals displaced by factors 
such as climate or natural disasters, should fall under an expanded UNHCR 
mandate. Particularly under the leadership of António Guterres, who was the 
UN High Commissioner for Refugees between 2005 and 2015, and who is 
often described as an ‘expansionist’ (INT-IO-08), UNHCR sought to move the 
discussion beyond the refugees and migrant dichotomy.  
In 2007, the High Commissioner’s Dialogue on Protection Challenges focused 
on the question of how to address what is often referred to as mixed 
migration flows. Ahead of the meeting, Guterres published an op-ed in the 
Guardian with the title ‘People on the Move’ in which he points to the 
challenges associated with the increasingly complex patterns of mobility, and 
the need to ‘provide more opportunities for people to move in a safe and legal 
manner’ in order to, one the one hand, ensure that the asylum systems are 
not overwhelmed, and, implicitly, to maximize the development benefits of 
migration (Guterres, 2007). As one observer noted, ‘it was a fairly calculated 
strategy to get beyond the traditional dichotomy of refugees and migrants’ 
(INT-IO-08). However, there has been general resistance to UNHCR 
expanding its mandate: 
‘You had the major donor states, particularly the US, 
saying “stick to your refugee mandate, this is too big for 
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UNHCR to take on”, and, “if you move in this direction, 
we are not going to fund you to do it”. At the same time, 
you had refugee-hosting countries in the developing 
world saying “we are very concerned that if UNHCR 
moves into climate change and natural disasters, you are 
going to have less money for refugee programmes in our 
countries”’ (INT-IO-08). 
States have, on the other hand, viewed IOM as an organization that can assist 
in emergency situations, and, perhaps more importantly, does not have a 
normative mandate. After IOM’s intervention during the first Gulf War to 
repatriate migrant workers from Kuwait (Section 7.4), IOM has attracted 
significant funds for its work with populations that have been displaced, 
including refugees but also other migrants. In McGregor (2019), I draw on 
project descriptions for all voluntary earmarked contributions made by 
Member States and the European Union (until 2005) and the European 
Commission (from 2006) (n=13,306) in order to review the patterns of 
contributions made to IOM between 2000 to 2016. For the top 10 donors plus 
the European Commission, which accounted for 86.6 per cent of all voluntary 
contributions from Member States across the period under review, projects 
related to refugees accounted for over one fifth (21.2%) of IOM’s revenue 
from these donors. Furthermore, 13.5 per cent of IOM’s projects related to 
work in emergency settings, 6.6 per cent for work with internally displaced 
persons, and 4.7 per cent related to natural disasters. IOM are also actively 
involved in projects related to return (18.0%), post-crisis reconstruction 
(11.8%), and irregular migration (3.6%)4. These numbers highlight the 
important operational role that IOM plays, not only for migrants who qualify 
for refugee status but also for vulnerable migrants who do not. 
The fact that IOM and UNHCR both see a role for themselves in addressing 
the challenges faced by vulnerable migrants who fall outside of the refugee 
definition has led to tensions between IOM and UNHCR. As the example of 
Iraq (Section 7.4) demonstrated, ‘there are very significant turf problems 
 
4 The percentages do not add up to 100 per cent because projects were categorized based on the 
identification of keywords. Some projects were therefore coded into multiple categories. 
Furthermore, the percentage is calculated based on the total value of each project as opposed to 
a count of projects with the specified keywords included in the short project description 
provided (McGregor, 2019). 
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going on between UNHCR and IOM (INT-OTHER-0345). These tensions 
were, as predicted by Rinscheid (2015), accentuated by the ‘migration crisis’ 
and were arguably the reasons why states ultimately decided to negotiate 
two Global Compacts in relative isolation from one another.  
 
8.3 The High-Level Summit and the New York 
Declaration  
 
In February 2016, the President of the General Assembly (PGA) appointed 
Ambassador Dina Kawar of Jordan, and Ambassador David Donoghue of 
Ireland to co-facilitate the High-Level Summit, and to prepare an outcome 
document for the meeting, which would become the New York Declaration 
(NYD)6. During the negotiations, a two-year process was envisaged for both 
Compacts. However, for some states, this was not acceptable, and they tried 
to push for quicker results: 
‘During the negotiations, the idea that the Summit 
would launch a process of negotiations leading to the 
adoption of two Global Compacts was subject to some 
controversy. There was concern that an agreement 
needed to be reached, particularly with respect to the 
ongoing crisis in Syria, as soon as possible. Shortly 
before the High-Level Summit, therefore, it was agreed 
that a Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework 
would be annexed to the NYD as a ‘down payment, a 
first draft of what would become the Global Compact on 
refugees’ (INT-GOV-027). 
The US also wanted to see quicker results and, the day after the High-Level 
Summit was due to be held, Barack Obama hosted a Leaders’ Summit for 
Refugees to secure commitments for refugees. Despite some controversy in 
the lead up to the High-Level Summit on 19 September, however, the NYD 
was unanimously adopted on 19 September 2016. Mirroring the structure of 
 
5 A similar argument was also presented in INT-IO-015 
6 New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants, UNGAOR. 71st Session, UN Doc. A/RES/71/1 (3 
October 2016) 
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Karen AbuZayd’s report, the NYD was structured around three sets of 
commitments: commitments for migrants, commitments for refugees, and 
commitments for migrants and refugees.  
The NYD received a mixed reception. On the one hand, some viewed the 
NYD positively for its clear and consistent references to human rights: 
‘We were very, very happy with the New York 
Declaration, and we think that it is a human rights-based 
document’ (INT-IO-040). 
The human rights nature of the document has also been noted in the academic 
literature on the NYD (cf. Gest et al., 2019; Guild et al., 2019). Guild et al. 
(2019), for example, point to the fact that there are more than 30 references to 
human rights in the NYD. An arguable by-product of the inter-subsystem 
tensions between the migration and refugee subsystems, which ultimately 
led to the decision to develop two distinct compacts, was that it also allowed 
the humans-rights advocacy coalition to frame the discussion on migration 
in a protection framework: 
‘Almost by accident, migrants became integrated into a 
protection discussion. Because both migrants and 
refugees were included in the New York Declaration, it 
became inconceivable to speak about migrants different 
from refugees from a human rights perspective. This 
then prompted the migration compact to become more 
and more of a human rights instrument’ (INT-IO-040). 
However, others have been more critical. As Doyle (2018) noted: ‘the New 
York Declaration was long on principles but short on specific commitments’ 
(p.618). There was a concern that the New York Declaration, and 
subsequently, the Global Compacts represented acceptance of a new more 
informal system of global governance, at the expense of legally binding global 
norms:  
‘The New York Declaration has behind it, an interest by 
some of its proponents to set a non-binding framework 
that can be put out there as a model for policy and 
governance that will substitute for an obligation, or a 
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sense of obligation to adhere to the much higher 
normative standards that are embodied in, particularly, 
the International Convention on the Protection of the 
Rights of all Migrant Workers and Members of their 
Families and the two complementary ILO Conventions’ 
(INT-IO-012). 
The argument embedded here is that the global compact process essentially 
legitimized a migration management approach to migration. Although the 
GCM is framed in terms of human rights, it is underpinned by another 
agenda (Jubilut and Casagrande, 2019; Delgado Wise, 2018b). The main 
argument is that the GCM represents the interests of proponents of the 
migration management frame to ‘depoliticise migration, obfuscate the 
existence of divergent interests, asymmetries of power or conflicts, avoid 
obligations imposed by international law and promote the idea that 
managing migration can be beneficial for all stakeholders: countries of 
destination, countries of origin, migrants themselves and their families’ 
(Delgado Wise 2018b, p.1-2). The main fear is that the non-binding nature of 
the Compacts allows states to retract from existing commitments and thus 
weakens normative instruments and ushers in a new form of international 
organization which reflects the interests of the world’s most powerful states 
(Gammeltoft-Hansen, 2019; Ferris and Donato, 2019; Gest, Kysel, and Wong, 
2019; Gilbert, 2019; Majcher, 2019). As Gammeltoft-Hansen (2019) noted, ‘the 
compact as a choice of instrument tends to place emphasis on political and 
practical cooperation as opposed to legal commitments’ (p.606). 
While largely united during the process leading up to the adoption of the 
SDGs (Chapter 6), therefore, the ‘migration crises’ arguably brought 
underlying frame conflicts back to the surface. However, other changes also 
had implications for the international landscape. 
 
8.4 The Changing of the Guards 
 
Chapter 7 discussed the ‘perfect storm’ that resulted in IOM’s admission into 
the UN system as a ‘related agency.’ Shortly after IOM joined the UN, 
however, several other changes occurred which had implications for the 
negotiations of the Global Compacts. The first significant change was that 
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Peter Sutherland, who, as discussed in the pages of this dissertation, had 
spent more than a decade advocating for the UN to take on a more visible 
and concrete role on migration, became gravely ill and was unable to 
continue in his role as the SRSG:  
‘Peter Sutherland's illness prevented him from 
participating in the UN Summit on Migration and 
Refugees in September 2016. This global meeting was 
very much the product of his active promoting of a more 
active UN role in these issues. IOM's closer association 
was one of the outcomes. I am not sure that he would 
have liked some other aspects of it…(such as) the two 
"separated, distinct and independent" global compacts, 
for refugees and for migrants. For my part, I consider it 
disastrous…My long experience with refugees has 
taught me how thin and variable can be the distinction 
between a refugee and a migrant’ (INT-IO-026). 
Peter Sutherland’s tasks were temporarily taken over by Karen AbuZayd, 
who, as noted, became Ban Ki-moon’s Special Adviser on the Summit on 
Addressing Large Movements of Refugees and Migrants. Later, when it 
became clear that Sutherland would not be able to resume his post (United 
Nations Archives, 2016), Louise Arbour was appointed as the Special 
Representative of the Secretary-General on International Migration in March 
2017. Her title is the first indication of a shift in the way migration was 
framed: 
‘What is interesting, for example, is that when Louise 
Arbour replaced Peter Sutherland, her title was Special 
Representative of the Secretary-General on International 
Migration. Development was eliminated from the title 
because now states consider that migration is a UN 
topic’ (INT-IO-013). 
With the appointment of Louise Arbour, Sutherland’s team was effectively 
disbanded (INT-IO-002; INT-IO-006; INT-IO-016). Her appointment was 
welcomed, particularly by advocates of a rights-based approach to migration:  
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‘At least Louise Arbour was earlier a Human Rights 
Commissioner…so she has a much clearer idea about 
migration and the rights-based approach’ (INT-IO-011). 
One significant difference between the team supporting Sutherland and the 
team supporting Arbour is that the latter was institutionalized within the UN. 
Where Sutherland had operated at the margins of the UN, the establishment 
of Louise Arbour’s team provides further evidence of the institutionalization 
of migration into the UN:  
‘Peter did not have a physical office. The people who 
were working with him all had contracts with different 
organizations, so there was not one kind of institutional 
home: it was all a bit of a patchwork, a virtual office 
arrangement. Whereas it is much more institutionalized 
and formalized now, and Louise has formalized 
responsibilities’ (INT-IO-006). 
In addition to supporting the Global Compact negotiations, one of the 
responsibilities of Louise Arbour’s office was to manage the entry of IOM into 
the UN and to mediate the sensitivities that surrounded its membership. 
With states recognizing IOM as the global lead agency on migration in the 
NYD7, some concern among existing members of the UN system could be 
observed:  
‘UNDESA saw itself as being the central, leading, 
coordinating agency, but the dynamics shifted 
significantly when IOM entered the system. Louise 
Arbour’s office was set up to address that dynamic… 
But then agencies like ILO and OHCHR continue to have 
reservations, and a lot of that boils down to IOM’s status 
as a non-normative organization which, for those 
organizations which have normative mandates 
 
7 Paragraph 49 of the New York Declaration states: ‘We commit to strengthening global 
governance of migration. We therefore warmly support and welcome the agreement to bring the 
International Organization for Migration, an organization regarded by its Member States as the 
global lead agency on migration, into a closer legal and working relationship with the United 
Nations as a related organization’ (A/RES/71/1). 
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themselves, is seen as being quite troublesome’ (INT-IO-
016). 
This arguably fed into the concern that, although the NYD had promoted a 
rights-based approach to migration, the negotiations of the GCM would 
reflect a continuation of the existing informal and non-binding approach to 
migration governance from a migration management perspective.  
IOM’s integration into the UN also took place during a period of UN reform. 
On 1 January 2017, former UN High Commissioner for Refugees, António 
Guterres, replaced Ban Ki-moon as Secretary-General of the UN. Shortly after 
becoming Secretary-General, Guterres initiated a management review and 
subsequently announced plans to reform the UN. The main goal of his reform 
was to make the UN ‘less fragmented and reactive8’ (para. 16, p.7). A key part 
of his reform agenda was the restructuring of the UN Development System9. 
This includes steps to improve the efficiency of UN Country Teams by, 
among other reforms, delegating more authority to Resident Coordinators, 
encouraging organizations to share premises and back offices (at least 50 per 
cent by 2021), charging a one per cent coordination levy on all earmarked 
contributions and advocating for an increase in voluntary funding. Another 
was a shift in the ‘management paradigm’ based on three principles: 
simplification, decentralization, and delegation10. Accordingly, ‘the UN that 
we (IOM) joined in 2016 was a very different animal from what it is now’ 
(INT-IO-041). 
External to the UN, change was also afoot that challenged the multilateral 
project. On 23 June 2016, the British public voted in a Referendum on their 
membership in the EU. The resulting vote, marginally in favour of leaving 
the EU, triggered several years of negotiations, which ultimately resulted in 
the UK leaving the EU on 31 January 2020. As one interviewee mused: 
 
8 Report of the Secretary-General on the work of the Organization, UNGAOR, 72nd Session, UN 
Doc. A/72/1 (28 July 2017)  
9 Report of the Secretary-General on the work of the Organization, UNGAOR, 73rd Session, UN 
Doc. A/73/1 (13 August 2018) and Operational Activities for Development of the United Nations 
System, UNGAOR, 72nd Session, UN Doc. A/RES/72/236 (20 December 2017) 
10 Report of the Secretary-General: Shifting the Management Paradigm in the United Nations: 
Comparative Assessment of Human Resources Structures, UNGAOR, 73rd Session, UN Doc. 
A/73/366 (5 September 2018) 
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‘After Brexit, has there ever been a worse time to try to 
get to a global understanding and common agreement 
on migration management? I think there has never been 
a worse time to start discussing it, and it became worse 
after Trump won’ (INT-IO-003). 
Furthermore, shortly after the adoption of the NYD, on 9 November 2016, 
Donald Trump was elected the 45th president of the US, marking the start of 
an era of American isolationism. His election platform was centred around 
the idea of ‘America First’ and, in his years in office, thus far, he has pulled 
the US out of several multilateral agreements. One such withdrawal was his 
decision in December 2017 to remove the US from the negotiations of the 
GCM citing incompatibility between the provisions of the NYD and US 
immigration policy: 
‘The global approach in the New York Declaration is 
simply not compatible with U.S. sovereignty’ (U.S. 
Mission to the United Nations, 2017). 
Despite the apparent crisis of multilateralism, the negotiations continued, 
and, against all the odds, a GCM emerged alongside the GCR. One factor that 
may have contributed to the perceived ease of the GCM negotiations (Section 
8.5) was Trump’s withdrawal from the negotiation process. Trump’s 
withdrawal from the GCM is arguably also why, after being a US-led 
organization for the best part of its history, the new head of IOM, António 
Vitorino of Portugal, was elected over the US’ candidate Ken Isaacs to become 
the new Director-General of IOM on 29 June 201811. As one interviewee noted: 
‘it was a gift from Trump’ (INT-OTHER-039). However, as argued earlier in 
the chapter, the way the Compacts emerged, and their reception, may also 
have been a product of the historical differences between the migration and 
refugee policy subsystems.  
 
 
 
11 He took office on 1 October 2018. 
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8.5 Negotiating the Global Compacts  
 
While the NYD envisaged three sets of commitments, for migrants, for 
refugees, and for ‘migrants and refugees’, this third set of commitments 
mostly fell through the cracks because the GCM and GCR negotiations took 
place in relative isolation from one another: 
‘If you read the New York Declaration, it is quite 
different from the development of the Global Compacts. 
The New York Declaration makes commitments for 
refugees and migrants and then for refugees separately 
and migrants separately, three types of commitments. 
But if you look at the development of the two Global 
Compacts, you can see that there is no mechanism, 
legislated by the General Assembly, to ensure that there 
are commitments for both refugees and migrants’ (INT-
IO-029).  
As shown in Figure 8.1, from the same origin point, the ‘migration crises’, the 
GCM and GCR were negotiated in parallel but separate negotiations. 
However, as theorized in the introduction and as the further examination of 
the negotiations (Section 8.51. and 8.5.2) demonstrates, their outcomes were 
perceived very differently (summarized in Table 8.3). As Gammeltoft-
Hansen (2018) argued: ‘while the migration compact may potentially come to 
fulfil such a role (as soft law filling gaps in treaty law) with regard to the more 
fragmented and rudimentary area of international migration law, the 
Refugee Compact enters a far more well-established normative terrain’ 
(p.607). This supports the notion that the impact of crises on unitary policy 
subsystems will be less pronounced than for collaborative or adversarial 
subsystems  
 
 
 
 
 
204   
 
 
 
Table 8.3 Comparing the Negotiations of the GCR and GCM 
 GCR GCM 
Subsystem 
Characteristics 
Unitary  Collaborative/Adversarial 
Negotiations UNHCR led State-led 
In Favour of Compact  181 in favour,  
Three abstentions  
152 in favour 
12 abstentions  
 
Not in Favour of 
Compact 
Two: Hungary and US Five: Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Israel, Poland, US 
Main Controversies Inclusion of 
commitments for 
migrants who are not 
refugees 
US withdrawal in November 
2017; the challenge to state 
sovereignty, non-binding 
nature, references to refugees  
Views on the Compact Negative to neutral. 
Lack of ambition, 
preserves the existing 
system but has the 
potential to bring more 
money into the 
humanitarian system. 
Both positive and negative 
with the potential for the 
GCM to become soft law 
furthering a rights-based 
approach to migration touted 
as its main contribution. 
 
8.5.1 The Global Compact on Refugees 
 
In Annex 1 of the New York Declaration, the High Commissioner for 
Refugees was invited to submit a proposal for a Global Compact on Refugees 
with his 2018 annual report to the General Assembly (para 19). Since the 
Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRFF) had already been 
agreed upon in the New York Declaration, the central area of work for 
UNHCR was the application of the CRRF and the preparation of a 
programme of action. For the first task, UNHCR created a Task Team on 
Comprehensive Responses. UNHCR then organized a series of thematic 
sessions in Geneva in 2017 covering a range of topics. At the thematic 
sessions, inputs were gathered from Member States and other experts. Like 
the GCM process, these sessions were followed up by a stocktaking phase. 
After the stocktaking phase, UNHCR prepared the draft compact, which was 
presented to Member States and other stakeholders in a series of 
consultations held between February and July 2018 (UNHCR, 2017).  
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Unlike the GCM (Section 8.5.2), UNHCR led the process of developing the 
Global Compact on Refugees (GCR) and not states.  
‘UNHCR wrote it. The GCR is based on their 
Comprehensive Refugee Relief Framework. The 
governments influenced the consultations, but it was 
ultimately what UNHCR wanted to put out. UNHCR 
was afraid that if they went too far, the governments 
would say no and not sign off on it. They were quite 
conservative in what they chose to put in the Compact’ 
(INT-OTHER-034). 
The drafted GCR was first put to the vote by the Third Committee of the 
General Assembly12 on 13 November 2018 and received 176 votes in its favour 
with only the US opposing the resolution13. While a vote on a resolution 
related to the work of UNHCR was unprecedented in the Third Committee, 
Türk (2019) argued that it ‘showed how seriously States take the 
responsibilities set out in the Compact and the importance they attribute to 
it, as well as how such a non-binding text could nonetheless influence State 
behaviour’ (p.580).  
However, the literature on the GCR thus far has been mostly critical (c.f. 
(Aleinikoff, 2019; Betts, 2018a; Chimni, 2019; Costello, 2019; Hathaway, 2019). 
The main criticisms levied towards the GCR are that it: 1) fails to provide any 
concrete solutions to the question of ‘responsibility sharing’ (Chimni, 2018, 
Hathaway, 2018); 2) does not adequately address the ‘root causes’ of 
displacement; and 3) dilutes existing commitments (Chimni, 2018). Aleinikoff 
(2019) suggested that ‘it would be better to think of the Refugee Compact as 
a ratchet – preventing backward slippage and creating opportunities for 
forward movement’ (2019, p.612). Betts (2018) suggested that ‘its basic aim, 
though, is to get more resources into the system rather than to change the 
system’ (p.625).  
The GCR also reinforced the refugee-migrant dichotomy by failing to address 
the situation for vulnerable migrants in refugee-like situations meaningfully. 
Evidence suggests that, throughout the negotiations, references that implied 
 
12 The Third Committee of the General Assembly addresses matters relating to social, 
humanitarian, and cultural issues.  
13 Thirteen countries were not present.  
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any kind of commitment to protecting those who did not fulfil the criteria 
established in the 1951 Refuge Convention were toned down (Aleinikoff, 
2018). A byproduct of state pressure on UNHCR to limit the scope of the GCR, 
however, was that many of these issues ended up in the GCM (Aleinikoff, 
2018). As one observer noted: 
‘I think the refugee compact is a weaker document 
because the US was in the room. And not because the US 
would have said anything, but because the assumption 
was that the US would not go along with it if certain 
issues were raised. It is self-censorship on the part of 
UNHCR and some of the other governments’ (INT-
OTHER-034). 
Ultimately, when put to the vote at the UN General Assembly on 17 
December 2018, 181 Member States voted in favour of the GCR. Despite 
participating in the negotiations, when it came to the vote, the US, along with 
Hungary, voted against the GCR.  
 
8.5.2 The Global Compact for Safe Orderly and Regular Migration 
 
After laying out an initial roadmap in Annex II of the New York Declaration, 
the General Assembly adopted a resolution on the negotiation modalities on 
6 April 201714. The President of the General Assembly appointed the 
Permanent Representatives of Mexico and Switzerland to facilitate the 
negotiations. The process included three phases: 1) preparatory, 2) 
stocktaking and 3) negotiations. During the preparatory phase, thematic and 
regional consultations were organized with a range of different stakeholders, 
which were fed into a stocktaking conference organized in Puerto Vallarta, 
Mexico, in December 2017. After the Stocktaking conference, the Secretary-
General released a summary report entitled ‘Making Migration Work for All’, 
following which the co-facilitators prepared a draft compact, which was then 
discussed in six rounds of negotiation between February and July 2018.  
 
14 Modalities for the Intergovernmental Negotiations of the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly 
and Regular Migration, UNGAOR, 71st session, UN Doc. A/RES/71/280 (6 April 2017) 
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Accordingly, between 5 February 2018 and 13 July 2018, seven drafts of the 
GCM were released. An examination of how the key objectives of the GCM 
evolved during the negotiations highlights a minimum of controversy 
(Annex 8.1), although, as Newland (2019) noted, the co-facilitators kept a 
‘tight grip on the text’ (p.657). Of the initial 22 objectives in the Zero draft, 13 
appeared unaltered in the final draft. Of the remaining objectives, most of the 
revisions can be described as relatively minor. For example, instead of 
providing ‘adequate’ information, Objective 3 specifies that the information 
should be ‘accurate’, which is essentially a condition of its adequacy. In some 
cases, the revision makes the objective more ambitious. For example, 
Objective 10 expanded its goal to include the eradication of trafficking. 
Objective 12 was the most controversial. In its first formulation, Objective 12 
referred to status determination, a process firmly under the mandate of 
UNHCR, and therefore, from the perspective of those wishing to keep the 
refugee and migration regimes separate, an issue that was better placed in 
the GCR. 
After a relatively uneventful negotiation, and as the ‘Intergovernmental 
Conference to Adopt the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular 
Migration’ in Marrakech on 10 and 11 December 2018 approached, states, 
particularly in Europe, became anxious about the implications of the GCM 
(Guild et al., 2019). As Becker (2020) observed: ‘a global network of 
nationalist, far-right activists fuelled a surge in social media activity by 
framing “compact” as a threat to national sovereignty thereby putting a 
spotlight on the negotiations’ (p.1). Three days before the meeting, and 
despite repeated assurances from UN officials,  the US fuelled the fire by 
releasing a new statement on 7 December:  
‘We believe the Compact and the process that led to its 
adoption, including the New York Declaration, 
represent an effort by the United Nations to advance 
global governance at the expense of the sovereign right 
of States to manage their immigration systems in 
accordance with their national laws, policies and 
interests’ (United States Mission to the United Nations, 
2018 in Guild et al. 2019, p.44). 
Perhaps the most extreme example of how the GCM affected national politics 
is the case of Belgium, where the Flemish nationalist party, Nieuw-Vlaamse 
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Alliantie15 withdrew from the governing coalition over their disagreement 
with the Prime Minister’s decision to endorse the GCM (Birnbaum, 2018; 
Schultheis & Calamur, 2018). 
Duncan (2019) refers to the GCM as ‘one of the most important acts of 
policymaking in the migration field’ (p.4). The very fact that the GCM exists 
has been hailed as ‘the beginning for the global regulation of migration’ 
(McAdam 2019, p.57316). Despite being non-binding, the GCM holds the 
potential to have legal effects as it builds on existing human rights and other 
obligations (Costello, 2019; Guild et al., 2019). Particularly given the context 
in which the Compacts were negotiated, with rising nationalism and a 
disdain for multilateralism, it is an achievement that they even came into 
being (Ferris and Donato 2019). However, as discussed, this is also the reason 
why several UN Member States withdrew from or voted against, the GCM. 
Despite the last-minute controversy, the GCM was officially adopted at the 
intergovernmental conference on international migration in Marrakesh on 11 
December 2018, with 164 Member States in attendance. At the General 
Assembly on 19 December 2018, the Global Compact for Safe Orderly and 
Regular Migration (GCM) was endorsed by the General Assembly. A total of 
152 Member States voted in favour of endorsing the GCM. Five Member 
States voted against it (Czech Republic, Hungary, Israel, Poland, US), and 12 
Member States abstained17. Twenty-four States did not vote (Ferris and 
Martin 2019). Among the countries in favour of the Compact, the Philippines 
hailed its endorsement as ‘a triumph of multilateralism’, a sentiment shared 
by many other Member States including Comoros, Morocco, and Namibia, 
who spoke on behalf of the Africa Group (United Nations, 2018b). The 
recurring theme of their statements was that a vote in favour of the GCM was 
a vote in favour of multilateralism, particularly given that the GCM was the 
product of two years of multilateral negotiations. Many Member States, 
including Belgium, Croatia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, 
Iceland, Lithuania, Malta, the Netherlands, Turkey, Peru, and the UK, while 
endorsing the Compact, did, however, emphasize its non-binding nature and 
the fact that it did not affect state sovereignty in matters related to migration.  
 
15 The New Flemish Alliance  
16 A similar observation is made by Klein Solomon and Sheldon (2019). 
17 For a full list of the votes see United Nations (2018b) 
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Among opposing states, the US reiterated its position of the incompatibility 
of the Compact with its sovereignty. Poland signalled a similar position. 
Hungary described it as an ‘unbalanced, biased, and pro-migration 
document’ and considered its endorsement a mistake (United Nations, 
2018b). The biggest concern of the Czech Republic, who had opted not to 
attend the meeting in Marrakech the week before the General Assembly, was 
the failure to make a clear distinction between ‘legal’ and ‘illegal’ migration. 
Libya shared this view and abstained from the vote.  
Several European countries were among those abstaining from the vote. 
Romania abstained because, despite recognizing that the GCM was not 
legally binding and represented a ‘menu of policy actions’, wished to take a 
balanced position ahead of taking over the Presidency of the European Union 
Council (United Nations, 2018b). Several of the countries that abstained from 
the vote, such as Singapore and Bulgaria, acknowledged several positive 
aspects of the Compact but chose to abstain because they were ‘not in a 
position to adhere fully to certain commitments’ (United Nations, 2018b). In 
other cases, the necessary parliamentary agreement had not been reached to 
allow a vote to be made. Interestingly, Switzerland, while the co-facilitator of 
the GCM, did not attend the meeting in Marrakesh and abstained from the 
General Assembly vote for this reason.  
 
8.6 Conclusion  
 
The case of the Global Compacts provides empirical support to the argument 
that policy change as a result of crises is less likely in a unitary subsystem as 
compared to adversarial or collaborative subsystems. The different 
configurations of the refugee and migration regimes, coupled with the US 
withdrawal from the GCM and participation in the GCR, seem to have made 
it easier for the discussion on migrants in refugee-like situations to take place 
within the context of the GCM process. Rather than bring more coherence to 
the global landscape concerning human mobility, the Global Compact 
process has arguably merely served to reinforce and perhaps exacerbate 
existing schisms.  
For many of the individuals involved with discussions regarding migration 
at the global policy level, the GCM, while imperfect, represents the 
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culmination of several decades of work. Gaining the agreement of states on 
the wording of a broad range of commitments on migration was likely 
facilitated by the fact that many of the same conversations had already 
occurred in the context of the GFMD (Chapter 5), the HLDs, and during the 
SDG negotiations (Chapter 6). Through the crafting of the SDGs, states 
developed and agreed upon common language, much of which is reflected 
in the text of the NYD and the GCM. 
As Ferris and Donato (2019) eloquently word it: the adoption of the Global 
Compacts is ‘both a symptom and a cause of fundamental changes in the 
global order’ (p.3). The migration crises also brought frame conflicts back out 
into the open. Many countries, notably the US, share a concern that the GCM 
represents more than a non-binding agreement on migration. From the 
perspective of the US, the GCM represents an attempt by the UN to deepen 
its role. From the perspective of some human rights advocates, it is an attempt 
to further deepen the neoliberal project by advocating a technocratic and 
depoliticized approach to migration. For others, it offers the potential for 
developing soft law that can improve the way the international community 
responds to migration-related issues. How the GCM will impact migration 
governance at the regional and national levels remains an empirical question 
for the future.
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9. Conclusion: International Organizations 
and Global Migration Governance 
 
9.1 Introduction  
 
This dissertation has examined the role played by IOs in the evolution of 
global migration governance. Accordingly, global governance was defined as 
both the process and product of the interactions of resource-dependent actors 
operating in networks around different policy issues of international 
relevance. At its core, the dissertation was about power: the power of IOs to 
establish norms and rules to govern the behaviour of states regarding specific 
global policy problems Two core theoretical principles were central to its 
approach. 
First, states delegate authority to IOs to address challenges where 
intergovernmental cooperation is deemed more efficient than unilateral 
efforts, often to achieve broader collaborative goals, such as global economic 
development or world peace. However, theory suggests that states will be 
unlikely to cede authority on matters that lead to the establishment of a new 
global order in which IOs, rather than states, become the main building block 
of the global system. The relationship between states and ‘their’ IOs is 
therefore theorized as one in which a careful balancing act exists between 
states delegating enough authority for IOs to be effective, but not too much 
that it would challenge state sovereignty. Migration has been challenging 
because the control of borders is at the heart of state sovereignty. While, like 
trade, the free mobility of people is central to neoliberal ideas about the 
virtues of a free global market economy, it questions one of the most central 
aspects of state sovereignty, the control of one’s territorial borders. The idea 
of IOs having a key role in the governance of migration also cuts to the core 
of an ideological discussion regarding the role of the state in society. From a 
(neo)liberal perspective, states should intervene when markets fail. From a 
Marxist perspective, free mobility supplies the global market with a ‘reserve 
army of labour’, exerting downward pressure on wages and increasing 
profits. As the dissertation has shown, these deeply embedded ideological 
differences continue to characterize the discussion of migration at the global 
level.  
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The second core theoretical principle was that IOs are able to exercise 
influence over states not only through the creation and enforcement of legal 
norms but also by shaping how policy problems are defined. Given the trend 
toward informal forms of multilateralism over the agreement of binding 
norms, this dissertation argues that this latter form of influence is 
increasingly important to understand the role of IOs in society. Reality 
construction is essentially about framing and framing how people think 
about an issue can influence how they think about solutions. In the current 
literature on IOs, a shift towards an ideational approach has focused attention 
on how IOs exercise autonomy through their power to frame: constitutive or 
symbolic power (Barnett and Finnemore, 2004). The focus of this scholarship 
has generally been on how individual organizations employ constitutive 
power to frame issues in a manner that justifies their existence. By situating 
the relationship between states and IOs within the context of the migration 
policy subsystem, and testing the potential of framing analysis as a 
methodological tool allowing for the implementation of interpretive process 
tracing, the dissertation has considered how different factors have influenced 
the way that migration has been framed as a global policy issue in order to 
explain how global migration governance has evolved. 
Three dominant approaches to the framing of migration as a global policy 
issue were identified: the rights-based approach, migration management, 
and migration and development. Framing migration as an issue of rights has 
a long tradition, particularly within the UN. The driving force behind the 
development of norms in the area of migration was an interest, particularly 
among countries of origin, to protect the rights of migrant workers in 
countries of destination (Section 4.3). The argument of many of the actors 
framing migration in terms of rights is that, if the rights of migrants are 
upheld, then many of the problems associated with migration will be solved. 
In this context, migrant rights are human rights. The frame pursued through 
many of the regional consultative processes (Section 4.4) and amplified 
through IOM’s International Migration Dialogues (IMD) and the State-led 
Berne Initiative (Section 4.6) was ‘migration management’. Discussions 
focused on logistical aspects of human mobility that states could theoretically 
address more efficiently in cooperation with one another, often on topics such 
as irregular migration, border management, smuggling, and trafficking. The 
central premise of the ‘migration and development’ frame is that migration 
can be both positive and negative for development. Through policies 
targeting remittances, migrants can contribute towards development in their 
countries of origin. Next to being a frame in its own right, however, the 
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‘migration and development’ frame can also be viewed as a unifying frame 
within which advocates of rights-based and management approaches can 
find common ground. The central thesis presented in this dissertation is that 
the UN employed the ‘migration and development’ frame in an attempt to 
overcome the polarization that had thwarted previous efforts to further 
international cooperation on migration within the UN. 
Accordingly, the central research question guiding the study was: 
How have international organizations influenced global 
migration governance? 
As opposed to taking IOs as the unit of analysis, this dissertation took 
migration, as a global policy issue, as its unit of analysis in line with 
Advocacy Coalition Framework. Drawing on interviews with 43 key 
informants and archival analysis, and employing process tracing and framing 
analysis, the dissertation has traced how migration has evolved as a global 
policy issue over the past century with a specific focus on how IOs have 
affected and been affected by, these developments. The remainder of this 
concluding chapter is structured as follows. Section 9.2 summarizes the main 
findings of the research. Section 9.3 discusses the contribution of the 
dissertation to the academic literature. Section 9.4 considers the policy 
recommendations that arise from the findings of the study. Section 9.5 closes 
with some reflections on the limitations of the study and avenues for future 
research.  
 
9.2 Summary of the Dissertation  
 
Historical accounts of the evolution of global migration governance are often 
presented linearly. Yet it is evident that a degree of cyclicity exists in how 
global migration governance has evolved. Events, such as the 1973 Oil Crisis, 
the end of the Cold War, 9/11, and the ‘migration crises’ of 2015, have elevated 
the position of migration in the public consciousness, creating the momentum 
required to seek international solutions to specific migration-relevant 
challenges. Accordingly, the way migration has been framed as an 
international policy issue has evolved, driven by external factors such as 
decolonization, economic crises, and conflict, which have shaped both the 
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patterns and governability of population movements. Furthermore, as the 
multilateral system has evolved, the environment within which migration is 
discussed at the global level has also been altered as the power hierarchy has 
shifted from a bipolar to a multipolar system. The changing composition of 
the UN’s membership made it increasingly difficult to accommodate the 
diversity of views, which resulted in many contentious matters, such as 
migration, being addressed in other more informal multilateral settings. 
Accordingly, the journey of migration as a global policy issue can be viewed 
as a commentary of the multilateral project.  
Chapter 4 established the context for the dissertation by analysing the 
evolution of the global migration governance landscape from 1919 to 2018. 
The majority of the IOs with a mandated role in global migration governance 
today were established by 1951. Between 1939 and 1990, various attempts 
were made to develop binding norms to govern population movements. 
However, these attempts generally failed to gain the support of, primarily 
countries in the Global North, which arguably pushed the issue of migration 
outside the UN and arguably fuelled the proliferation of Regional 
Consultative Processes (RCPs) starting from the Intergovernmental 
Consultations on Migration and Asylum (IGC) in 1985. After the fall of the 
Berlin Wall in 1991, renewed optimism for international cooperation saw the 
UN hosting a flurry of conferences on a range of different issues, although 
attempts in the area of migration did not garner much support. By the turn 
of the century, interest in migration had increased, and then UN Secretary-
General Kofi Annan signalled his desire to see migration more 
comprehensively addressed by the UN. The launch of the GFMD in 2007 after 
the first-ever High-Level Dialogue on International Migration and 
Development (HLD) in 2006, renewed hopes for global cooperation in the 
area of migration. The GFMD represented an attempt to build on the trend of 
informal intergovernmental cooperation embodied in the proliferation of 
RCPs, with a view to continuing involvement of the UN in the discussions 
while moving the conversation away from the matter of norm-setting and 
rights. 
In 2006, Kofi Annan appointed Peter Sutherland to assist in his preparations 
for the first HLD. While Kofi Annan and Peter Sutherland likely had different 
motivations for wanting to see migration included more clearly as part of the 
UN’s mandate, they were united in the goal of seeing international 
cooperation move beyond the impasse that had characterized the Cold War. 
Accordingly, as Chapter 5 demonstrated, framing migration as a 
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development issue was at the centre of the UN’s efforts to convince states to 
deal with migration within the context of the UN. The ‘migration and 
development’ frame was strategically invoked to calm the fears of some 
Member States wary of the idea that the GFMD would lead to the creation of 
a World Migration Organization. By focusing on migration and 
development, as opposed to the human rights of migrants, or management-
related issues, space was created for actors with different frames of reference 
to come together, to build trust, to further international cooperation on 
migration. Chapter 5 highlighted the strategic relocation of international 
dialogue on migration to a non-UN venue alongside the deliberate omission 
of human rights to progress the discussion without the alienation of certain 
powerful states, most notably, the US. The ongoing existence of the GFMD 
provides evidence of the resonance of the ‘migration and development’ 
frame.  
The success of the GFMD in creating shared narratives around migration 
from a development perspective facilitated the inclusion of several 
migration-related references in the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in 
2015. As the diversity of references to migration in the SDGs discussed in 
Chapter 6 demonstrated, the ‘migration and development’ frame has 
assumed, if not resolved, frame conflicts. From a framing perspective, the 
comparison of the arguments made for the GFMD, with the calculated 
omission of human rights, with the arguments made for the inclusion of 
migration in the SDGs, which captured human rights within a broader 
migration and development perspective, shows that frames are not static and 
evolve. However, the conflict between adherents to the human rights and 
management frames remained unresolved. For some Member States, such as 
Ecuador, Mexico, and Switzerland, bringing migration into the post-2015 
development agenda was a way of furthering the institutionalization of 
migration within the UN. With the acceptance of migration as a UN issue, not 
only in connection with development, the necessity of having a UN body to 
coordinate its work on migration emerged, and, faced with the choice 
between the creation of a new UN agency for migration or accepting the entry 
of IOM to the UN system, its Member States chose for the latter (Chapter 7). 
For some, the inclusion of migration in the SDGs was the step required to 
bring IOM into the UN, lending weight to the migration management frame. 
For others, it was an opportunity to renew past efforts to develop universal 
norms and to re-establish a place for migration under the UN’s human rights 
instruments. Ultimately framing migration as a development issue has been 
a vehicle for bringing migration into the UN.  
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However, the migration crises of 2015 brought further attention to global 
migration governance and revealed the limits of the existing international 
architecture. As Chapter 8 demonstrated, the migration crises led to increased 
polarization both within the migration subsystem, but also with the refugee 
subsystem. Rather than bring more coherence to the global landscape 
concerning human mobility, the Global Compact process, which has its origin 
in the migration crises of 2015, has arguably merely served to reinforce 
existing schisms. The US withdrawal from the Compact negotiations owing 
to its perceived incompatibility with the sovereign right of states to control 
their borders, brings us back to the starting point of our discussion. Global 
migration governance has been challenging because it is not only about 
migration; it is also about how the process of international organization 
should function. Ultimately, the discussion on whether migration should be 
in the UN comes down to fundamental beliefs about the role of the UN and 
its organizations in the world. As an IO, the UN has become what its Member 
States want it to become. However, not all Member States are equal. 
However, as the balance of power in the global system evolved, with the end 
of the Cold War and the rise of a multipolar world, the nature of 
multilateralism has also changed. Whereas in the post-Second World War, 
the decision of the US to withdraw from a process almost inevitably led to its 
failure, in a multipolar world, this is no longer valid.  
Hence the dissertation argues that it is a range of factors including the 
migration crises of 2015 which propelled migration into the political 
limelight; the reframing of migration as a development issue (Chapter 5) and 
the subsequent inclusion of migration in the Sustainable Development Goals 
(Chapter 6); coupled with the threat of IOM’s exclusion and the creation or 
appointment of a new lead agency for migration within the UN, that led its 
Member States to acknowledge the necessity of IOM becoming part of the UN 
system in 2016 (Chapter 7). However, while the migration crises of 2015 
created the necessary ‘window of opportunity’ to bring IOM into the UN, it 
also provided a fertile environment for advocates of the migrant rights frame 
to revive their struggle for universal norms to govern international migration 
(Chapter 8). The global migration governance continues to be characterised 
by frame conflicts.  
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9.3 Contribution to the Literature 
 
This section outlines the most relevant methodological and theoretical 
contributions that the dissertations add to the literature.  
The dissertation offers a methodological contribution to the literature on IOs. 
Often the study of IOs takes a specific organization as unit of analysis, 
whereas this dissertation offers an approach that takes the policy issue as its 
main unit of analysis. By employing process tracing informed by the 
Advocacy Coalition Framework, the dissertation has traced the evolution of 
migration as a global policy issue. A similar approach may be applied to the 
evolution of other intractable policy challenges, such as climate change. The 
dissertation also fills a gap in the IR literature in the sense that migration is 
not often taken as a case study. 
This dissertation has demonstrated that an examination of how migration has 
evolved as a global policy issue provides empirical evidence that supports 
much of the theoretical literature in IR on how multilateralism has evolved. 
As the world has evolved, so too have the concepts used to describe it. Cohen 
(2018) argues that multilateralism has a life cycle and that the success of early 
multilateral efforts in shifting the balance of power in the international 
system towards a multipolar model based on the principle of universality, 
has in fact made it increasingly difficult to reach agreement in a multilateral 
setting, an argument evident in the realist writings of the early 1990s (Kahler, 
1992). Hence, multilateralism, as a ‘problem solving strategy or organizing 
principle’ (Cohen, 2018, p.4), has evolved and matured over time (Kahler, 
1992; Weber, 1992; Van Langenhove, 2010) which has led to the emergence of 
concepts such as Multilateralism 2.0 (Van Langenhove, 2010), and ‘new 
multilateralism’ (Villanueva Ulfgard & Alejo Jaime, 2014) to describe the 
range of alternative approaches to multilateral cooperation that have 
proliferated, particularly since the end of the Cold War. The account of 
migration’s journey as a global policy issue presented in this dissertation can 
be viewed as a commentary on the evolution of multilateralism in the 20th and 
21st centuries.  
The dissertation also contributes evidence to the body of literature on 
discursive institutionalism. Schmidt (2010) calls on researchers to focus on 
showing, by empirical means, ‘how, when, where and why ideas and 
discourse matter for institutional change, and when they do not’ (Schmidt, 
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2010, p.21). The case of migration has illustrated how the UN, through the 
work of Peter Sutherland and his team, have employed discursive tactics to 
further international cooperation. The empirical findings of the dissertation 
show how the ‘migration and development’ frame was instrumentalized for 
the purpose of furthering international cooperation on migration. While it is 
clear that institutional change cannot be solely attributed to the role of 
individual ‘entrepreneurs’ or ‘reframers’, they play a role in creating the 
necessary space for dialogue and the development of common language. The 
relative banality of the GCM negotiations demonstrates the strategic 
relevance of reframing an issue in order to move beyond an impasse, a tactic 
that may be applied to other intractable policy problems  
Finally, the dissertation also offers a contribution to the growing literature on 
the behaviour of IOs. Chapter 7 provides evidence that IOM, as theory would 
lead us to expect from an IO, is sensitive to changes in its environment 
responding to external events that present both opportunities and threats to 
its existence. However, the same can also be observed for other organizations, 
such as ILO in the 1950s, UNHCR from the 1980s, and DESA since the IOM 
joined the UN.  
 
9.4 Policy Implications 
 
The primary policy-relevant suggestions arising from this dissertation relate 
to the importance of being aware that global problems are defined through 
the struggles of different actors, not limited to IOs, to achieve certain goals. 
Strategically framing an issue in a specific way, with the underlying 
motivation to achieve an unstated goal, may lead to unintended 
consequences. For example, it may allow funding to be diverted towards 
issues that serve unilateral interests. The focus on migrants as development 
actors may dilute the responsibility of states to provide development 
opportunities to their populations. Rein and Schon (1996) make the argument 
for a frame-reflexive approach to public policy and, in particular, to 
developing educational programmes that prepare future policymakers to be 
critically aware of how problem-framing influences policy. Students should 
be encouraged to ask questions such as: how is the problem being framed? 
What solutions does a particular problem formulation imply? Moreover, 
whose interests do they serve?  
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Another framing related suggestion relates to being aware of how linking two 
issues together can be used in a strategic way to achieve particular goals. 
Therefore, when people start linking different topics to migration, one might 
wish to critically question the underlying reasoning. One of the initial hurdles 
that proponents of the ‘migration and development’ frame claimed to have 
overcome when they wanted to see migration included in the post-2015 
development agenda was the use of migration as a ‘scare tactic’ to compel 
action on climate change. Migration is an issue that cuts across all aspects of 
society. Migration touches on issues of identity and is politically emotive. 
Actors using migration as a way of elevating other issues up the international 
agenda should be conscious that the consequences of doing so may lead to 
the reinforcement of xenophobia and, ultimately, worse outcomes for 
migrants and societies in general. Brexit is perhaps the best contemporary 
example of how this can play out in practice.  
The reverse may also be true. The outcry against the GCM as a challenge to 
sovereignty reflects more deep-seated fears that a new political system that 
transcends the state is slowly being built by advocates of a new global order. 
This may lead those interested in maintaining their sovereignty to find 
alternative ways of asserting their authority and redefining multilateralism. 
Although a rapidly evolving issue, a contemporary example of this can be 
found in the response of many states, including the US, to the COVID-19 
pandemic. At the time of writing, the US had frozen its contributions to the 
World Health Organization and was also threatening to withdraw from the 
organization over concerns regarding its handling of the pandemic. 
 
9.5 Limitations and Avenues for Future research  
 
The focus of this dissertation has been on how IOs exercise constitutive power 
in order to shape the decisions made by states with regards to how migration 
is governed at the global level. Through framing the research project in this 
way, several avenues of investigation inevitably remain unexplored. Thus, in 
closing the dissertation, this section reviews some potential areas for future 
research that also respond to its inherent limitations.  
The first avenue for future research is the application of the same 
methodology to a different policy area. A testable proposition would be that 
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a similar trajectory would be identified when tracing the evolution of 
governance in other intractable policy issues. Applying the methodological 
approach to a different policy area would serve to add robustness to the 
argument that the evolution of global migration governance provides 
insights into the evolution of multilateralism more broadly. Another means 
of increasing the robustness of the findings would be to test its results 
through the inclusion of more voices from the Global South. 
Another area for future research would be to investigate the impact of 
changes in the way migration has been framed at the global level on what has 
happened at the regional and national levels, and vice versa. The dissertation 
has focused on what happened at the global level, but governance happens 
at different levels, from the household to the global. To a certain extent, this 
is one of its main limitations. While I can say with relative certainty that IOs 
seek to influence the actions of states through the creation and maintenance 
of frames that shape the way states think about the necessity for international 
cooperation on migration-related issues, I cannot make any conclusive 
remarks regarding the effects that this has on the level of national 
policymaking. While the inclusion of migration in the SDGs, IOM’s entry into 
the UN system as a ‘related agency’ and the adoption of two Global 
Compacts, provides evidence that states have deemed migration to be an 
issue that merits the attention of the UN, the fact that all these commitments 
are non-binding, and make use of constructive ambiguity in their framing, 
means that their actual impact on what happens on the ground remains to be 
seen. Particularly given the pertinence of sovereignty and state emphasis on 
the non-binding nature of the GCM, one might anticipate the impacts to be 
modest. One way of investigating the impact of the ‘migration and 
development’ frame on the behaviour of states would be an examination of 
how migration policies have evolved. Building on the policy diffusion and 
policy transfer literature, this avenue of research could seek to investigate the 
impact of the global discourse on national policymaking. Some initial support 
for the diffusion of the ‘migration and development’ frame can be seen in the 
proliferation of diaspora institutions across the world (Gamlen, 2014).  
Another relevant area for further research would be an examination of how 
states use IOs to influence other states. One way of investigating this would 
be to ‘follow the money.’ The influence of earmarked funding has been 
alluded to in the dissertation. States have increasingly used earmarked 
funding to pursue areas of international cooperation that are neither suitable 
nor politically feasible to address at the global level. A growing body of 
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literature exists that examines the relationship between earmarked funding 
and governance and to which I have already contributed (cf. Graham, 2015; 
2017a; 2017b; Bayram and Graham, 2017; Gray, 2014; Seitz and Martens, 2017; 
McGregor, 2019). In the context of UN reforms (Section 8.4) where, on the one 
hand, the Secretary-General is promoting a process of decentralization and 
on the other encouraging less earmarked funds, there is, at least rhetorically, 
a desire to return to a purer form of multilateralism within the UN. How these 
reforms play out will be an area of relevance for future empirical work.  
A notable characteristic of contemporary multilateralism is the relevance of 
non-state actors to global governance. While this dissertation has focused on 
a narrow subset of IOs, it is clear that another relevant line of inquiry is the 
role of other forms of IOS, including regionally-oriented intergovernmental 
organizations as well as non-state actors in supporting or opposing particular 
frames. The role of civil society in challenging the ‘migration and 
development’ frame as a way of depoliticizing migration and furthering the 
technocratic migration management approach to its governance has been 
alluded to in the pages of the dissertation and is the subject of an emerging 
body of literature (cf. Jaeger, 2007; Piper and Rother, 2012; Rother, 2013; Piper, 
2015; Delgado Wise, 2018b; Wee, Vanyoro, and Jinnah, 2018; Rother, 2018; 
Rother and Steinhilper, 2019; Schierup et al., 2018). Another relevant group 
of non-state actors is the private sector, and, as the GFMD has evolved, it has 
already granted access to a broader group of such actors. The GFMD Business 
Mechanism is an example of how the international community is seeking to 
engage the private sector in the discussion of migration governance. Between 
states, an increase in the number of dialogues between municipal actors 
through fora such as the Global Mayoral Forum on Human Mobility, 
Migration and Development is also evident. After the US withdrew from the 
GCM negotiations, more than 130 mayors, including 18 from the US, signed 
a position paper that lobbied for cities to have a seat at the negotiation table.  
It is evident that the adoption of the GCM does not mark the end of the 
journey for global migration governance. Faced with a new crisis, such as the 
COVID-19 pandemic, one might reasonably expect that the frame conflicts 
that characterize the migration policy subsystem become even more 
pronounced. Advocates of the human rights frame may use the pandemic 
crisis to extract further commitments from states regarding the protection of 
different categories of migrants who in many cases are being recognized as 
‘key workers’ providing essential services in, among others, the health care 
sector, the agriculture and food sector; and the transportation and logistics 
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sector. However, the pandemic also lends credence to the necessity of 
improving the management of human mobility from a virus containment 
perspective. The next chapter in the evolution of global migration governance 
will be a further test of how states cooperate multilaterally on matters that 
transcend state borders. Advocates of a more formal system of global 
governance for migration may seize the opportunity presented by the current 
crisis, to push forward further policy change. Time will tell.  
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Annexes 
Annex 3.1 Information Letter  
Maastricht Graduate School of Governance | UNU–MERIT, Maastricht University 
Boschstraat 24, 6211 AX, Maastricht 
The Netherlands, T: +31 43 388 4652 
 
Title of Project: The Role of International Organizations in Migration Governance 
Principal Investigator(s): Elaine McGregor – PhD Fellow at the Maastricht Graduate 
School of Governance, Maastricht University | UNU-MERIT (Supervision team: 
Ronald Skeldon, Michal Natorski and Melissa Siegel) 
1. Purpose of the Study:  The purpose of this research is to understand the role of 
international organizations in the evolution of the migration and development debate 
and to understand what impact, if any, this has had on migration governance. The 
interviews will contribute to this goal by investigating the relative importance of 
different factors in influencing migration narratives over time.  
2. Procedures to be followed:  You will be invited to take part in an interview that is 
anticipated to last approximately one hour. During the interview you will be asked 
questions about your engagement in migration issues throughout your career. With 
your permission, the interview will be recorded and later transcribed. The recording 
itself will be stored on a secure server only accessible to the researcher and her 
supervision team. It may be made available for the purpose of verifying the validity 
of the research findings. The interviews will only be used for the purpose of this study 
and not shared with any third parties.  
3. Discomforts and Risks: There are no risks in participating in this research beyond 
those experienced in everyday life. Some of the questions may be politically sensitive. 
However, you are always able to decline to answer any question at any time.  
4. Benefits: There are no direct benefits (e.g., compensation) to participating in this 
interview. However, you may feel satisfied knowing your participation helps to 
improve the knowledge about what drives debates on migration and development. 
5. Duration/Time: The interview should not take longer than 1 hour to complete in its 
entirety. 
6. Statement of Confidentiality: Your participation in this research is confidential. 
Even though the interview asks for certain identifying information, they will be 
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anonymized with code numbers for all future purposes. Selected quotations may be 
used for illustrative purposes in future work; however, you will not be personally 
identified. 
7. Right to Ask Questions: Please contact Elaine McGregor 
(e.mcgregor@maastrichtuniversity.nl) or her supervisor Ronald Skeldon 
(r.skeldon@sussex.ac.uk) with any questions, complaints, or concerns about this 
research. 
8. Voluntary Participation: Your decision to participate in this research is voluntary. 
You can stop at any time. You do not have to answer any questions you do not want 
to answer. 
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Annex 3.2 Interview Guide 
 
Interview Guide 
 
My name is Elaine McGregor, and I am currently a researcher at Maastricht University. My 
PhD research is focused on migration governance. As a professional working in the area of 
migration, I am thus interested in understanding your thoughts and experiences with regard 
to key events and people that have been influential in the field of migration at the global policy 
level. I would like to record the interview to ensure that I accurately recall the details of our 
discussion. However, all contributions will be completely anonymized. Do you agree to 
participate in the interview and give permission for the interview to be recorded?  
 
Introduction  
Please introduce yourself and explain your current role at <organization>.  
Prompts: is migration part of your current work portfolio? In what ways? 
How long have you worked on migration issues? In what capacity? For whom?  
Prompts: have you worked for other IGOs? States? NGOs? Have you always worked on 
migration issues? Were there gaps? Why?  
How long has your organization worked on migration issues? Constantly? Has it been 
more intense at specific points in time? Please explain. 
 
What led you to work on migration? (i.e., personal motivation, career opportunity) 
Events 
Have any key events influenced your work on migration during your career? (e.g., 
economic, political, organizational) If so, in what ways?  
 
Individuals 
Are there specific individuals that you think are particularly noteworthy who have 
influenced the way migration is discussed at the global policy level a) within your 
organization b) externally?  
Prompts: Who are they? In what way(s) have they influenced the discussion? Have you 
worked directly with these individuals?  
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Organizations 
Are there specific international organizations (IGO or NGO) that you think are 
particularly noteworthy who have influenced the way migration is discussed at the 
global policy level? In what way? 
Prompts: What organizations? In what way(s) have they influenced the discussion? Have 
you worked directly with these organizations? In what way(s)?  
 
Governments 
Are there specific governments that you think are particularly noteworthy who have 
influenced the way migration is discussed at the global policy level? In what way? 
Prompts: What governments? In what way(s) have they influenced the discussion? Have 
you worked directly with these governments? In what way(s)?  
 
Funders 
Are there specific funders that you think are particularly noteworthy who have 
influenced the way migration is discussed at the global policy level? In what way? 
Prompts: What funders? In what way(s) have they influenced the discussion? Have you 
worked directly with these funders? In what way(s)?  
 
Publications 
Are there specific publications that you think are particularly noteworthy that have 
influenced the way migration is discussed at the global policy level? In what way? 
Prompts: What publications? In what way(s) have they influenced the discussion? Were you 
involved in the preparation of this publication? In what way(s)?  
 
Other Influences 
Has anything else influenced the way migration is discussed at the global level?  (e.g., 
specific processes?)  
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Specific Events 
 
Sustainable Development Goals 
What do you think about the inclusion of migration in the SDGs? 
 
Why do you think migration was included in the SDGs but not in the MDGs? 
 
Were you involved in the run-up to the adoption of the MDGs?  In what way? Were 
you supported or assisted by anyone if your efforts in this area (e.g., 
funders/States/collaboration with other IOs?) 
 
Were you involved in the run-up to the adoption of the SDGs? In what way? Were 
you supported or assisted by anyone if your efforts in this area (e.g., 
funders/States/collaboration with other IOs?) 
 
If applicable, how did the lead up to the MDGs and the SDGs differ? 
 
Do you think any specific individuals or organizations influenced the inclusion of 
migration in the SDGs? In what way? 
 
Has anything changed in the way your organization works on migration as a result of 
the inclusion of migration in the SDGs? If applicable, what has changed? 
 
Global Compact for Safe, Regular and Orderly Migration and a Comprehensive 
Refugee Response Framework 
 
Have you been involved in discussions surrounding the elaboration of a Global 
Compact for Safe, Regular and Orderly Migration and/or Comprehensive Refugee 
Response Framework? If yes, how? If no, skip to q23 
 
Have you been supported or assisted by anyone if your efforts in this area thus far 
(e.g., funders/States/collaboration with other IGOS)?  
 
What do you think of the process? 
 
Do you think it will lead to a stronger multilateral framework for the global 
governance of migration? Why or why not? 
258   
 
 
 
Who have been the most visible individuals/IGOs/states in the negotiations thus far? 
In what ways? 
 
IOM and the UN 
 
What do you think of IOM joining the UN system? Do you support IOM joining the 
UN? Do you have any hesitation? 
 
What factors do you think led to IOM joining the UN system? 
 
What changes, if any, do you think will happen as a result of IOM joining the UN 
system? 
 
(If not IOM and changes are reported) Do you think these changes will affect your 
organization, if at all?  
 
Closing  
 
Thank you for your time. Is there anything we have not yet covered that you would 
like to add? 
 
Is there anyone else that you would recommend that I speak to?  
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Annex 3.3 Code Book 
Name Description Files References 
Frames This node captures examples of how migration has 
been framed in different ways. Broadly, there are 
three child nodes (or frames), which are 1. 
development; 2. migration management; and 3. 
human rights, which correspond to the pillars of 
the UN system.  
42 419 
Development_Frame Captures examples of the migration and 
development frame 
32 92 
Human_Rights_Frame Captures examples of the ‘human rights’ 
frame 
21 55 
Management_Frame Captures examples of the ‘migration 
management’ frame 
9 17 
Frame_Shift Captures accounts of when a shift in framing 
occurs 
23 45 
Frame Conflicts Captures accounts of conflicts between 
frames 
26 79 
Categories Captures accounts of how the categorization 
of different mobile populations affects 
governance. This mostly relates to the 
refugee vs migrant distinction 
24 63 
Metaphors Captures any metaphors used to describe 
either migration or the process of its 
governance 
21 39 
Narratives in General Captures accounts of how narratives are 
constructed 
10 16 
Global Initiatives This node captures all references to various 
milestones in the evolution of migration as a 
policy issue. 
41 464 
2004 ILO GB References to the 2004 Meeting of the ILO 
Governing Body 
1 4 
Berne References to the Berne Initiative 9 14 
CAP - Vietnam References to the Comprehensive Plan of 
Action for Indochinese Refugees in 1989 
2 3 
Doha References to the Doha Round of Trade 
Negotiations in 2001 
2 4 
GCIM References to the Global Commission on 
International Migration  
23 50 
GFMD References to the Global Forum on Migration 
and Development 
29 78 
Global Compacts References to the Global Compacts 13 21 
GCM References to the Global Compact for Safe, 
Orderly and Regular Migration 
27 64 
GCR References to the Global Compact on 
Refugees  
4 7 
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Name Description Files References 
GMG References to the Global Migration Group 17 27 
HLD 2006 References to the first High-Level Dialogue 
on International Migration and Development 
in 2006 
21 34 
HLD 2013 References to the second High-Level 
Dialogue on International Migration and 
Development in 2013 
12 20 
ICPD References to the 1994 International 
Conference on Population and Development 
(ICPD) in Cairo 
15 23 
IDM References to IOM’s International Dialogue 
on Migration (IDM) in 2001 
2 2 
IGC + RCPS References to the Intergovernmental 
Consultations on Migration, Asylum and 
Refugees (IGC) and other Regional 
Consultative Processes 
11 27 
ILO C143 References to the Migrant Workers 
(Supplementary Provisions) Convention 
1975 (No. 143) 
6 8 
ILO C97 References to the Migration for Employment 
Convention (Revised), 1949 (No. 97) 
6 10 
MICIC References to the Migrants in Countries in 
Crisis Initiative  
1 2 
MLF References to ILO’s 2006 Multilateral 
Framework on Labour Migration 
3 5 
ICRMW References to the 1990 International 
Convention on the Protection of the Rights of 
All Migrant Workers and Members of Their 
Families (ICRMW) 
9 14 
NYD and Summit References to the New York Declaration and 
the High-Level Summit to Address the Large 
Movements of Refugees and Migrants in 
September 2016 
19 31 
Rio +20 References to the UN Conference on 
Sustainable Development (Rio+20) 
4 5 
SDGs References to the Sustainable Development 
Goals 
27 81 
Governance Drivers This node captures the factors that are drivers of 
changes in the way migration has been discussed 
at the international level. 
42 642 
Conflict (end of) Capture accounts of how the period of 
transformation after a conflict (e.g., World 
War 2, the Cold War) provides momentum 
for international dialogue 
9 18 
Crisis Capture accounts of how crises provide 
momentum for international dialogue 
29 56 
261 
 
 
 
Name Description Files References 
Demography Captures accounts of the implications of 
demographic change for global governance  
5 6 
Economic Captures accounts of the implications of 
economic factors on migration governance 
9 14 
Events Captures specific occurrences that have 
impacted global migration governance. 
Examples include 9/11, Lampedusa, or Alan 
Kurdi's death 
18 28 
Governments Captures accounts of states influencing what 
is possible in terms of international 
cooperation 
40 202 
Ideology Captures how ideological shifts have 
influenced governance 
13 20 
Media Captures how the media have influence 
governance 
8 11 
Money Captures how money drives global 
governance  
25 61 
Organizations Captures the role of specific organizations in 
driving global migration governance.  
31 78 
People Captures the role of specific individuals in 
driving global migration governance 
31 95 
Technology Captures accounts of the implications of 
technological change for global governance 
5 5 
Time Captures accounts of global migration 
governance as a temporal phenomenon  
13 18 
Individuals This node captures ALL mentions of individuals 
by interviewees 
40 643 
Key Captures individuals who are considered by 
the interviewee to have been key actors in 
migration governance and is qualified in two 
ways:  
1) the name is offered in answer to a direct 
question about key individuals  
2) the interviewee describes the specific 
individual's role in achieving something 
specific, often using descriptive adjectives 
such as 'influential’ and ‘key’ 
25 121 
Mentions Captures all other individuals. 40 506 
IOM This node captures any mentions of IOM. 39 428 
Descriptions Captures the different ways that 
interviewees describe and refer to IOM as an 
organization 
33 173 
IOM Journey to UN Captures accounts of IOM's journey in the 
UN 
34 254 
Views on UN 
Membership  
Captures different views on IOM becoming a 
related agency of the UN 
16 26 
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Name Description Files References 
Reasons for UN 
Membership 
Captures the reasons why IOM became part 
of the UN 
23 83 
      Specific Individuals 
Captures the role of specific individuals in 
IOM becoming a UN agency 
19 34 
      Governments 
Captures the role of specific governments in 
IOM becoming a UN Member 
19 43 
      Migration Journey  
Captures the argument that IOM joining the 
UN was part of the strategy to bring 
migration into the UN 
14 22 
      SDGs 
Captures the argument that the inclusion of 
migration in the SDGs is the reason why IOM 
joined the UN 
5 7 
      Fear of Exclusion   
Captures the argument that IOM feared 
being excluded from work on migration if it 
did not join the UN 
4 5 
      Crisis 
Captures the argument that the migration 
crises of 2015 led IOM to join the UN 
4 6 
Specific Individuals Based on an initial systematic coding of all 
mentions of individuals (see ‘individuals’ node), 
the most commonly recurring nodes were then 
coded to capture accounts of how these 
individuals were viewed in terms of the role in 
migration governance. 
36 201 
Peter Sutherland Reference to Peter Sutherland  30 97 
Kofi Annan References to Kofi Annan  23 55 
William Lacy Swing References to William Lacy Swing  21 49 
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Annex 3.4 UN Archives  
Reference Date Broad Description 
S-1062-0022-0005-00001 23-12-1994 Internally Displaced Persons 
S-1953-0078-0002-00005 02-07-1995 Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) 
S-1093-0086-04-00001 07-01-1997 Letter inviting Secretary-General to IOM 
seminar 
S-1092-0138-01-00027 13-01-1997 Invitation to Inter-Agency Standing Committee 
Meeting 
S-1093-0086-04-00002 09-05-1997 Summary of Meeting about demobilization in 
Angola 
S-1093-0086-04-00003 16-05-1997 Draft letter for UN PRs about Angola 
S-1092-0130-04-00034 29-05-1997 Letter to Peter Sutherland (highlights early 
relationship) 
S-1093-0086-04-00004 03-06-1997 Summary of 73rd Special Session of the Council 
of the IOM 
S-1093-0086-04-00005 04-06-1997 Submission of a report on IDPs to Secretary-
General  
S-1096-0344-01-00016 10-06-1997 Draft preface by the Secretary-General for 
Masses in Flight 
S-1094-0027-02-00017 27-06-1997 Letter regarding IDPs (and IOM creeping in) 
S-1092-0137-07-00012 02-07-1997 Russian views on reform of the humanitarian 
cluster. 
S-1093-0124-04-00034 19-07-1997 Report on Regional Conference CIS and one on 
UAM 
S-1093-0086-04-00006 16-09-1997 Angola 
S-1093-0086-04-00007 23-09-1997 Robert Paiva appointed as Permanent Observer 
for IOM to UN 
S-1093-0086-04-00008 23-09-1997 Letter to Mr Purcell about the appointment of 
Rover Paiva 
S-1093-0086-04-00009 07-10-1997 Agenda for 74th session  
S-1093-0122-04-00020 10-10-1997 UN-OSCE Cooperation  
S-1093-0086-04-00010 30-10-1997 World Bank contribution for Angola 
S-1098-0151-07-00004 01-11-1997 Brief 9: Refugees 
S-1093-0086-04-00011 30-01-1998 Executive Office of the Secretary-General 
informing Secretary-General of 
recommendation for IOM post  
S-1094-0024-05-00053 10-02-1998 Report of the Representative of the Secretary-
General on IDPs 
S-1093-0086-04-00012 17-02-1998 Russian Permanent Representative writing 
about refugees in CIS 
S-1093-0115-04-00042 17-02-1998 Programme of Action of the Geneva Regional 
Conference to Address the Problems of 
Refugees, Displaced Persons, Other Forms of 
Involuntary Displacement and Returnees in the 
Countries of the Commonwealth of 
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Reference Date Broad Description 
Independent States and Relevant Neighbouring 
States 
S-1097-0011-01-00026 20-03-1998 Press Briefing  
S-1093-0086-04-00013 02-06-1998 75th session of the IOM Council 
S-1096-0311-06-00007 10-07-1998 Letter exchange with James Purcell about the 
death of Special Representative in Angola 
S-1093-0115-03-00045 06-08-1998 Follow-up to the Regional Conference to 
Address the Problems of Refugees, Displaced 
Persons., Other Forms of Involuntary 
Displacement and Returnees in the Countries of 
the Commonwealth of Independent States and 
Relevant Neighbouring States 
S-1093-0086-04-00014 01-10-1998 Notifying UNITAR and other UN agency 
directors of his appointment as IOM Director-
General 
S-1093-0086-04-00015 03-11-1998 Letter to Mr Purcell about IOM-UN relations 
S-1093-0112-04-00030 13-11-1998 Cooperation between the UN and the OSCE 
S-1093-0086-04-00016 16-11-1998 Letter to Brunson McKinley about his 
appointment  
S-1093-0086-04-00017 03-12-1998 Fax from UNOG summarizing 76th Council 
meeting 
S-1093-0106-07-00019 18-12-1998 Regional Population Meeting Budapest. 7-9 
December 1998 
S-1094-0024-04-00003 18-12-1998 The mandate of the Representative of the 
Secretary-General on IDPs 
S-1093-0086-04-00018 04-05-1999 Brunson McKinley invited to meeting about 
Balkan crisis 
S-1093-0086-04-00019 10-05-1999 Meeting on Balkan crisis referenced in S-1093-
0086-04-00018 
S-1096-0272-03-00053 10-05-1999 Thanking Mr Riza for inviting IOM to Balkan 
meeting 
S-1093-0086-04-00020 18-05-1999 Appointment of Martin Griffiths for Balkans 
S-1093-0086-04-00021 23-08-1999 Resignation notification from Narcisa Escaler  
S-1093-0086-04-00023 23-08-1999 Letter to Louise Frechette notifying about 
resignation  
S-1093-0086-04-00022 08-10-1999 Relates to the situation in Guatemala 
(irregularities) 
S-1093-0086-04-00024 08-10-1999 Letter to Permanent Representative Guatemala  
S-1093-0106-07-00001 31-11-1999 1999 Review and Appraisal of the ICPD 
Programme of Action  
S-1093-0090-02-00009 07-03-2000 On role of UNHCR and IDPs 
S-1093-0101-06-00040 29-06-2000 Cooperation between the United Nations and 
the Organization for Security and Cooperation 
in Europe 
S-1093-0089-07-00023 31-08-2000 Follow-up to the Regional Conference to 
Address the Problems of Refugees, Displaced 
Persons, Other Forms of Involuntary 
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Reference Date Broad Description 
Displacement and Returnees in the Countries of 
the Commonwealth of Independent States and 
Relevant Neighbouring States 
S-1093-0092-03-00018 13-12-2000 Seminar for the Media on the Convention 
against Transnational Organized Crime 
S-1096-0186-01-00007 16-05-2001 The United Nations Family in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
S-1093-0065-06-00001 21-05-2001 Note to Secretary-General about IDPs 
S-1092-0094-07-00008 29-05-2001 Institutional Arrangements for the Internally 
Displaced 
S-1093-0088-05-00004 19-06-2001 Cooperation between the United Nations and 
the Organization for Security and Cooperation 
in Europe 
S-1092-0094-03-00001 24-12-2001 Internal Displacement Unit 
S-1093-0051-03-00001 12-01-2002 Letter to Secretary-General about Afghan return 
S-1093-0056-05-00006 06-03-2002 International Migration Policy Programme 
(IMP) 
S-1095-0030-01-00029 22-04-2002 Letter to Brunson McKinley about East Timor 
S-1093-0064-05-00018 16-07-2002 Cooperation between the United Nations and 
the Organization for Security and Cooperation 
in Europe 
S-1100-0012-13-00014 05-09-2002 Requesting a meeting with Kofi Annan 
S-1093-0086-04-00026 05-10-2002 Agenda Item 100: International Migration and 
Development 
S-1093-0048-11-00001 15-10-2002 Meeting between Brunson McKinley and 
Secretary-General about IOM-UN relations 
S-1093-0048-11-00002 28-10-2002 Writes to Kofi Annan about IOM-UN discussion 
S-1093-0048-11-00004 25-11-2002 Writes to Kofi Annan - includes the address to 
IOM Council 
S-1093-0048-11-00006 04-12-2002 Summary of IOM’s 64th Council Session  
S-1093-0051-02-00025 06-12-2002 UNHCR Input for Secretary-General’s meeting 
with Brunson McKinley 
S-1093-0038-06-00011 14-02-2003 Reply to Ruud Lubbers about UNHCR 2004 
Process 
S-1093-0048-11-00007 17-03-2003 Letter from Executive Office of the Secretary-
General thanking DDG of IOM for a booklet 
about Somalian Women and Conflict 
Resolution 
S-1093-0038-06-00016 26-03-2003 Reply to Ruud Lubbers regarding strengthening 
New York office 
S-1093-0038-05-00001 27-03-2003 Letter to Louise Frechette about IOM 
S-1093-0038-05-00006 10-04-2003 Letter to Secretary-General about Iraq 
S-1093-0038-05-00007 22-04-2003 Reply to Ruud Lubbers about Iraq 
S-1093-0048-11-00011 07-05-2003 Note to Secretary-General: Follow-up on 
International Migration, including the 
formation of a Global Commission 
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Reference Date Broad Description 
S-1093-0048-11-00012 19-05-2003 Letter to Brunson McKinley about the 
appointment of Luca Dall'Oglio 
S-1093-0048-11-00013 03-06-2003 Note to Secretary-General about GCIM 
S-1093-0045-09-00012 06-06-2003 Letter to Mr Riva regarding developments in 
the area of migration  
S-1093-0038-05-00012 10-06-2003 Letter about UNHCR role in Iraq 
S-1093-0048-11-00015 10-06-2003 Report of IOM Working Group on Institutional 
Arrangements 
S-1093-0048-11-00016 18-06-2003 Note to Secretary-General about including a 
developing country in a meeting on migration 
S-1093-0048-11-00017 26-06-2003 Letters to Brazil, Morocco, and the Philippines 
about GCIM 
S-1096-0143-03-00013 01-07-2003 Press Briefing 
S-1092-0059-01-00015 03-07-2003 Press Release  
S-1098-0054-09-00007 07-07-2003 Secretary-General Activities including Berne 
Initiative 
S-1093-0048-11-00018 08-07-2003 Note to Mr Tiza about Berne Initiative  
S-1093-0038-05-00017 15-07-2003 Letter to Secretary-General about UNHCR 2004 
S-1093-0048-11-00019 20-07-2003 Letter exchange with Brunson McKinley about 
Iraq 
S-1093-0048-11-00020 23-07-2003 Letter to Brunson McKinley about the loss of 
staff member in Iraq 
S-1093-0048-11-00021 28-07-2003 Letter to Kofi Annan thanking him for his letter 
of condolence (S-1093-0048-11-00021) 
S-1093-0048-11-00022 04-08-2003 Seeking meeting between Director-General of 
IOM and Secretary-General 
S-1093-0048-11-00023 11-08-2003 A letter following up on August 2003 meeting 
with Kofi Annan. 
S-1093-0038-04-00021 21-08-2003 Letter to Kofi Annan about the report on 
Strengthening UNHCR to carry out its mandate 
S-1093-0048-11-00024 03-09-2003 Letter to Ruud Lubbers about the division of 
labour IOM-UNHCR 
S-1094-0009-02-00002 26-09-2003 Protection of and assistance to internally 
displaced persons 
S-1093-0048-11-00025 09-10-2003 Note to Mr Riza about GCIM 
S-1093-0048-11-00026 23-10-2003 Letter exchanges Brunson McKinley and Ruud 
Lubbers 
S-1096-0125-05-00001 19-12-2003 Emma Lazarus Lecture 
S-1093-0035-11-00001 28-01-2004 Letter to Kofi Annan about IOM-UN 
relationship 
S-1093-0035-11-00002 09-03-2004 Meeting between IOM and the UN.  
S-1092-0050-01-00022 01-04-2004 High-Level Humanitarian Forum 
S-1093-0035-11-00003 28-06-2004 Writes to Kofi Annan about IOM relationship 
with Cuba 
S-1093-0035-07-00013 01-09-2004 Cooperation between the United Nations and 
regional and other organizations 
S-1096-0098-09-00005 16-09-2004 Criticizes IOM Practices in Darfur 
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Reference Date Broad Description 
S-1093-0025-12-00015 14-10-2004 Letter to Kofi Annan asking for permission to 
take responsibility for IDPs in West Darfur 
S-1093-0028-05-00021 09-12-2004 Summary of 88th Session of the Council of the 
International Organization for Migration 
S-1093-0035-11-00004 10-12-2004 Note about the GCIM 
S-1093-0025-12-00022 21-12-2004 Review of Management and Administration in 
the Office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees 
S-1100-0005-07-00011 04-05-2005 A letter exchange between Kofi Annan and 
Peter Sutherland regarding him becoming High 
Commissioner for Refugees  
S-1100-0005-07-00012 04-05-2005 Letter to Peter Sutherland about High 
Commissioner for Refugees position 
S-1098-0020-09-00031 06-06-2005 Secretary-General Appointments. 
S-1100-0005-07-00015 20-06-2005 Letters with Peter Sutherland about WTO 
S-1093-0022-10-00001 04-08-2005 Writes to Mark Malloch Brown about deficit 
facing the Office of the Special Envoy (mentions 
funding structure) 
S-1093-0022-05-00001 05-09-2005 MDG contribution 
S-1093-0022-10-00002 22-09-2005 Invitation to presentation of GCIM report 
S-1092-0032-07-00013 29-09-2005 Proposal for an Upgraded Central Emergency 
Response Fund (CERF): 
S-1093-0022-10-00003 04-10-2005 Note to Kofi Annan about the launch of GCIM 
report 
S-1093-0022-10-00004 05-10-2005 Note to Kofi Annan about the GCIM 
S-1093-0022-10-00005 12-10-2005 Letter to Kofi Annan about the GCIM 
S-1092-0032-07-00004 14-10-2005 Secretary-General Report on Central 
Emergency Revolving Fund 
S-1093-0022-10-00006 19-10-2005 Note to Kofi Annan about GCIM  
S-1096-0062-01-00001 19-10-2005 Interparliamentary Union Resolution on M&D 
S-1093-0022-10-00008 24-10-2005 Thank you letters to GCIM chairs 
S-1093-0048-11-00008 24-10-2005 Note to Secretary-General about Migration 
Report 
S-1093-0022-10-00009 17-11-2005 Letter: Kofi Annan-Ramphele 
S-1093-0048-11-00009 17-11-2005 Note to Deputy Secretary-General about 
meeting with Gene Dewey regarding the US 
view towards international cooperation.  
S-1093-0048-11-00010 21-11-2005 Note to Kofi Annan about the GCIM  
S-1092-0019-08-00013 29-11-2005 Meeting between Peter Sutherland and Kofi 
Annan 
S-1098-0020-07-00032 01-12-2005 Secretary-General Appointments 
S-1092-0005-04-00011 18-01-2006 Memo about 2006 Treaty Event on Crossing 
Borders 
S-1091-0001-03-00007 02-02-2006 Deputy Secretary-General's monthly planning 
meeting on economic, social and reform issues 
S-1098-0015-03-00001 02-02-2006 Secretary-General Activities in Switzerland, 23 - 
29 January 
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Reference Date Broad Description 
S-1092-0013-02-00006 06-02-2006 A proposal from the GMG on the enlargement 
and enhancement of the inter-agency group on 
migration 
S-1092-0013-06-00012 09-03-2006 Note to Secretary-General on Ministerial 
Conference of the LDCs on Enhancing the 
Development Impact of Remittances  
S-1100-0001-06-00003 13-03-2006 Secretary-General's telephone conversation 
with Mr Oscar Berger regarding the death of 
Guatemalan Peacekeepers: controversy 
regarding IOM statement 
S-1092-0013-01-00009 23-03-2006 Draft Policy Committee Submission: Migration 
including a discussion of changes 
S-1092-0013-01-00004 27-03-2006 Note to the Secretary-General through the 
Deputy Secretary-General (Policy Committee 
Submission: Migration) 
S-1092-0009-04-00002 28-03-2006 Letter about the visibility of EC contribution 
managed by UN 
S-1092-0014-08-00001 31-03-2006 Accounts - CERF 
S-1092-0005-01-00047 03-04-2006 Letter from Peter Sutherland to Kofi Annan and 
information about Treaty Event  
S-1100-0003-13-00013 03-04-2006 Letter from Peter Sutherland to Kofi Annan 
about GMG/GFMD 
S-1092-0012-10-00032 04-05-2006 Letter from the Secretary-General to members 
of the Global Migration Group 
S-1093-0011-01-00009 10-05-2006 Letter from EC to Kofi Annan about HLD 
S-1092-0017-02-00023 25-05-2006 Draft of the Secretary-General's Report on 
"Strengthening the Coordination of Emergency 
Humanitarian Assistance of the United Nations 
S-1092-0016-05-00002 08-06-2006 Letter updating Secretary-General on work on 
human security including eligibility of IOM 
S-1096-0030-02-00011 08-06-2006 A letter exchange between Trade Union 
(ICFTU) regarding concerns about civil society 
involvement in HLD. 
S-1092-0013-01-00002 10-06-2006 Letter from GCIM Chairs to Kofi Annan 
S-1096-0022-20-00002 12-06-2006 The selection process for Secretary-General for 
Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief 
Coordinator 
S-1092-0012-10-00022 26-06-2006 Letter from Michael Doyle to KA 
S-1093-0010-01-00002 17-07-2006 Letter to Brunson McKinley about IOM-UN 
relationship 
S-1092-0012-10-00017 20-07-2006 Letter from UNCTAD to Mark Malloch Brown 
and his reply 
S-1092-0012-10-00014 25-07-2006 Note to the Secretary-General (Through Ms 
Barcena) Consultative Forum for Migration 
(from Bob Orr) 
S-1092-0017-01-00014 25-07-2006 Draft of the Secretary-General's Report on 
"Humanitarian Assistance And Rehabilitation 
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For Selected 
Countries And Regions" 
S-1093-0038-05-00018 25-07-2006 Reply to Ruud Lubbers about Strengthening 
UNHCR report 
S-1096-0029-02-00017 28-07-2006 A letter exchange between Kofi Annan and Prof. 
Sussmuth (part of GCIM) 
S-1092-0012-10-00006 21-08-2006 Letter responding to EU position at HLD 
S-1093-0010-13-00016 21-08-2006 Letter to Erkki Tuomioja (Finland) about HLD) 
S-1093-0010-01-00003 30-08-2006 Note: Orr: Kofi Annan 
S-1092-0012-10-00001 01-09-2006 Ref-. Speech to High-Level Dialogue on 
Migration and Development 
S-1092-0012-10-00002 01-09-2006 Note on High-Level Dialogue on Migration 
(from DESA with Secretary-General response) 
S-1093-0010-01-00004 01-09-2006 Letter to Chief of Cabinet (Alicia Barcena) 
request meeting between Mr McKinley and 
Secretary-General 
S-1092-0016-06-00019 08-09-2006 Draft of the Report of the Secretary-General on 
the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) 
S-1098-0006-08-00006 12-09-2006 Priority issues for the NAM Summit (Havana, 
11-16 September) 
S-1092-0012-09-00025 18-09-2006 Note to the Secretary-General High-Level 
Dialogue on International Migration and 
Development from DESA 
S-1093-0003-08-00016 25-09-2006 Letter to Kofi Annan from UNITAR post HLD 
S-1092-0012-09-00023 27-09-2006 Note to the Secretary-General: a Global Forum 
on International Migration and Development 
from DESA 
S-1092-0001-03-00022 28-09-2006 Letter to Mark Malloch Brown about CEDAW 
S-1092-0012-09-00009 13-10-2006 Note to the Secretary-General: a Global Forum 
on International Migration and Development 
from DESA 
S-1093-0013-03-00004 16-10-2006 Report of the High-Level Committee on 
Programmes (HLCP) at its Twelfth Session 
S-1098-0006-05-00013 30-10-2006 Global Forum on International Migration and 
Development 
S-1098-0006-05-00012 03-11-2006 Secretary-General Address To XVI Ibero-
American Summit 
S-1092-0001-01-00033 15-11-2006 Pending Proposals, and invitations -November 
and December 
S-1093-0003-08-00021 16-11-2006 Meeting with Mr Boisard regarding 1UNITAR 
becoming part of GMG 
S-1956-0025-0007-00016 19-01-2007 Letter to set up a meeting with Deputy 
Secretary-General Asha Rose Migiro with 
Ndiora Ndiaye  
S-1956-0030-0004-00017 15-02-2007 A letter exchange between Jonathan Fanton 
(MacArthur) and Ban Ki-moon 
S-1956-0025-0007-00014 19-03-2007 Note: Orr-Ban Ki-moon 
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S-1956-0025-0007-00015 19-03-2007 Note: Ocampo-Ban Ki-moon 
S-1943-0031-0003-00002 21-03-2007 Appointments of the Secretary-General 
S-1956-0025-0007-00013 13-04-2007 Letter to set up a meeting with Deputy 
Secretary-General Asha Rose Migiro for 
Brunson McKinley  
S-1956-0025-0007-00001  27-04-2007 Letter to Mr Yoon of Executive Office of the 
Secretary-General to set up a meeting  
S-1956-0025-0007-00012 01-05-2007 Letters: Sutherland-Ban Ki-moon 
S-1943-0019-0001-00011 07-05-2007 Letter Ban Ki-moon to Peter Sutherland 
S-1956-0025-0007-00011 07-05-2007 Letters: Sutherland-Ban Ki-moon 
S-1956-0025-0007-00010 11-05-2007 Note: Ocampo-Ban Ki-moon 
S-1953-0012-0002-00016 21-05-2007 Draft of the Secretary-General's Report on 
"Strengthening the Coordination of Emergency 
Humanitarian Assistance of the United 
Nations" 
S-1956-0002-0006-00007 08-06-2007 Letter from Dutch Prime Minister to Ban Ki-
moon  
S-1953-0012-0002-00006 27-06-2007 Letter to PGA about Advisory Group of the 
Central Emergency Response Fund 
S-1956-0025-0007-00008 06-07-2007 Note: Orr-Ban Ki-moon 
S-1942-0041-0004-00003 10-07-2007 GFMD Belgium Programme 
S-1956-0025-0007-00007 10-07-2007 Letter to Ban Ki-moon about IOM being in 
UNDG and Chief Executive Board for 
Coordination 
S-1956-0056-0008-00001 11-07-2007 Report of first GFMD 
S-1956-0025-0007-00006 23-07-2007 Note: Zukang-Ban Ki-moon 
S-1943-0017-0006-00019 30-08-2007 Letter Ban Ki-moon to Peter Sutherland 
S-1956-0025-0007-00002 25-09-2007 Evaluation of first GFMD 
S-1956-0014-0011-00016 28-09-2007 A letter from the President of the Philippines to 
Ban Ki-moon 
S-1956-0025-0007-00005 08-10-2007 Letter from Ban Ki-moon to Brunson McKinley 
about UNDG and Chief Executive Board for 
Coordination 
S-1956-0025-0007-00004 25-10-2007 Letter: Navide-Ban Ki-moon 
S-1956-0031-0009-00011 09-11-2007 A letter exchange between Institut International 
des Sciences Politiques and the Executive Office 
of the Secretary-General 
S-1943-0054-0001-00003 23-11-2007 Secretary-General's meeting with Mr Esteban B. 
Conejos, Under-Secretary for Migrant Workers' 
Affairs, Department of Foreign Affairs, the 
Philippines 
S-1956-0025-0007-00003 26-12-2007 Letter to Mr Yoon to organize a meeting 
between Brunson McKinley and Secretary-
General 
S-1956-0056-0007-00006 09-01-2008 Letters: Sutherland-Ban Ki=moon 
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S-1956-0056-0007-00005 04-02-2008 Letter to Deputy Secretary-General (Asha-Rose 
Migito) thanking for participation in the 
conference 
S-1953-0034-0003-00022 29-04-2008 Progress Report to the Advisory Board on 
Human Security - IOM granted access to fund 
S-1953-0034-0003-00003 22-05-2008 Draft Report of the Secretary-General on 
Strengthening the Coordination of Emergency 
Humanitarian Assistance of the United Nations 
(Scores Out IOM) 
S-1957-0013-0006-00013 05-07-2008 Inviting Deputy Secretary-General to an event 
on trafficking 
S-1956-0044-0007-00021 17-07-2008 Letter from Mexico Secretary of Foreign Affairs 
to Ban Ki-moon 
S-1956-0056-0007-00004 22-07-2008 Letters: Sutherland-Ban Ki-moon 
S-1943-0014-0001-00015 05-08-2008 Letter Ban Ki-moon to Peter Sutherland 
S-1943-0014-0001-00014 08-08-2008 Letter Ban Ki-moon to Peter Sutherland 
S-1956-0069-0009-00006 31/8/2008 Letter to Ban Ki-moon about Athens GFMD 
S-1953-0033-0005-00013 08-09-2008 Draft report of the Secretary-General on the 
Central Emergency Response Fund. 
S-1956-0056-0007-00003 16-09-2008 Memo to PRs of UN and UN heads about 
William Lacy Swing’s appointment 
S-1956-0060-0003-00001 19-09-2008 Advisory Board on Human Security Seventh 
annual meeting: Draft Agenda 
S-1956-0039-0007-00014 26-09-2008 Letter Exchange between Greek (Mr John 
Mourikis) inviting Ban Ki-moon to 3rd GFMD 
S-1956-0056-0007-00001 28-10-2008 Letter to set up a meeting between William Lacy 
Swing and Ban Ki-moon 
S-1953-0031-0001-00026 31-10-2008 DPI Weekly Press Review  
S-1956-0056-0007-00002 04-11-2008 Invitation to Secretary-General for 96th Council 
meeting.  
S-1956-0087-0005-00032 13-01-2009 A letter exchange between Jonathan Fanton 
(MacArthur) and Ban Ki-moon 
S-1956-0115-0012-00011 13/01/2009 Letter to Ban Ki-moon thanking him for the first 
meeting in his role as Director-General and 
regarding the  GFMD secretariat 
S-1953-0045-0003-00028 30-01-2009 Re: Top Echelon and $1 a Year Appointments 
S-1956-0115-0012-00010 02-02-2009 Letter to Mr Dall-Oglio and Joe Chamie 
regarding a conference on migration and 
development 
S-1956-0115-0012-00009 04-02-2009 Letter to William Lacy Swing regarding 
Tanzania Regional Immigration Training 
Academy 
S-1953-0045-0003-00024 25-02-2009 Letters to the Top Echelon and WAE 
Appointments (Ethics) 
S-1956-0073-0004-00026 02-03-2009 Report sent to Secretary-General post ABHS 
meeting  
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S-1956-0115-0012-00008 30-04-2009 Letter to Ban Ki-moon about UNITE to end 
violence against women campaign.  
S-1953-0066-0005-00015 05-05-2009 Improving the coordination of efforts against 
trafficking in persons 
S-1956-0083-0010-00010 19-05-2009 Italian Government concerns regarding 
UNHCR statements on the handling of illegal 
immigrants 
S-1956-0115-0012-00007 28-05-2009 Letters: Sutherland-Ban Ki-moon 
S-1956-0115-0012-00006 30-07-2009 Letters: Sutherland-Ban Ki-moon 
S-1953-0046-0006-00020 05-08-2009 An exchange between Executive Office of 
Secretary-General regarding a meeting  
S-1956-0115-0012-00005 10-08-2009 Letter to Ndioro Ndiaye thanking her for words 
reflecting on their collaboration 
S-1956-0115-0012-00004 25-08-2009 Letter to Ndioro Ndiaye thanking for a letter 
regarding his resignation  
S-1943-0009-0003-00055 14-09-2009 Letter Ban Ki-moon to Peter Sutherland 
S-1956-0115-0012-00001 07-10-2009 Chef de Cabinet declining invitation for 
Secretary-General to give opening remarks at a 
conference on irregular migration  
S-1956-0115-0012-00003 23-10-2009 Invites UNHCR to 98th Council session 
S-1956-0115-0012-00002 26-10-2009 Letter thanking Ban Ki-moon for inviting him to 
Heads of state and government luncheon at 64th 
General Assembly 
S-1943-0008-0002-00070 05-01-2010 Letter Ban Ki-moon to Peter Sutherland 
S-1953-0068-0004-00024 01-02-2010 Note to Mr Sutherland from Ethics Office 
S-1956-0109-0003-00004 02-03-2010 Interim Report on GFMD from Peter Sutherland  
S-1956-0109-0003-00001 15-03-2010 Letter seeking a meeting between Ban Ki-moon 
and William Lacy Swing  
S-1953-0079-0003-00030 24-03-2010 Letter to Secretary-General regarding Arab 
Summit and problems regarding operations in 
Libya 
S-1956-0109-0003-00005 07-04-2010 Letter to Ban Ki-moon congratulating him on 
conferences related to Haiti  
S-1943-0007-0001-00023 22-04-2010 Letter Ban Ki-moon to Peter Sutherland 
S-1956-0112-0001-00003 26-04-2010 Letters to Mr Johan Ketelers (ICMC) 
S-1956-0095-0015-00002 14/7/2010 Letter to Ban Ki-moon about a report of Athens 
GFMD (not enclosed)  
S-1953-0079-0003-00015 19/7/2010 Report of the Secretary-General on the 
promotion and protection of human rights, 
including ways and means to promote the 
human rights of migrants 
S-1953-0078-0002-00008 20-07-2010 Expulsion of two IOM staff in Sudan 
S-1956-0110-0006-00013 21/07/2010 Invitation to Ban Ki-moon to Chair Mexican 
Civil Society Days 
S-1956-0110-0006-00004 26/08/2010 Letter on behalf of Secretary-General declining 
invite to Mexico GFMD 
S-1951-0003-0003-00013 23/9/2010 Letter exchange about GFMD in the Philippines 
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S-1956-0109-0003-00003 12-10-2010 Letter to Ban Ki-moon congratulating him on 
meetings in September 2010, including review 
of MDGs and thanking him for a meeting. 
Michelle Klein Solomon appointed as a 
Permanent Observer of the IOM to the UN. 
S-1956-0109-0003-00002 27-10-2010 Letter to Ban Ki-moon about suicide attack in 
Afghanistan 
S-1943-0109-0003-00020 01-12-2010 Update Note for the Secretary-General 
S-1953-0070-0004-00002 21-12-2010 Meeting of the Advisory Group of the Central 
Emergency Response Fund 
S-1943-0004-0004-00080 31-12-2010 Letter Ban Ki-moon to Peter Sutherland 
S-1943-0082-0006-00001 31-12-2010 Meeting Notes 2010 
S-1959-0005-0001-00009 04-02-2011 Interim Report on GFMD (2 from Peter 
Sutherland to Ban Ki-moon. 
S-1959-0004-0007-00019 05-05-2011 UN position on the 2013 High-Level Dialogue 
on Migration and Development 
- a Proposal 
S-1959-0022-0004-00010 13-05-2011 Strengthening of the coordination of emergency 
humanitarian assistance of the United Nations 
S-1943-0024-0004-00005 18-05-2011 Appointments of the Secretary-General 
S-1943-0024-0004-00004 19-05-2011 Appointments of the Secretary-General 
S-1959-0024-0004-00007 05-10-2011 Draft Secretary-General Report on UNITAR 
S-1943-0075-0001-00025 01-01-2012 Letter Ban Ki-moon to Peter Sutherland 
S-1943-0023-0003-00011 09-02-2012 Appointments of the Secretary-General 
S-1943-0083-0001-00001 09-02-2012 Meeting Notes 2012 
S-1959-0050-0014-00008 23-02-2012 A letter exchange between Ban Ki-moon and 
Prime Minister of Mauritius regarding the 2012 
GFMD 
S-1959-0045-0008-00002 07-03-2012 Letter to UNHCR about the 10-year report of 
UNHCR 
S-1959-0050-0012-00022 04-06-2012 Report of the UN System Task Team on the 
Post-2015 UN Development Agenda. 
S-1959-0095-0004-00027 18-07-2012 Director-General of International commission 
on Missing Persons writes about a partnership 
with UN 
S-1959-0052-0001-00018 26-07-2012 Implementation Matrix for the UN system on 
the Rio+ 20 outcome document 
S-1959-0049-0002-00010 30-07-2012 Explanatory Memorandum for the International 
Conference on 
People's Empowerment and Development 
S-1959-0050-0015-00005 01-08-2012 Report of the Secretary-General on International 
migration and development  
S-1959-0050-0015-00004 02-08-2012 Request for clearance of the report of the 
Secretary-General on international migration 
and development for the sixty-seventh session 
of the General Assembly 
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S-1959-0057-0005-00034 11-08-2012 Letter to William Lacy Swing regarding his 
letter of condolence  
S-1959-0090-0003-00005 22/08/2012 A letter exchange between Deputy Secretary-
General and Jacque Chirac about an event that 
conflicts with Mauritius GFMD 
S-1959-0051-0009-00002 28-08-2012 Europe's Immigration Challenge By Peter D. 
Sutherland and Cecilia Malmstrom 
S-1959-0066-0013-00004 07-09-2012 Secretary-General Report on Central 
Emergency Response Plan 
S-1959-0046-0015-00003 18/09/2012 UN Trust Fund for Human Security project 
proposal 
S-1959-0050-0006-00003 28-09-2012 Overview of the General Debate: 27 
September/Full day 
S-1943-0022-0002-00009 16-11-2012 Appointments of the Secretary-General 
S-1959-0088-0006-00007 16/11/2012 Letter to Mauritius advising he cannot attend 
GFMD due to tension in middle east 
S-1959-0050-0011-00009 20-11-2012 United Nations System Chief Executives Board 
for Coordination: Second Regular Session for 
2012: Issue Notes from High-Level Committee 
on Programmes 
S-1943-0071-0006-00026 26-11-2012 Letter Ban Ki-moon to William Lacy Swing 
S-1959-0050-0011-00007 26-11-2012 Letter to Jan Eliasson about the Post-2015 
Development Agenda 
S-1959-0050-0014-00007 27/11/2012 Letter from UNODC Director (as Chair of GMG) 
S-1959-0088-0005-00011 27-11-2012 Letter to William Lacy Swing saying he cannot 
attend the 101st Council session but that Peter 
Sutherland will address via video 
S-1959-0050-0011-00005 11-12-2012 Secretary-General's Initial Input to the Open 
Working Group on Sustainable Development 
Goals 
S-1943-0089-0004-00024 09-01-2013 Letter Ban Ki-moon to Peter Sutherland 
S-1951-0004-0006-00030 20-01-2013 Letter to Mr Swing about the loss of life in Haiti 
S-1959-0126-0006-00013 29-01-2013 Letter to William Lacy Swing - regarding Chief 
Executive Board for Coordination/Policy 
Committee  
S-1959-0099-0012-00002 02-02-2013 Official Visit of the Deputy Secretary-General to 
Brussels and Geneva (27-28 November 2013) 
S-1959-0177-0010-00020 11-02-2013 Letter to William Lacy Swing about Cholera in 
Haiti 
S-1959-0151-0002-00016 26-02-2013 Letter from International Planned Parenthood 
Federation about post-2015 agenda - mentions 
migration as challenge 
S-1959-0104-0003-00007 04-03-2013 "Development for All" conference, which 
recently took place in Dili, Timor Leste 
S-1959-0147-0004-00034 12-03-2013 Invitation to 2013 IOM Council Meeting which 
includes IOM position paper for HLD  
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S-1959-0123-0002-00038 15-03-2013 Secretary-General’s Guidance Note on Racial 
Discrimination and Protection of 
Minorities 
S-1959-0150-0002-00030 28-03-2013 invites Ban Ki-moon to Commission on 
Population and Development 
S-1959-0106-0002-00016 03-04-2013 Report of the fourth meeting of HLP on the 
P2015 Development agenda 
S-1959-0106-0002-00004 08-04-2013 Letter to Ivan Lewis (Shadow Secretary of State 
for International Development of UK) about 
Social Contract without borders (vision for post-
2015) 
S-1959-0155-0008-00012 08-04-2013 Thanking Secretary-General for inviting him to 
Chief Executive Board for Coordination 
meeting on 05.04.2013 
S-1959-0145-0022-00013 01-05-2013 Letter about meeting on 24 April 2013 (discusses 
IOM-UN relation and SDGs) 
S-1959-0127-0002-00023 07-05-2013 UNITAR- Report of the Secretary-General 
S-1959-0152-0005-00033 08-05-2013 Invitation from the Scalibrini International 
Migration Network to Jan Eliasson to give 
opening remarks at the IV International Forum 
on Migration and Peace 
S-1959-0107-0001-00013 18-06-2013 Letter from Peter Sutherland to Amina 
Mohammed regarding SDGs  
S-1943-0021-0004-00004 25-06-2013 Meeting between Peter Sutherland and Ban Ki-
moon 
S-1943-0087-0004-00022 25-06-2013 Letter to William Lacy Swing regarding the 
death of an IOM staff member in Kabul 
S-1959-0105-0008-00005 25-06-2013 Letter to Secretary-General from Civil Society 
Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights 
Platform - one mention of migration 
S-1959-0112-0002-00016 26-06-2013 Declaration from the Fourth International 
Forum on Migration And Peace (In New York 
City) 
S-1959-0102-0002-00018 05-07-2013 Preparatory event for HLD including 
roundtable on post-2015 
S-1959-0105-0007-00040  05-07-2013 A letter exchange between Peter Sutherland and 
Ban Ki-moon relating to the SDGs 
S-1959-0107-0001-00005 05-07-2013 A letter exchange between Peter Sutherland and 
Ban Ki-moon relating to the SDGs 
S-1959-0148-0002-00004 05-07-2013 Letter to PGA on behalf of Secretary-General 
S-1959-0105-0007-00034 12-07-2013 Reply to letter from Bernd Nilles about his 
report on MDGs and Post-2015 - includes one 
mention of migration  
S-1943-0087-0002-00058 19-07-2013 Preface to “International Migration and 
Development: Contributions and 
Recommendations of the International System",  
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S-1959-0106-0006-00025 24-07-2013 Letter to Jan Eliasson regarding dissatisfaction 
with contents of Secretary-General report for 
HLD 
S-1959-0099-0003-00006 25-07-2013 Report of the Secretary-General on International 
Migration and Development 
S-1959-0105-0006-00017 07-08-2013 Reply to letter from Mr Adler Bynoe regarding 
recommendations for the Secretary-General 
report on the SDGs 
S-1959-0106-0005-00018 09-08-2013 Letter to Pope and post-2015 development 
including Secretary-General report 
S-1959-0155-0003-00017 27-08-2013 Letter scheduling meeting with Secretary-
General about, among other things M&D and 
the post-2015 development agenda 
S-1959-0126-0009-00005 04-09-2013 Letter from William Lacy Swing to Francois 
Crépeau 
S-1959-0101-0013-00025 17-09-2013 Letter regarding IOM taking over as chair of 
GMG and asking him to open side event 
S-1959-0122-0003-00012 17-09-2013 Ten year report of UNHCR 
S-1959-0147-0002-00011 17-09-2013 Letter from William Lacy Swing to Ban Ki-moon 
S-1959-0147-0002-00006 18-09-2013 Letter from Peter Sutherland to Jan Eliasson  
S-1959-0106-0003-00019 26-09-2013 Note to Secretary-General about the proposed 
scenario for opening of 2013 HLD 
S-1959-0107-0006-00025 01-10-2013 A letter exchange between Sweden and UN 
Deputy Secretary-General 
S-1943-0049-0005-00017 03-10-2013 Remarks To High-Level Dialogue on 
International Migration And Development 
S-1959-0107-0004-00008 09-10-2013 Note on the High-Level Dialogue on 
International Migration and Development 
S-1959-0127-0006-00010 09-10-2013 Note on the United Nations Chronicle Issue on 
Migration 
S-1959-0105-0003-00002 16-10-2013 Letter from Peter Sutherland to Jan Eliasson  
S-1959-0105-0004-00036 16-10-2013 Report on the follow up to the ICPD Programme 
of Action beyond 2014 
S-1959-0105-0004-00029 19-10-2013 Gender-specific content of the general debate 
and high-level meetings of the 68th session of 
the General Assembly 
S-1959-0105-0004-00032 19-10-2013 The 2013 ECOSOC Presidential Retreat - 
migration as a global challenge that should be in 
the post-2015 
S-1959-0154-0001-00050 21-10-2013 Letter about HLD follow up and GMG meeting 
(IOM=chair) 
S-1959-0108-0005-00004 04-11-2013 Chair's Summary of the United Nations 
Economic Commission for Europe’s Regional 
Conference on lCPD beyond 2014, "Enabling 
Choices: Population Priorities for the 21st 
Century." 
S-1943-0085-0005-00079 07-11-2013 Letter Ban Ki-moon to Peter Sutherland 
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S-1959-0101-0011-00008 07-11-2013 Invites Secretary-General to 103rd Session of 
IOM Council  
S-1943-0120-0003-00002 17-01-2014 Remarks At Informal Meeting of the Plenary of 
the General Assembly To Hear a Briefing on UN 
Challenges 
S-1959-0166-0007-00013 20-01-2014 Summary report of the Secretary-General on the 
Operational Review of the ICPD 
S-1959-0157-0008-00005 04-02-2014 Draft Report of the Secretary-General on the 
Activities of the Department of Public 
Information - para on HLD 
S-1959-0222-0001-00002 05-02-2014 Invitation to Secretary-General to attend 25th 
Conference of NGOs in Consultative 
Relationship with the United Nations  
S-1943-0120-0002-00004 12-02-2014 Remarks At Launch of International Conference 
on Population And Development Global 
Review Report 
S-1943-0090-0008-00007 21-02-2014 Appointments of the Secretary-General 
S-1959-0164-0001-00004 07-03-2014 The ninth session of the Open Working Group 
on SDGs 
S-1959-0185-0009-00011 13-03-2014 Twenty-fifth session of the Human Rights 
Council (3- 28 March 2014) 
S-1959-0166-0010-00007 14-03-2014 Note to the Deputy Secretary-General: Twelfth 
coordination meeting on international 
migration New York, 20-21 Feb 
S-1959-0218-0003-00001 18-03-2014 Student event in Stockholm  
S-1959-0174-0006-00014 19-03-2014 Letter from Abi Williams (Hague Institute) to 
Ban Ki-moon  
S-1959-0212-0004-00002 27-03-2014 Reports of Secretary-General drafts prepared by 
UNODC 
S-1943-0118-0005-00003 02-04-2014 Remarks To Opening of the Fourth Eu-Africa 
Summit 
S-1959-0160-0004-00013 09-04-2014 Letter to Dr Niblett regarding meeting about 
post-2015 development agenda - migration 
mentioned 
S-1959-0166-0007-00010 14-04-2014 Letter to Secretary-General about 47th 
Commission on Population and Development 
Meeting  
S-1959-0166-0010-00006 15-04-2014 Note from IOM requesting information about 
different possibilities for UN-IOM relationship 
S-1959-0164-0004-00017 17-04-2014 The outcome of the Forty-Seventh Session of the 
Commission on Population and Development 
S-1943-0090-0006-00003 28-04-2014 Appointments of the Secretary-General 
S-1959-0167-0005-00002 05-05-2014 Draft report of the intergovernmental 
committee of experts on Sustainable 
Development Financing 
S-1959-0165-0002-00004 13-05-2014 Report of the Secretary-General: 
Implementation of the Programme of Action for 
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he Least Developed Countries for the Decade 
2011-2020 
S-1959-0166-0010-00003 19-06-2014 Letter from Tobias Billstrom and Hillevi 
Engstrom regarding the GFMD in Sweden 
S-1959-0185-0008-00014 20-06-2014 Twenty-sixth session of the Human Rights 
Council (10- 27 June 2014) 
S-1943-0112-0001-00010 29-06-2014 Letter to Princess of Sweden about GFMD/SDGs 
S-1959-0193-0005-00004 36-06-2014 Reports prepared by UNODC for the General 
Assembly at its 69th session 
S-1959-0186-0003-00014 07-07-2014 Secretary-General report on Globalization 
S-1959-0163-0004-00022 10-07-2014 Letter to PGA about the thematic debate on 
Human Security 
S-1959-0166-0010-00001 23-07-2014 Report of the Secretary-General: International 
Migration and Development 
S-1943-0114-0005-00002 30-07-2014 Lecture At the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights 
S-1959-0188-0012-00005 01-08-2014 Draft Report of the Secretary-General on 
International 
Cooperation on Humanitarian Assistance In the 
Field of 
Natural Disasters, From Relief To Development 
S-1959-0193-0005-00003 07-08-2014 Reports of Secretary-General drafts prepared by 
UNODC 
S-1959-0161-0005-00028 14-08-2014 Letter from Director of Communications and 
Speech Writing Department to Peter Sutherland  
S-1959-0186-0002-00005 20-08-2014 Draft Secretary-General report on the assistance 
to refugees, returnees, and displaced persons in 
Africa. 
S-1959-0190-0005-00016 27-08-2014 Letter to Secretary-General about post-2015 
S-1959-0193-0007-00006 02-09-2014 Report of the Secretary-General on Oceans and 
the Law of the Sea 
S-1959-0191-0001-00004 12-09-2014 Letter to PGA about AoC report  
S-1959-0158-0009-00002 16-09-2014 An email exchange about a non-relevant event 
with one mention of Deputy Secretary-General 
representing Secretary-General at GFMD in 
Turkey 
S-1959-0220-0002-00035 18-09-2014 The 2014 World Forum on the Diaspora 
Economy 
S-1959-0169-0002-00004 21-09-2014 Letter from Transparency International 
Bangladesh about climate change - including 
migration 
S-1959-0165-0004-00006 02-10-2014 A summary note on the United Nations General 
Assembly Special Session on the follow-up to 
the Programme of Action of the International 
Conference on Population and Development 
beyond 2014: 
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Reference Date Broad Description 
S-1959-0158-0007-00004 20-10-2014 Letter from Permanent Representative Italy and 
China on World Cities Day  
S-1959-0163-0002-00009 26-11-2014 Letter to Guy Ryder about GMG contributions 
to post-2015 development agenda 
S-1959-0223-0006-00007 08-12-2014 Letter from William Lacy Swing to Ban Ki-
moon. 
S-1959-0187-0007-00002 18-12-2014 Letter to International Maritime Organization 
about the Mediterranean 
S-1959-0163-0001-00003 24-12-2014 Letter to Peter Sutherland from Amina 
Mohammed regarding Stockholm Agenda 
S-1959-0211-0005-00007 24-12-2014 Letter regarding Michelle Klein Solomon 
resignation 
S-1959-0256-0009-00014 05-01-2015 Letter to Jan Eliasson about a meeting about 
UN-IOM relationship 
S-1959-0282-0002-00024 19-01-2015 Invitation to address the 13th coordination 
meeting on international migration 
S-1959-0232-0008-00036 21-01-2015 Invitation to Turkish GFMD  
S-1959-0280-0004-00016 21-01-2015 Invitation from Turkey to Ban Ki-moon for 
Turkish GFMD 
S-1959-0234-0004-00012 23-01-2015 Letter about 13th coordination meeting and 
organizing meeting for GFMD troika 
S-1959-0340-0005-00031 27-01-2015 IOM IDM on implementation of SDGs 
S-1959-0256-0009-00011 02-02-2015 Draft report of the Secretary-General on the UN 
Institute for Training and Research for 
consideration by the Economic and Social 
Council in April 2015. 
S-1959-0256-0008-00027 05-03-2015 Letter to Jan Eliasson about UNDG's decision to 
exclude IOM 
S-1943-0137-0003-00025 06-03-2015 Letter Ban Ki-moon to Peter Sutherland 
S-1959-0234-0004-00011 13-03-2015 Letter exchange about UNDAF 
restrictions/IOM-UN relations 
S-1943-0137-0003-00061 17-03-2015 Letter Ban Ki-moon to Peter Sutherland 
S-1959-0229-0005-00024 17-03-2015 Invitation to Secretary-General (from Belgium) 
to forty-eighth session of the Commission on 
Population and Development 
S-1959-0283-0003-00042 17-03-2015 A letter exchange between Ban Ki-moon and 
Peter Sutherland about the Sutherland Report 
S-1959-0256-0008-00022 20-03-2015 Letter to Secretary-General about the death of 
two Dutch UN Peacekeepers 
S-1959-0233-0002-00008 26-03-2015 Draft report of the Secretary-General on 
mainstreaming the three dimensions of 
sustainable development to the United Nations 
system 
S-1959-0256-0008-00018 13-04-2015 Letter to Jan Eliasson about a meeting about 
UN-IOM relationship 
S-1959-0311-0006-00004 20-04-2015 General Assembly decision 70/539  
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Reference Date Broad Description 
S-1959-0234-0004-00009 24-04-2015 Letter about inviting Committee for ICRMW to 
Istanbul  
S-1959-0227-0009-00030 22-05-2015 DPI Press Review including several migration-
related paragraphs 
S-1959-0227-0009-00029 29-05-2015 DPI Press Review including several migration-
related paragraphs 
S-1959-0283-0003-00018 22-06-2015 Writes to request meeting between Prime 
Minister of Malta and BM to discuss, among 
other things, migration 
S-1959-0266-0007-00013 24-06-2015 Deputy Secretary-General report on visits to 
Oslo, Stockholm, London, and Luxembourg 
S-1959-0346-0011-00001 09-07-2015 Declaration 
S-1959-0284-0008-00017 16-07-2015 Letter to Martin Schulz discussing among other 
things the European Agenda on Migration 
S-1959-0284-0008-00016 20-07-2015 Letter to Frank Walter Steinmeier (Germany) - 
mentions discussing migration 
S-1959-0234-0004-00007 21-07-2015 Note to the Secretary-General: Update from Mr 
Peter Sutherland, Special Representative of the 
Secretary-General for International Migration 
and Development // Letter from Sutherland to 
Ban Ki-moon including a summary by Paul 
Akiwumi 
S-1959-0234-0004-00008 22-07-2015 Letter about European Migration Agenda 
S-1959-0234-0010-00006 27-07-2015 The outcome of the Third International 
Conference on Financing for Development 
S-1959-0259-0007-00004 30-07-2015 Relationship between the United Nations and 
the International Organization for Migration 
(IOM) 
S-1959-0284-0008-00014 30-07-2015 Letter to Federica Mogherini about the 
partnership between the EU and the UN on 
migration 
S-1959-0251-0005-00009 05-08-2015 Draft report on Activities of the United Nations 
Voluntary Fund for Victims of Torture 
S-1959-0254-0001-00006 12-08-2015 Draft Secretary-General report on international 
cooperation on humanitarian assistance in the 
field of natural disasters (ND). 
S-1959-0251-0004-00008 18-08-2015 Draft Secretary-General report on Assistance to 
refugees, returnees, and displaced persons in 
Africa 
S-1959-0251-0004-00005 21-08-2015 Draft Secretary-General report on total 
elimination of racism, racial discrimination, 
xenophobia, and related intolerance. 
S-1959-0234-0004-00006 24-08-2015 Talking points on Migration Crisis 
S-1943-0139-0005-00036 28-08-2015 Letter Ban Ki-moon to Mevlut Cavusoglu 
S-1959-0227-0009-00018 28-08-2015 DPI Press Review including several migration-
related paragraphs 
S-1959-0227-0009-00017 04-09-2015 DPI Weekly Press Review 
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Reference Date Broad Description 
S-1959-0232-0004-00018 08-09-2015 Address to UNICEF Executive Board about 
SDGs 
S-1959-0227-0009-00016 11-09-2015 DPI Weekly Press Review 
S-1959-0281-0003-00002 28-09-2015 Letter from Turkey (Mehmet Samsar) to Jan 
Eliasson regarding GFMD in Turkey 
S-1959-0227-0009-00014 02-10-2015 DPI Weekly Press Review 
S-1959-0234-0004-00005 02-10-2015 Address to side event: "Strengthening 
cooperation on migration and refugee 
movements under the new development 
agenda," 
S-1959-0257-0004-00010 05-10-2015 Letter from Peter Sutherland to Ban Ki-moon  
S-1943-0140-0002-00008 22-10-2015 Message To United Nations Association of New 
York Humanitarian Awards Dinner 
S-1959-0234-0009-00005 04-11-2015 Letter to G20 leaders ahead of the first meeting 
after the adoption of the SDGs.  
S-1959-0234-0004-00004 05-11-2015 Note to Deputy Secretary-General about Valetta 
Summit 
S-1959-0234-0004-00001 10-11-2015 Situation report on Migrants 
S-1959-0227-0009-00008 13-11-2015 DPI Press Review including several migration-
related paragraphs 
S-1959-0232-0004-00004 17-11-2015 Letter to International Maritime Organization 
about people in distress at sea 
S-1943-0140-0005-00002 18-11-2015 Communications with King and Prime Minister 
of Spain about SDGs and migration crisis 
S-1959-0227-0009-00005 25-11-2015 DPI Press Review including several migration-
related paragraphs 
S-1959-0251-0003-00008 07-12-2015 draft Secretary-General report on "Impact of the 
arbitrary deprivation of nationality  
S-1959-0233-0007-00004 16-12-2015 Letter to Secretary-General about data 
disaggregation  
S-1959-0237-0001-00005 16-12-2015 Outcome documents from African 
Parliamentary Union 
S-1959-0347-0016-00001 17-12-2015 Letter from Advisory Board on Human Security 
- concerning migration and SDGs 
S-1959-0234-0004-00003 31-12-2015 Writes about developments in Denmark and 
threats to reopen 1951 convention 
S-1959-0311-0007-00001 15-01-2016 Writes to Mr Lars Løkke Rasmussen (Denmark) 
about Danish response to refugees 
S-1959-0354-0003-00013 18-01-2016 Invitation Secretary-General to give the opening 
address at 108th session of the council 
S-1959-0311-0007-00014 20-01-2016 Eritrean Minister writes to Ban Ki-moon  
S-1959-0335-0001-00023 20-01-2016 A letter exchange between Sheikh Hasina 
(Bangladesh) and Ban Ki-moon regarding 
GFMD 
S-1959-0311-0007-00013 21-01-2016 Writes to Minister for Foreign Affairs and 
Emigrants (Lebanon) responding to letter 
regarding the situation in Lebanon  
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Reference Date Broad Description 
S-1959-0311-0007-00012 25-01-2016 Prime Minister of Denmark replies to Ban Ki-
moon (S-1959-0311-0007-00001) 
S-1959-0342-0005-00021 25-01-2016 Bangladesh writes to Secretary-General to seek 
a meeting between Shahidul Haque and Ban Ki-
moon and Peter Sutherland 
S-1959-0340-0005-00028 29-01-2016 Invitation to Jan Eliasson from Bangladesh for a 
special meeting on 25 February 2016 
S-1959-0311-0007-00011 03-02-2016 Club de Madrid (non-profit - members are 
former world leaders) proposing to use 2016 
dialogue to discuss the refugee crisis 
S-1959-0317-0001-00016 05-02-2016 Letter to William Lacy Swing about IOM 
relationship agreement 
S-1959-0311-0007-00010 12-02-2016 Letter from Canadian Bishop 
S-1959-0311-0007-00009 17-02-2016 Writes to Ban Ki-moon about Syrian Donor 
conference in London on 4 February 2016 
S-1959-0311-0007-00008 25-02-2016 Writes to Prime Minister of Iraq copying in 
Secretary-General about the situation in Iraq 
S-1959-0311-0007-00007 26-02-2016 Views of refugee movements ahead of High-
Level Summit  
S-1959-0311-0007-00005 29-02-2016 Views of refugee movements ahead of High-
Level Summit 
S-1959-0311-0007-00006 29-02-2016 Views of refugee movements ahead of High-
Level Summit 
S-1959-0311-0007-00003 01-03-2016 Views of refugee movements ahead of High-
Level Summit 
S-1959-0311-0007-00004 01-03-2016 Views of refugee movements ahead of High-
Level Summit 
S-1959-0311-0006-00013 02-03-2016 Contributions from Bangladesh for UN High-
Level Plenary Meeting on addressing large 
movements of refugees and migrants 
S-1959-0311-0006-00012 11-03-2016 Writes to Ban Ki-moon about the situation in 
Europe 
S-1959-0311-0006-00011 13-03-2016 Writes to Ban Ki-moon about the situation in 
Lebanon 
S-1959-0311-0006-00010 15-03-2016 French letter about refugees 
S-1959-0311-0006-00009 18-03-2016 Writes to Ban Ki-moon about the situation on 
Lesvos 
S-1959-0311-0006-00008 23-03-2016 Head of Republic Forum - former president of 
Lebanon writes to Ban Ki-moon about the 
Syrian crisis 
S-1959-0311-0006-00007 24-03-2016 Letter to Jan Eliasson advising that Michele 
Klein Solomon and Lea Matheson have been 
seconded for the Summit preparations 
S-1959-0311-0006-00006 07-04-2016 Asking about grants for organizations helping 
IDPs 
S-1959-0311-0006-00005 08-04-2016 Advisor to Prime Minister of Pakistan writes to 
Ban Ki-moon regarding refugee crises 
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Reference Date Broad Description 
S-1959-0293-0012-00015 13-04-2016 Letter about High-Level Summit (NY Sep 2016) 
// Refers to a concept note for GFMD and 
suggested elements for a Global Compact which 
is not attached 
S-1959-0295-0007-00016 19-04-2016 Letter to Secretary-General regretting he cannot 
attend the signing of Paris Agreement 
S-1959-0311-0006-00001 21-04-2016 Invitation to Jan Eliasson for the Regional 
Forum on Syria Refugee Crisis: 
S-1959-0311-0006-00002 25-04-2016 Three letters to and from Ban Ki-moon relating 
to his visit to Lebanon 
S-1959-0311-0005-00024 27-04-2016 Letter to Ban Ki-moon protesting the actions of 
FYROM in closing borders 
S-1959-0311-0005-00025 27-04-2016 Letter to Yale President (referred to in S-1959-
0311-0005-00017) regarding scholarships for 
Syrians  
S-1959-0340-0004-00004 06-05-2016 Invitation from the IIEA to Jan Eliasson for an 
event on Migration and the 2030 Development 
Agenda. 
S-1959-0311-0005-00023 09-05-2016 Letter to Ban Ki-moon reference in S-1959-0311-
0005-00020 
S-1959-0311-0005-00021 11-05-2016 Letter from Kenya about Dadaab 
S-1959-0287-0004-00003 13-05-2016 Press Review 
S-1959-0340-0003-00034 25-05-2016 Thematic Workshop on Migration for Peace, 
Stability, and Growth 
S-1959-0311-0005-00019 02-06-2016 Regards a situation where a refugee was 
prevented from leaving Iraq 
S-1959-0311-0005-00020 02-06-2016 Protection of women and girls in refugee crises. 
S-1959-0311-0005-00018 07-06-2016 Update on the preparations for the high-level 
plenary meeting of the General Assembly to 
address large movement of refugees and 
migrants 
S-1959-0311-0005-00016 20-06-2016 Civil society letter about the situation in 
Cameroon. 
S-1959-0311-0005-00017 20-06-2016 References a letter sent to the president of Yale 
about Syrian Refugees  
S-1959-0311-0005-00015 28-06-2016 Lithuania would like to become a Member State 
of the Executive Committee of the High 
Commissioner's 
Programme. 
S-1959-0311-0005-00014 07-07-2016 Fiji would like to become a member of the 
Executive Committee of the Programme of 
UNHCR 
S-1959-0292-0007-00006 15-07-2016 Draft Report of the Secretary-General on 
International Migration and Development for 
the seventy-first session of the General 
Assembly 
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Reference Date Broad Description 
S-1959-0293-0012-00007 26-07-2016 Report of the Secretary-General on International 
Migration and Development for the seventy-
first session of the General Assembly 
S-1959-0311-0005-00013 26-07-2016 Secretary-General visit to Lesvos 
S-1959-0317-0001-00008 28-07-2016 Letter to William Lacy Swing about IOM 
relationship agreement 
S-1959-0311-0005-00012 03-08-2016 Note to the Secretary-General: Outcome 
document for 19 September Summit for 
Refugees and Migrants 
S-1959-0313-0001-00006 04-08-2016 Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) 
S-1959-0335-0006-00009 19-08-2016 Opening of the 108th Session of the IOM 
Council  
S-1959-0309-0012-00015 22-08-2016 Assistance to refugees, returnees, and displaced 
persons in Africa 
S-1959-0311-0005-00011 22-08-2016 Report of the Secretary-General: Assistance to 
refugees, returnees, and displaced persons in 
Africa 
S-1943-0147-0005-00017 30-08-2016 Letter Ban Ki-moon to Peter Sutherland 
S-1959-0309-0011-00004 23-09-2016 Note after the NY Summit  
S-1959-0311-0005-00010 23-09-2016 Memo on United Nations Summit for Refugees 
and Migrants  
S-1959-0317-0001-00004 07-10-2016 Agreement concerning the UN-IOM 
Relationship  
S-1959-0291-0009-00003 10-10-2016 Synopsis of the general debate of the seventy-
first session of General Assembly 
S-1959-0311-0005-00009 12-10-16 Letter from civil society actors outlining alarm 
at how little states achieved at the summit.  
S-1959-0350-0011-00011 12-10-2016 Letter to Secretary-General about meeting in 
Cartagena  
S-1959-0354-0009-00001 12-10-16 About a petition #WithRefugees  
S-1959-0340-0001-00017 14-10-2016 Global Compact event on 14 November 2016 
including concept note 
S-1959-0340-0001-00012 31-10-2016 Request for a video message from Jan Eliasson 
for Global Compact event on 14 November 
S-1959-0311-0005-00008 04-11-2016 Condemning attacks against Rohingya 
S-1959-0332-0011-00002 09-11-2016 Draft report on trafficking which references 
GCM 
S-1959-0297-0003-00004 24-11-2016 Thanks Jan Eliasson for his efforts in migration 
entering UN 
S-1959-0311-0005-00007 01-12-2016 Condemning attacks against Rohingya 
S-1959-0291-0009-00002 14-12-2016 Summary of Second Committee Meeting of 71st 
General Assembly (Dec 2016) 
S-1959-0293-0012-00005 16-12-2016 Appointment of SRSG (only on international 
migration) 
S-1959-0311-0005-00006 16-12-2016 Secretary-General's letter to PGA on the 
appointment of SRSG for International 
Migration  
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Reference Date Broad Description 
S-1959-0298-0004-00005 20-12-2016 Letter congratulating Amina Mohammed on 
appointment  
S-1943-0145-0005-00005 21-12-2016 Letter Bank Ki-moon to PGA 
S-1959-0298-0006-00010 29-12-2016 Letter from Ban Ki-moon to Peter Sutherland - 
thank you letters at end of tenure including to 
Sutherland 
S-1959-0300-0001-00001 02-01-2017 Invitation to Guterres from the Scalibrini 
International Migration Network to give 
opening Remarks of the VI International Forum 
on Migration and Peace 
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FAO 12 2014 Targets and Indicators for the Post-2015 Development Agenda 
and the Sustainable Development Goal 
FAO 2 2014 FAO and the Post-2015 Development Agenda Issue Papers: 
Poverty Eradication 
FAO 134 2015 The Director-General’s Medium Term Plan 2014-17 and 
Programme of Work and Budget 2016-17 
FAO 28 2015 FAO and the Post-2015 Development Agenda Issue Papers: 
Food Security and the Right to Food 
FAO 6 2015 FAO’s e-Bulletin on the Post-2015 Development Agenda. 
ILO 1 n.d. The ILO and the Post-2015 Development Agenda 
ILO 14 n.d. Mainstreaming of Migration in Development Policy and 
Integrating Migration in the Post-2015 UN Development 
Agenda 
ILO 30 2013 Labour Migration and Development: ILO Moving Forward 
ILO 4 n.d. Migration and Decent Work and the Post-2015 Development 
Agenda 
ILO 1 2014 Fair Migration and the Post-2015 
ILO 14 n.d. Integrating Labour Migration into the 2013 UN High-Level 
Dialogue on International Migration and Development, and the 
Post-2015 UN Development Agenda  
ILO 11 2014 Promoting Effective Governance of Labour Migration from 
South Asia  
ILO 30 2014 Report for ILC 2014 Fair Migration: Setting an ILO Agenda 
ILO 13 2015 Promoting Decent Work For Migrant Workers  
ILO 12 n.d. PowerPoint Presentation by Michelle Leighton 
ILO 5 n.d. Outcome 7 2014-2015 results 
ILO 1 2014 Michelle Leighton keynote to ICRMW Committee 
IOM 144 2013 Migration and the United Nations Post-2015 Development 
Agenda 
IOM 8 n.d. IOM Position on the Post-2015 United Nations Development 
Agenda 
IOM 392 2014 Migration Initiatives 2015 Regional Strategies 
IOM 1 2013 Migration and the Post-2015 UN Development Agenda 
IOM 12 2014 Integrating Migration into the Post-2015 United Nations 
Development Agenda 
IOM 4 n.d. Health in the Post‐2015 Development Agenda: The Importance 
of Migrants’ Health for Sustainable and Equitable Development 
IOM 4 2014 Migration in the Post-2015 process: Analysing Key Trends 
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OHCHR 48 2013 Migration and Human Rights: Improving Human Rights-Based 
Governance of International Migration 
OHCHR 10 2013 Protecting Human Rights in the Context of Migration (OHCHR 
Report 2013) 
OHCHR 8 2012 Protecting Human Rights in the Context of Migration (OHCHR 
Report 2012) 
OHCHR 128 2013 OHCHR Management Plan 2014-2017 
OHCHR 11 2015 Twenty-Third Session of the Committee on the Protection of the 
Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families 
OHCHR 12 2014 Twenty-First Session of the Committee on the Protection of the 
Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families 
OHCHR 21 2014 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of 
Migrants 
OHCHR 7 2015 Twenty-Second Session of the Committee on the Protection of 
the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their 
Families 
OHCHR 13 2012 Towards Freedom from Fear and Want: Human Rights in the 
Post-2015 Agenda  
OHCHR 26 2015 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of 
Migrants 
UNCTAD 14 2014 The Role Of International Trade in the Post-2015 Development 
Agenda  
UNCTAD 4 2015 Access To Financial Services as A Driver for the Post-2015 
Development Agenda 
UNCTAD 14 2014 Tackling Inequality through Trade and Development in the 
Post-2015 Development Agenda  
UNCTAD 6 2013 Management Response to the External Evaluation of UNCTAD 
Subprogramme 3 
UNCTAD 42 2014 Activity Report 2013 
UNCTAD 3 2013 Contribution to the Implementation of and Follow-up to the 
Outcomes of Major United Nations Conferences and Summits 
in the Economic and  Social Fields 
UNDESA 30 2012 The International Development Strategy Beyond 2015: Taking 
Demographic Dynamics into Account 
UNDESA 12 2015 Social Inclusion, Poverty Eradication & Post-2015 Development 
Agenda 
UNDESA 56 2012 Tenth Coordination Meeting on International Migration 
UNDESA 10 2012 PowerPoint Presentation by Bela Hovy: Preparations for the 
2013 High-Level Dialogue 
UNDP 27 2013 Post 2015 Discussions in Turkey 
UNDP 106 2014 Human Development Report Kosovo 
288   
 
 
 
IO
  
N
o
. o
f 
P
a
g
es
 
Y
ea
r 
o
f 
P
u
b
li
ca
ti
o
n
 
T
it
le
 
UNDP 30 2013 Human Development Report Office Occasional Paper Series: 
Issues for a Global Human Development Agenda 
UNDP 52 2014 Building the Post-2015 Development Agenda: 2014 Annual 
report 
UNDP 15 2015 Annual Progress Report Global Project on  
“Mainstreaming Migration into National Development 
Strategies” – Phase II 
UNDP 18 2015 China, the Millennium Development Goals, and the Post-2015 
Development Agenda  
UNDP 239 2014 Human Development Report 2014 
UNDP 14 2014 Discussion Paper: Governance for Sustainable Development 
Integrating Governance in the Post-2015 Development 
Framework 
UNDP 65 n.d. Building More Inclusive, Sustainable, and Prosperous Societies 
in Europe and Central Asia: A Common United Nations Vision 
for the Post-2015 Development Agenda 
UNESCO 41 2015 UNESCO’s Participation in the Preparations for a Post-2015 
Development Agenda 
UNESCO 28 2015 Background Paper for Education for All Global Monitoring 
Report 2015 
UNESCO 13 n.d. Position Paper on Education Post-2015 
UNESCO 63 2014 UNESCO Education Strategy 2014–2021 
UNESCO 40 2015 Background paper for the Education for All Global Monitoring 
Report 2015 
UNESCO 11 2013 UNESCO’S Participation in the Preparations for a Post-2015 
Development Agenda 
UNESCO 8 2013 Envisioning Education Post-2015  
UNESCO 24 2014 Sustainable Development begins with Education: How 
Education can Contribute to The Proposed Post-2015 Goals 
UNESCO 9 2014 UNESCO’S Participation in the Preparations for a Post-2015 
Development Agenda 
UNFPA 23 2015 United Nations Population Fund Report of the Executive 
Director 
UNFPA 24 2013 The UNFPA Strategic Plan, 2014-2017 
UNFPA 49 2013 Development Challenges and Population Dynamics in a 
Changing Arab World 
UNFPA 32 2012 Population Matters for Sustainable Development 
UNFPA 7 n.d. The Future UNFPA Wants for All: Keys For The Post-2015 
Development Agenda 
UNFPA 60 2014 Realizing the Potential 2013: UNFPA Annual Report 
UNFPA 19 2013 UNFPA Strategic Plan, 2014-2017 Annex 2  
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UNFPA 37 2013 UNFPA Global Interventions Action Plan, 2014-2017 Technical 
Division 
UNHCR 20 2014 Trends Report 
UNHCR 11 2014 High Commissioner’s Dialogue 2014 Background Paper 
UNHCR 6 2014 Global Appeal 2014-2015 
UNHCR 17 2015 63rd Standing Committee Meeting: Note on international 
protection 
UNHCR 8 2015 Global Appeal 2015 Update 
UNHCR 8 2015 Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
2014-2015 
UNHCR 7 2014 High Commissioner’s Dialogue on Protection at Sea (10-11 
December 2014) 
UNHCR 7 2014 61st Standing Committee Meeting 
UNHCR 19 2015 2015 Annual Consultation with CSOs  
UNHCR 7 2015 62nd Standing Committee Meeting:  
UNHCR 36 2014 2014-2024 Plan to End Statelessness 
UNHCR 10 2014 65th Session of the Executive Committee of the High 
Commissioner’s Programme 
UNICEF 4 2013 UNICEF Population Dynamics: International Migration and 
Generation 2025 
UNICEF 2 2014 Early Childhood Development: The Foundation for Sustainable 
Development 
UNICEF 5 2013 Key Asks on the Post-2015 Development Agenda 
UNICEF 13 2013 Key Messages On The Post-2015 Development Agenda 
UNICEF 14 2014 A Post-2015 World Fit For Children - An Agenda For 
#Everychild 2015 
UNICEF 41 2014 Policy Advocacy and Partnerships for Children’s Rights 
UNICEF 62 2014 Child Protection from Violence, Exploitation and Abuse 
UNITAR 8 2014 How Cities are already Leveraging a More Mobile World 
UNITAR 3 2014 Statement of Assistant Secretary-General  
UNITAR 17 2013 Report to the Secretary-General 
UNODC 18 2012 Inputs by Member States for the Post-2015 Development 
Agenda 
UNODC 151 2013 Accounting for Security and Justice in the Post-2015 
Development Agenda 
UNODC 19 2015 Trafficking in Persons and Smuggling of Migrants 
UNODC 133  2014 UNODC Annual Report 2014 
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UNODC 13 2015 Draft Doha Declaration  
UNU 6 2013 Migration in the Post-2015 Development Agenda 
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World Bank 27 2015 Migration and Development Brief 24 
World Bank 31 2014 Migration and Development Brief 22 
World Bank 29 2013 Migration and Development Brief 21 
World Bank 11 2013 Migration and Development Brief 20 
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Agenda 
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WHO 2 n.d. TB Prevention and Care for Migrants 
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for the Health Goals of the Post-2015 Sustainable Development 
Goals 
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Annex 4.1 Timeline: The History of Global Migration 
Governance 
 
Year Event 
1648 Concept of State Sovereignty born in Westphalia 
1919 ILO Founded 
1921 
Fridjolt Nansen appointed as High Commissioner for (Russian) Refugees by the League 
of Nations 
1922 Nansen Passport 
1924 Nansen's mandate extended to include Armenian refugees 
1925 ILO assumes operational responsibility for refugees (until 1929) / ILO Refugee Service 
1927 Nansen Stamp Fund (Refugees Revolving Fund) started (to run until 1930) 
1927 
League of Nations Conference exploring adoption of an international convention to 
'facilitate and regulate' the exchange of labour  
1928 Nansen's mandate extended to include Assyrian and Assyro-Chaldean refugees 
1929 
In 1929, the High Commission took back technical responsibilities 
for refugee settlement and employment from the ILO.' (Long, 2013, p.11) 
1933 
League of Nations establishes a High Commissioner for Refugees (Jewish and Other) 
Coming from Germany 
1933 Refugee Convention  
1935 Nansen's mandate extended to include Saarland refugees 
1938 
ILO holds conference on international collaboration on migration establishing the 
Permanent Migration Committee (PMC) 
1938 League of Nations Conference in Evian  
1938 
Creation of Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees (IGCR) outside of League of 
Nations (but never became active) 
1938 Refugee Convention  
1939 ILO convenes a meeting to establish an 'international scheme for financing migration.' 
1943 US organizes a conference in Bermuda to 'revitalise the dormant IGCR' (p.527) 
1943 United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) established 
1944 Declaration of Philadelphia asserts ILO role in the transfer of labour 
1946 The first conference of ILO's PMC 
1946 
IRO founded, replaced UNRRA and IGCR (as non-permanent specialized agency 
meaning not under the supervision of General Assembly) 
1947 
ILO-UN Plan on international coordination in the area of migration (mentions seven 
organizations - ILO and the UN (as permanent) and IRO, UNSECO, FAO, WHO, 
International Bank for Development and Reconstruction (as temporary) 
1948 ILO PMC Conference discussing Migration for Employment Convention  
1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights  
1948 
Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) founded - now OECD - in 
the context of Marshall Plan 
1949 
United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East 
(UNRWA) 
1949 ILO 1949 Convention  
1950 ILO convenes the Preliminary Migration Conference 
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Year Event 
1950 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 
1951 ILO convenes a conference in Naples 
1951 
Provisional Intergovernmental Committee for the Movement of Migrants from Europe 
(PICMME) later to become ICM in 1980 and IOM in 1989 
1951 Refugee Convention  
1953 PICMME becomes ICEM 
1967 Refugee Protocol  
1975 ILO 1975 Convention  
1978 
UN Resolution "to explore with Member States, and in cooperation with the United 
Nations agencies, and in particular the International Labour Organization, the 
possibility of drawing up an international convention on the rights of migrant workers." 
1979 
Adoption at ICEM council that ICEM is relevant (for the foreseeable future) and to the 
global community, not just Europe 
1980 PICMME becomes ICM  
1980 
The creation of an Open-ended Working Group of the General Assembly to develop a 
new UN convention. 
1980 
West Germany makes a proposal at UN General Assembly which results in 
'International Cooperation to Avert New Flows of Refugees' as discussion point 
(Widgren 1990 argues this resulted in little more than a data collection (bureaucracy) 
1981 The first draft of ICRMW presented (May) 
1981 
The decision to expand ICEM's transfer of qualified human resources programme from 
LA to other regions.  
1982 The UN Commission on Human Rights releases 'Human Rights and Mass Exoduses.' 
1984 ICM Constitution updated to reflect global activities 
1985 Launch of the Intergovernmental Consultations on Migration, Asylum and Refugees 
1986 Single European Act 
1987 The decision to amend the ICEM Constitution  
1989 ICM becomes IOM and constitution changes accepted 
1990 Creation of the Central American Commission of Migration Directors 
1990 
International Convention on the Rights of All Migrant Workers and their Families 
(ICRMW) 
1991 UNHCR Declares 'Year of Return' 
1992 ICMPD Founded 
1992 
Meeting in Bellagio resulting in statement 'Humanitarian Action in the post-Cold War 
Era 
1992 
UNDP Human Development Report highlights economic gains of liberal immigration 
policies 
1993 
Commission on Global Governance considered a paper (by Ghosh) on a new global 
regime to better manage the movement of people. 
1993 
RES/48/113: Convening of a UN Conference for the Comprehensive consideration and 
review of refugees, returnees, displaced persons, and migrants 
1993 Launch of the Budapest Process 
1993 Creation of the European Union  
1994 NAFTA 
1994 Uruguay Round of Trade Talks - General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) 
1994 Cairo International Conference on Population and Development 
1995 Survey of member state views on an international conference on international migration 
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Year Event 
1995 
Member States adopted an annual resolution on international migration and 
development, which subsequently became a biennial resolution of the UN General 
Assembly 
1996 Launch of the Regional Conference on Migration (Puebla Process) 
1996 
Launch of the Inter-Governmental Asia-Pacific Consultations on Refugees, Displaced 
Persons and Migrants 
1996 International Metropolis Project founded 
1996 Launch of the Pacific Immigration Directors' Conference 
1996 Regional Conference on Migration in the Soviet Union  
1996 
Inclusion of Mode 4 commitments (on the movement of natural persons) under the 
Third Protocol to the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) 
1996 Launch of the Manila Process 
1997 New International Regime for Orderly Movement of People (NIROMP) 
1997 Survey of member state views on an international conference on international migration 
1997 Human Rights Commission establishes a working group on migration  
1998 
ILO’s Committee of Experts on the Application of Convention and Recommendations 
(conclude conventions on migration written in a different context) 
1998 
International Labour Conference, ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and 
Rights at Work, 86th Session of 18 June 1998 
1998 Launch of the International Migration Policy Programme 
1999 Survey of member state views on an international conference on international migration 
1999 
Appointment of a Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants by the UN 
Commission on Human Rights 
2000 
Publication of Replacement Migration: Is It a Solution to Declining and Ageing 
Populations? 
2000 Launch of the Hague Process on Refugees and Migration 
2000 Launch of the Migration Dialogue for Southern Africa 
2000 Launch of the South American Conference on Migration (Lima Process) 
2000 Launch of Issyk-Kul Dialogue 
2000 
Adoption of the United Nations Millennium Declaration (Millennium Development 
Goals) 
2000 UNHCR's Global Consultation Process 
2000 Trafficking/Smuggling Protocols 
2000 
West African Ministerial Conference on Migration, held in Dakar (the Programme of 
Action mirrors recommendations of NIROMP project) 
2001 Creation of the Berne Initiative 
2001 Launch of the IOM International Dialogue on Migration (IDM) 
2001 Launch of the Cross-Border Cooperation Process (Söderköping Process) 
2001 Doha Round of Trade Negotiations  
2001 Launch of the Migration Dialogue for West Africa Process 
2001 
Debate NIROMP report (growing interest in multilateral regime to manage migration) 
+ launch of the Commission on Human Security (2001-2003) 
2002 the Hague Declaration on the Future of Asylum and Migration Policy 
2002 
Launch of the Coordination Meeting on International Migration, United Nations 
Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs 
2002 
Launch of the Regional Ministerial Conference on Migration in the Western 
Mediterranean (5+5 Dialogue) 
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Year Event 
2002 
Launch of the Bali Process on People Smuggling, Trafficking in Persons and Related 
Transnational Crime 
2002 
Adoption of the Migration Working Group's Report to the Secretary-General (Doyle 
Report) 
2002 
UN Secretary-General Report: Strengthening of the United Nations: an agenda for 
further change 
2003 
Conference on Migrant Remittances: Development Impact, Opportunities for the 
Financial Sector and Future Prospects organized by DFID and the World Bank (but 
more generally the point made (in Newland, 2010) is the role of the World Bank, Bretton 
Woods, and other financial institutions on the realization that remittances exceeded 
ODA 
2003 1990 Migrant Workers Convention comes into force 
2003 
Launch of Convention Plus - the asylum-migration nexus is on the agenda (Newland, 
2010) 
2003 Survey of member state views on an international conference on international migration 
2003 Establishment of the Global Commission on International Migration 
2003 Berne Initiative Publication: Migration and International Legal Norms  
2003 Establishment of the Geneva Migration Group 
2003 Launch of the Mediterranean Transit Migration Dialogue 
2003 
Launch of the Ministerial Consultation on Overseas Employment and Contractual 
Labour for Countries of Origin in Asia (Colombo Process) 
2003 Launch of the Migration, Asylum, Refugees Regional Initiative 
2003 
General Assembly resolution 58/208 in December 2003 called for high-level dialogue on 
international migration and development within the context of the 2006 General 
Assembly. 
2004 
Adoption of the non-binding International Labour Organization (ILO) 'Report VII: 
Towards a Fair Deal for Migrant Workers in the Global Economy, International Labour 
Conference 
2004 
Adoption of the non-binding Berne Initiative, International Agenda for Migration 
Management 
2005 Migration in an interconnected world: New directions for action 
2005 
New Special Rapporteur (OHCHR): Mr Jorge A. Bustamante (Mexico), August 2005-
July 2011 
2005 
Migration is the theme of its 10-year review at the Beijing World Conference on Women 
and Development. 
2005 Europe’s Global Approach to Migration (GAM) 
2005 Secretary-General Resolution 60/227 on organization details of HLD 
2006 
Establishment of the Global Migration Group (GMG) (formerly the Geneva Migration 
Group) 
2006 First High-Level Dialogue on International Migration and Development (2006 HLD) 
2006 
Appointment of a Special Representative of the Secretary-General for International 
Migration and Development by the UN Secretary-General 
2006 Launch of the Euro-African Dialogue on Migration and Development (Rabat Process) 
2006 Adoption of the non-binding ILO Multilateral Framework on Labour Migration 
2006 Establishment of Human Rights Council by UN General Assembly 
2007 Launch of the Global Forum on Migration and Development (GFMD) 
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Year Event 
2008 
Launch of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development “ Regional Consultative 
Process on Migration 
2008 
Launch of the Ministerial Consultations on Overseas Employment and Contractual 
Labour for Countries of Origin and Destination in Asia (Abu Dhabi Dialogue) 
2008 
The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies appoint a Special 
Representative on International Migration  
2010 GMG Handbook on Mainstreaming Migration into Development Planning 
2011 Launch of the Global Diaspora Forum 
2011 
Launch of the Eastern Partnership Panel on Migration and Asylum (incorporating the 
Söderköping Process) 
2011 
Adoption of the Istanbul Declaration and Programme of Action for the Least Developed 
Countries 
2011 UN Conference of the Least Developed Countries 
2011 Nansen Conference on Climate Change and Displacement in Oslo 
2011 
New Special Rapporteur (OHCHR): Mr François Crépeau (Canada), August 2011 - 
present 
2012 UN Conference on Sustainable Development (Rio+20) 
2012 Launch of the Nansen Initiative on Disaster-Induced Cross-Border Displacement 
2012 Launch of the Migration Dialogue for Central African States 
2012 Adoption of the non-binding IOM Migration Crisis Operational Framework (MCOF) 
2012 UNDESA Launch UN Migration Strategy (received no traction - Thouez, 2018) 
2013 Second High-Level Dialogue on International Migration and Development (2013 HLD) 
2013 Launch of the Almaty Process on Refugee Protection and International Migration 
2013 
Launch of the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) Regional 
Consultative Process (Migration Dialogue for the COMESA Member States) 
2013 
Report to UN General Assembly by the Special Rapporteur on the human rights of 
migrants, François Crépeau: Global migration governance (A/68/283) 
2014 Launch of the Migrants in Countries in Crisis (MICIC) Initiative 
2014 Launch of the Mayoral Forum on Human Mobility, Migration and Development 
2014 Adoption of the non-binding report, 'Fair Migration: Setting an ILO Agenda' 
2014 International Labour Conference 
2014 
Adoption of the non-binding Small Island Developing States Accelerated Modalities of 
Action Pathway (SAMOA Pathway) 
2015 Launch of the Intra-Regional Forum on Migration in Africa (Pan-African Forum) 
2015 Launch of the Arab Regional Consultative Process 
2015 
Adoption of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development by the UN General 
Assembly 
2015 Adoption of the Migration Governance Framework by the IOM Council 
2015 Adoption of the Addis Ababa Action Agenda on Financing for Development 
2015 
Adoption of the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction, Third UN World 
Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction 
2015 Adoption of the Paris Agreement on Climate Change 
2015 
Adoption of the non-binding Nansen Initiative's Agenda for the Protection of Cross-
Border Displaced Persons in the Context of Disasters and Climate Change 
2015 
OHCHR's Recommended Principles and Guidelines on Human Rights at International 
Borders 
296   
 
 
 
Year Event 
2015 
Formation of the 'ad hoc UN Quartet' including heads of agencies of IOM, UNHCR, 
OHCHR, and the SRSG 
2015 EU Agenda on Migration  
2016 
In safety and dignity: addressing large movements of refugees 
and migrants’ Karen AbuZayd’s report to Secretary-General ahead of the summit on 21 
April 2016 
2016 World Humanitarian Summit and launch of the Grand Bargain 
2016 
Adoption of the New Urban Agenda, UN Conference on Housing and Sustainable 
Development (Habitat III) 
2016 
Adoption of the non-binding MICIC Initiative's Guidelines to Protect Migrants in 
Countries Experiencing Conflict or Natural Disasters 
2016 OHCHR-GMG Guidelines and Principles on Migrants in Vulnerable Situations 
2016 
Adoption of the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants at the UN Summit 
for Refugees and Migrants 
2016 IOM incorporated in UN 
2016 Obama Leaders’ Summit on Refugees 
2017 Sutherland Report 
2017 Appointment L. Arbour as Special Representative to UNSG on International Migration 
2017 SG Report Making migration work for all - 12 December 2017 
2017 
UN MSs agreed to host a third HLD in the first half of 2019 and to reconvene every four 
years after that 
2017 
PGA (President Miroslav Lajcàk) identifies migration as one of his six priorities on 12 
September 2017 
2018 Global Compacts on refugees and migrants 
Sources: Bauloz 2017; Betts and Kainz 2017; Martin 2014; 2015; Koser 2010; Chamie and Mirkin 
2013; Newland 2010; Pécoud and de Guchteneire 2007; Thouez 2018; de Wenden 2012; Karatani 
2005; Long 2013; Crush 2013; Ghosh 2005; Thouez and Channac 2005; Bohning 1991; Doyle 2004; 
Miller 2000; Martin, Martin, and Cross 2007; and Widgren 1990.  
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Annex 4.2 Comparing the Migration for Employment 
Convention, 1939 (No. 66) and the Migration for 
Employment Convention (Revised), 1949 (No. 97) 
 
 C66 C97 
Article 1  Address propaganda and supervise 
information distributed with regards 
to migration. 
Requires ratifying states to provide 
information on policies, provisions, 
general agreements, and 
arrangements to the ILO. 
Article 2 The government should ensure that 
information is provided to 
immigrants and emigrants. 
The government should ensure 
migrants have access to assistance, 
mainly information. 
Article 3  Regards regulating recruitment.  Addresses propaganda. 
Article 4  Regards government supervision of 
work contracts. 
Measures to facilitate migration. 
Article 5  Provision for migrants for whom the 
employment opportunity falls 
through. 
Measures to ensure that migrants are 
in good health before travel and to 
ensure access to health care. 
Article 6  Equal conditions for foreign workers 
(conditions of work including pay, 
right to join trade unions, taxes, 
contracts). 
Equal conditions without 
discrimination, for foreign workers 
(conditions of work including pay, 
minimum age, working conditions, 
right to join a trade union, 
accommodation, social security, 
taxes). 
Article 7  Exemption of personal effects from 
customs duty. 
Cooperation between states on 
matters related to employment; and 
services provided to migrants should 
be free. 
Article 8  Workers excluded from convention: 
those moving within a territory, 
frontier workers, seamen, and 
indigenous workers. 
A provision relating to return if 
migrant falls ill or is injured if they 
have permanent status (which should 
be given no more than five years after 
arrival). 
Article 9  Communication of ratification to ILO. Remittances. 
Article 10  The Convention comes into effect 12 
months after ratification registered 
(only two ratifications required for the 
Convention to come into effect) 
Where a large number of migrants go 
from one destination to another, states 
can enter agreements relating to 
common concerns. 
Article 11 Relates to denouncing convention Workers excluded from the 
convention: frontier workers; short 
terms entry of liberal professions and 
artistes; and seamen. 
Article 12 Relates to notifying members of 
ratifications, denunciation 
Regards communication of ratification 
to ILO 
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 C66 C97 
Article 13 Relates to reporting on the 
implementation of the convention, 
including possible revisions. 
The Convention comes into effect 12 
months after ratification registered 
(only two ratifications required for the 
Convention to come into effect). 
Article 14  Relates to any future conventions that 
may supersede this one. 
Relates to annexes and right to exclude 
provisions. 
Article 15 Validates the English and French texts 
of the Convention. 
Regards communicating declarations 
to ILO. 
Article 16  n/a Regards to communicating which 
parts of the convention apply. 
Article 17  n/a Regards denunciation.  
Article 18  n/a Relates to notifying members of 
ratifications, denunciation. 
Article 19  n/a Regards communicating ratifications, 
declarations, and denunciations to the 
UN Secretary-General 
Article 20  n/a Relates to reporting on the 
implementation of the convention 
including possible revisions. 
Article 21  n/a Relates to any future conventions that 
may supersede this one. 
Article 22  n/a Regards making revisions 
Article 23  n/a Validates the English and French texts 
of the Convention 
Annex 1 n/a Recruitment and work conditions – 
non-government sponsored 
Annex 2 n/a Recruitment and work conditions – 
government-sponsored group 
transfers 
Annex 3 n/a Import of personal effects 
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Annex 4.3: Inter-State Consultation Mechanisms 
  
Inter-State Consultation Mechanism Region Covered Founded  Status 
The Intergovernmental Consultations on 
Migration, Asylum and Refugees (IGC) 
Europe, Asia, and 
Americas 
1985 Active 
Central American Commission of Migration 
Directors (OCAM) 
Americas 1990 Active 
The Budapest Process Europe and Asia 1993 Active 
Regional Conference on Migration (Puebla 
Process) 
North and Central 
America 
1996 Active 
Inter-Governmental Asia-Pacific 
Consultations on Refugees, Displaced 
Persons and Migrants (APC) 
Asia-Pacific  1996 Inactive 
The Pacific Immigration Directors’ 
Conference (PIDC) 
Pacific 1996 Active 
CIS Conference CIS 1996 Inactive 
The Manila Process Asia-Pacific 1996 Inactive 
Migration Dialogue for Southern Africa 
(MIDSA)  
Africa 2000 Active 
South American Conference on 
Migration  (Lima Process) 
South America 2000 Active 
African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of 
States (ACP) – European Union (EU) 
Dialogue on Migration (ACP-EU) 
Africa, Asia, the 
Americas, and 
Europe 
2000 Active 
Launch of the Migration Dialogue for West 
Africa Process (MIDWA) 
West Africa 2001 Active 
Eastern Partnership Panel on Migration, 
Mobility, and Integrated Border 
Management 
Europe 2001 Active 
Launch of the Regional Ministerial 
Conference on Migration in the Western 
Mediterranean  
Europe and Africa 2002 Active 
Bali Process on People Smuggling, 
Trafficking in Persons and Related 
Transnational Crime 
Europe, Asia, the 
Americas, Africa 
2002 Active 
The Asia – European Union Meetings 
(ASEM) Conference of the Directors General 
of Immigration and Management of 
Migratory Flows 
Asia and Europe 2002 Active 
Launch of the Ministerial Consultation on 
Overseas Employment and Contractual 
Labour for Countries of Origin in Asia  
Asia 2003 Active 
Euro-African Dialogue on Migration and 
Development 
Africa and Europe 2006 Active 
Launch of the Ministerial Consultations on 
Overseas Employment and Contractual 
Asia and the Middle 
East 
2008 Active 
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Inter-State Consultation Mechanism Region Covered Founded  Status 
Labour for Countries of Origin and 
Destination in Asia  
Intergovernmental Authority on 
Development Regional Consultative Process 
on Migration  
Africa 2008 Active 
Ibero-American Forum on Migration and 
Development (FIBEMYD) 
South America, 
Central America, the 
Caribbean, and 
Europe 
2008 Active 
The Prague Process Europe 2009 Active 
European Union – Latin America and the 
Caribbean Structured and Comprehensive 
Bi-regional Dialogue on Migration (EU-
LAC) 
Europe, Latin 
America, and the 
Caribbean  
2009 Active 
Migration Dialogue for Central African 
States (MIDCAS) 
Central Africa 2012 Active 
Ibero-American Network of Migration 
Authorities (RIAM) 
Americas and Europe 2012 Active 
Almaty Process on Refugee Protection and 
International Migration 
Eurasia 2013 Active 
Migration Dialogue from the Common 
Market for Eastern and Southern Africa 
Member States (MIDCOM) 
Africa 2013 Active 
EU-Horn of Africa Migration Route 
Initiative (Khartoum Process)  
The Horn of Africa 
and Europe 
2014 Active 
Arab Regional Consultative Process on 
Migration and Refugees Affairs (ARCP) 
The Middle East and 
Africa 
2015 Active 
Pan-African Forum on Migration (PAFoM) Africa (all regions) 2015 Active 
Caribbean Migration Consultations (CMC) Caribbean and 
Central America 
2016 Active 
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Annex 6.1 Selected Migration References in the SDGs  
 
SDG Target Relevance to 
Migration 
1.1 By 2030, eradicate extreme poverty for all people everywhere, 
currently measured as people living on less than $1.25 a day. 
Inclusive 
Language 
1.2 By 2030, reduce at least by half the proportion of men, women and 
children of all ages living in poverty in all its dimensions according to 
national definitions. 
Inclusive 
Language 
1.3 Implement nationally appropriate social protection systems and 
measures for all, including floors, and by 2030 achieve substantial 
coverage of the poor and the vulnerable. 
Inclusive 
Language 
1.4 By 2030, ensure that all men and women, in particular the poor and 
the vulnerable, have equal rights to economic resources, as well as 
access to basic services, ownership and control over land and other 
forms of property, inheritance, natural resources, appropriate new 
technology and financial services, including microfinance. 
Inclusive 
Language 
1.5 By 2030, build the resilience of the poor and those in vulnerable 
situations and reduce their exposure and vulnerability to climate-
related extreme events and other economic, social, and environmental 
shocks and disasters. 
Appears in all four 
SDG review 
publications (IOM, 
ODI, JMDI, and 
GMPA) 
2.1 By 2030, end hunger and ensure access by all people, in particular 
the poor and people in vulnerable situations, including infants, to safe, 
nutritious, and sufficient food all year round. 
Inclusive 
Language 
3.8 Achieve universal health coverage, including financial risk 
protection, access to quality essential health-care services and access to 
safe, effective, quality, and affordable essential medicines and vaccines 
for all. 
Inclusive 
Language, 
Appears in all four 
SDG review 
publications (IOM, 
ODI, JMDI, and 
GMPA) 
3.b Support the research and development of vaccines and medicines 
for the communicable and non-communicable diseases that primarily 
affect developing countries, provide access to affordable essential 
medicines and vaccines, in accordance with the Doha Declaration on 
the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, which affirms the right of 
developing countries to use to the full the provisions in the Agreement 
on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights regarding 
flexibilities to protect public health, and, in particular, provide access to 
medicines for all. 
Inclusive 
Language 
4.1 By 2030, ensure that all girls and boys complete free, equitable and 
quality primary and secondary education leading to relevant and 
effective learning outcomes. 
Inclusive 
Language 
4.2 By 2030, ensure that all girls and boys have access to quality early 
childhood development, care, and pre-primary education so that they 
are ready for primary education. 
Inclusive 
Language 
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SDG Target Relevance to 
Migration 
4.3 By 2030, ensure equal access for all women and men to affordable 
and quality technical, vocational, and tertiary education, including 
university. 
Inclusive 
Language 
4.4 By 2030, substantially increase the number of youth and adults who 
have relevant skills, including technical and vocational skills, for 
employment, decent jobs, and entrepreneurship. 
Appears in all four 
SDG review 
publications (IOM, 
ODI, JMDI, and 
GMPA) 
 
4.6 By 2030, ensure that all youth and a substantial proportion of adults, 
both men and women, achieve literacy and numeracy. 
Inclusive 
Language 
4.7 By 2030, ensure that all learners acquire the knowledge and skills 
needed to promote sustainable development, including, among others, 
through education for sustainable development and sustainable 
lifestyles, human rights, gender equality, promotion of a culture of 
peace and non-violence, global citizenship and appreciation of cultural 
diversity and of culture’s contribution to sustainable development. 
Inclusive 
Language 
4.a Build and upgrade education facilities that are child, disability and 
gender sensitive and provide safe, non-violent, inclusive, and effective 
learning environments for all. 
Inclusive 
Language, 
Appears in all four 
SDG review 
publications (IOM, 
ODI, JMDI, and 
GMPA) 
 
5.1 End all forms of discrimination against all women and girls 
everywhere 
Inclusive 
Language 
5.2 Eliminate all forms of violence against all women and girls in the 
public and private spheres, including trafficking and sexual and other 
types of exploitation. 
Inclusive 
Language 
5.4 Recognize and value unpaid care and domestic work through the 
provision of public services, infrastructure and social protection 
policies and the promotion of shared responsibility within the 
household and the family as nationally appropriate. 
Appears in all four 
SDG review 
publications (IOM, 
ODI, JMDI, and 
GMPA) 
5.c Adopt and strengthen sound policies and enforceable legislation for 
the promotion of gender equality and the empowerment of all women 
and girls at all levels. 
Inclusive 
Language 
6.1 By 2030, achieve universal and equitable access to safe and 
affordable drinking water for all. 
Inclusive 
Language 
6.2 By 2030, achieve access to adequate and equitable sanitation and 
hygiene for all and end open defecation, paying special attention to the 
needs of women and girls and those in vulnerable situations. 
Inclusive 
Language 
8.10 Strengthen the capacity of domestic financial institutions to 
encourage and expand access to banking, insurance, and financial 
services for all. 
Inclusive 
Language 
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SDG Target Relevance to 
Migration 
8.3 Promote development-oriented policies that support productive 
activities, decent job creation, entrepreneurship, creativity, and 
innovation, and encourage the formalization and growth of micro-, 
small- and medium-sized enterprises, including through access to 
financial services. 
Appears in all four 
SDG review 
publications (IOM, 
ODI, JMDI, and 
GMPA) 
8.5 By 2030, achieve full and productive employment and decent work 
for all women and men, including for young people and persons with 
disabilities, and equal pay for work of equal value. 
Inclusive 
Language 
8.7 Take immediate and effective measures to eradicate forced labour, 
end modern slavery and human trafficking and secure the prohibition 
and elimination of the worst forms of child labour, including 
recruitment and use of child soldiers, and by 2025 end child labour in 
all its forms 
Appears in all four 
SDG review 
publications (IOM, 
ODI, JMDI and 
GMPA) 
8.8 Protect labour rights and promote safe and secure working 
environments for all workers, including migrant workers, in particular 
women migrants, and those in precarious employment. 
Explicit Reference, 
Inclusive 
Language, Appears 
in all four SDG 
review 
publications (IOM, 
ODI, JMDI, and 
GMPA) 
9.1 Develop quality, reliable, sustainable, and resilient infrastructure, 
including regional and trans-border infrastructure, to support 
economic development and human well-being, with a focus on 
affordable and equitable access for all. 
Inclusive 
Language 
10.2 By 2030, empower and promote the social, economic, and political 
inclusion of all, irrespective of age, sex, disability, race, ethnicity, origin, 
religion or economic or other status. 
Inclusive 
Language 
10.7 Facilitate orderly, safe, regular, and responsible migration and 
mobility of people, including through the implementation of planned 
and well-managed migration policies. 
Explicit Reference, 
Appears in all four 
SDG review 
publications (IOM, 
ODI, JMDI, and 
GMPA) 
10.c By 2030, reduce to less than 3 per cent the transaction costs of 
migrant remittances and eliminate remittance corridors with costs 
higher than 5 per cent. 
Explicit Reference, 
Appears in all four 
SDG review 
publications (IOM, 
ODI, JMDI, and 
GMPA) 
11.1 By 2030, ensure access for all to adequate, safe, and affordable 
housing and basic services and upgrade slums 
Inclusive 
Language 
11.2 By 2030, provide access to safe, affordable, accessible, and 
sustainable transport systems for all, improving road safety, notably by 
expanding public transport, with special attention to the needs of those 
in vulnerable situations, women, children, persons with disabilities and 
older persons. 
Inclusive 
Language 
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SDG Target Relevance to 
Migration 
13.1 Strengthen resilience and adaptive capacity to climate-related 
hazards and natural disasters in all countries. 
Appears in all four 
SDG review 
publications (IOM, 
ODI, JMDI, and 
GMPA) 
13.b Promote mechanisms for raising capacity for effective climate 
change-related planning and management in least developed countries 
and small island developing States, including focusing on women, 
youth, and local and marginalized communities. 
Appears in all four 
SDG review 
publications (IOM, 
ODI, JMDI, and 
GMPA) 
16.3 Promote the rule of law at the national and international levels and 
ensure equal access to justice for all. 
Inclusive 
Language, 
Appears in all four 
SDG review 
publications (IOM, 
ODI, JMDI, and 
GMPA) 
16.9 By 2030, provide legal identity for all, including birth registration. 
 
Inclusive 
Language 
17.18 By 2020, enhance capacity-building support to developing 
countries, including for least developed countries and small island 
developing states, to increase significantly the availability of high-
quality, timely and reliable data disaggregated by income, gender, age, 
race, ethnicity, migratory status, disability, geographic location and 
other characteristics relevant in national contexts. 
Explicit Reference, 
Appears in all four 
SDG review 
publications (IOM, 
ODI, JMDI, and 
GMPA) 
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Annex 6.2 Migration References in UNTT Thematic Think 
Pieces 
 
UNTT Thematic Think 
Piece (May 2012) 
Date Author(s) Migration Reference 
Countries with special needs May 
2012 
OHRLLS One reference – increased 
migration as a challenge. 
Culture: a driver and an 
enabler of sustainable 
development 
May 
2012 
UNESCO No reference  
Disaster Risk and Resilience May 
2012 
UNISDR, WMO No reference 
Education and skills for 
inclusive and sustainable 
development beyond 2015 
May 
2012 
UNSECO with 
contributions from 
DESA, ITU, and 
UNITAR 
No reference 
Emerging development 
challenges for the post-2015 
UN development agenda: 
Employment 
May 
2012 
ILO1* No reference 
Imagining a world free from 
hunger: Ending hunger and 
malnutrition and ensuring 
food and nutrition security 
May 
2012 
FAO, IFAD, WFP No reference 
Governance and 
development 
May 
2012 
UNDESA, UNDP, 
UNESCO 
No reference 
Health in the post-2015 UN 
development agenda 
May 
2012 
UNAIDS, UNICEF, 
UNFPA, WHO 
One reference – migration as a 
relevant factor for health 
Towards freedom from fear 
and want: Human rights in 
the post2015 agenda 
May 
2012 
OHCHR Several references – primarily 
migrants as a group vulnerable 
to exclusion or marginalization, 
which denies them of their 
human rights and limits their 
potential development 
contributions. 
Addressing inequalities: The 
heart of the post-2015 
agenda and the future we 
want for all 
May 
2012 
ECE, ESCAP, 
UNDESA, 
UNICEF, UNRISD, 
UN Women 
One reference – migrants as a 
vulnerable to exclusion 
exacerbating inequality 
Science, technology and 
innovation and intellectual 
property rights: The vision 
for development 
May 
2012 
IAEA, ITU, 
UNESCO, 
UNOOSA, WIPO 
No reference 
 
1 ILO always makes the point that it is the view of senior officials and not ILO. 
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Macroeconomic stability, 
inclusive growth, and 
employment 
May 
2012 
ILO*, UNCTAD, 
UNDESA, WTO 
One reference to migration as a 
factor to be considered to avoid 
unemployment. 
Migration and human 
mobility 
May 
2012 
IOM, UNDESA Migration is driven by 
inequality (social, economic, 
economic), which is affected by 
population dynamics. Three 
associations to development: 1) 
underdevelopment as a root 
cause; 2) underdevelopment as 
a consequence (brain drain), 
and 3) an enabler of 
development if human rights 
protected and migration is well 
managed. Proposes that 
migration is a cross-cutting 
issue across the development 
agenda. 
Peace and security May 
2012 
Peace-Building 
Support Office 
(PBSO) 
One reference is made to 
migration and human 
trafficking as by-products of 
development deficits.  
Population dynamics May 
2012 
UNDESA, UNFPA Several references are made to 
migration as a demographic 
phenomenon, often driven by 
economic disparity. Migrants 
are often vulnerable and yet 
can contribute to development 
when enabled to do so.  
Social protection: A 
development priority in the 
post-2015 UN development 
agenda 
May 
2012 
ECA, ILO*, 
UNCTAD, 
UNDESA, UNICEF 
One reference to migrants as a 
group vulnerable to exclusion 
from social protection. 
Building on the MDGs to 
bring sustainable 
development to the post-
2015 development agenda 
May 
2012 
ECE, ESCAP, 
UNDESA, UNEP, 
UNFCCC 
No reference 
Sustainable Urbanization May 
2012 
UN-Habitat One reference to immigration 
as a social inclusion challenge 
Assessment of MDG8 and 
lessons learned 
Jan 
2013 
ITU, OHCHR, 
UNDESA 
One reference to tighter 
immigration policies limiting 
trade opportunities  
Analysis and overview of 
new actors and formats for 
the global partnership for 
development post-2015 
Jan 
2013 
IFAD, IOM, ITU, 
OHCHR, OHRLLS, 
UNCTAD, 
UNDESA, UNEP, 
UNFCCC, UNFPA, 
UNIDO, WTO 
Two references to migration as 
a global collective action 
problem; and migration as an 
enabler of development in both 
monetary and non-monetary 
ways 
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Financing for sustainable 
development in the global 
partnership beyond 2015 
Jan 
2013 
OHCHR, OHRLLS, 
IFAD, IOM, 
UNCTAD, 
UNDESA, UNDP, 
UNEP, UNESCO, 
UNFCCC, UNFPA 
Several references to the impact 
of migrant remittances on how 
development can be enhanced 
by lowering transaction costs, 
increasing migration 
opportunities, and on financial 
inclusion.  
Trade and development and 
the global partnership 
beyond 2015 
Jan 
2013 
UNCTAD No reference 
Trade in the global 
partnership for development 
beyond 2015 
Jan 
2013 
IOM, OHCHR, 
OHRLLS, 
UNCTAD, UNEP, 
UNIDO, WTO 
One reference to interregional 
mobility as a key factor for 
labour market efficiency and a 
source of remittances. 
Global governance and 
governance of the global 
commons in the global 
partnership for development 
beyond 2015 
Jan 
2013 
OHCHR, OHRLLS, 
UNDESA, UNEP, 
UNFPA 
Two references to migration as 
contributing to the greater 
interdependency between 
countries yet simultaneously a 
lack of adequate mechanisms 
for the regulation of labour 
migration, including protection 
of the rights of migrants and 
their access to services.  
Partnerships for 
development: Perspectives 
from global health 
Jan 
2013 
OHCHR, UNEP, 
UNFPA, WHO 
One reference to the necessity 
of ensuring that the recruitment 
of health workers aligns with 
an ethical code of practice. 
Global partnerships in the 
area of population and 
migration 
Jan 
2013 
IOM, UN DESA, 
UNFPA 
Migration as a development 
enabler for migrants; those left 
behind (through remittances 
and knowledge transfers) and 
countries of reception 
(innovation; easing labour 
shortages).  
Building Resilience to 
Disasters through 
Partnerships 
Jan 
2013 
IOM, ITU, 
OHCHR, 
UNESCO, UNEP, 
UNISDR, UNFPA, 
WMO 
No direct references – 
population growth in urban 
areas as a challenge. 
Science, technology, and 
innovation for sustainable 
development in the global 
partnership for development 
beyond 2015 
Jan 
2013 
ITU, OHCHR, 
UNCTAD, UNEP, 
UNESCO, 
UNFCCC, UNIDO, 
WIPO, WMO 
One reference – labour mobility 
as a source of innovation  
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Annex 8.1 Comparing Objectives Across GCM Drafts 
 
Objective  Text (Zero Draft) Text (Final Draft) 
3 
Provide adequate and timely 
information at all stages of migration 
Provide accurate and timely information 
at all stages of migration 
4 
Provide all migrants with proof of legal 
identity, proper identification and 
documentation 
Ensure that all migrants have proof of 
legal identity and adequate 
documentation 
10 
Prevent and combat trafficking in 
persons in the context of international 
migration 
Prevent, combat and eradicate trafficking 
in persons in the context of international 
migration 
12* 
Strengthen procedures and 
mechanisms for status determination 
Strengthen certainty and predictability 
in migration procedures for appropriate 
screening, assessment and referral 
13 
Use migration detention only as a last 
resort and work towards alternatives 
Use migration detention only as a 
measure of last resort and work towards 
alternatives 
15 
Provide access to basic social services for 
migrants 
Provide access to basic services for 
migrants 
17 
Eliminate all forms of discrimination 
and promote fact-based public 
discourse to shape perceptions of 
migration 
Eliminate all forms of discrimination 
and promote evidence-based public 
discourse to shape perceptions of 
migration 
18 
Invest in skills development and 
facilitate recognition of skills, 
qualifications and competences 
Invest in skills development and 
facilitate mutual recognition of skills, 
qualifications and competences 
21 
Cooperate in facilitating dignified and 
sustainable return, readmission and 
reintegration 
Cooperate in facilitating safe and 
dignified return and readmission, as 
well as sustainable reintegration 
23 n/a 
Strengthen international cooperation 
and global partnerships for safe, orderly 
and regular migration 
* In the first round of revisions Objective 12 became ‘Strengthen certainty and predictability in 
migration procedures’ and then in the second round of revisions ‘Strengthen certainty and 
predictability in migration procedures for appropriate determination and referral’ 
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Valorization 
 
From the 2015 ‘migration crises’ in the Mediterranean, Central America, and 
the Andaman Sea, to the COVID-19 pandemic that has sent the world into an 
economic crisis, the rationale for international cooperation has become even 
more apparent in recent years. However, the international architecture 
established by states to respond more effectively to challenges that traverse 
state borders, most notably the UN and its agencies, has come under 
increasing scrutiny for its handling of global crises. The migration crises of 
2015 demonstrated the inadequacy of existing intergovernmental responses 
to migration. Accordingly, states agreed to negotiate two global compacts, 
one for migrants and one for refugees in order to better respond to migration 
related issues at the international level. However, the non-binding nature of 
these agreements is characteristic of a broader trend in multilateralism, 
towards carefully crafted yet ambiguous agreements. 
International organizations are limited in how they can respond to issues of 
global concern because they are the creations of states that impose limitations 
on how they can act. Sometimes these limitations are also self-imposed. For 
example, as was discussed in Chapter 8 of the thesis, UNCHR was 
deliberately conservative in what they chose to include in the negotiations of 
the Global Compact on Refugees for fear of states rejecting the Compact if 
deemed too radical by its key Member State funders. Blaming international 
organizations for failing to act ignores the role that the uneven distribution of 
power in the global system has played in creating the international system. 
However, blaming the uneven distribution of power between states also 
ignores the role that IOs play in shaping social reality and defining global 
problems.  
Many people have devoted their careers to the furtherance of global migration 
governance. Sir Peter Sutherland, often referred to as ‘the father of 
globalisation’, devoted the last years of his illustrious career to the pursuit of 
a more significant role for the UN in global migration governance. The fact 
that the UN now has an agency for migration, the International Organization 
for Migration (IOM), which was considered impossible just 25 years ago, is 
testament to a significant change in how states view the role of the UN, and 
how the UN functions. The fact that the US’ withdrawal from the Global 
Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration did not immediately result 
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in its failure, as it did when the US rejected ILO’s plans in the 1940s,  supports 
the notion that the UN has evolved.  
By examining the case of migration, the dissertation offers insights into how 
intergovernmental organizations operate and contributes to a growing body 
of literature on the role of international organizations in migration 
governance. Understanding the history of multilateralism has never been 
more relevant, but also more difficult to achieve. The dissertation provides a 
historical understanding of the emergence of global migration governance 
through a time of tumultuous change. 
Accordingly, the materials in the dissertation have been integrated into the 
educational programme at UNU-MERIT and the Maastricht Graduate School 
of Governance. In the migration specialization of the MSc Public Policy and 
Human Development, students are introduced to the global dimension of 
migration governance in their fourth and final course. The materials in this 
dissertation have been used to develop a short course which provides 
students with a historical account of the emergence of global migration 
governance from 1919 to the present day. The teaching materials developed 
by the author have also been used by other teachers to implement similar 
courses in Ghana, Kenya and Kosovo. To promote the use of the dissertation 
in education, a revised version of chapter 4 is currently under review for 
publication as an International Migration Institute Network (IMIn) Working 
Paper to ensure its rapid dissemination through a well-respected channel. 
Many IMIn Working Papers have gone on to become well-cited articles in 
high impact journals. In the future, I plan to further develop and refine the 
monograph for submission to a relevant publisher. The envisioned 
manuscript is expected to be a useful resource for researchers and students 
interested in global migration governance, but also to practitioners who may 
be interested in understanding how and why global migration governance 
has evolved in the way that it has. I would also like to work on a paper that 
brings out the specific methodological contribution of the thesis in a non-
migration related journal. The potential for advocacy coalition framework 
theory to be more consistently applied to the study of the global policy process 
holds potential. The combination of analytical tools used to implement 
process tracing clearly and transparently also has the potential to be applied 
to other policy areas. Disseminating the methodological tools will serve to 
encourage research in this direction.  
In addition to these broader plans, I had the opportunity to present various 
parts of my dissertation in different stages of development to diverse 
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audiences, which has led to several publications. In March 2017, I presented 
an early draft of Chapter 6 at the Migrating out of Poverty “From Evidence to 
Policy” Conference at the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS). The 
conference was interesting in the sense that the audience was comprised not 
only of academics but also practitioners. Building on the feedback that I 
received at the conference, I further developed my research on the SDGs. A 
concrete outcome of this research was the contribution of a chapter entitled 
‘Migration, the MDGs, and SDGs: Context and Complexity” to the Routledge 
Handbook of Migration and Development edited by Tanja Bastia and Ronald 
Skeldon (London, 2020, pp.284-297).  
Next to the opportunity to meet and discuss my initial ideas with a group of 
highly respected individuals, many of whom had long careers in the UN, the 
feedback received at the conference also inspired me to start a side project 
exploring the relationship between funding patterns and governance. This 
project attracted a great deal of attention. I published the initial research in an 
IMIn Working Paper entitled ‘Money Matters: The Role of Funding in 
Migration Governance’. I presented the initial results of this research at a 
research seminar at the University of Amsterdam entitled “Show me the 
Money! Money Matters in Migration Policy and Practice”. A chapter based on 
this work, further refined based on the research conducted for Chapter 7 has 
been contributed to an edited collection by Dr Tesseltje de Lange, Prof. 
Annette Schrauwen and Prof. Willem Maas which is currently under review 
with Cambridge University Press. 
Based on this work, I was invited to join an Expert Workshop on the 
International Organization for Migration (IOM) on 2 Feb 2019 at the Refugee 
Studies Centre at the University of Oxford. The goal of this workshop was to 
bring together experts with interest in understanding the role of international 
organizations, especially IOM, in global migration governance. The meeting 
allowed me to share some of the preliminary findings of Chapter 7 and to 
engage in critical discussions with researchers from different disciplines 
which allowed me to disseminate its findings but also to refine and develop 
my research. A revised version of Chapter 7 has been accepted as a chapter in 
the forthcoming Edward Elgar Handbook on the Institutions of Global 
Migration Governance co-edited by Hélène Thiollet and Antoine Pécoud. 
In the future, I would like to develop this line of research further. I am 
currently working on a collaboration with Dr Nicholas R. Micinski, the ISA 
James N. Rosenau Postdoctoral Fellow at the Center for the Study of Europe, 
Boston University on “Money, Multilateralism and Migration” to develop 
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these ideas further. We plan to replicate the methodological approach that I 
used to examine IOM’s earmarked contributions to other international 
organizations.  
Furthermore, throughout the research process, I have engaged in several 
activities that have allowed me to engage in dialogue with policy-makers and 
other stakeholders. When I started working on the PhD as part of the GPAC2 
dual-career programme in late 2015, I was working as a migration researcher 
at UNU-MERIT and the Maastricht Graduate School of Governance. While 
the research work conducted in this capacity was not always directly relevant 
to my PhD, complementarities existed. My contract research work, as I 
explain in my methodology, helped me to gain an understanding of the global 
landscape, and access to respondents that I may not have otherwise been able 
to reach. However, my PhD research also helped me in the execution of much 
of my contract work.   
I have been able to apply the knowledge gained in the context of writing my 
thesis in my consultancy work on several occasions. For example, I co-
authored a report for the IOM Migration Research Series which looked at the 
relationship between migration and the Millennium Development Goals and 
discussed possible ways that migration could be included in the Post-2015 
Development Agenda. Furthermore, in 2017, UNU-MERIT and the Maastricht 
Graduate School of Governance were asked by the United Nations Industrial 
Development Organization (UNIDO) to assist in the preparation of their 
Migration and Development Strategy. UNIDO had recently joined the Global 
Migration Group (GMG). In the discussions, I was able to use research 
conducted in the context of my dissertation work to brief staff on the 
landscape of organizations working on migration issues, the history of the 
GMG and to discuss some of the sensitivities of the field.  
Additionally, I participated in three Global Forums on Migration and 
Development meetings (Civil Society Days and Common Space) in Turkey 
(2015), Bangladesh (2016), and Germany (2017), as well as several preparatory 
meetings. Ahead of the GFMD in Dhaka, Bangladesh, I prepared a report for 
the Migration and Development (MADE) network which looked at progress 
in achieving civil society’s 5-year-8-point Plan of Action. The positive 
response to this report led to the elaboration of a second edition of the report 
in which I elaborated a methodology for measuring progress in global 
governance that aligned with the goals defined by global civil society 
networks. Additionally, I joined the International Steering Committee for the 
GFMD Civil Society Days.  
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In recent months I have been working as a consultant for IOM. I have assisted 
the Government of the Republic of Armenia in the implementation of their 
first National Voluntary Review of the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and 
Regular Migration which has provided a further opportunity to use the 
knowledge gained in the context of my PhD research but also to lay ground 
work for future research which will look beyond 2018.  
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